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ABSTRACT
For more than two millennia believers have struggled with the antinomy of God’s
absolute sovereignty over and man’s ultimate responsibility in justification and
sanctification. For at least the past several hundred years theologians have used some
version of the terms “active justification” and “definitive sanctification” in an attempt to
illuminate this mystery. However, in the past decade scholars have begun to criticize
these concepts, saying that they are unsupported in Scripture, lead to theological
confusion, and are of no practical benefit to believers.
Through the work of theologians from the broader Dutch Reformed tradition,
especially Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), Alexander Comrie (1706-1774), Herman
Witsius (1636-1708), and Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), this thesis will demonstrate that
the terms active justification and definitive sanctification are derived from Scripture and
serve to clarify, not obscure the doctrines of justification and sanctification. In addition,
the paper will show that neglect, misuse, or misunderstanding of the terms have resulted
in contemporary criticisms that are unconvincing and unfounded.
Writings of the aforementioned theologians will define and expound four
characteristics held in common between active justification and definitive sanctification,
i.e., inseparability: active justification is distinct but also inseparable from passive
justification; likewise definitive sanctification is distinct but also inseparable from
progressive sanctification (Bavinck); objectivity and decisiveness: justification and
sanctification are both grounded solely in God’s objective and decisive decree (Comrie);
Christ-centeredness: Christ’s righteousness and holiness are the ultimate source of the
x

believer’s justification and sanctification (Witsius); and God’s absolute sovereignty: the
believer’s salvation in all its dimensions is under the gracious, sovereign disposition of
our heavenly Father (Kuyper). All four characteristics of active justification and
definitive sanctification emphasize the “God-driven” nature of salvation.
This thesis will explain how when properly defined and presented the terms active
justification and definitive sanctification are important theologically, bringing clarity to
the issue of the perfect balance between God’s sovereignty and human responsibility in
salvation. The paper will also reveal the practical benefit of these terms to believers who
need a deeper understanding of how the dimensions of justification and sanctification can
be both distinct and perfectly unified. Finally, the study will show how active justification
and definitive sanctification offer true believers practical assurance of their perseverance
unto glory, and provide pastors with an invaluable tool for exhorting parishioners who
may have lapsed into either triumphalism or defeatism.

xi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction and Thesis Statement
In theological literature the term justification is often used in place of the more precise
term “passive” justification, the once-for-all declarative act of forgiveness which takes
place in the conscience of the sinner and is logically tied to faith (i.e., sinners are justified
by faith).1 Similarly, the term sanctification often replaces the more explicit term
“progressive” sanctification, the believer’s ongoing, lifelong process of becoming holy.2
For several hundred years, in an effort to dispel confusion and account for all the
dimensions of salvation, scholars have advanced and defended the concepts of “active”
justification and “definitive” sanctification as necessary corollaries to passive
justification and progressive sanctification respectively.
In particular, John Murray (1898-1975), professor of systematic theology at
Westminster Theological Seminary (1930-1967) who was influential in American
conservative Presbyterian circles, challenged the idea that sanctification is merely the
ongoing process lasting a lifetime. He provided two basic reasons for the need for the

According to Berkhof, “[w]hen the Bible speaks of justification, it usually refers to what is
known as passive justification.” See Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (London: Banner of Truth Trust,
1966), 517 (hereafter, ST). See also Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of
Justification (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 231-232.
1

2

Berkhof, ST, 534; Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 5th ed., vol. 3 (Peabody: Hendrickson
Publishers, 2011), 213-258; Robert L. Dabney, Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic
Theology Taught in Union Theological Seminary, Virginia, 6th ed. (Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of
Publication, 1927), 660-674; William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, ed. Alan W. Gomes, 3d ed.
(Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2003), 803-806.

2

concept of definitive sanctification.
First, in Murray’s judgment any soteriology that incorporates the idea of human
ability or activity into the doctrine of sanctification fails to measure up to biblical truth.3
Second, in his opinion Scripture itself speaks of sanctification or holiness as definitive,
saying that “it is a fact too frequently overlooked that in the New Testament [e.g., 1 Cor
1:2, 6:11, etc.] the most characteristic terms that refer to sanctification are used, not of a
process, but of a once-for-all definitive act” (emphasis added).4 Through the concept of
definitive sanctification, Murray emphasizes that a believer’s union with Christ points to
a holiness that is a fait accompli. Definitive sanctification also preserves the concept that
God is the only source and agent of sanctification.
Meanwhile other Reformed theologians, such as Herman Bavinck (1854-1921),
Louis Berkhof (1873-1957), and Francis Turretin (1623-1687) et al. have distinguished

3
John Murray, “Definitive Sanctification,” in Collected Writings of John Murray, vol. 2
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1976), 277; previously published in Calvin Theological Journal 2, no.1
(April 1967): 5-21.
4
John Murray, “The Agency in Definitive Sanctification,” in Collected Writings of John Murray,
vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1976), 285-286, 304. See also John Murray, “The Pattern of
Sanctification,” in Collected Writings of John Murray, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1976),
305-312. What Murray keeps in mind would be the Chaferian notion of sanctification. In the Chaferian
concept of sanctification, the believer is not a participant in sanctification, but the primary agent of
sanctification, actualized only by the believer’s own faith in a kind of Pelagian sense. See, e.g., Peter C.
Nelson, Bible Doctrines: A Series of Studies Based on the Statement of Fundamental Truths as Adopted by
the General Council of the Assemblies of God (Springfield: Gospel Pub. House, 1948), 104; Myer
Pearlman, Knowing the Doctrines of the Bible (Springfield: Gospel Pub. House, 1937); Ralph W. Harris,
Our Faith and Fellowship: Teacher’s Manual (Springfield: Gospel Pub. House, 1963), 24; Ernest S.
Williams, Systematic Theology (Springfield: Gospel Publishing House, 1953), 2:256. Cf. Charles C. Ryrie,
“Contrasting Views of Sanctification,” in Walvoord: A Tribute, ed. Donald K. Campbell (Chicago: Moody
Press, 1982), 194-195. For an extensive exposition concerning the old Princeton Presbyterian response to
the Holiness movement, see David D. Cho, “The Old Princeton Presbyterian Response to the Holiness
Movement in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries in America” (PhD diss., Westminster
Theological Seminary, 1994).

3

between the active and passive dimensions of justification to counter the antinomian and
neonomian misconceptions that often accompany the traditional doctrine of justification.5
Antinomianism emphasizes absolutely free justification before faith, thus neglecting the
role of human responsibility in justification,6 while neonomianism emphasizes human
responsibility at the expense of God’s sovereignty.
Active (or objective) justification, which takes place in foro Dei (in the court of
God), logically precedes and is the object of faith. Passive (or subjective) justification
which takes place in foro conscientiae (in the court of the sinner’s conscience) logically
follows faith.7 This distinction precludes the theologian from seeing justification
exclusively one way or the other.

5

The scholastic distinction of active/passive justification has a long tradition in Reformed
theology. See, e.g., Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 4:200-204, 219-223 (hereafter, RD); Berkhof, ST, 517; Francis Turretin,
Institutio theologiae elencticae, status controversiae perspicue exponitur, praecipua orthodoxorum
argumenta proponuntur & vindicantur, & fontes solutionum aperiuntur, 3 vols. (1696), 2:731 (16.7.1), 748
(16.9.9); idem, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James T. Dennison, trans. George Musgrave Giger
(Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1992), 2:669, 684; Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and
Illustrated From the Sources, ed. Ernst Bizer, trans. G. T. Thomson (London: Allen, & Unwin, 1950), 555559; Herman Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants between God and Man. Comprehending a Complete
Body of Divinity, trans. William Crookshank (Edinburgh, 1803), 1.2.7.16; 1.3.8.45, 47-48, 51-52, 56-57;
2.7.16 (hereafter, Economy); Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, ed. Joel R. Beeke,
trans. Bartel Elshout (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012), 2:376-381; Bartholomäus
Keckermann, Systema S.S. theologiae: Tribvs libris adornatum (Hanoviae: Antonius, 1610), 3.7; Daniel
Wyttenbach, Tentamen theologiae dogmaticae methodo scientifica pertractatae (Francofurti ad Moenum:
Andreae et Hort, 1747), 2:939; Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Corpus theologiae christianae, vol. 2 (Zürich:
Ex officina Heideggeriana, 1732), 22.78-79 (p. 303); Leonard Rijssen, Summa theologiae elencticae
completa et didacticae quantum sufficit (Bern: Georgii Sonnleitneri, 1676), 14 (pp. 184-198); Thomas
Halyburton, An Essay on the Ground or Formal Reason of Saving Faith. to Which Are Added, 2 Essays,
Illustrative of the Subject of Justification (London, 1865), 101-104; Samuel Maresius, Collegium
theologicum sive systema breve universae theologiae, comprehensum octodecim disputationibus (Geneva,
1662), 11.58 (pp. 255-256); Johannes Maccovius, Collegia theologica quae extant omnia, tertio ab auctore
recognita, emendata & plurimis locis aucta, in partes duas distributa (Franeker: Ulderici Balck, 1641),
129, 153, 423-425; Johannes Maccovius, Scholastic Discourse: Johannes Maccovius (1588-1644) on
Theological and Philosophical Distinctions and Rules, trans. Willem J. Van Asselt et al. (Apeldoorn:
Instituut voor Reformatieonderzoek, 2009), 231-237.
6

See section 3.4.2 of this study for a detailed discussion on this.

7

Berkhof, ST, 517; Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2:669, 684. James Buchanan

4

Although the ideas of active justification and definitive sanctification have been
widely accepted in conservative evangelical and Reformed circles for many years,8 they
have recently been criticized. For example, J. V. Fesko regards the notion of definitive
sanctification as an “unsatisfactory” doctrinal category derived from “exegetical
fallacy.”9 Unlike Fesko, Michael Horton basically accepts the concept of definitive
sanctification10 but he raises questions about where Murray places definitive

employs the distinction between “actual” and “declarative” justification instead of an active/passive
distinction. For Buchanan, actual justification is exactly the same as active justification, and declarative
justification is the same as passive justification in terms of their connoted meaning. Yet, Buchanan’s
distinction seems to lead to confusion since active justification is more closed to the declarative meaning of
justification (God’s promise and decree to justify sinners in foro Dei) and passive justification is more
closed to the meaning of justification’s actuality (believers are actually justified by faith in foro
conscientiae) as shall be examined onward. Cf. James Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification: An Outline
of Its History in the Church, and of Its Exposition from Scripture. With Special Reference to Recent Attacks
on the Theology of the Reformation (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1955), 233-239.
8

For the use of active justification, see Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 555-559; Bavinck, RD,
4:202-204, 219-223; Berkhof, ST, 516-517. For the use of definitive sanctification, see Robert L. Reymond,
A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: T. Nelson, 1998), 757; Anthony A.
Hoekema, “Reformed View,” in Five Views on Sanctification, ed. Stanley N. Gundry (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1996), 72-77; J. I. Packer, Keep in Step with the Spirit (Old Tappan: F. H. Revell, 1984),
passim; David Peterson, Possessed by God: A New Testament Theology of Sanctification and Holiness
(Leicester: Apollos, 2000); Sinclair B. Ferguson, The Holy Spirit (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press,
1996); Richard B. Gaffin, “By Faith, Not by Sight”: Paul and the Order of Salvation (Bletchley:
Paternoster, 2006), 77-78; John M. Frame, “Salvation and Theological Pedagogy,” Reformation & Revival
14, no. 1 (2005): 57-70; Herman N. Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology, trans. John Richard de
Witt (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975); Ivor J. Davidson, “Gospel Holiness: Some Dogmatic Reflections,”
in Sanctification: Explorations in Theology and Practice, ed. Kelly M. Kapic (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2014), 189-211. See also incidental materials to deal briefly with the idea of definitive
sanctification: John Piper and David Mathis, eds., Acting the Miracle: God’s Work and Ours in the Mystery
of Sanctification (Wheaton: Crossway, 2013), 15; Nelson, Bible Doctrines, 104; Williams, Systematic
Theology, 2:256; Harris, Our Faith and Fellowship, 24; Douglas Vickers, The Cross: Its Meaning and
Message in a Postmodern World (Eugene: Wipf & Stock Pub., 2010), 96; Bruce A. Demarest, The Cross
and Salvation: The Doctrine of Salvation (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1997), 407; Kenneth Keathly, “The
Doctrine of Salvation,” in A Theology for the Church, ed. Daniel Akin (Nashville: Broadman & Holman,
2007), 407.
J. V. Fesko, “Sanctification and Union with Christ: A Reformed Perspective,” Evangelical
Quarterly 82, no. 3 (July 2010): 197, 208; idem, The Theology of the Westminster Standards: Historical
Context and Theological Insights (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2014), 257n69.
9

10

Michael S. Horton, Covenant and Salvation: Union with Christ (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2007), 248; idem, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 650-653.

5
sanctification in the ordo salutis.11 Lane Tipton questions Berkhof’s concept of active
justification because he believes that the idea “clouds a clear affirmation of justification
sola fide”12 and is at best a “fiction” that has no practical impact on the believer’s life.13
Objections to active justification and definitive sanctification fall into three main
categories: (1) they lack biblical support; (2) they produce theological confusion; and (3)
they provide no practical benefit to believers. Much of the criticism rests on
misunderstanding or misapplying the terms.
In response, this thesis asserts that both concepts are supported scripturally,
provide theological clarity, and are of practical benefit to believers. This study presents a
portrait of salvation that is God-driven while still affirming the ways in which human
response and responsibility is required. Once misunderstandings are resolved and
misapplications removed, both ideas will be shown to be biblically supported,
theologically clarifying, and practically edifying.
Active justification and definitive sanctification have a common foundation in
the gracious objective work of God in Christ on behalf of His own. Sinners are actively
and objectively justified (made righteous) in foro Dei on the basis of Christ’s perfect
righteousness. Definitive sanctification occurs when believers are decisively sanctified
(made holy) in foro conscientiae on the basis of Christ’s perfect holiness through

11

Horton, The Christian Faith, 650n6.

Lane G. Tipton, “Biblical Theology and the Westminster Standards Revisited: Union with
Christ and Justification Sola Fide,” Westminster Theological Journal 75, no. 1 (January 2013): 9-10. This
article is a revised version of Tipton’s inaugural address at Westminster Theological Seminary on
November 13, 2012.
12

13

Tipton, “Biblical Theology,” 9.
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mystical union with Him in His death and resurrection. Active justification and definitive
sanctification have in common four important characteristics operating in parallel: (1)
Inseparability: active justification is inseparable from passive justification, and definitive
sanctification is inseparable from progressive sanctification; (2) Objective and Decisive
Salvation: justification and sanctification are both grounded solely in God’s objective and
decisive decree; (3) Christ-centeredness: Christ is the heart of believers’ justification and
sanctification; and (4) God’s Sovereignty: believers’ salvation in all its parts is under the
gracious, sovereign disposition of the Heavenly Father.
These will be examined in the soteriology of four theologians from the broader
Dutch Reformed tradition: the essential inseparability of active and passive justification
and definitive and progressive sanctification in Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) in chapter
4; the objective and decisive character of salvation in Alexander Comrie (1706-1774) in
chapter 5; the Christ-centeredness of salvation in Herman Witsius (1636-1708) in chapter
6; and God as gracious sovereign in salvation in Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) in
chapter 7.
This paper will show that the ideas of definitive sanctification and active
justification are biblically supported, theologically clarifying, and of practical help to the
believer. They effectively remove any confusion between God’s sovereignty and human
responsibility, give greater assurance to believers about their perseverance to glory, and
offer pastoral relief to those who may have lapsed into either triumphalism or defeatism.

7

1.2. Present Status of the Problem
1.2.1. Definitive Sanctification
Definitive sanctification, sometimes called “positional,”14 “objective,”15 or the
“punctiliar” as opposed to the “linear” aspect of sanctification,16 was advocated by
Murray.17 Although the idea can be found in prior writers,18 he developed it further
using sound theology and scriptural depth.
In contrast to the ongoing lifelong process of progressive sanctification,
definitive sanctification holds that believers are already sanctified in a decisive way
when they are mystically united with Christ in His death and resurrection. Since the
dominion of sin is ended upon the believer’s union with Christ, sin is “no longer en
rapport with life.”19 Definitive sanctification is therefore the “once-for-all definitive and
irreversible breach with the realm in which sin reigns in and unto death.” Believers
definitively and decisively “died to sin” and are “translated into another realm . . .

14
Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Nashville: Broadman & Holman,
1994), 443; Cornelius R. Stam, True Spirituality (Chicago: Berean Bible Society, 1959), 79; Keith A.
Kettenring, The Sanctification Connection: An Exploration of Human Participation in Spiritual Growth
(Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), 9.
15

Anonymous, The Gospel Herald; Or, Poor Christian’s Magazine, vol. 50 (Ipswich: London,

1882), 5.
16

Chester K. Lehman, The Holy Spirit and the Holy Life (Scottdale: Herald Press, 1959), 108.
Cf. Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
2000), 747-748.
Murray, “Definitive Sanctification,” 5-21; idem, “The Agency in Definitive Sanctification.”
For the biblical exegesis on Romans that is related with the idea of definitive sanctification, see John
Murray, The Epistle to the Romans: The English Text with Introduction, Exposition, and Notes (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959), 1:277-284.
17

18

See, e.g., Nelson, Bible Doctrines, 104; Pearlman, Knowing the Doctrines of the Bible; Harris,
Our Faith and Fellowship, 24; Williams, Systematic Theology, 2:256.
19

Murray, “Definitive Sanctification,” 279.

8
[namely] the sphere of life” through union with Christ.20 Murray finds definitive
sanctification in biblical testimonies such as 1 Corinthians 1:2, where believers are
“sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints,” and 1 Corinthians 6:11, where believers
were “washed, sanctified, and justified.”
Murray’s proposal has had a mixed reception. Some embrace the idea and use it
in their own soteriology.21 Others object to it because they believe the notion confuses
sanctification with justification.22
Murray and others including David Peterson23 are concerned that the progressive
aspect of sanctification, i.e., the call for believers to grow in holiness, has been
emphasized at the expense of the clear New Testament teaching that in Christ believers
are already holy (e.g., 1 Cor 1:2, 1 Cor 6:11, Rom 6:1-7:6, 1 Pet 2:24, etc.).24 This onesided emphasis leads to the belief that sanctification is accomplished primarily through
human will and effort. Advocates of definitive sanctification are not opposed to

20

Murray, “Definitive Sanctification,” 279.

Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, 757; Hoekema, “Reformed
View;” Peterson, Possessed by God; Piper and Mathis, Acting the Miracle, 15; Charles Caldwell Ryrie, So
Great Salvation: What It Means to Believe in Jesus Christ (Wheaton: Victor Books, 1989), 150-152;
Nelson, Bible Doctrines, 104; Williams, Systematic Theology, 2:256; Harris, Our Faith and Fellowship, 24;
Vickers, The Cross, 96; Demarest, The Cross and Salvation, 407; Keathly, “The Doctrine of Salvation;”
Davidson, “Gospel Holiness: Some Dogmatic Reflections.”
21

22

Fesko, “Sanctification and Union with Christ.”

23

Peterson, Possessed by God.

Peterson, Possessed by God, 11-14. See also Murray, “Definitive Sanctification,” 277. Cf.
James M. Howard, Paul, the Community, and Progressive Sanctification: An Exploration into CommunityBased Transformation within Pauline Theology (New York: Peter Lang, 2007).
24
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progressive sanctification,25 but they also point to Scriptures that support a definitive,
objective holiness for believers.26
There are also writers who include a semblance of definitive sanctification in
their doctrine of sanctification. These divide sanctification into two types—definitive and
progressive—and regard them as two sides of the same coin (i.e., “holiness”).27 Or,
alternatively, they understand sanctification as taking place in three stages of an “already
but not yet” eschatology: (1) the definitive beginning of sanctification at regeneration; (2)
progressive development in this life; (3) completion of sanctification in the eschaton.28 In
this sense, definitive sanctification is understood as one of the multiple aspects of
sanctification—represented as the initial inner stage of sanctification.29 However, none
of these have examined definitive sanctification in detail but only in broad strokes as part
of a general discussion. A more detailed explanation of the notion of definitive
sanctification is therefore called for.30
There are also those who are altogether uncomfortable with definitive

25
As claimed, for example, by Henri Blocher, see Henri Blocher, “Sanctification by Faith?,” in
Sanctification: Explorations in Theology and Practice, ed. Kelly M. Kapic (Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2014), 59n9.

Cf. John Murray, “Progressive Sanctification,” in Collected Writings of John Murray, vol. 2
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1976), 294-304.
26

27

Piper and Mathis, Acting the Miracle, 15-16.

28

Grudem, Systematic Theology, 747-748.

Hoekema, “Reformed View,” 72-77; Grudem, Systematic Theology, 747; John Webster,
Holiness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 79-84.
29

30

Although thinkers like Murray and Peterson have precisely examined the nature of definitive
sanctification, their work has not directly dealt with current criticisms of definitive sanctification. This
study will fill this gap.
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sanctification. Fesko is convinced that the notion of definitive sanctification is an
“unhelpful” category and an “unsatisfactory” notion in the ordo salutis.31 Fesko holds
that the category of definitive sanctification is founded on an exegetical and interpretative
fallacy, and if accepted it confuses sanctification with forensic justification. Michael
Horton admits that Murray’s idea is theologically helpful and employs it in his own
exposition of sanctification.32 Nevertheless, he distances himself from Murray because
he thinks that in Murray’s system definitive and progressive sanctification look like two
distinct points in the ordo salutis, not two aspects of the same reality.33
Definitive sanctification has been defended by an appeal to crucial New
Testament texts34 as well as to sources in the historic Reformed tradition. Scripture
passages in defense of definitive sanctification include: 1 Corinthians 1:2,35 1

31

Fesko, “Sanctification and Union with Christ,” 197, 207.

32

Horton, Covenant and Salvation, 248; idem, The Christian Faith, 650-653.

33

Horton, The Christian Faith, 650n6.

34

Most works that defend the notion of definitive sanctification appeal to its biblical foundation.
See Demarest, The Cross and Salvation, 407; Erroll Hulse, “Definitive Sanctification,” in The Pursuit of
Holiness, International Baptist Conference (Toronto: Toronto Baptist Seminry & Bible College, 1990), 2841; Erroll Hulse, The Doctrine and Practice of Holiness (Faverdale North: EP Books, 2011), 81-92;
Kettenring, The Sanctification Connection, 9; Joseph A. Pipa, “Definitive Sanctification: Righteousness
Leading to Holiness,” in Sanctification: Growing in Grace, eds. Joseph A. Pipa and J. Andrew Wortman
(Taylors: Southern Presbyterian Press, 2001), 1-16; David Mathis, “Introduction: The Search for
Sanctification’s Holy Grail,” in Acting the Miracle: God’s Work and Ours in the Mystery of Sanctification,
eds. John Piper and David Mathis (Weaton: Crossway, 2013), 13-28; Victor Adrian, “Definitive
Sanctification” (ThM Thesis, Westminster Theological Seminary, 1961).
Some call attention to the perfect participle form of the verb ἁγιάζω (I sanctify) in 1 Cor 1:2.
See, e.g., Thomas R. Schreiner, New Testament Theology: Magnifying God in Christ (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2008), 373; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1987), 32; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the
Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 76; Peterson, Possessed by God, 40-46.
35
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Corinthians 6:11,36 and Romans 6:1-7:6.37
Defense of definitive sanctification also includes an appeal to witnesses from the
historic Reformed tradition. Richard Gaffin, adhering closely to Calvin’s Commentary on
Romans, labels the idea of definitive sanctification as a “crucial soteriological truth.”38
Ralph Cunnington similarly finds the idea of definitive sanctification in John Calvin and
several Reformed Confessions.39 In his dissertation, Mark Snoeberger draws definitive
sanctification from John Calvin and John Owen.40 Their proposals are significant but

36
The aorist passive form of ἁγιάζω in 1 Cor 6:11 (ἡγιάσθητε) also suggests the idea of definitive
sanctification. See Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 246; Thiselton, The First Epistle to the
Corinthians, 454; Schreiner, New Testament Theology, 373; David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, BECNT
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 216-217; D. A. Carson, For the Love of God: A Daily Companion
for Discovering the Riches of God’s Word (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1998), August 27 entry; Richard B.
Hays, First Corinthians, IBC (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997), 16; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First
Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2008), 126.
37
Much depends on whether Rom 6:1-7:6 is about justification or sanctification. See Peterson,
Possessed by God, 96-109. Fesko thinks that Rom 6:1-7:6 is about justification, not sanctification. See
Fesko, “Sanctification and Union with Christ,” 212-213. On the interpretation of Rom 6:1-14 in the context
of definitive sanctification, see Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, NICNT (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1996), 352; Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998), 346371; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, 1st ed., The
Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 429-430; C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, ICC (London: T & T Clark, 2011), 1:296.

“This [the idea of definitive sanctification] is the crucial soteriological truth that in the
inception of the application of redemption, at the moment sinners are united to Christ by faith, they are
delivered from sin’s enslaving power, from bondage to sin as master.” See Richard B. Gaffin, “A Response
to John Fesko’s Review,” Ordained Servant 18 (2009): 111. Gaffin’s article is a response to Fesko’s review
article, “A Tale of Two Calvins: A Review Article,” Ordained Servant 18 (2009): 98-104. One thing that is
lamentable in the debate between Gaffin and Fesko is that the notion of definitive sanctification is highly
exploited simply for the purpose of defending their argument. In this appropriation, the notion’s original
intention and meaning seems to significantly fade way. As a result, unnecessary confusion and
misunderstanding of the notion of definitive sanctification is evident. To avoid this error, the present study
will begin by clarifying the very natures of the notion that have been overlooked in the debate. And then,
this study will show that a clarified understanding of definitive sanctification provides theological and
practical benefits, not confusion.
38

Ralph Cunnington, “Definitive Sanctification: A Response to John Fesko,” Evangelical
Quarterly 84, no. 3 (July 2012): 234-252.
39

Mark A. Snoeberger, “Definitive Sanctification: Threading a Path between Legal Fiction and
Works Righteousness” (PhD diss., Baptist Bible Seminary, 2007), esp., 46-93.
40
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also of somewhat limited value because opponents such as Fesko also appeal to Calvin.41

1.2.2. Active Justification
Debates over active justification follow a pattern similar to those over definitive
sanctification. It has also been neglected, misunderstood, and misused by antinomians
and hyper-Calvinists who also fail to see the proper distinction between active
justification and passive justification.42 Antinomians seek to magnify God’s sovereignty
out of proportion by focusing only on justification in the presence of God. In this they
miss passive justification, opening the door to a neglect of the law and the need for
sanctification.43 When hyper-Calvinists teach that justification is an immanent act of

Fesko, “Sanctification and Union with Christ,” passim. Since entering into a scholarly debate
on Calvin’s interpretation of Romans is beyond the scope of this study, it will not be dealt with in detail.
41

Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification, 158-161; Carl R. Trueman, “John Owen on
Justification,” in Justified in Christ: God’s Plan for Us in Justification, ed. K. Scott Oliphint (Fearn:
Mentor, 2007), 81-98; Robert J. McKelvey, “‘That Error and Pillar of Antinomianism’: Eternal
Justification,” in Drawn into Controversie: Reformed Theological Diversity and Debates within
Seventeenth-Century British Puritanism (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 233-235, 259-262.
42

43

For a detailed examination about English antinomianism and its perspective on justification,
see Hans Boersma, A Hot Pepper Corn: Richard Baxter’s Doctrine of Justification In Its SeventeenthCentury Context of Controversy (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 1993), passim; J. I. Packer, A
Quest for Godliness: The Puritan Vision of the Christian Life (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1990), passim;
Carl R. Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster Press,
1998), passim; Joel R. Beeke and Mark Jones, eds., “Thomas Goodwin and Johannes Maccovius on
Justification from Eternity,” in A Puritan Theology: Doctrine for Life (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage
Books, 2012), 133-148. For a detailed discussion on antinomianism per se, see Mark Jones,
Antinomianism: Reformed Theology’s Unwelcome Guest? (Phillipsburg: P&R Pub., 2013); William K. B
Stoever, A Faire and Easie Way to Heaven: Covenant Theology and Antinomianism in Early
Massachusetts (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1978); T. D. Bozeman, The Precisianist Strain:
Disciplinary Religion & Antinomian Backlash in Puritanism to 1638 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2004); David Como, “Puritans and Heretics: The Emergence of an Antinomian
Underground in Early Stuart England” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1999); Norman Brooks Graebner,
“Protestants and Dissenters: An Examination of the Seventeenth-Century Eatonist and New England
Antinomian Controversies in Reformation Perspective” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1984); Christopher
Earl Caughey, “Puritan Responses to Antinomianism in the Context of Reformed Covenant Theology:
1630-1696” (PhD diss., Trinity College, 2013).
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God from eternity, thus equating active justification with eternal justification or even
with decree per se, they produce the same fruit as the antinomians.44 Emphasizing active
justification leads to thinking of justification as an eternal act of God that makes the
believer’s act of faith unnecessary and irrelevant.45 It is important to note that the
distinction between active justification and passive justification effects a logical and not a
temporal order.46
Although it is understandable that the idea of active justification has been
neglected historically and remains so today, when criticisms are found in contemporary
theological literature they often indicate a misunderstanding of it. For example, Timothy
Price rather arbitrarily equates active justification with eternal justification.47 Tipton also
criticizes Berkhof’s use of active justification, arguing that “if active justification

44

James Leo Garrett, Baptist Theology: A Four-Century Study (Macon: Mercer University Press,
2009), 89. For the detailed discussion on hyper-Calvinism, see Peter Toon, The Emergence of HyperCalvinism in English Nonconformity, 1689-1765 (London: Olive Tree, 1967); David Engelsma, HyperCalvinism and the Call of the Gospel (Grand Rapids: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 1980); Gerald
L. Priest, “Andrew Fuller, Hyper-Calvinism, and the ‘Modern Question,’” in “At the Pure Fountain of Thy
Word”: Andrew Fuller as an Apologist, ed. Michael A. G. Haykin (Waynesboro: Paternoster Press, 2004),
43-73; Curt D. Daniel, “Hyper-Calvinism and John Gill” (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1983); Tom
J. Nettles, By His Grace and for His Glory: A Historical, Theological and Practical Study of the Doctrines
of Grace in Baptist Life (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986); Peter Naylor, Picking Up a Pin for the
Lord: English Particular Baptists from 1688 to the Early Nineteenth Century (London: Grace, 1992).
45
Ralph Wardlaw, Systematic Theology, ed. James Robinson Campbell (Edinburgh: A. and C.
Black, 1857), 188-189.
46

Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 555-557; Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2:682-683;
Geerhardus Vos, Systematische theologie: Compendium (Grand Rapids, 1905), 24, 98; J. van Genderen and
W. H. Velema, Concise Reformed Dogmatics, trans. Gerrit Bilkes and Ed M. van der Maas (Phillipsburg:
P&R Pub., 2008), 621-622; Bavinck, RD, 3:583, 590-595; 4:214-219; G. C. Berkouwer, Faith and
Justification (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 143-168; John Murray, Redemption, Accomplished and
Applied (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), 102-103, 119-131; Berkhof, ST, 517-520; à Brakel, The
Christian’s Reasonable Service, 2:380-382.
Timothy Shaun Price, “John Calvin and Herman Bavinck on the Doctrine of Justification in
Relation to Ethics,” in Since We Are Justified by Faith: Justification in the Theologies of the Protestant
Reformation, ed. Michael Parsons (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2012), 138-149.
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logically precedes faith, then active justification logically precedes faith-union with
Christ. This is not possible from a biblical and confessional perspective.”48 Tipton
believes that the concept of active justification denies the truth that “justification sola fide
depends on union with Christ sola fide” (emphasis in the original).49
This study holds that most objections to active justification and definitive
sanctification come from conceptual misunderstanding of the terms themselves. When
such misunderstandings are removed, the theological and practical validity and value of
both ideas become obvious. It appears that no recent studies have undertaken to clarify
the meaning of both active justification and definitive sanctification in opposition to the
recent criticisms; this paper will endeavor to fill that void.

1.3. Proposed Method
Definitive sanctification and active justification are distinct but complementary. The need
for justification speaks to our guilt or unrighteousness, and the need for sanctification
speaks to our pollution or unholiness. However, since justification and sanctification are
God-driven but also involve human participation in faith and obedience, it follows that
the problems, misunderstandings, and misuses of both ideas, though distinct, also
correlate. Therefore at the outset we state the conviction that definitive sanctification and
active justification have in common the clear understanding that there is a scriptural
balance between gracious, divinely sovereign initiative and grateful human response and
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Tipton, “Biblical Theology,” 8.

49

Tipton, “Biblical Theology,” 10.
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responsibility. To demonstrate this we will examine four parallel characteristics or
properties common to active justification and definitive sanctification: Inseparability,
Decisive and Objective Salvation, Christ-centeredness, and God’s Sovereignty in
Salvation. These parallel properties will show that active justification and definitive
sanctification equally affirm that the believer’s salvation is ultimately God-driven. They
also maintain that the believer’s justification and sanctification is grounded in an actual,
once-for-all reality (“Objectivity” and “Decisiveness” respectively) that is solidly rooted
in Christ’s perfect righteousness and holiness (“Christ-centeredness”), bound up and in
perfect balance with human responsibility (“Inseparability”) and entirely governed by
God’s absolute sovereignty (“God’s Sovereignty in Salvation”). These parallel
characteristics of active justification and definitive sanctification display the truth that no
one other than God justifies and sanctifies sinners, thus revealing a God-driven salvation.
In this study, each of the four characteristics will be discussed by examining four notable
theologians in the broader Dutch Reformed tradition who elucidated the respective
characteristics, i.e., Bavinck, Comrie, Witsius, and Kuyper.
The first parallel characteristic of active justification and definitive sanctification
is that they each are inseparable from passive justification and progressive sanctification,
respectively.50 This inseparability answers the objection that active justification
contradicts justification sola fide and the concern that definitive sanctification might

See James Eglinton, “On Bavinck’s Theology of Sanctification-as-Ethics,” in Sanctification:
Explorations in Theology and Practice, ed. Kelly M. Kapic (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2014),
167-188.
50
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minimize the importance of progressive sanctification.51 While the two dimensions of
justification and of sanctification are distinctive, they are never divided. The theological
significance and practical benefit of the idea of inseparability will be examined in
Bavinck’s soteriology.
The second parallel characteristic in the two ideas is that they both point to a
decisive and objective reality of salvation. Specifically, the objective quality of active
justification is often misunderstood as coincident with eternal justification.52 However,
since active justification must be distinguished from the erroneous idea of eternal
justification, this study will present the superiority of active or objective justification as
revealed in the writings of Comrie.
The third parallel characteristic of active justification and definitive
sanctification is that they are each Christ-centered, i.e., the believer’s salvation is
established and maintained through mystical union with Christ and His meritorious work
of satisfaction. Some critics assert that definitive sanctification creates theological
confusion because it either treats sanctification and justification as an amalgam or it
erroneously occupies two distinct moments in the ordo salutis. These objections are
answered by showing that the real value of definitive sanctification lies in its unique
ability to describe the condition or state of the believer’s sharing in Christ’s perfect
holiness in union with Him rather than merely asserting a particular sequence in the ordo.
This understanding of the Christ-centeredness of the two concepts is developed in
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Cf. Tipton, “Biblical Theology,” 10; Blocher, “Sanctification by Faith?” 64.

52

Cf. Price, “John Calvin and Herman Bavinck on the Doctrine of Justification," 148.
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Witsius, whose understanding of justification and sanctification emphasizes union with
Christ and His meritorious work.
The fourth parallel characteristic shared by active justification and definitive
sanctification focuses on God’s sovereignty in salvation. In both definitive sanctification
and active justification, any role of human merit in salvation is ruled out. Yet this does
not mean that the believer’s salvation is deterministic or fatalistic; rather, the point is that
believers’ forgiveness and holiness are solely gifts of God’s grace. Even in passive
justification where faith is indispensable and in progressive sanctification where human
will and activity are required, God’s absolute sovereignty in salvation is always upheld.
In this study, the complete reliance on God’s sovereignty in both justification and
sanctification will clearly be seen in Kuyper’s soteriology.
By looking at the four parallel characteristics of active justification and definitive
sanctification in the soteriology of Bavinck, Comrie, Witsius, and Kuyper, the essence of
these two ideas will be conceptually clarified, criticisms will be answered, and the
theological and practical significance and relevance of active justification and definitive
sanctification will be discovered, affirming that every aspect of salvation is God-driven.

1.4. Outline – A Study in Three Parts
Part I – Definitive Sanctification and Active Justification Defined
Chapter 1 – Introduction and Thesis Statement
Chapter 2 – Clarification of terms; outline of Murray’s view of definitive
sanctification; comparison with progressive sanctification; close examination of biblical
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texts (esp., Rom 6:1-14, 1 Cor 1:2, and 6:11) and confessional evidence (Heidelberg
Catechism and Westminster Confession of Faith); the essence of definitive sanctification
as found in Swiss-Italian Reformed theologian Francis Turretin (1623-1687); introduction
to recent doctrinal objections to the idea (Fesko) and initial response to his criticisms.
The main purpose of chapter 2 is to clarify the meaning, scope, and validity of definitive
sanctification in order to resolve misconceptions and misunderstanding.
Chapter 3 – Clarification of the difference between active justification and
passive justification; examination of the biblical foundation (esp., Gen 3:15); explanation
of its doctrinal development and historical context; introduction to another recent
doctrinal objection (Tipton); examination of theological neglect (John Eaton in the
tradition of English antinomianism) and misuse or abuse of the concept (John Brine in the
tradition of hyper-Calvinism); initial response to criticism, neglect, and misuse.
Part II – “Four Parallel Characteristics of Active Justification and Definitive
Sanctification,” includes four theologians who each elucidate one of the parallels, i.e.,
Bavinck, Comrie, Witsius, and Kuyper.
Chapter 4 – Examine the first parallel characteristic of definitive sanctification
and active justification (“Inseparability”) as revealed in the soteriology of Bavinck. Just
as divine initiative and sovereignty is inseparable from human responsibility to believe
and obey, so active justification is inseparable from passive justification and definitive
sanctification inseparable from progressive sanctification. This inseparability found in
Bavinck’s soteriology is necessary to refute objections that fail to take it into account.
Chapter 5 – Examine the second parallel characteristic, “The Decisive and
Objective Reality of Salvation,” through the lens of Alexander Comrie’s soteriology.
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Chapter 6 – Examine the third parallel characteristic, “Christ-centeredness,”
through the soteriology of Herman Witsius, particularly his understanding that definitive
sanctification is not a distinct element in the “order” or “sequence” in salvation, but
rather a “condition” or “state” of being definitively sanctified in union with Christ and
sharing in His holiness.
Chapter 7 – Examine the fourth parallel characteristic, “God’s Sovereignty in
Salvation,” as found in the soteriology of Abraham Kuyper as he considers the ceaseless
struggle to maintain a clear view of God’s total control of salvation, seen within the
context of the highly anthropocentric culture and society of his time.
Part III – “The Soteriological Significance of Active Justification and Definitive
Sanctification”
Chapter 8 – The theological and practical significance of definitive sanctification
and active justification. Divine initiative and sovereignty in grace are placed in proper
relation to human responsibility, affording assurance of perseverance to believers while
avoiding either defeatism or triumphalism.
Chapter 9 – Summary of the case: once objections are refuted, misunderstandings
removed, and misuses resolved, the concepts of active justification and definitive
sanctification are found to be biblically supported, theologically clear and necessary, and
of great practical benefit to believers.

PART I
DEFINITIVE SANCTIFICATION AND ACTIVE
JUSTIFICATION DEFINED

CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIVE SANCTIFICATION

Before going on to the four characteristics of definitive sanctification, it is essential to
have the idea itself clearly defined. This chapter will analyze definitive sanctification by
summarizing the work of John Murray, its chief representative, and stating and answering
key differences to his concept as expressed by John Fesko and Michael Horton. This
chapter will examine biblical texts including Romans 6:1-14 and 1 Corinthians 1:2; 6:11,
two confessional documents (Heidelberg Catechism and Westminster Confession of
Faith), and the theology of Reformed scholastic theologian Francis Turretin (1623-1687).

2.1. Clarification of Terms
Definitive sanctification has been called a variety of names with little actual variation in
meaning. It has been called “positional,”1 “objective,”2 and “judicial,”3 and even the
“indicative” of sanctification.4 It has also been graphically expressed as “punctiliar” in
contrast to “linear” sanctification.5 Others use the comprehensive term “initial

1

Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 443; Stam, True Spirituality, 79; Kettenring, The
Sanctification Connection, 9; William D. Barrick, “Sanctification: The Work of the Holy Spirit and
Scripture,” The Master’s Seminary Journal 21, no. 2 (2010): 180, 183-184, 190.
2

Anonymous, The Gospel Herald, 5.

3

Demarest, The Cross and Salvation, 407.

Demarest, The Cross and Salvation, 407-408; Andrew V. Snider, “Sanctification and
Justification: A Unity of Distinctions,” The Master’s Seminary Journal 21, no. 2 (2010): 170-171.
4

5

Lehman, The Holy Spirit and the Holy Life, 108. Cf. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 747-748.
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sanctification.”6
The major differences between definitive and positional sanctification have
already been thoroughly studied7 and a brief summary will suffice here. However, in
properly defining definitive sanctification we must still call attention to subtle but
important nuances in the idea of “positional” sanctification,8 a term coined by the
Keswick movement.9 It refers to the way that believers are positionally set apart for God
through union with Christ, and an old entity, i.e., the sinful nature, is supplemented but
not replaced by a new entity, i.e., the sanctified nature through the second crisis event or
“second blessing” of the Holy Spirit. Through this second blessing believers receive the
enablement or potential power (something less than an active or accomplished power) to

6

Snoeberger, “Definitive Sanctification,” 1-8; Barrick, “Sanctification,” 180, 183.

See, e.g., Snoeberger, “Definitive Sanctification”; Adrian, “Definitive Sanctification;” Cheul
Hee Lee, “Sanctification by Faith: Walter Marshall’s Doctrine of Sanctification in Comparison with the
Keswick View of Sanctification” (PhD diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 2005); Stephen Clark
Brown, “A Thematic Comparison of the Keswick, Chaferian, and Reformed Views of Sanctification”
(ThM Thesis, Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, 1985).
7

8

On the different theological perspectives on sanctification, see Melvin E. Dieter et al., Five
Views on Sanctification (Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1987); Donald Alexander, ed., Christian
Spirituality: Five Views of Sanctification (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1988). The former deals with
the Wesleyan, Reformed, Pentecostal, Keswick, and Augustinian-Dispensational views; the latter identifies
the Lutheran, Reformed, Wesleyan, Pentecostal, and Contemplative views on sanctification. See also
Gregory A. Boyd and Paul R. Eddy, Across the Spectrum: Understanding Issues in Evangelical Theology
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 161-182.
Keswick is the name of a resort town in England’s lake district where annual conventions “for
the promotion of practical holiness” have been held since 1875. According to Barabas, the best summary of
the Keswick message is expressed in the “call” to the original convention—a “Convention for the
Promotion of Practical Holiness.” Further said: “It [Keswick] shows that in Christ there is provided for
every believer victory, liberty, and rest, and that this may be obtained not by a life-long struggle after an
impossible ideal but by the surrender of the individual to God, and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.” See
Steven Barabas, So Great Salvation: The History and Message of the Keswick Convention (London:
Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1952), 21, 84, 108. For a typical devotional exposition of Keswick teaching, see
Robert C. McQuilkin, The Life of Victory and the Baptism of the Holy Spirit (Chicago: Moody Press,
1953). For vigorous criticism of Keswick teaching, see Benjamin B. Warfield, Perfectionism, 2 vols. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1931), passim; Packer, Keep in Step with the Spirit, passim.
9
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become “saints” and to be “holy.”10 The term “positional” was used slightly differently
by dispensationalist Lewis Sperry Chafer, who implied that the believer is not only a
participant but the primary agent of sanctification.11 Benjamin Warfield criticized this
view as a form of Pelagianism.12
However, John Murray defines definitive sanctification as taught by the
Reformed tradition. As such it is unlike any form of positional sanctification that either
calls for a necessary second blessing of the Holy Spirit or suggests greater confidence in
human ability to achieve sanctification. In fact, Warfield referred to the latter type as the
“quintessence of Arminianism.”13 Neither of these ideas are part of the understanding of
definitive sanctification that will be defined and defended in this dissertation,14 which

10
See J. Robertson McQuilkin, “The Keswick Perspective,” in Five Views on Sanctification
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1987), 151-183; Barabas, So Great Salvation, passim. Snoeberger’s dissertation
extensively deals with the meaning of positional sanctification in the context of the Keswick movement.
See Snoeberger, “Definitive Sanctification,” 134-169. Cf. Adrian, “Definitive Sanctification,” 103-132.
11
See, esp., vol. 7: Lewis Sperry Chafer, Systematic Theology, 8 vols. (Dallas: Dallas Seminary
Press, 1948). According to Murray, the agency in definitive sanctification should be understood in God’s
redemptive action and union with Christ. See Murray, “The Agency in Definitive Sanctification,” 285-293.
12
Benjamin B. Warfield, “Review of He That Is Spiritual,” Princeton Theological Review 17.2
(1919): 322–327; idem, Perfectionism. For an extensive exposition concerning the old Princeton
Presbyterian response to the Holiness movement, see Cho, “The Old Princeton Presbyterian Response to
the Holiness Movement in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries in America.” Yet, some (e.g.,
Charles C. Ryrie) do not agree with this evaluation, arguing that “the Reformed and Chaferian views are
not very far apart in what is taught concerning the relationship between human activity and divine
sovereignty.” See Ryrie, “Contrasting Views of Sanctification,” 194-195.

Warfield, “Review of He That Is Spiritual,” 324. For a detailed exposition regarding a
different perspective on sanctification between Warfield and Chafer, see Randall Gleason, “B. B. Warfield
and Lewis S. Chafer on Sanctification,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 40, no. 2 (1997):
241-257.
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An effort to equate Chaferian positional sanctification with Murray’s definitive sanctification
exists. See, e.g., Ryrie, “Contrasting Views of Sanctification,” 194-195. According to Snoeberger, Ryrie is
not alone in making this error, but Anthony Hoekema also. However, Hoekema definitely distinguishes
between Chaferian positional sanctification and Murray’s definitive sanctification. See Anthony A.
Hoekema, Saved by Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 205-206. Cf. Snoeberger, “Definitive
Sanctification,” 173n19.
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concentrates on and is in accord with Murray’s view.

2.2. John Murray’s View of Definitive Sanctification15
2.2.1. Views that Differ from Murray’s
John Murray’s definitive sanctification was quite different from the human-centered
definitions presented by some of his contemporaries.16
First, Murray pointed out theological weaknesses in the positional sanctification
of the dispensationalist Keswick movement or Chaferian interpretation. He not only
emphasized accomplished (determined) initial sanctification, but he also held to an
ultimate divine superintendent of sanctification as opposed to a human agent.17
Second, Murray also differentiated himself from his brethren in the traditional
American Presbyterian circle who treated sanctification as being predominantly
progressive.18 In Murray’s own words, “It is a fact too frequently overlooked that in the
New Testament the most characteristic terms that refer to sanctification are used, not of a

15

Note that it is no exaggeration to say that Murray is the well-established founder of the
conception of definitive sanctification. As a result of Murray’s extensive introduction to the concept, the
idea of definitive sanctification is shaped as a concrete theological conception and discussed among other
writings in earnest.
Not only Barabas’ So Great Salvation and Chafer’s Systematic Theology as discussed above,
but also other works already discussed the concept of positional sanctification. Before that Murray dealt
with it in earnest. See, e.g., Nelson, Bible Doctrines, 104; Pearlman, Knowing the Doctrines of the Bible;
Harris, Our Faith and Fellowship, 24; Williams, Systematic Theology, 2:256.
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Murray, “The Pattern of Sanctification,” 305-312; idem, “The Agency in Definitive
Sanctification,” 285-286, 304.
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See, e.g., Dabney, Syllabus and Notes, 660-674; Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 803-806; Hodge,
Systematic Theology, 213-258.
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process, but of a once-for-all definitive act” (emphasis added).19

2.2.2. Definition and Two Main Themes: Identity and Lordship
In contrast to the widely-accepted idea that sanctification is primarily a lifelong,
progressive process, Murray maintained that believers are sanctified in the definitive
sense when they are mystically united with Christ in His death and resurrection.
Definitive sanctification therefore describes a “once-for-all definitive and irreversible
break with the realm in which sin reigns in and unto death.” Through union with Christ
believers definitively and decisively “died to sin” and were “translated into another
realm . . . [namely] the sphere of life.”20 This definitive severance from sin brings about
objective, active, actual, and experiential change which is effectively and efficiently
performed in one’s inner and outer Christian life.21 Thus Murray can say, “This
[definitive sanctification] means that there is a decisive and definitive break with the
power and service of sin in the case of everyone who has come under the control of the
provisions of grace.”22
Two important consequences flow from this theological idea. First, definitive
sanctification clearly identifies those who are redeemed in Christ. It reminds believers
that although their battle with sin continues and they may lapse on occasion, they remain
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Murray, “Definitive Sanctification,” 277.
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the “people of God…” who were “…called effectually by God’s grace” (1 Cor 1:2,
6:11).23 The term therefore gives believers unshakable confidence in their true identity.
Second, definitive sanctification connotes the deliverance of believers from
bondage to sin. Romans 6:12-22 is crucial for Murray; to be “holy in Christ” means that
believers are no longer “dead in sin” but are now “dead to sin.” Sin no longer holds
dominion; the old sinful man has been crucified and the body of sin destroyed. Believers
no longer serve sin, and it no longer reigns in their mortal bodies; they are now and
forevermore under the reign of grace.24 This eradication of sin’s power and rule is
neither illusory nor superficial but is actual, comprehensive and experiential.25 Murray
sees that in Romans 6 Paul “is dealing with the believers’ actual death to sin [emphasis
added].”26 Believers definitively and substantively break with sin; the old self is radically
replaced (not just supplemented) by the new self which is given efficient and active
power to be holy.
Definitive sanctification is not to be confused with “sinless perfection” in the
Wesleyan sense.27 Taking a favorite text of perfectionists, 1 John 3:9 “Those who have
23
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been born of God do not sin, because God’s seed abides in them; they cannot sin, because
they have been born of God,”28 Murray declares simply and directly that “…sinless
perfection is not John’s meaning.”29 Instead, Murray asserts that the main themes of
definitive sanctification, i.e., identity and lordship, provide credible alternative
explanations. While sinless perfection is not possible, even the persistent presence of sin
cannot change the identity of those who are in Christ, but for them the dominion of sin is
broken. Believers are no longer “slaves to sin.”30

2.2.3. Union with Christ and the Agency of Definitive Sanctification
For Murray, union with Christ is the alpha and omega for defining, defending, and
deepening the meaning of definitive sanctification. Murray brings union with Christ to
the forefront, not only to eliminate any reliance on human merit, but also to elevate the
theological standing of definitive sanctification so that we might use it to better
understand the doctrine of sanctification itself.
Murray sees that “[t]he bearing of Jesus’s death and resurrection upon
our justification has been in the forefront of Protestant teaching.” However, he is
concerned that “. . . its bearing upon sanctification has not been sufficiently appreciated.”
He is especially concerned that Christ’s death and resurrection is too often connected
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more to justification than sanctification. He is certain that in the arena of sanctification, it
is “proper . . . to focus attention upon the action of Christ” (emphasis added).31 Murray
specifically attaches the core meaning of union with Christ to the idea of definitive
sanctification:
It [definitive sanctification] is by virtue of our having died with Christ, and
our being raised with him in his resurrection from the dead, that the decisive
break with sin in its power, control, and defilement has been wrought, and
that the reason for this is that Christ in his death and resurrection broke the
power of sin, triumphed over the god of this world, the prince of darkness,
executed judgment upon the world and its ruler, and by that victory
delivered all those who were united to him from the power of darkness, and
translated them into his own kingdom. So intimate is the union between
Christ and his people, that they were partakers with him in all these
triumphal achievements, and therefore died to sin, rose with Christ in the
power of his resurrection, and have their fruit unto holiness, and the end
everlasting life. As the death and resurrection are central in the whole
process of redemptive accomplishment, so are they central in that by which
sanctification itself is wrought in the hearts and lives of God’s people
[emphasis added].32
Death to sin (mortification) and a new sanctifying life (vivification) both happen in
conjunction with and as a consequence of the believer’s intimate union with Christ’s
death and resurrection.33 Historical events, i.e., Christ’s decisive and definitive death and
resurrection, are not just locked in the past, but find their expression again in the realm of
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This language echoes Calvin’s twofold aspect of sanctification, i.e., mortification and
vivification. See John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis
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one’s life experience through vital spiritual union with Christ.34 In Murray’s words: “The
truth is that our death to sin and newness of life are effected in our identification with
Christ in his death and resurrection.”35 As Murray puts it, the objective reality of Christ’s
death and resurrection “…must not be allowed to impair or tone down [undermine] the
reality of [it] in God’s reckoning,” but at the same time His death and resurrection must
also be amplified and applied to the subjective reality of our new life in union with
Christ, or again as Murray said, “…in the actual constitution established by him [God] in
the union of his people with Christ.”36 Thus due emphasis is placed upon both the
“objective and subjective in our dying and rising again with Christ [and] in his death to
sin and living again to God.”37
Murray sees that union with Christ is key in sanctification, leaning heavily on
that theme in “The Agency in Definitive Sanctification.” He makes it abundantly clear
that in definitive sanctification human beings are not the primary agents but rather are
partakers of or participants in union with Christ that marks a definitive and decisive
break with sin. Although human participation through will and action is included in union

34
Murray further notes: “The apostle constantly interweaves the most explicit references to the
death and resurrection of Christ as once-for-all historic events with the teaching respecting actual,
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with Christ, it does not follow that definitive sanctification is primarily performed by
human agency. Rather, humans act as secondary agents that take part in the action and
effect of the primary divine agent. Murray notes, “[In] progressive sanctification the basic
consideration is that we must realize increasingly the implications of union and
communion with Christ, and of communication from him.”38
For Murray, Christ’s works (death and resurrection), and the believer’s union
with those works are the ultimate foundation and performing agency of both definitive
and progressive sanctification. It is a more important condition than any other. In
contrast, others understood sanctification to be accomplished as only the progressive,
lifelong human effort. In opposition Murray assures us that strictly speaking “there is no
need of [our effort],” at least as the starting point or efficient cause to be holy.39 This
does not completely depreciate the role of the human in the sphere of sanctification, but
rather it highlights the point where sanctification ultimately begins as well as the primary
agency that fundamentally leads the believer along on his sanctifying pilgrimage. For
Murray, the beginning point and agency of sanctification is Christ and His works, not
humankind and our ability or efforts.40

2.2.4. Definitive Sanctification and Progressive Sanctification
Some critics believe that the notion of definitive sanctification deemphasizes or
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minimizes progressive sanctification,41 but in fact, affirming definitive sanctification is
part of Murray’s intent to promote, not inhibit the believer’s growth in holiness.42
Murray writes that the believer “is not so delivered from sin in its lust and
defilement [that he need not be] actively engaged in the business of the slaughterhouse
with reference to his own sins.”43 That is, the condition of the believer in this life is not
one of maintaining the status quo, but is one of progressive holiness.44 Murray brings out
two points that the dimension of progressive sanctification embodies.
First, the progression of sanctification is both positive and negative in character;
it embraces both mortification (dying to sin) and sanctification (vivification).45 Even
though mortification connotes “passivity” in sanctification in the sense that believers are
“dead to sin” by union with Christ (Rom 6:2; Col 2:20; Rom 7:4), mortification also
involves “activity” in that “[w]e ourselves [must] be actively engaged in cleansing
ourselves from that defilement, just as on the more positive side, we are to [seek] perfect
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holiness in the fear of God [2 Cor 7:1].”46 Mortification has two aspects, i.e., it is done
through union with Christ (definitive sanctification), but must still be actively performed
in this life (progressive sanctification).
The nature of progressive sanctification can be expressed in a single word:
“growth.” Murray recalls Ephesians 4:15 (“speaking the truth in love, we must grow up
in every way into him who is the head, into Christ”) which shows the aim of growth (to
be like Christ “in every way”), the necessity of growth (we “must grow up” into the
fullness of His stature), and the way of growth (through “speaking the truth in love”).47
With knowledge and love at the core of progressive sanctification, Murray sees that these
are interwoven (Eph 1:17; 4:13-15; 2 Pet 3:18).48 Since “God is love, and those who
abide in love abide in God, and God abides in them” (1 John 4:16), love is “fed by the
increasing apprehension of the glory of him who is love, and of him in whom the love of
God is manifested.”49 If the purpose of progressive sanctification is the increase of the
fruit of the Spirit in love, joy, and peace, it follows that we can expect to be increasing in
the knowledge of God in love. This is how we practice the new life in Christ.
Second, sanctification is not merely related to the individual, but to the
ecclesiastic community as well. Murray emphasizes the nature of “fellowship” in
progressive sanctification, saying that “progression has respect, not only to the individual,
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but also to the church in its unity and solidarity as the body of Christ.”50 Murray notes
that believers “have never existed as independent units,” for in God’s eternal counsel
“they were chosen in Christ (Eph. 1:4); in the accomplishment of their redemption they
were in Christ (2 Cor. 5:14-15; Eph. 1:7); in the application of redemption they are
ushered into the fellowship of Christ (1 Cor. 1:9).”51 If individuals as members of
Christ’s body are indifferent to the sanctification of others, it is not only the “absence of
the ministry which [it] should have afforded others” but also a “vice that gnaws at the
root of spiritual growth.”52 Murray therefore stresses that interaction within the
fellowship of the saints should become an integral part of the progressive sanctification
of the people of God: “If one member suffers, all suffer together with it; if one member is
honored, all rejoice together with it” (1 Cor 12:26). Since the church is the fullness of
Christ (Eph 1:23) and the goal of progressive sanctification is participation in the fullness
of Christ (Col 1:19), progressive sanctification should be performed in ecclesiastic
community and fellowship. This is why Murray underlines the need for “fellowship” to
fulfill progressive sanctification.
When Murray elucidates definitive sanctification, he does not neglect the
dimension of progressive sanctification.53 Rather, Murray affirms the importance of both
individual and ecclesiastical progressive sanctification in the outworking of mortification
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(actively dead to sin) and vivification (abiding in the truth in love).

2.3. Defending the Idea of Definitive Sanctification
Now that we have defined definitive sanctification and summarized Murray’s
understanding of it, we shall set forth a more comprehensive defense. This section will
begin by examining three key biblical passages that Murray himself used, Romans 6:114, 1 Corinthians 1:2, and 1 Corinthians 6:11; then examine the Reformed and
Presbyterian confessions for allusions to the idea, and finally consider whether there is a
corollary to definitive sanctification in Francis Turretin’s idea of “passive
sanctification.”54 Note that a full biblical defense of definitive sanctification, a complete
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examination of the Reformed confessional and theological traditions, and a
comprehensive study of Francis Turretin are beyond the scope of this paper; this section
intends only to present sufficient evidence from each source to make a reasonable case
for definitive sanctification.

2.3.1. The Biblical Case for Definitive Sanctification55
Murray derived definitive sanctification from scriptural texts and biblical principles,56
using Romans 6:1-14, 1 Corinthians 1:2, and 1 Corinthians 6:11 as the main texts
supporting the idea. Later writers have focused on three crucial questions: First, can
definitive sanctification legitimately be extracted from Romans 6:1-14 (specifically Rom
6:2, 6:6, and 6:14a) in that the verses speak of lordship and the ultimate dominion of
Christ over believers. Second, can “ἡγιασμένοις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, κλητοῖς ἁγίοις” (“…
to those who are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints …,” 1 Cor 1:2) refer to
definitive sanctification in that the passage is closely related to a believer’s definitive
“status” in union with Christ. Third, how do we understand “ἀλλὰ ἀπελούσασθε, ἀλλὰ
ἡγιάσθητε, ἀλλὰ ἐδικαιώθητε ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ” (“… but you
were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus
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Christ,” 1 Cor 6:11) in the context of definitive sanctification in that the passage speaks
of actions completed in the past. In fact, all of these passages do speak of a sanctification
which is decisive not progressive, and they call out the believers’ identity/status and
lordship/dominion in union with Christ which are the main characteristics of definitive
sanctification.

2.3.1.1. Romans 6:1-14 and Definitive Sanctification57
The idea of definitive sanctification can be found in Romans 6:1-14; these verses speak
not only of justification but also of sanctification which is closely related to the lordship
and dominion of Christ over believers. Two exegetical discussions support this argument:
(1) Romans 6:1-14 concerns both justification and sanctification; and (2) Romans 6:2,
6:6, and 6:14a refer directly to lordship of believers in Christ.
First, biblical scholars have found that the “subject matter” of Romans 6:1-14 is a
believer’s “change of realm through union with Christ”58 and a “freedom from sin’s
tyranny,”59 or “recasting both ideas of sanctification (indicative and imperative) in
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connection to justification,”60 or the “meaning of the believer’s sanctification,”61 etc.
Even though the emphasis may be somewhat different, the general consensus among
scholars is that Romans 6:1-14 applies to believers who experience a duplex beneficium
of justification and sanctification in uniting with Christ (indicative sense) and who are
called to “[bear] Christian fruits” (imperative sense) as a spiritual response to their
“indicative” condition. Interestingly, both the active opponents (e.g., Fesko62) and
proponents of definitive sanctification (e.g., Peterson and Cunnington63) tend to join this
scholarly consensus but from different directions. For example, Fesko reasons that the
foundation and hermeneutical center of gravity of Romans 6:1-14 (or Rom. 6:1-7:6) is
forensic justification.64 Peterson agrees that Romans 6 is fundamentally based on the
judicial or forensic, but he also asserts that Romans 6 has “often been characterized as a
classic statement of the doctrine [of sanctification].”65 In other words, whereas
opponents of active justification and definitive sanctification tend to interpret Romans
6:1-14 as a story of “justification,” proponents interpret it as primarily a story of
“sanctification.” In fact both own the truth, so the view of Romans 6:6-14 by one party

Fitzmyer, Romans, 429-430. In Fitzmyer’s own words: “Paul . . . contrasts the indicative (you
are a Christian!) with the imperative (become the Christian that you have been enabled to become!): you
have died to sin, so put to death the old self! You have been raised with Christ, so live a new life with him!
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must not be discounted merely to lay the groundwork for the other’s argument. As Moo
observes, in a real sense Romans 6 shows both aspects, that “the new status enjoyed by
the believer (justification) brings with it a new influence and power that has led and must
lead to a new way of life (sanctification).”66 Thus the subject matter of Romans 6:1-14 is
not only justification but also sanctification.
Second, Romans 6:2 (“dead to sin”), 6:6 (“[the] old self was crucified”), and
6:14a (“sin will have no dominion over you”) support the idea of definitive sanctification
in that they include the lordship and dominion of Christ over believers. Two possible
interpretations have been put forward: realistic and idealistic.67 C. E. B. Cranfield, who
interprets the expression “dead to sin” in the idealistic sense, understands it in terms of
four possible hermeneutical categories: judicial, baptismal, moral, and literal or
eschatological.68 For Cranfield the meaning of a believer being “dead to sin” is close to
the baptismal sense in that believers, having been sealed by God’s gracious decision,
have in fact “died to sin.”69 However, he also sees that the forensic or judicial
interpretation of “dead to sin” is “more probable” than the baptismal.70 Cranfield reasons
that believers “died to sin in God’s sight [the less realistic interpretation] when Christ
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died on the cross for them. This is a matter of God’s decision.”71 In the idealistic
interpretation, the phrase “old self was crucified” (v. 6) also embodies a less “radical”
transformation. Cranfield writes that “it is not to be implied here that the old man no
longer exists. Pace Murray I, p. 219f, the old fallen nature hangs on in the believer.”72
When this is taken into account, “dead to sin” in Cranfield’s idealistic reasoning is less
actually and existentially experienced, but more judicially and forensically proclaimed in
God’s sight. In addition, for Cranfield the “crucifixion of the old self” is not a decisive,
experiential annihilation; consequentially it can be understood that the old self was
supplemented by the new self, not radically supplanted by it. In general, Cranfield’s
idealistic interpretation therefore seems to differ from what definitive sanctification
means, viz., a decisive and actual break with sin and its power.
The other possible interpretation for “dead to sin” and “crucifixion of the old
self” is the realistic. In Murray’s writings on definitive sanctification, his interpretation of
“dead to sin” is in fact realistic, i.e., it is wholly experiential and actualized through
mystical union with Christ; therefore a believer’s former slavery to sin and its realm has
been terminated and the old self has been completely annihilated.73 In a similar way
biblical scholars also present “dead to sin” (v. 2) and the “old self was crucified” (v. 6) as
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a “decisive and final break in one’s state of being,”74 “not [a] legal relationship, but
actual power,”75 or a “casting out the old [self],” etc.76 These commentators are not
satisfied to regard “dead to sin” as only a judicial or forensic declaration, nor do they
accept the “crucifixion of the old self” in the merely passive sense. The realistic
interpretation of “dead to sin” and “crucifixion of the old self” is what definitive
sanctification connotes as the believer’s experience in a decisive, actual, and experiential
break with sin and the attendant escape from its powerful realm through the union with
Christ, in which the old self is “realistically” eradicated and then “radically” replaced by
the new self.
The actual and decisive change in the believer’s condition which appears in
Romans 6:2 and 6:6 is also expressed in 6:14a as “dominion.” This text proclaims that sin
will have no dominion over God’s children, who are dying to sin and who crucified their
old self on the cross. Moo points out that this passage “reminds us of just what we have
become in Jesus Christ: ‘dead to sin, alive to God.’ There has already taken place in the
life of the believer a ‘change of lordship.’”77 This change “[provides] the assurance of
the continuance of this new state [so] that the believer can go forth boldly and confidently
to wage war against sin.”78 The phrase “will not rule” (κυριεύσει) is a future tense, but as
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Schreiner notes, this “eschatological future has broken into the present era, for the
mastery of sin has been broken for those who belong to Christ . . . What we have is a
promise that assures believers that sin cannot rule over them [in the here and now].”79
Thus, Romans 6:14a which is based on the argument of Romans 6:2 (“dead to sin”) and
6:6 (“old self was crucified”) supports the notion of definitive sanctification, signifying
that in the lordship of Christ, sin will have no dominion over believers who have
definitively died to sin in mystical union with Christ.
Thus it is reasonable to conclude that Romans 6:1-14 (specifically, 6:2, 6:6, and
6:14a) supports the notion of definitive sanctification.

2.3.1.2 Definitive Sanctification in 1 Corinthians 1:2,80 6:1181
Since Murray also sees a “definitive” dimension as well as regeneration, justification, and
adoption in sanctification in 1 Corinthians 1:2 and 1 Corinthians 6:1182 we must examine
them to see whether they actually support the concept of definitive sanctification.
First, if ἡγιασμένοις “to those who are sanctified” in 1 Corinthians 1:2 is the
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perfect passive participle of the verb ἁγιάζω “to sanctify,” and is merely understood as
sanctification that has already been completed in the past,83 it may be difficult to draw
the complete sense of definitive sanctification from it, for definitive sanctification
includes not only the sense that the action has been completed in the past, but also the
ongoing “condition” of sharing and conforming to Christ’s perfect holiness. Therefore if
“ἡγιασμένοις” depicts the believer’s status as most current exegetical treatments hold,84
in order to legitimately support definitive sanctification it must also include the
“condition” of being sanctified.
But a number of commentators do see the complete sense of definitive
sanctification in 1 Corinthians 1:2. Thiselton writes that the phrases “ἡγιασμένοις” (to
those who are sanctified) and “κλητοῖς ἁγίοις” (called to be holy) refer to the believers’
“special status” or their “already given status” derived from their being in Christ.85 Also,
Fee says that 1 Corinthians 1:2 shows how “they [who are in union with Christ] are to
behave differently from the wicked, because God in his mercy has already removed the
stains of their past sins, has already begun the work of ethical transformation, and has
already given them forgiveness and restored right standing with himself.”86 Schreiner, a
staunch advocate for the notion of definitive sanctification in 1 Corinthians 1:2, notes that
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in referring to believers as the “sanctified in Christ Jesus, [Paul] could scarcely be
referring to their notable progress in holiness. . . . Since they are in Christ, they belong to
the realm of the holy. They are sanctified definitively or positionally, even though they
are not sanctified in terms of personal behavior.”87 In a similar vein, “most of the places
where Paul talks about being ‘holy’ or ‘sanctified,’” Carson observes, “fall into this
POSITIONAL or DEFINITIONAL camp. That is certainly the case in 1 Corinthians
1:2 . . . The Corinthians already are sanctified; they have been set apart for God”
(capitalization and emphasis in the original).88 As Peterson points out, ἡγιασμένοις (to
those who are sanctified) in 1 Corinthians 1:2 “can hardly refer to their holiness of
character or conduct,” but “has to do with the identity and status of those who are ‘in
Christ’” (emphasis added).89 Commentators who see the concept of definitive
sanctification in 1 Corinthians 1:2 are convinced that (1) the object of the plural form of
the dative participle ἡγιασμένοις (to those who are sanctified) is not the ecclesiological
body, but the individual church members who have the personal responsibility to live out
their consecrated status in Christ (Thiselton, Fitzmyer, etc),90 and (2) ἡγιασμένοις is
understood as “the result of divine activity (specifically through union with Christ)” or
“not achieving holiness, but a received gift” and a “divine call” (Fee, Garland, etc.).91
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Given all these affirmative interpretations, it can be safely said that ἡγιασμένοις in 1
Corinthians 1:2 substantially supports the idea of definitive sanctification in terms of the
individual’s already given condition through divine activity and call.
The second issue is the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 6:11, specifically in the
phrase “you were sanctified [ἡγιάσθητε] . . . in [ἐν] the name of the Lord Jesus Christ.”
As Peterson points out, “The verb of the indicative aorist passive form “ἡγιάσθητε” (you
were sanctified) does not refer to a process of ethical development but highlights the fact
that God claimed [the individual Corinthian church members] as his own and made them
members of his holy people.”92 Witherington also notes that the past tense of the verb
ἡγιάσθητε “indicates that Paul is referring to a definitive event in the past.”93 Thus, the
meaning of ἡγιάσθητε is closer to the idea of definitive sanctification than that of
progressive sanctification. As to ἐν (“in” the name of the Lord Jesus Christ), Fee observes
that the usage in the “instrumental sense” is more reasonable than in the “baptismal
sense.”94 That is, not by a baptizing action but only in and through the name and work of
Jesus Christ can sanctification be started and finished. The phrase “ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ
κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ” (in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ) therefore refers “to what
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God has done for his people in Christ.”95 Just as 1 Corinthians 1:2 does, 1 Corinthians
6:11 also includes both the definitive and Christological dimensions in sanctification.

2.3.2. The Confessional Case for Definitive Sanctification
Is it acceptable to say that “… no Reformed confessional document has a doctrine
formally or materially like definitive sanctification” as Fesko claims?96 Although the
Reformed and Presbyterian confessions do not explicitly name definitive sanctification,
their clear affirmation of the lordship of Christ incorporates the idea. Thus, it is not
surprising to find that several Reformed confessions contain the emblem of definitive
sanctification or at least an analogous expression of it.
The first example is Q&A 43 of the Heidelberg Catechism (1563, hereafter
HC):97
Question: What further benefit do we receive from the sacrifice and death of
Christ on the cross?
Answer: That by his power our old man is with him crucified, slain, and
buried; that so the evil lusts of the flesh may no more reign in us, but that
we may offer ourselves unto him a sacrifice of thanksgiving.98
The language “old man is crucified with Christ” (identity) and “sin no more reigns in us”
(lordship) is similar to what definitive sanctification stands for as previously mentioned.
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The new identity and lordship, according to HC 43, are the gracious “practical” benefits
of the sacrifice and death of Christ just as Murray said. Expositors therefore tend to
interpret HC 43 in the context of sanctification. For example, Johannes van der Kemp
closely connects the expression “being crucified, dead, and buried” of HC 43 to
sanctification.99 Likewise according to Allen Verhey the content of HC 43 deals with
“the blessings of membership in Christ” which remain as “practical” interests as well as
“moral” inferences.100 G. H. Kersten concurs with other commentators that HC 43
describes the “fruit of the sacrifice of the Lord that we may already taste here in this life,
the fruit of sanctification” (emphasis added).101 And Norman Jones notes, “Question 43
teaches us . . . he [Christ] died to make us holy, to purify our hearts by the power of the
Holy Spirit. . . . Christians enjoy the benefit of sanctification by the Spirit of Christ!”102
In the way it depicts the believer’s definitive “identity” and “lordship” in relation to sin
through Christ’s works in the context of salvation, one can say that HC 43 gives a
definite picture of definitive sanctification.103
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Not only HC 43, but also HC 1 and 34 show the dimension of definitive sanctification. Cf.
HC 1: “What is thy only comfort in life and in death? That I, with body and soul, both in life and in death,
am not my own, but belong to my faithful Saviour Jesus Christ, who with his precious blood has fully
satisfied for all my sins, and redeemed me from all the power of the devil; and so preserves me that without
the will of my Father in heaven not a hair can fall from my head; yea, that all things must work together for
my salvation. Wherefore, by his Holy Spirit, he also assures me of eternal life, and makes me heartily
willing and ready henceforth to live unto him.” HC 34: “Why callest thou him our Lord? Because, not with
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A second example of definitive sanctification in confessional documents is the
section on sanctification in the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647, hereafter WCF).
WCF 13.1 says that:
They who are effectually called and regenerated, having a new heart and a
new spirit created in them, are further sanctified, really and personally,
through the virtue of Christ’s death and resurrection, by his Word and Spirit
dwelling in them; the dominion of the whole body of sin is destroyed, and
the several lusts thereof are more and more weakened and mortified, and
they more and more quickened and strengthened in all saving graces, to the
practice of true holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord.104
WCF 13.1 describes sanctification in both its definitive and progressive aspects. The
meaning of “the dominion of the whole body of sin is destroyed” is identical with the
meaning of “lordship” expressed in definitive sanctification. Then the language “[sin]
more and more weakened and mortified” and the “[the believer] more and more
quickened and strengthened in all saving graces” evokes an image that we connect with
progressive sanctification. Robert Letham agrees that both conceptions of sanctification
(i.e., definitive and progressive) coexist in WCF 13.1.105 Several expositors have
interpreted the expression “the dominion of the whole body of sin is destroyed” in the
context of regeneration.106 This is a possible interpretation, but there are three more

silver or gold, but with his precious blood, he has redeemed and purchasd us, body and soul, from sin and
from all the power of the devil, to be his own.”
WCF 13.1. See Philip Schaff, ed., “The Westminster Confession of Faith,” in The Creeds of
Christendom with A History and Critical Notes, 3 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1919), 3:629.
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reasonable alternatives in which definitive sanctification may be inferred from WCF
13.1. First, in context the expression “the dominion of the whole body of sin is
destroyed” appears to be the once-for-all, permanent condition of regenerated people who
are then “further sanctified.” Seen in this light, definitive sanctification (“the dominion of
the whole body of sin is destroyed”), vivification (regenerated people), and progressive
sanctification (“further sanctified”) appear to be independent ideas in WCF 13.1. Second,
the expression “the dominion of the whole body of sin is destroyed” appears prior to the
concept of progressive sanctification. This implies that definitive sanctification is
understood as an initial stage before advancing to progressive sanctification. Third, WCF
13.1 is fundamentally about sanctification. It is therefore reasonable that definitive
sanctification is implied in WCF 13.1 in the expression “the dominion of the whole body
of sin is destroyed” where it conveys the idea of “lordship.”

2.3.3. Francis Turretin’s Case for Definitive Sanctification
As seen before, definitive sanctification speaks to believers’ “status” or “identity” in
Christ, i.e., believers are definitively sanctified in union with Christ. While believers
actively make an effort to be holy for the rest of their lives (progressive sanctification),
they are passively sanctified through the mystical union with Christ (definitive
sanctification). Human action or effort is neither needed nor found in definitive

Faith: A Handbook of Christian Doctrine Expounding the Westminster Confession (London: Banner of
Truth Trust, 1958), 194-196; Edward D. Morris, Theology of the Westminster Symbols: A Commentary
Historical, Doctrinal, Practical, on the Confession of Faith and Catechism and the Related Formularies of
the Presbyterian Churches (Columbus: Champlin Press, 1900), 452-455.
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sanctification.
Swiss-Italian Reformed theologian Francis Turretin also speaks of the passive
aspect of sanctification. He states, “it [sanctification] is taken passively, insofar as it is
wrought by God in us; then actively, insofar as it ought to be done by us, God performing
this work in us and by us” (emphasis in the original).107 According to Turretin there is an
aspect of sanctification that God alone accomplishes; thus his concept of passive
sanctification matches the idea of definitive sanctification which is God’s monergistic
work.
Turretin notices the biblical expression “those who are sanctified” (τοὺς
ἁγιαζομένους, Heb 10:14) when he describes the state of the believer.108 For Turretin,
those who are sanctified are not people who merely change their external moral behavior,
but those whose nature itself is renovated. Referring to 1 Thessalonians 5:23 “May the
God of peace himself sanctify you entirely,” Turretin specifies, “it [sanctification]
consists in a change and renovation of the nature itself, corrupted by original sin, by
which depraved qualities and habits are cast out and good ones infused so that the man
desists from evil acts and strives for good.”109 Turretin’s discussion of the “changed
nature” speaks of the believer’s radically altered identity, that he is no longer Satan’s
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Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae, 2:754 (17.1.3); Institutes of Elenctic Theology,
2:689. “Hoc sensu modò passivè sumitur, quatenus fit à Deo in nobis, modò activè quatenus debet fieri à
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offspring, a corrupted one, but God’s child, sanctified by the renovation of his sinful
nature itself by God’s sovereign work. The concept of sanctification that Turretin
proposes is closer to the idea of definitive sanctification than to progressive
sanctification.

2.4. Theological Disagreement
The notion of definitive sanctification has become widely accepted in conservative
evangelical and Reformed circles since Murray elaborated on it.110 In theological
discussions that primarily dealt with progressive sanctification, the dimension of
definitive sanctification has enriched our understanding of the doctrine of sanctification.
However, even though for a long time theological consensus has approved of the idea of
definitive sanctification, recently it has come under fire. The criticisms involve two
theological issues: (1) the relationship between forensic justification and definitive
sanctification, and (2) the placement of definitive sanctification in the ordo salutis.111
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2.4.1. Mixing Forensic Justification with Definitive Sanctification
Fesko is uncomfortable with definitive sanctification, arguing that “it is an unhelpful
category because it confuses the forensic [with the] transformative aspect of our
redemption.”112 For Fesko, definitive sanctification is at best a notion that “muddies the
waters regarding the inseparable but nevertheless distinct blessings of the duplex gratia”
[justification and sanctification].113 The phrase “the decisive and definitive break with
the power and service of sin” that Murray uses to support the idea of definitive
justification, Fesko says “according to the historic witness of the Reformed tradition
[always] comes in justification,” not in definitive sanctification.114 Fesko adds that if
sanctification as defined in Murray’s exposition “contains both forensic [definitive
sanctification] and transformative [progressive sanctification] realities,” “[this] confuses
justification (Christ’s work for us) with sanctification (Christ’s work in us) and
compromises the integrity of both.”115 According to Fesko, if definitive sanctification
indeed “confuses the forensic and transformative categories by taking a statement [that
applies to] justification and [moves] it under the doctrine of sanctification,” the notion
has an “unsatisfactory nature” in terms of the doctrinal category.116
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Fesko, “Sanctification and Union with Christ,” 207. Even though Fesko ceaselessly
emphasizes a “divisibility” between justification and sanctification as well as a “logical priority” of
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sanctification. We receive this inseparable double-blessing, but justification and sanctification are
116

52
Fesko’s criticism is worthwhile in that it provides a valuable opportunity to
analyze in detail the place of definitive sanctification in comparison to other logical
sections of the ordo salutis, specifically in the sphere of justification. However, Fesko’s
basic objection must itself be rejected.
Fesko claims that the idea of definitive sanctification inevitably confuses
justification with sanctification. He appears to say that an objective change in our status
before God is all and only about justification.117 Even if the notion of definitive
sanctification were to include an objective and definitive change in status, Fesko doubts
that both definitive sanctification and justification are needed to explain the change; if he
is correct, then definitive sanctification is redundant and serves no purpose. However, the
heart of his argument does not bear close scrutiny. The fact that our union in Christ
definitively changes our status before God cannot belong under the doctrine of
justification alone; the believer’s union with Christ has other dimensions. Of course, it
would be easier to restrict the concept of justification to our forensic or legal status of
guilt or innocence before God. Yet in Christ believers are no longer slaves but redeemed;
no longer alienated but reconciled; no longer in bondage but liberated; and particularly no
longer corrupt and polluted but holy. In all of these changes there is an objective,
declarative, and once-for-all decisive and definitive reality that is actual and active in the
life of the believer.118 The doctrine of justification by itself cannot satisfactorily

nevertheless distinct and different and must be without confusion, mixture, or separation.” See Fesko,
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encompass all of these.
In particular, if the believer’s definitive changed status before God is limited to
justification as Fesko maintains, then the believer’s changed status with respect to
holiness before God will be missed. Who believers are before God (definitive status)
must include both justification (righteous as opposed to guilty) and sanctification (holy as
opposed to polluted) in union with Christ. Thus these ideas are complementary and allinclusive.

2.4.2. The Placement of Definitive Sanctification in the Ordo Salutis
Murray does not offer a clear view of where definitive sanctification is situated in the
ordo salutis. This leaves us with two theological questions.119 The first, posed by Fesko
himself, is whether forensic justification logically comes prior to sanctification. The
second, asked by Michael Horton, is whether definitive sanctification is placed at a

of justification, but there also was a forensic aspect in his understanding of regeneration and sanctification.”
See Richard A. Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of
Salvation (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 209n27. According to Yoo, Calvin attempted to show
harmony between forensic sanctification (objective aspect; accomplished by Christ) and factual
sanctification (subjective aspect; growth in righteousness). The forensic aspect of sanctification, for Yoo, is
related with Christ’s satisfactory and vicarious atonement (see Calvin’s Commentaries, Heb 5:9, 10:10-14;
John 5:9, 17:19, etc.); the factual aspect is with the impartation of Christ’s holiness to the church, a
conformity to the pattern of Christ’s sanctification, and mortification and vivification in Christ’s death and
resurrection (see Calvin’s Commentaries, John 2:6, Rom 8:28-29; 2 Cor 8:9 and Institutes, 3.3.5, etc.). See
Yoo, A Reformed Doctrine of Sanctification for the Korean Context, 55-62. See also Jesse Couenhoven,
“Grace as Pardon and Power: Pictures of the Christian Life in Luther, Calvin, and Barth,” Journal of
Religious Ethics 28, no. 1 (2000): 63-88.
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“Definitive Sanctification” and “The Agency of Definitive Sanctification,” Murray does not try to assign
the placement of definitive sanctification in the ordo salutis.
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distinct and independent point in the ordo salutis.120

2.4.2.1. Logical Priority121 of Justification over Sanctification
Fesko’s criticism of definitive sanctification is based on his conviction that forensic
justification is the predecessor to sanctification on the basis of union with Christ.122
Fesko’s argument brought him into a theological debate with Richard Gaffin.123 He
insists that Gaffin has mistakenly mixed the duplex gratia together by not properly
recognizing the priority of forensic justification before sanctification.124 Fesko is firm
about the need to maintain this sequence and avoid treating forensic justification and
sanctification as an amalgam. Fesko’s securing the order of justification before
sanctification is theologically correct and proper, for indeed the logical priority of
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forensic justification over progressive sanctification has never been in dispute.125 Murray
endorses it elsewhere,126 and no one questions this truth.127
However, the logical placement of justification prior to all aspects of
sanctification in the ordo salutis is not so straightforward.128 First, according to Calvin
justification and sanctification are given to the faithful “simultaneously” (simul) as well
as distinctively,129 and second, the logical sequence has mainly been argued using
progressive sanctification, not definitive sanctification.130
This second point is directly connected to the present study. Fesko does not allow
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for definitive sanctification when he highlights the importance of the logical priority of
justification over sanctification; this is a consistent omission for him since he dismisses
entirely the concept of definitive sanctification.131 Even though Murray also endorses
securing the logical priority of forensic justification over progressive sanctification in the
ordo salutis,132 he does not explicitly mention anywhere the order of forensic
justification and definitive sanctification. Rather, he concentrates on affirming that both
forensic justification and definitive sanctification are a result of or directly stem from
union with Christ’s death and resurrection.133 In his discussion of definitive
sanctification Murray does not directly address the logical order of justification and
definitive sanctification but chooses instead to examine the ordo salutis through the lens
of union with Christ. For Murray it is more important to see the soteriological duplex
gratia in the light of union with Christ134 rather than to make an exhaustive (and
exhausting) effort to find the priority between justification and definitive sanctification.
But Murray does consider the logical soteriological sequence, inasmuch as he endorses
the logical priority of forensic justification ahead of progressive sanctification. In
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Murray’s words: “Indeed the whole process of salvation has its origin in one phase of
union with Christ and salvation has in view the realization of other phases of union with
Christ.”135 Since it is appropriate to place the duplex gratia under the umbrella of union
with Christ, attempting to place forensic justification ahead of both definitive and
progressive sanctification rather than only the progressive aspect is illogical. Definitive
sanctification should be understood as the “condition,”136 or state, or mode of existence
of sharing in Christ’s perfect holiness through mystical union with Christ, not as part of a
particular order or sequence.
In sum, the notion of definitive sanctification can best be understood in the allencompassing concept of union with Christ rather than in the logical soteriological steps,
for definitive sanctification is simply the “condition” or “state” of conforming to Christ’s
perfect holiness in union with Christ.137

2.4.2.2. The Ordo Salutis and Definitive Sanctification
Before addressing the issue of where definitive sanctification might be situated in the
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ordo salutis, a relationship between the classic ordo and definitive sanctification must
first be established. According to Murray, the ordo is about the application of the
redemption accomplished in Christ.138 The elements of the classic ordo which Murray
affirms139 include calling, regeneration, conversion, justification, sanctification, and
perseverance of the saints.140 A distinction can be drawn between calling and
regeneration on one hand and the conversion, justification, sanctification, and
perseverance of the saints on the other. The first group of terms is monergistic, i.e., all
God-acting—only God ordains and actually accomplishes them. The second group of
terms has both God- and human-acting components: the human acts in faith, obedience,
perseverance, courage, etc. With this second grouping there is a risk that human efforts
might be emphasized more than God’s initiative.
In the classic ordo, definitive sanctification identifies the divine initiative aspect
of sanctification, while progressive sanctification identifies the human response in
obedience. Thus definitive sanctification and progressive sanctification are distinct and
necessary aspects of the same reality (sanctification) in the ordo. Emphasizing definitive
sanctification does not change the classic ordo; it only places an appropriately equal
emphasis on both sovereign initiative and human response.
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2.4.2.3. Does Definitive Sanctification Represent a Distinct and Independent Point within
the Ordo Salutis?
While recognizing the theological verity and helpfulness of Murray’s notion of definitive
sanctification, Horton separates himself by arguing that “[unlike] Murray, however, I
would treat definitive and progressive sanctification as two aspects of the same reality
rather than two distinct points in the ordo salutis.”141 Fesko also points out that Murray’s
idea of definitive sanctification seems to support an assumption that he has something
else in mind other than the established ordo salutis.142 Murray gives the impression that
definitive sanctification is placed in the ordo salutis distinctively and independently in
the same way as are other logical steps in the sequence. This may arise from those parts
of Murray’s argument that seem contradictory.
Murray says:
We properly think of calling, regeneration, justification, and adoption as
acts of God effected [once-for-all], and not requiring or admitting of
repetition. It is of their nature to be definitive. But a considerable part of
New Testament teaching places sanctification in this category. When Paul,
for example, addresses the believers at Corinth as the church of God
‘sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints’ (I Cor. 1:2), and later in the
same Epistle reminds them that they were ‘washed, sanctified, and justified’
(I Cor. 6:11), it is apparent that he co-ordinated their sanctification with
effectual calling, with their identity as saints, with regeneration, and with
justification [emphasis added].143
But he also says:
While regeneration is an all-important factor in definitive sanctification, it
would not be proper to subsume the latter under the topic ‘regeneration.’
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The reason is that what is most characteristic in definitive sanctification,
namely, death to sin by union with Christ in his death and newness of life
by union with him in his resurrection, cannot properly be referred to as
regeneration by the Spirit. There is multiformity to that which occurs at the
inception of the Christian life, and each facet must be accorded its own
particularity. Calling, for example, as the action of the Father, must not be
defined in terms of what is specifically the action of the Holy Spirit,
namely, regeneration. Definitive sanctification, likewise, must be allowed
its own individuality. We impoverish our conception of definitive grace
when we fail to appreciate the distinctiveness of each aspect, or indulge in
over-simplification.144
The former quotation is about simultaneity (i.e., the absence of logical sequence) or
better, the inseparability of definitive sanctification from the rest of the soteriological
order; the latter quotation is about the independence of definitive sanctification from
other moments in the ordo. In other words, definitive sanctification in Murray’s scheme
cooperates and collaborates with calling, regeneration, and justification at the inception
of Christian life, but is at the same time distinct and different from them and therefore
cannot be amalgamated with the rest of the soteriological order. In simultaneously
viewing these two different pictures of definitive sanctification (i.e., that they are both
inseparable and distinct), Murray does not describe a uniquely independent point for
definitive sanctification in the established ordo salutis. Still, Murray offers two
considerations.
First, in the classic ordo, definitive sanctification is understood to be particularly
within the sphere of sanctification. For Murray, definitive sanctification is only one of the
distinct aspects of sanctification. Horton contends that Murray does not treat definitive
and progressive sanctification as two aspects of the same reality, but as two distinct
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points in the ordo salutis.145 But his view can be discounted since Murray actually treats
sanctification as having three aspects of the same reality, i.e., definitive, progressive, and
eschatological.146 Definitive sanctification is the initial and dispositional change that is
the decisive and irreversible break with sin and its defilement and power, and thus signals
the once-for-all transformation of the believer’s identity and lordship with regard to the
realm of sin. Progressive or transformative sanctification, which follows definitive
sanctification, is the lifelong sanctifying process that embraces both mortification of sin
and vivification of new life in a continuing sense.147 Contrast this with the eschatological
perspective—“already, but also not yet”—which reveals that even though believers were
already sanctified in the definitive sense and are still being sanctified in the progressive
sense, the final fulfillment of sanctification does not come until the eschaton. In “The
Goal of Sanctification” Murray elaborates on the eschatological aspect of sanctification,
stating that in the day of the Lord believers “will [finally] be able to contain the full
manifestation of the glory of God, and it is the full manifestation of the glory of God that
will itself bring with it the glorification of the believer. These are correlative the one with
the other.”148 In these three aspects of sanctification the notion of definitive
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sanctification plays its specific role in describing the believer’s initial condition followed
by the progressive and then the final fulfillment of sanctification.
Second, the theme of “union with Christ” is Murray’s central solution to obviate
the appearance of contradiction. He shows that definitive sanctification is distinct from
effectual calling, regeneration, and justification, albeit in a closely correlated
soteriological order, but they all ultimately converge in the believer’s union with Christ.
Murray notes:
Obviously it [union with Christ] is an important aspect of the application of
redemption and, if we did not take account of it, not only would our
presentation of the application of redemption be defective but our view of
the Christian life would be gravely distorted. Nothing is more central or
basic than union and communion with Christ. . . . [U]nion with Christ is in
itself a very broad and embracive subject. It is not simply a step in the
application of redemption; when viewed, according to the teaching of
Scripture, in its broader aspects it underlies every step of the application of
redemption. Union with Christ is really the central truth of the whole
doctrine of salvation not only in its application but also in its once-for-all
accomplishment in the finished work of Christ.149
Since every step in the soteriological order stems from the same root, namely, union with
Christ, retaining the particularity and uniqueness of each step does not disorder the ordo
salutis, but rather shows that its salvific meaning is rich and multifaceted. Murray
emphasizes definitive sanctification’s own particularity, not to make a new place for it in
the classic ordo salutis as some assume, but to ensure that definitive sanctification is not
confused or mixed with other redemptive steps so that its own place does not collapse
and disappear. For Murray, definitive sanctification stands as the initial stage in the
threefold sanctification in the ordo and is grounded in union with Christ just as the other
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salvific steps are. Union with Christ therefore functions not only as the lifeline for each
unique soteriological step, but also synchronizes each particular step of the ordo salutis
into one consistent salvific viewpoint.
In sum, definitive sanctification is understood to be the first of three aspects of
the one reality of sanctification in the classic ordo. Definitive sanctification points to the
divine initiative of sanctification; human response acts in the sphere of progressive
sanctification. The uniqueness of definitive sanctification in the ordo salutis must be seen
in the light of union with Christ.

2.4.3. Lessons from Theological Debates
Murray’s conception of definitive sanctification has theological benefit in that it helps to
defend against the error of seeing sanctification as based on human merit. It also helps to
focus our attention on the role of union with Christ in sanctification as presented in
Scripture. And it highlights an otherwise obscured aspect of sanctification, i.e., its
definitiveness and decisiveness. This is why the concept has been actively employed so
successfully in the discussion of sanctification. Yet it is also true that the idea of
definitive sanctification has not been sufficiently clarified, which is why questions have
arisen concerning where it is positioned in the ordo salutis, or whether it belongs there at
all.
It is hard to deny that Murray has opened himself up to misunderstandings since
he does not directly address the issues which are now being criticized. Yet it is important
to keep in mind Murray’s chief concern was not to defend the existence or position of
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definitive sanctification in the ordo salutis; rather his main interest was to provide
scriptural evidence pointing to the “definitive” aspect of sanctification, and to address the
way that in the soteriology of his day progressive sanctification overemphasized the role
that human activity plays in sanctification.
However, even with the limited evidence presented thus far we have successfully
defended the concept of definitive sanctification against the objections, only having
shown that it merely speaks to the “condition” or “state” of being sanctified as a result of
having been conformed to Christ’s perfect holiness in and through mystical union with
Christ. The concept of definitive sanctification is not intended nor does it in fact upset the
classic ordo salutis; attempts to deflect the discussion in this direction ignore the main
point.

2.4.4. Definitive Sanctification and Faith
In the past the Reformation principle of sola fide has been recognized as residing in the
sphere of justification; Christians are in general more accustomed to hearing the
expression “justification by faith.”150 Yet this study maintains that Christians are also

When Ferguson talks about the “means of sanctification,” he does not mention “faith,” but
provides four other major means, namely, the Word, the providence, the fellowship of the church, and the
sacraments. See Sinclair B. Ferguson, “The Reformed View,” in Christian Spirituality: Five Views of
Sanctification, ed. Donald Alexander (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1988), 67-74. Meantime,
Ferguson mentions the role of faith in the realm of sanctification in the context of emphasizing the
foundational importance of union with Christ: “[T]his union with Christ does not take place over our heads,
as it were. It engages our whole being. Consequently, a second element in it is that of faith. In the New
Testament’s language, we believe into Christ (pisteuein eis), that is, into union with him. Faith involves
trusting in and resting on the resources of Christ as though they were our own.” See Ferguson, “The
Reformed View,” 51.
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sanctified by faith.151 As Anthony Hoekema explains it, faith is a means of sanctification
because it is by faith that “we continue to grasp our union with Christ, which is the heart
of sanctification”; it is also by faith that “we accept the fact that in Christ sin no longer
has the mastery over us”; and finally it is by faith that “we grasp the power of the Holy
Spirit, which enables us to overcome sin and live for God.”152
But even having heard it expressed so succinctly does not necessarily make it
easier to hold onto the idea that we are sanctified by faith. To better pin it down, we must
first answer the question of whether justification by faith and sanctification by faith are
distinct from one other.153 Then we must determine whether the term definitive
sanctification can be used to describe any part of sanctification by faith. Finally, with
these questions settled it must be determined whether or not the role of faith in definitive
sanctification is different from that of progressive sanctification. These questions are
closely related to the theology of the role of faith in justification and sanctification
generally or in definitive and progressive sanctification specifically.
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In answer to the first question, faith performs as a passive instrument and has a
receptive function in the realm of justification. The passive role and receptive nature of
faith in justification is well defined in the WCF and LC (Westminster Larger Catechism)
LC 73 answers the question “How does faith justify a sinner in the sight of God?” thusly:
Faith justifies a sinner in the sight of God, not because of those other graces
which do always accompany it, or of good works that are the fruits of it, nor
as if the grace of faith, or any act thereof, were imputed to him for his
justification; but only as it is an instrument by which he receives and
applies Christ and His righteousness [emphasis added].154
WCF 11.1.2 also defines the relationship between justification and faith:
Those whom God effectually calls, He also freely justifies; not by infusing
righteousness into them, but by pardoning their sins, and by accounting and
accepting their persons as righteous; not for anything wrought in them, or
done by them, but for Christ’s sake alone; nor by imputing faith itself, the
act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them, as their
righteousness; but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto
them, they receiving and resting on Him and His righteousness by faith;
which faith they have not of themselves, it is the gift of God. Faith, thus
receiving and resting on Christ and His righteousness, is the alone
instrument of justification; yet it is not alone in the person justified, but is
ever accompanied with all other saving graces, and is no dead faith, but
works by love [emphasis added].155
In both the WCF and LC, while justifying faith is a receptive act it is solely a gift from
God. Faith is merely the receptive instrument by which humans receive, trust, and rest in
Christ’s righteousness so as to be righteous in the sight of God.156
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As to the second question, justifying faith and sanctifying faith are different and
distinct.157 If justifying faith is understood to be passive and receptive described above,
then sanctifying faith is understood as active and operative. In J. C. Ryle’s words,
“Justifying faith is a grace that ‘worketh not,’ but simply trusts, rests, and leans on Christ
(Rom. iv. 5). Sanctifying faith is a grace of which the very life is action: it ‘worketh by
love,’ and like a mainspring, moves the whole inward man (Gal. v. 6).”158
It is true that when the expression “sanctification by faith” is used it normally
refers to the process or means of “progressive” sanctification. G. C. Berkouwer notes:
The immediate consequence of the “sola-fide” doctrine was exactly this
indissoluble bond between faith and sanctification. And we speak of faith,
not as a point of departure for a fresh emission of power, or as a human
function or potency producing other effects, but of faith as true orientation
toward the grace of God and as the life which flourishes on this divine
grace, on the forgiveness of sins. . . . The Sola-fide is at the heart of
justification but no less at that of sanctification. . . . Faith is not inactive,
cannot be inactive, but operates in our common daily life.159
In contrast to the passive and receptive role of faith in the sphere of justification, faith in
the sphere of progressive sanctification is active and operative. However, this effective
function of faith should not be regarded as a manifestation of human potency or ability.
Rather, just as with passive/receptive faith it is solely God’s gracious gift. Even though
justifying faith and sanctifying faith are functionally distinct and different, nevertheless
they essentially aim in the same soteriological direction and ultimately converge in
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“saving faith.” WCF 14.2 describes it as follows:
By this [saving] faith, a Christian believes to be true whatsoever is revealed
in the Word, for the authority of God Himself speaking therein; and acts
differently upon that which each particular passage thereof contains;
yielding obedience to the commands, trembling at the threatenings, and
embracing the promises of God for this life, and that which is to come. But
the principal acts of saving faith are accepting, receiving, and resting upon
Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life, by virtue of the
covenant of grace [emphasis added].160
Saving faith encompasses not only justifying faith but also sanctifying faith. A
passive/receptive faith of justification and an active/operative faith of progressive
sanctification work together as saving faith in order to taste the ultimate soteriological
fruit of redemption and a redemptive life. As Hoekema puts it, faith “is not only a
receptive organ but also an operative power. True faith by its very nature produces
spiritual fruit.”161
Third, although the relationship between faith and justification has been actively
discussed, the question of the relationship between faith and definitive sanctification has
scarcely been touched. Even when Berkouwer enunciates an embryonic concept of
definitive sanctification in his exposition, “The Genesis of Regeneration,”162 he does not
investigate how faith functions in the realm of definitive sanctification.163 Murray is also
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silent on it. The silence is broken by Calvin Beisner who says that Christians “do not
believe in order to be reborn – or to be definitively sanctified. Instead, faith is a
consequence of rebirth, which is one aspect of definitive sanctification”164 (emphasis in
the original). Beisner adds:
In justification, faith is a passive instrument that receives Christ’s
righteousness as the ground of God’s declaration that we are righteous in
His sight. In definitive sanctification, faith is the effect of God’s
regenerating work and is one of the changes wrought in us to separate us
not only from the unholy world but also from our own unholy past. In
progressive sanctification, faith is an active cause that produces our growth
in holiness of character and conduct (emphasis in the original).165
For Beisner, definitive sanctification defines faith as a result and outcome of
regeneration. This conclusion appears to be based on the following suppositions: (1)
definitive sanctification and regeneration are conceptually identical;166 therefore (2)
definitive sanctification (regeneration) must logically precede justification;167 and (3) the
faith of definitive sanctification (regeneration) becomes the instrument for justification.168
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Beisner reasons that faith in the dimension of definitive sanctification is acquired as an
outcome of regeneration which occurs solely by God’s sovereign grace. This is what the
“divine monergism” of regeneration stands for. J. I. Packer describes it thusly:
Spiritual vivification is a free, and to man mysterious, exercise of divine
power (John 3:8), not explicable in terms of the combination or cultivation
of existing human resources (John 3:6), not caused or induced by any
human efforts (John 1:12-13) or merits (Titus 3:3-7), and not, therefore, to
be equated with, or attributed to, any of the experiences, decisions, and acts
to which it gives rise and by which it may be known to have taken place.169
The nature of faith in the realm of definitive sanctification (or regeneration in Beisner’s
postulate) is totally free of human effort and merit. Although Murray does not equate
definitive sanctification with regeneration,170 and also does not explicitly mention it
regarding the nature of faith in the sphere of definitive sanctification, he would at least
agree that definitive sanctification and its effects are not obtained by human merited faith,
but by a monergistic gracious act—in Murray’s crucial point, through “union with
Christ.” In other words, humans do not and cannot believe in order to experience the
once-for-all definitive and irreversible break with the power and service of sin. Instead, it
is only the mystical union with Christ’s death and resurrection that results in that decisive
break; they are then also given the faith in who they are (identity) and by whom they are
ruled (lordship).
Faith in justification, as observed above, is passive/receptive and faith in
progressive sanctification is active/operative. Both faiths are performed by believers
J. I. Packer, “Regeneration,” in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1984), 925. This is requoted from Reymond, A New Systematic
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acting not with God synergistically171 but as subordinates, for faith either in justification
or progressive sanctification springs from God’s grace and is thus solely God’s gift. 172
Having accepted this, what is the exact role of faith in bringing about definitive
sanctification? Beisner’s answer is succinct: “[P]recisely nothing. . . . Far from saying
that we are definitively sanctified by faith, we must say rather that we are made believers
by our definitive sanctification.”173 In other words, the human’s act of faith does not
serve as the primary or first cause of definitive sanctification per se because it relies
solely on God’s work, but the human’s faith is certainly required in the realm of
progressive sanctification in order to “continue to grasp our union with Christ, which is
the heart of sanctification.”174

2.5. The Four Core Characteristics of Definitive Sanctification
Now that definitive sanctification has been clearly defined, it can be explained using four
characteristics that it has in common with active justification.
First is the quality of “inseparability.” Definitive sanctification does not replace
or supersede progressive sanctification because they are both rooted in who Christians are
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(identity) and by who rules them (lordship) through union with Christ. Definitive and
progressive sanctification are therefore indivisible and inseparable. The former is the
driving force of the latter; the latter is the spiritual fruit of the former. Inseparability
means that definitive sanctification and moral progression do not contradict but
complement one another, and human works while not meritorious, are still included in
the sphere of sanctification.
The second characteristic of definitive sanctification is “objectivity and
decisiveness.” Sanctification includes not only a continuing aspect, but also a once-for-all
decisive aspect; in both aspects it is God-driven (objective) and in the definitive aspect it
is decisive. The decisive characteristic is expressed in relation to sin where definitive
sanctification leads to a once-for-all irreversible break with the realm in which sin reigns
unto death. Yet this decisive characteristic does not mean the Wesleyan “sinless” state,
but rather it denotes an immutable change of ownership where the believer’s status is
definitively changed from a child of wrath into one of grace and righteousness.
The third characteristic is “Christ-centeredness.” The alpha and omega of
definitive sanctification is the mystical union with Christ; it helps define how through
union with Him sinners die to sin and are raised to new life through His death and
resurrection, and how Christians share His perfectly holy nature. Thus definitive
sanctification is a decisive condition or state, or mode of existence of holiness, not a
particular order or a sequence in the established ordo.
The fourth characteristic of definitive sanctification is “God’s absolute
sovereignty in salvation.” God’s absolute rule over salvation is fully represented in
definitive sanctification, inasmuch as the concept reveals that sanctification, which had
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been generally understood as merely the ongoing, lifelong progression toward holiness by
the human agent, is ultimately God-driven. This does not mean that human agency is
totally unnecessary and unrewarded in the realm of sanctification. The Holy Spirit is the
primary agent when sanctification begins; as it continues the human being joins Him as
the secondary agent in progressive sanctification. The answer to who is the primary agent
is always God, not the human.

2.6. Summary
This chapter dealt with definitive sanctification by analyzing the work of its chief
representative John Murray. It answers key objections to his view by presenting biblical,
confessional, and theological evidence.
The two main themes of definitive sanctification are identity and lordship.
Definitive sanctification speaks of the believer’s decisively changed status, i.e., who
believers ultimately are when they are united with Christ. Definitive sanctification also
speaks of the believer’s decisively changed ownership, i.e., who believers ultimately
belong to once sin no longer has dominion over them. This idea is supported by Romans
6:2 (“dead to sin”), 6:6 (“old self was crucified”), and 6:14a (“sin will have no dominion
over you”). In particular, the stative and perfective tense of 1 Corinthians 1:2
(ἡγιασμένοις—“to those who are sanctified”) and 1 Corinthians 6:11 (ἡγιάσθητε—“you
were sanctified”) convey the exact meaning of definitive sanctification.
This chapter also dealt with the confessional and theological evidence for
definitive sanctification. Here again the two main themes of definitive sanctification
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(identity and lordship) can be found in the statements of HC 43 and WCF 13.1. Francis
Turretin’s concept of passive sanctification, which speaks of God’s monergistic work in
the sphere of sanctification, also approximates the meaning of definitive sanctification.
The chapter then dealt with theological objections to definitive sanctification.
These disagreements involve whether the concepts of forensic justification and definitive
sanctification are mixed or confused (Fesko), and whether definitive sanctification is
distinctly positioned in the ordo salutis (Horton). The former concern is voided when we
make the distinction between our definitive change in status from “guilty before God” to
“righteous before God” (forensic justification), and our definitive change in status from
“corrupted/polluted before God” to “holy before God” (definitive sanctification) in and
through union with Christ. Both changes are definitive and decisive, but they are still
conceptually distinct. Furthermore, the concern regarding the placement of definitive
sanctification in the ordo salutis is put to rest when we see that definitive sanctification
does not occupy an independent place in the ordo but is rather the “condition” of sharing
in Christ’s perfect holiness, and as such it is one of the two aspects of the same reality,
i.e., “sanctification,” in the classic ordo. Definitive sanctification describes the divine
initiative under God the Father’s sovereignty, and progressive sanctification describes
human responsibility under God the Holy Spirit’s sovereignty, both rooted in the
believer’s union with Christ. Taken together with progressive sanctification, definitive
sanctification affirms that sanctification is never human-driven but entirely God-driven.

CHAPTER 3
ACTIVE JUSTIFICATION

In the previous chapter we explored the two inseparable and indivisible aspects of
sanctification, definitive and progressive. Justification also has two aspects, active and
passive which are also inseparable and indivisible. In the same way that definitive
sanctification has often been overlooked or dismissed in theology, active justification is
rarely mentioned and sometimes even rejected outright.1 Louis Berkhof (1873-1957) is
one theologian who offers a clear affirmation of active (or objective) justification:
This is justification in the most fundamental sense of the word. It is basic to
what is called subjective justification, and consists in a declaration which
God makes respecting the sinner, and this declaration is made in the tribunal
of God. This declaration is not a declaration in which God simply acquits
the sinner, without taking any account of the claims of justice, but is rather a
divine declaration that, in the case of the sinner under consideration, the
demands of the law are met. The sinner is declared righteous in view of the
fact that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to him. In this transaction
God appears, not as an absolute Sovereign who simply sets the law aside,
but as a righteous Judge, who acknowledges the infinite merits of Christ as
a sufficient basis for justification, and as a gracious Father, who freely
forgives and accepts the sinner. This active justification logically precedes
faith and passive justification. We believe the forgiveness of sins [emphasis
in the original].2
Berkhof also comments on the objectivity of the divine tribunal’s decision to impute
Christ’s righteousness to the sinner as the necessary precursor to the aptly named passive

1

E.g., the idea of active justification is missing in the theologies of Hodge, Systematic Theology,
114-212; Horton, The Christian Faith, 620-647; Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian
Faith, 739-756; J. van Genderen and W. H. Velema, Concise Reformed Dogmatics, 606-644; Millard J.
Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1998), 968-978; Grudem, Systematic
Theology, 722-735.
2
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justification which “takes place in the heart or conscience of the sinner.”3
This chapter will elucidate and elaborate on the necessity of including active
justification in any sound soteriology. We will examine the relevant terms and ideas used
by several theologians in the Reformed tradition (Maccovius, Turretin, and à Brakel),
then explore the biblical support for the concept, and expose and explain the
misunderstandings, misuse, and neglect of the idea that are found in the errors of
antinomianism and hyper-Calvinism. Finally, we will show that when properly
understood and presented, definitive sanctification and active justification serve to clarify
the doctrine of sanctification, thus avoiding theological confusion and providing practical
benefit to the believer.

3.1. Clarification of Terms
In distinguishing (but not separating) active from passive justification, Berkhof says that
“when the Bible speaks of justification, it usually refers to what is known as passive
justification.”4 Since passive justification has been the primary focus of most
theologians, it is important to make clear the distinction between it and active
justification.
First, the distinction is a matter of perspective. The active perspective is God’s

Berkhof, ST, 517. Berkhof’s main point is that “[a] purely objective justification that is not
brought home to the sinner would not answer the purpose. The granting of a pardon would mean nothing to
a prisoner, unless the glad tidings were communicated to him and the doors of the prison were opened.”
Furthermore, “It should be borne in mind, however, that the two cannot be separated. The one is based on
the other. The distinction is simply made to facilitate the proper understanding of the act of justification.
Logically, passive justification follows faith; we are justified by faith.”
3

4

Berkhof, ST, 517.

77

and the passive perspective is the human. Simple Latin grammar reveals them; according
to Johannes Maccovius (or Maccowski, 1588-1644), nouns ending in –io in Latin, such as
justificatio, usually have both an active and a passive sense.5 That is, God justifies
(active voice); human beings are justified (passive voice). Similarly, Francis Turretin
(1623-1687) states that “since justification can be viewed either actively (on the part of
God who justifies) or passively (on the part of man who is justified), a twofold
understanding of it can also be adopted: either with respect to the benefit itself conferred
upon us by God and of the righteousness imputed to us, or with respect to its reception
and application made by faith.”6 Wilhelmus à Brakel (1635-1711) makes the same point:
God must be viewed as the Justifier and man as the one being justified.
Justification is therefore the pronouncement of a sentence, not only
concerning man, but also addressed to man. One can thus view the act of
justification from God’s perspective, that is, what He performs in this act, or
from man’s perspective, noting the manner whereby man receives this.
When viewing this act from God’s perspective it is referred to as
justification activa, active justification. When viewed from man’s
perspective it is referred to as justification passiva, passive justification.7
“Justificatio alia est active, alia passive. Verbalia in io, plerumque ita accipiuntur, justificat
enim Deus, et nos justificatmur.” See Johannes Maccovius, Distinctiones et regulae theologicae ac
philosophicae (Franeker: sumptibus Joannis Archerii, 1653), 124. Maccovius also finds the distinction
between active and passive justification in Keckermann, Twisse, among others. See Maccovius, Collegia
theologica quae extant mmnia, tertio ab auctore recognita, emendata & plurimis locis aucta, in partes duas
distributa, 423-425. For Maccovius’ theological distinction and its usage in his theology of justification, see
W. J. van Asselt, “The Theologian’s Tool Kit: Johannes Maccovius (1588-1644) and the Development of
Reformed Theological Distinctions,” Westminster Theological Journal 68, no. 1 (2006): 23-40; Gerrit A.
van den Brink, “Johannes Maccovius (1588-1644) en de rechtvaardiging van eeuwigheid,” Theologia
Reformata 51, no. 4 (2008): 336-353; Joel R. Beeke and Mark Jones, eds., “Thomas Goodwin and
Johannes Maccovius on Justification from Eternity,” 133-148. Maccovius’ Distinctiones et regulae
theologicae ac philosophicae has been translated into English by Willem van Asselt, et al. See Maccovius,
Scholastic Discourse.
5

6

Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae, 2:731 (16.7.1); Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2:669.
“Cum Justificatio possit spectari, vel active a parte Dei qui justificat, vel passive, a parte hominis qui
justificatur. Duplex etiam eius tractatio institui potest, Vel respectu ipsius beneficii a Deo nobis indulti, &
Justitiae nobis imputatae, Vel respectu receptionis & applicationis eius, quae fit per fidem . . .”
Wilhelmus à Brakel, De redelijke godsdienst (Leiden, 1893), XXXIV.LIII.1; The Christian’s
Reasonable Service, 2:376. “In de rechtvaardigmaking komt God voor als rechtvaardigende, en de mens,
als gerechtvaardigd wordende; zodat rechtvaardigmaking is een uitspraak van sententie, niet alleen over de
7
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Thus three significant theologians in the Reformed tradition agree that the distinction
between active and passive justification can be seen as a matter of perspective, one divine
and the other human, depending on who is perceived to be either actively doing the
justifying (God) or passively receiving it in faith (humans).
Second, active and passive justification can be distinguished in terms of the role
of faith. While active (objective) justification takes place in the tribunal of God and
logically precedes faith, passive (subjective) justification takes place in the conscience of
the sinner and logically follows faith (i.e., sinners are justified by faith).8 For Berkhof, the
concept of justification before faith9 is not problematic, at least in the distinction between
active and passive justification, for “active justification logically precedes faith,”
and “[l]ogically, passive justification follows faith,” so “the two [active and passive
justification] cannot be separated,” because “[t]he one is based on the other.”10 There is
therefore only one reality—forgiveness of sins—but a twofold expression, with passive
justification being based on active justification.11 This distinction reassures believers, for
if they thought their justification were only the result of their own subjective faith in

mens, maar ook tot de mens. Zodat men diezelfde daad van rechtvaardigen aanmerken kan, of aan de zijde
Gods, hoe God ze doet, óf aan de zijde des mensen, boe zij ze ontvangt. Als men ze aan de zijde Gods
aanmerkt, dan wordt ze genoemd Justificatio activa, de dadelijke rechtvaardigmaking; als men ze aanmerkt
aan de zijde des mensen, dan wordt ze genoemd Justificatio passiva, de lijdelijke rechtvaardigmaking.”
8

Berkhof, ST, 517.

Although Berkhof speaks of the idea of “justification before faith” in active justification, it does
not mean at all that justification is already complete before faith. That’s why Berkhof later criticizes the
notion of “justification from eternity” which is the idea of justification’s termination before faith, even in
eternity. See Berkhof, ST, 517-519.
9

10

Berkhof, ST, 517.
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moments of weak faith they could doubt and even despair of their salvation. At such
times the believer needs to know that justification does not depend wholly on personal
subjective faith but on the objectivity of God’s gracious declaration. In this sense, active
justification logically precedes faith.
These two points remind us that when we say that we are “justified by faith
alone” this does not mean that justification comes primarily from human faith or from a
self-induced moral change in the human heart. Rather, it is grounded primarily in the
“objective” fact that human beings are declared righteous in the tribunal of a gracious
God without assistance from the human “subject.” However, active justification does not
negate the Protestant Reformation’s sola fide. As Bavinck notes, “Active justification has
a tendency, so to speak, to communicate itself in faith and by faith to bring about its own
acceptance.”12 So although active justification logically precedes faith, it does not mean
that faith is excluded. Active justification that logically precedes faith and passive
justification that takes place in faith merely complement one another. In fact, God’s
active justification becomes the “object” of justifying faith. In order to be saved we must
believe that “it is God who justifies.”
Now on to the third point. Along with the two perspectives, i.e., the divine and
the human, and the role of faith, active and passive justification are distinguished by
priority. Daniel Wyttenbach (1706-1779) rightly refers to active justification as the “first
justification” and passive justification as the “second justification,”13 with the second

Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219. “De justificatio activa draagt nl. om zo te spreken,
de tendentie in zich, om zich in het geloof mee te delen en door het geloof zich te laten aannemen.”
12

13

Wyttenbach, Tentamen theologiae dogmaticae methodo scientifica pertractatae, 2.9.1146 (p.
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always following the first. Without the active the passive logically cannot happen. Thus
Berkhof can say, “This is [active] justification in the most fundamental sense of the word.
It is basic to what is called subjective [passive] justification.”14 In this context it is
understood that this priority is logical but not temporal. In Bavinck’s words: “[C]ertainly
one must take account of the fact that the above distinction [between active and passive
justification], though it has logical import, has no temporal significance.”15 This is
important because failure to recognize it opens the door to the idea of eternal justification
or to antinomianism.16
Although the Reformed theologians who affirm active justification all agree on
its basic meaning, there are differences in emphasis. Maccovius took it to a higher level
of abstraction, making a scholastic distinction between actu esse (actual existence) and
esse cognitum (cognitive existence) in order to lay emphasis on the idea that it is enough
for us to be only “in the mind of God” (esse cognitum) to legitimately be the objects of
God’s justifying grace.17 This line of thought does not appear in other writers such as à
Brakel, Turretin, Bavinck, or Berkhof et al. who choose to simply emphasize the divine
initiative in justification; Maccovius’ distinction is also of no concern to writers who

2:939).
14

Berkhof, ST, 517.

15

Bavinck, GD, 4:199 (§51.476); RD, 4:219; idem, GD 4:185 (§51.472); RD, 4:203.

16

Cf. Bavinck, GD, 4:182-186, esp., 4:185n1 (§51.472); RD, 4:200-204, esp., 4:203n98.

17
See Maccovius, Distinctiones, 174: “Esse reale & esse Cognitionis, sive esse Cognitum, idem
est quod esse rei & Obiectum. Ut omnes res fuerunt in Deo quantum ad esse cognitum, sed esse reale
acceperunt in tempore.” Van den Brink and Jones use this distinction to argue that Maccovius does not hold
the idea of justification from eternity. See Van den Brink, “Johannes Maccovius,” 345-346; Beeke and
Jones, “Thomas Goodwin and Johannes Maccovius,” 144-145.
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focus on the idea that justification prior to faith is the core of active justification.18
Historical context also plays a role; those who had to contend with antinomianism,19
including William Twisse (c.1577-1646) and William Eyre (1642-1660),20 held that
justification before faith is an immanent act of God from eternity but did not camp on the
idea of justification preceding faith, focusing instead on the divine initiative in
justification.

3.2. Biblical Foundation of Active Justification
The foundation of active justification is Christ’s perfect righteousness and its merit. In
justification, writes Berkhof, “[the sinner] is declared righteous in view of the fact that
the righteousness of Christ is imputed to him. In this transaction God appears, not as an
absolute Sovereign who simply sets the law aside, but as a righteous Judge, who
acknowledges the infinite merits of Christ as a sufficient basis for justification, and as a

18

Those who are well aware of the danger of eternal justification, but still speak of active
justification (e.g., à Brakel) tend to less connect between active justification and the idea of justification
before faith in comparison to Maccovius.
19
20

The antinomian error will be concretely dealt with in a later section.

According to Packer, Trueman, Wallace, McKelvey, Daniel, Jones, etc., William Twisse
embraces the idea of eternal justification. See Packer, A Quest for Godliness, 155; Trueman, The Claims of
Truth, 209n30; Dewey D. Wallace, Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant Theology,
1525-1695 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 119; McKelvey, “‘That Error and Pillar
of Antinomianism,’” 242; Daniel, “Hyper-Calvinism and John Gill,” 305; Beeke and Jones, “Thomas
Goodwin and Johannes Maccovius,” 147; Boersma, A Hot Pepper Corn, Pt. 3, passim. Twisse says:
“Remissio peccatorum si quidditatem inspicias nihil aliud est, quam punitionis negatio, aut volitionis
puniendo negatio. Sit ergo peccata remittere nihil aliud, quam nolle punire, ut actus immanens in Deo, fuit
ab aeterno.” See William Twisse, Vindiciæ gratiæ , potestatis, ac providentiæ Dei; hoc est, ad examen
libelli perkinsiani de præ destinationis modo et ordine, institutum a J. Arminio, responsio scholastica, tribus
libris absoluta (Amsterdam: Ioannem Ianssonium, 1632), 1:2.25 (p.194, emphasis added).
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gracious Father, who freely forgives and accepts the sinner” (emphasis added).21 With the
foundation of active justification in place, the sinner can appropriate this justification by
faith alone (passive justification). Sinners must believe that God justifies them on the
basis of Christ’s satisfaction and righteousness.
Leonard Rijssen (or Leonhard Ryssen, c.1636-1700) offers three biblical
passages to emphasize Christ’s role in reconciliation and justification, stating that “this
[active justification] occurs in paradise and by promise (Gen. 3:15), in Christ the Head (2
Cor. 5:19), and in his Word (Rom. 1:8).”22 For Rijssen, active justification is neither
God’s thinking alone, nor a subjective reasoning; rather it is firmly grounded on the
“objective” Messianic promise that the woman’s offspring (Christ) will strike the
serpent’s (Satan’s) head (Gen 3:15); God will not count trespasses of human beings
against them in Christ (2 Cor 5:19);23 and there is no condemnation for those who are in
Jesus Christ (Rom 1:8).24 Herman Witsius (1636-1708) also interprets the Genesis 3:15
narrative as the protoevangelium (“first good news”), stating that “in the first Gospel
promise [πρωτευαγγελιω, Gen 3:15]; which presupposes that [suretyship] of Christ,
whereby he took upon himself all the sins of the elect, and on account of which God

21

Berkhof, ST, 517.

Rijssen, Summa theologiae elencticae completa, 14.7 (p.186). Rijssen’s Summa theologiae
elencticae complete has been partly translated into English (only chapter 14 on justification) by J. Wesley
White. See Leonard Rijssen, “On Justification,” trans. J. Wesley White, Mid-America Journal of Theology
16 (2005): 115-131. For Rijssen’s use of the distinction between active and passive justification, see
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 557.
22

“[T]hat is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses
against them, and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us.”
23

“First, I thank my God through Jesus Christ for all of you, because your faith is proclaimed
throughout the world.” See also Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 557.
24
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declared, he never intended to exact them from any of his chosen.”25 In his exposition of
Genesis 3:15 Maccovius also finds that “[a]ctive justification has happened when God
promised us Christ as the Mediator.”26 Thus according to these Reformed theologians the
final basis for active justification is Christ’s perfect righteousness and messianic work
which are promised by God in Genesis 3:15.27
Other biblical passages also explicitly support active justification when they say
that God actively and objectively decrees and promises to justify sinners in foro Dei. For
example, Romans 8:30a (“those whom he predestined he also called; and those whom he
called he also justified”) and Romans 3:24a (“they are now justified by his grace as a
gift”) refer to the objective, decisive, and free character of justification. On the basis of

25

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.LVII (p.296-297); Witsius, Economy, 1:420.
“Haec enim omnia πρωτευαγγελιω continentur: quod supponit, eam Christi sponsionem, qua peccata omnia
electorum in se suscepit, & propter quam declaravit Deus, non esse sibi animum ea a quoquam electorum
exigendi.”
Maccovius, Collegia, 423. “Activa justificatio facta est, quando nobis Deus promisit Christum
in Mediatorem.” For Maccovius’ Genesis 3:15 promise and its relation to justification, see Van den Brink,
“Johannes Maccovius,” 344-351; Beeke and Jones, “Thomas Goodwin and Johannes Maccovius,” 144.
26
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The attempts at looking at Gen 3:15 in the perspective of the protoevangelium (the first good
news) can be traced to its origin in Against Heresies of Irenaeus. See Irenaeus, “Against Heresies,” in AnteNicene Fathers: The Apostolic Fathers, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, eds. Alexander Roberts and James
Donaldson, vol. 1 (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2012), 548-549 (chap. XXI). In a similar vein with
Irenaeus, John Calvin also interprets Gen 3:15 as a messianic promise of victory over the devil by Christ
who is the divine Head of all mankind. See John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses Called
Genesis, trans. John King, 500th Anniversary Edition (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2009), 170-171.
Modern commentators, even though not directly making a connection to the idea of active justification, also
take a look at Gen 3:15 in the context of the messianic promise. Yet, they caution against the one-sided
interpretation that Gen 3:15 is exclusively interpreted merely as the protoevangelium while excluding other
connoted meaning. See Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, WBC (Waco: Word Books, 1987), 80-81;
Kenneth A. Mathews, Genesis 1-11:26, NAC (Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1996), 247;
Derek Kidner, Genesis: An Introduction and Commentary, TOTC (Chicago: Inter-varsity Press, 1967), 7071; Bruce K. Waltke and Cathi J. Fredricks, Genesis: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001),
103-104; Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1990), 200; Allen P. Ross, Creation and Blessing: A Guide to the Study and Exposition of the Book of
Genesis (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988), 109; John Skinner, A Critical and Exegetical
Commentary on Genesis, ICC (New York: Scribner, 1910), 81.
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these texts, WCF 11.4 says that “God did, from all eternity, decree to justify all the elect,
and Christ did, in the fullness of time, die for their sins, and rise again for their
justification.”28
Active justification is the idea that God justifies on the basis of His promise
given in the protoevangelium of Genesis 3:15 and grounded in Christ’s mediatorial
headship and suretyship (Rom 8:30a, Rom 3:24a). In passive justification, human beings
are justified by believing God’s promise that Christ’s perfect righteousness is theirs (1
Cor 1:30).

3.3. Doctrinal Development and Theological Context
As most subtle scholastic distinctions are,29 the distinction between active and passive
justification was one of the elegant theological responses to the doctrinal kaleidoscope
that appeared in the post-Reformation era. New theological questions demanded more
thoughtful answers; the distinction between active and passive justification was the
theological reaction to a series of mutations coming from England in the early 1600s,

28

Schaff, ed., “The Westminster Confession of Faith,” 627.

Here “scholastic” or “scholasticism” should not be regarded as a particular theological or
philosophical content, or as a speculative form of Aristotelian philosophy, or as the assimilating of
“scholasticism” of seventeenth-century Protestants into the “scholasticism” of the Middle Ages. Rather,
these terms were a method of the classroom and of the more detailed systems of theology during the era of
orthodoxy. For a detailed discussion on the “scholasticism” of Protestant orthodoxy, see Richard A. Muller,
After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), 25-46; idem, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed
Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 1:27-84 (hereafter,
PRRD); W. J. van Asselt et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, trans. Albert Gootjes (Grand
Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011), 1-9.
29
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especially antinomianism30 and the notion of justification from eternity.31
Bavinck notes that the distinction between active and passive justification does
not specifically appear in the works of the Reformers.32 In their polemic against the
Roman Catholic idea of justification merited by human works, the Reformers spoke of
justification as a concrete and singular gift of God’s grace received in faith sola fide.33
Furthermore, they did not deal directly with justification from eternity and felt no
pressing need to deal with antinomianism.34
This changed in the seventeenth century. The distinction between active and
passive justification was developed by the Reformed orthodox theologians to respond
directly to these two issues.35 As examples we point to the writings of John Eaton
(c.1574-c.1630), Tobias Crisp (1600-1643), and John Saltmarsh (d.1647).36 All three

On the issue of Puritanism, antinomianism, and soteriology, Parnham’s articles are helpful.
See David Parnham, “The Humbling of ‘High Presumption’: Tobias Crisp Dismantles the Puritan Ordo
Salutis,” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 56, no. 1 (1999): 50-74; idem, “The Covenantal Quietism of
Tobias Crisp,” Church History 75, no. 3 (2006): 511-543; idem, “Motions of Law and Grace: The Puritan
in the Antinomian,” Westminster Theological Journal 70, no. 1 (2008): 73-104; idem, “John Saltmarsh and
the Mystery of Redemption,” Harvard Theological Review 104 (2011): 265-298.
30

31

Bavinck, GD, 4:184-185 (§51.472); RD, 4:202-203.

Yet, Brian Cummings tries to explain Martin Luther’s doctrine of justification in the distinction
of active/passive justification. Yet, Cummings’ distinction, which is based on a grammatical approach,
differs from the distinction that has been dealt with here so far. For in Cummings’ analysis, passive
justification (by which God is justified by our faith, we are justified) is our own active justification by God.
See Brian Cummings, The Literary Culture of the Reformation: Grammar and Grace (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 93-95. On Bavinck’s account of Luther’s distinction of active/passive justification,
see Bavinck, GD, 4:173 (§51.469); RD, 4:191.
32
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Cf. Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification, 100-126; Boehl, The Reformed Doctrine of
Justification, 23-46.
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Bavinck, GD, 4:184-185 (§51.472); RD, 4:202-203.
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Bavinck, GD, 4:184 (§51.472); RD, 4:202.
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See John Eaton, The Honey-Combe of Free Justification by Christ Alone Collected Out of the
Meere Authorities of Scripture and Common and Unanimous Consent of the Faithfull Interpreters and
Dispensers of Gods Mysteries Upon the Same, Especially as They Expresse the Excellency of Free
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were concerned about Arminian ideas that credited human willingness and ability as
fundamental to justification.37 In an example of argumentative overreach, they went so
far as to say that justification was freely obtained only by virtue of Christ’s complete
work (thus, even apart from faith); for them this meant that there is then no sin in the
presence of God.38 By claiming reliance only on the absolute perfection of Christ’s work,
and the resultant sinless status of believers in the sight of God, these antinomian
theologians negated the role of faith in justification. They could then also set aside the
need for daily prayers for forgiveness and the need to obey God’s law, and even eliminate
the call to sanctification. Understandably, this stance aroused significant opposition.39
Samuel Maresius (1599-1673), Johann Heinrich Heidegger (1633-1698), Herman
Witsius, Francis Turretin, Leonard Rijssen, and Johannes Maccovius also respond
critically to the antinomian writings of the mid-1600’s using the distinction between
active and passive justification.40 They wrote to provide a more balanced understanding

Justification (London: Printed by R.B., 1642); Tobias Crisp, Christ Alone Exalted, 2 vols. (London, 1643);
John Saltmarsh, Free Grace, Or, the Flowings of Christs Blood Free to Sinners Being an Experiment of
Jesus Christ Upon One Who Hath Been in the Bondage of a Troubled Conscience (London: Printed for
Giles Calvert, 1646).
Thus, McKelvey observes: “All antinomians were anti-Arminian but not all anti-Arminians
were antinomian.” See McKelvey, “That Error and Pillar of Antinomianism,” 262.
37

38

Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 24; Crisp, Christ Alone Exalted, 1643, 2:190; Saltmarsh, Free

Grace, 129.
39
The leading opponents of Antinomians in England during the seventeenth century are Henry
Burton (1578-1648), Anthony Burgess (d.1664), Daniel Williams (1643-1716), Samuel Rutherford (16001661), Stephen Geree (1594-1656), Thomas Bakewell (c.1618-), Thomas Bedford (d.1653), Richard Baxter
(1615-1691), Thomas Gataker (1574-1654), etc.
40
See, e.g., Maresius, Collegium theologicum sive systema breve universae theologiae, 11.58
(pp. 255-256); Heidegger, Corpus theologiae christianae, 27.28-29 (p. 303); Witsius, Economy, 2.16 (pp.
248-249); Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2:669, 684; Rijssen, Summa theologiae elencticae
completa, 14 (pp. 184-198); Maccovius, Distinctiones, 13 (pp. 124-129).
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of justification as opposed to the antinomian view in which passive justification is
overshadowed by an excessive emphasis on active justification. Similarly, postseventeenth century theologians including Heinrich Heppe (1820-1879), Herman
Bavinck, and Louis Berkhof were also concerned with the balance between the active and
passive aspects of justification.41

3.4. Misunderstanding, Neglect, and Misuse of Active Justification
Notwithstanding the historical importance of the notion of active justification, it has its
contemporary critics and has often been neglected and misused. The thesis of this study is
that most of the criticism involves three specific charges. First, we will refute the charge
that the notion of active justification undermines the Reformation’s bedrock principle of
sola fide. Second, we will discredit the claim that active justification leads to
antinomianism. Third, we will disprove the argument that active justification is complete
in an immanent act of God from eternity as presented in hyper-Calvinism.

3.4.1. Misunderstanding: Active Justification Undermines the Reformation’s Doctrine of
Justification Sola fide
3.4.1.1. Tipton’s Argument
Lane Tipton advanced the argument that the distinction between active and passive
justification undermines the fundamental principle of the Reformation that justification is

41
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See Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 555-559; Bavinck, RD, 4:202-204, 219-223; Berkhof, ST,
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by faith alone (sola fide).42 Tipton does not entirely reject the distinction formulated by
Louis Berkhof, in particular the distinction between justification “in the tribunal of God”
(in foro Dei; objective justification) and justification “in the heart or conscience of the
sinner” (in foro conscientiae; subjective justification).43 But Tipton considers Berkhof’s
placement of faith after active justification and before passive justification to be
“clouded” reasoning that “raises concerns.”

44

Tipton contends that if active justification

entails a precedence over faith and passive justification, the notion is “not possible from a
biblical and confessional perspective”45 and therefore, it needs to be “abandon[ed].”46
Tipton provides two complementary reasons for this strong judgment. He
believes that positing a precedence of active justification prior to faith contradicts the
scriptural truth which emphasizes the necessary link between justification and faith, and
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of anti-Arminian soteriology in the seventeenth century, a number of Reformed theologians have used this
distinction to either endorse or analyze carefully regarding the idea of justification before faith. See, e.g.,
William Pemble, Vindiciae Gratiae. A Plea for Grace More Especially the Grace of Faith. Or, Certain
Lectures as Touching the Nature and Properties of Grace and Faith (London: Printed by Humphrey
Lownes, 1629), 21-22; William Twisse, Vindiciæ gratiæ , 2.4.4 (p. 79). Whether those who use the
distinction between justification in foro Dei and in foro conscientiae inevitably hold the idea of justification
from eternity is controversial. For example, whereas Dewey Wallace thinks that Pemble teaches the idea of
eternal justification, Hans Boersma does not think so because he sees that Pemble does not place
justification in foro divino in eternity. See Wallace, Puritans and Predestination, 119; Boersma, A Hot
Pepper Corn, 73. Tipton’s affirmation can be seen in the following passage: “Certainly this distinction is
valid and useful. The declaration of justification has unique reference to the tribunal of God’s justice: the
sinner’s legal relationship to the tribunal of God’s justice is changed in justification. The declaration of
justification occurring in the tribunal of God is the objective reality that the sinner comes to know as true
by faith ‘in his heart or conscience.’ What the sinner receives by faith in Christ (passive justification) is a
declaration of righteousness that obtains before the tribunal of God’s justice (active justification).” See
Tipton, “Biblical Theology,” 8.
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thus “clouds a clear affirmation of justification sola fide.”47 In other words, according to
Tipton justification prior to faith (active) and justification based on faith alone (sola fide)
are mutually exclusive and contradictory.
Tipton’s second reason for rejecting the idea of active justification has to do with
the relationship between faith and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. According to
Tipton, if the declaration which is grounded on the imputation of Christ’s righteousness
does not also bring faith into view, it becomes just a “legal fiction” or a mere “judicial
declaration.” Tipton insists that justification (whether active or passive) is obtained solely
by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness achieved by faith alone. If active justification
logically precedes faith, then sola fide does not apply.48 Tipton therefore insists that
Berkhof’s formulation “does not cohere with a biblical or confessional notion of
justification by faith alone by virtue of union with Christ.”49 He concludes that “we must
avoid at all costs speculative, dogmatic constructions . . . that make the declaration of
righteousness logically prior to union with Christ by faith,” inasmuch as they eventually
“cloud the precious biblical truth that believers are justified only by faith.”50 Is this a
tenable and justifiable conclusion? We will address this in the next section.
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3.4.1.2. A Response to Tipton
We fully concur with Tipton’s concern to protect and sustain the Reformation’s doctrine
of justification sola fide as well as his insistence on the imputation of Christ’s
righteousness as the foundation of justifying grace. Nevertheless, Tipton’s application of
this truth to the distinction between active and passive justification is misplaced. Tipton
speaks as though justification is both realized and terminated in active justification when
he says that “the matter becomes more concerning when . . . Berkhof is suggesting that
the declaration of the sinner’s righteousness logically precedes faith, by which the sinner
is united to Christ in his effectual calling and by which the sinner receives the imputed
righteousness of Christ.”51 Tipton’s argument is something like this: since justification—
which can only be obtained by the imputed righteousness of Christ through faith—is said
to be realized without faith as it is in active justification it contradicts the doctrine of
justification sola fide and therefore must be abandoned.
The problem with this line of thinking is that it overlooks Berkhof’s point “that
the two [active and passive justification] cannot be separated.”52 Tipton’s strategy of
trying to show that the absence of faith in active justification means that faith is absent in
justification altogether is fatally flawed. Justification sola fide is referenced in passive
justification since active justification is the object of the faith that saves.
What then of the concern to maintain the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to
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Tipton, “Biblical Theology,” 8.
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Berkhof, ST, 517; the principle that active justification and passive justification are logically
distinct but inseparable is also clearly taught by Bavinck; cf. GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219. This
“inseparability” of the two will be concretely dealt with in Chapter 4 of this study. They always go together
without separation.
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believers as the sole ground of justification sola fide? Is it true that because the
imputation of Christ’s righteousness requires faith, a declaration of righteousness without
faith in active justification becomes just a “legal fiction” which does not have a real and
actual effect?53 Tipton’s argument can be stated like this:
(1) First premise: Justification is based on the imputation of Christ’s righteousness
which is received sola fide.
(2) Second Premise: Faith follows and is therefore not a factor in active justification.
(3) Conclusion: The declaration of imputed righteousness to believers in active
justification is a ‘legal fiction’ because faith is absent.
The presupposition of Tipton’s objection is that imputation and faith must somehow also
function in the sphere of active justification. But this misses Berkhof’s point, which is not
that the whole of justification is actualized and terminated in active justification, but that
the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is the “objective ground” for accomplishing
passive justification, so that imputation is realized in the heart and conscience of the
sinner by faith alone. Justification in its fullness is realized not just in active or objective
justification alone but together with passive or subjective justification.54
There is another curious matter contained in Tipton’s conclusion. In order to
show the necessity of faith in imputation, he must place more emphasis on how Christ’s
righteousness is to be imputed (i.e., by faith alone) than on the content of faith (what one
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Berkhof, ST, 517: “A purely objective justification [active justification] that is not brought
home to the sinner would not answer the purpose. The granting of a pardon would mean nothing to a
prisoner, unless the glad tidings were communicated to him and the doors of the prison were opened.”
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should believe). In other words, by pointing to the supposed “fictional” character of
imputation in active justification Tipton overemphasizes the importance of the
instrumental function of faith in imputation.55 Such an overemphasis leads to the idea
that faith itself imputes righteousness which would then imperil the crucial Reformation
principle that our righteousness comes solely by grace from God (sola gratia), through
faith (διά as a receptive instrument), thanks to Christ.56 We are not of course suggesting
that Tipton holds to the notion of meritorious faith as the grounds for justification.57
However, what is lacking in Tipton’s conclusion is the proper “object” of faith. This
absence becomes conspicuous when we compare his view with that of the Westminster

The key word of Tipton’s article would be “by faith alone” (or sola fide). These words appear
34 times throughout his short article.
55
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Horton, The Christian Faith, 637-638.

Tipton, “Biblical Theology,” 5; “[T]he faith that unites to Christ is . . . the sole instrumental
organ that receives the imputed righteousness of Christ” (emphasis added). Rather, Robert Gundry regards
some notion of meritorious faith as the grounds for justification. Gundry states, “[T]he righteousness that
comes ‘from’ (ek) faith (Ro 9:30: 10:6) and from God ‘through’ (dia) faith and ‘on the basis of’ (epi) faith
(Php 3:9) is the faith that God counts as righteousness. Paul’s language is supple: faith is the origin, the
means, and the basis of righteousness in that God counts it as righteousness.” See Robert H. Gundry, “The
Nonimputation of Christ’s Righteousness,” in Justification: What’s at Stake in the Current Debates, eds.
Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 25. Richard Baxter’s view
of justification also can be regarded as a kind of neonomian understanding. According to Baxter, in order to
be justified, a double righteousness is needed: Christ’s (Gospel) which led to the enacting of God’s new
law, and our own, in conforming that new law by our faith and repentance. See Richard Baxter, Confession
of His Faith: Especially Concerning the Interest of Repentance and Sincere Obedience to Christ, in Our
Justification and Salvation (London, 1654), 296. In terms of having taught that faith itself (and repentance)
becomes the ground of justification and explained it in legal code of natural theology, Baxter’s argument is
similar to Simon Episcopius (1583-1643) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). Baxterian theology is often
called neonomianism which is developed by Daniel Williams (1643-1716). See Packer, A Quest for
Godliness, 156-161; idem, The Redemption & Restoration of Man in the Thought of Richard Baxter: A
Study in Puritan Theology (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2003); Boersma, A Hot Pepper Corn,
166-194. On criticism to neonomianism by contemporary of Daniel Williams, see Isaac Chauncy,
Neonomianism Unmask’d, Or, the Ancient Gospel Pleaded Against the Other, Called a New Law or Gospel
in a Theological Debate (London, 1692). Due to Baxter’s unique argument that legalistically views the
relationship between faith and salvation, some (e.g., Packer, Fesko, etc.) rightly evaluate that Baxter’s
theology is far from the Reformed tradition at least in this point. Yet, Timothy Beougher interprets
differently because works (including faith and repentance) which Baxter emphasizes are not a meritorious
cause of our salvation for Baxter. See Timothy K. Beougher, Richard Baxter and Conversion: A Study of
Puritan Concept of Becoming Christian (Fearn: Mentor, 2008). Cf. Fesko, Beyond Calvin, 300-317.
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Confession of Faith which is as concerned with the object of justifying faith as it is with
faith’s instrumentality. In WCF 11.1 the object of belief is the imputation of Christ’s
“obedience” and “satisfaction” to the sinner. It states, “He [God] also freely justifieth; . . .
[not] by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to
them, as their righteousness; but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ
unto them, they receiving and resting on him and his righteousness by faith; which faith
they have not of themselves, it is the gift of God” (emphasis added).58 Therefore, in
order to be justified one must receive and rest on Christ’s obedience and satisfaction (the
object of belief, WCF 11.1)59 through (διά) faith (the instrumental cause). In
emphasizing faith’s instrumental function, Tipton pays too little attention to the object,
namely, Christ’s meritorious works (obedience and satisfaction). Without the object of
belief, the act of believing is empty. When we speak of sola fide we must not restrict our
understanding to the act of believing but must include the content, the what (or Who) of
believing. This idea is included in the very definition of active justification.
Tipton also confuses matters when he raises questions about the placement of
active justification in the ordo salutis. He supposes that “active justification is a blessing
of redemption applied (ordo salutis).”60 While Tipton does not explain this term clearly,
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Here, Christ’s obedience includes both the active obedience (Christ’s perfect obedience to the
law of God) and the passive obedience (Christ’s enduring the punishment of the crucifixion suffering and
death). Yet there has been an argument which rejects Christ’s active obedience. It was by Johannes Piscator
(1526-1625). On this, see Heber Carlos De Campos Júnior, “Johannes Piscator (1526-1625) and the
Consequent Development of the Doctrine of the Imputation of Christ’s Active Obedience” (PhD diss.,
Calvin Theological Seminary, 2011).
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it appears that he considers active justification as an independent moment in the ordo
salutis. His argument is that “… if active justification is a blessing of redemption applied
(ordo salutis), and if active justification logically precedes faith, then active justification
logically precedes faith-union with Christ.”61 However, active justification does not
stand alone as a dimension in the ordo salutis. Instead it is only one of two inseparable
dimensions of the same reality, i.e., “justification” in the classic ordo. We saw in the
previous chapter that definitive and progressive sanctification are the two inseparable
dimensions of one reality, i.e., “sanctification” in the classic ordo salutis.62 In parallel
with this, active justification serves as the “object” of passive justification sola fide, thus
marking the two of them as the logically inseparable dimensions of justification in the
classic ordo.
In conclusion, it must be said that Tipton tends to overlook the historical
background of both the imperative and the theological motivation for developing the
doctrine of active justification, and the richness of the ensuing theological discussions. As
the following section makes clear, the distinction between active and passive justification
has played a valuable role in opposing antinomianism as well as neonomianism in the
seventeenth century. A healthy balance between the two aspects of justification was then
available to block the misuse of active justification in the hyper-Calvinism of the
eighteenth century. Tipton acknowledges that a theological motivation for the distinction
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could be seen as “noble.”63 We would state it more strongly: the distinction between
active and passive justification is crucial and should not be abandoned or neglected but its
theological legacy respected.64

3.4.2. Neglect: Opening the Door to Antinomianism
We now consider the consequences of neglecting the doctrine of active justification, or
more precisely, neglecting the important distinction between active and passive
justification. We find that the distinction was largely developed to oppose the antinomian
error. While there were variations among individual theologians alleged to be guilty of
antinomianism, in general they held the following tenets in common: (1) Christians are
freely justified in God’s sight, solely by grace (i.e., not by faith); (2) by virtue of Christ’s
complete satisfaction for sin, God sees justified people as sinless; (3) sinless Christians,
because of Christ’s perfect substitutionary atonement, are liberated from and not
obligated to keep the law. The distinction between active and passive justification
invalidates this mistaken application of the doctrine of justification. Ironically, the danger
of antinomianism arises from the same emphasis that we find in advocates of active
justification, namely an emphasis on the objective justification of sinners in the court of
God (in foro Dei). What antinomians fail to see is that active justification affirms that in
fact perfect justice requires the fulfillment of the law’s demands; thus they miss the real
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meaning of active justification and fail to make the distinction between it and passive
justification. Berkhof captures this well when he clarifies, “This declaration [active
justification] is not a declaration in which God simply acquits the sinner, without taking
any account of the claims of justice, but is rather a divine declaration that, in the case of
the sinner under consideration, the demands of the law are met” (emphasis added).65
Heppe distinguishes active and passive justification similarly: “In the former case [i.e.,
active justification] justification of the elect results in a complete ‘single act’ once and for
all . . . passive justification remains at the best of times so imperfect here on earth, that
the believer must cry to God daily for forgiveness of his past and his future sins.”66 We
find the same point made by Wilhelmus à Brakel.67

3.4.2.1. Important Historical Background in the Development of Antinomianism
The story of antinomianism68 in sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritan thought,
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In the preface of the second volume of à Brakel’s Christians’ Reasonable Service, Joel Beeke
states that “[b]earing this statement [the devil is continually engaged in denying, perverting, and obscuring
the truth expressed in the doctrine of justification], combined with à Brakel’s grave concern for the
antinomian error, it will be understood why he places strong emphasis on the need for both the personal
experience of justification in the heart of a sinner, as well as the need for a daily and repeated sense of
justification.” See à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, xvii (preface, 2nd vol.).
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including its origins, is complex and far beyond the scope of this study.69 The most
sympathetic treatment helps to get at the root of the problem: Antinomian theologians
tend to be radically anti-Arminian70 and zealous about eliminating any works or merit in
human salvation; even instrumental faith can be conceived as a “good work.” This is why
the antinomianist perspective we portrayed in the previous section focuses so radically
and tragically on God’s work in justification at the expense of sola fide. This brings to
mind one of the conventional criticisms of Calvinism, i.e., its doctrine of predestination,
and it is therefore not surprising that historians point out similarities between Calvinist
Puritan thought and antinomianism. For example, T. D. Bozeman claims that there was
an “antinomian backlash” within the Puritan tradition from the start, since Puritans
tended to adjure Christians to fulfill “precise” or “exact walking” in Christian practice.71
However, while acknowledging that there might be some plausibility in seeing
antinomianism as “contra-Puritan,” David Como still notes the similarity to Calvinist
Puritanism.72 From this perspective antinomianism can be classified as “extreme

Burgess also perceives a multifaceted opinion in antinomianism: “And indeed the Antinomians are at a
variance amongst themselves.” See Anthony Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification Asserted, and
Vindicated, from the Errours of Papists, Arminians, Socinians, and More Especially Antinomians.
(London, 1648), 190.
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Special Reference to the Period, 1640-1660 (London: Cresset Press, 1951).
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71

72

Como, Blown by the Spirit, 176-218. According to Como, as like Puritan teaching, Eaton also
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Calvinism.”73 Further confirmation of this can be found in repudiated antinomians, such
as Eaton, Crisp, and Saltmarsh, who accept a traditional Reformed soteriology in which
sinners are justified by having Christ’s perfect righteousness imputed unto them (Rom
5:9, 1 Cor 6:11). All guilt and iniquity is forgiven once and for all thanks to the blood of
Christ shed on the cross (Isa 53:3-5), and Christ’s substitutionary atonement fully
liberates them from the power of evil (Acts 15:11; 26:18).74 The problem of
antinomianism, therefore, is that the zeal to defend the completely gratuitous character of
salvation led to an extreme imbalance that is only corrected by the proper distinction
between active and passive justification. Even though their theological motivation may
have been sincere, it is undeniable that antinomians made a critical mistake by trying to
deny human activity a place in Christian doctrine and practice.75 This is why they are
called the “unwelcome guests” of Reformed theology.76

3.4.2.2. A Case Study in Anti-Arminian Antinomianism: John Eaton
In the previous section we pointed out that ardent anti-Arminianism was a major factor
leading to the development of antinomianism. The controversial John Eaton (1575–
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1641),77 vicar of Wickham-Market in Suffolk from 1625 until his death, serves as a good
illustration of what happens when anti-Arminianism is taken to an extreme without the
counterbalance of the distinction between active and passive justification. Eaton wrote his
The Honey-Combe of Free Justification (1642) to show how the Christian doctrine of
justification is sweet and precious only when it is understood as free grace that is based
on Christ’s perfect righteousness and absolute atonement apart from a human work.
While this intention is honorable, the solution proposed by Eaton is extreme and it is not
surprising that his work was judged by many of his contemporaries to be flawed and
hurtful to Christian living.78
Eaton’s fundamental intention in writing The Honey-Combe was to eradicate the
“dead faith” of papists and even Protestants who tried to hold justification in “a carnal
humane witted-fashion” using “natural reason [as] their chiefest guide.”79 He wrote that
such views deprive Christians of “all sweetness” in the doctrine and show that they
“understand not the nature and excellency of Free Justification.”80 Eaton therefore made
a powerful attempt to erase human sense, feeling, reason, and indeed any human effort
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John Eaton (fl.1619), divine, born in Kent in or about 1575, was educated at Trinity College,
Oxford, where he became the first recipient of the newly founded Blount exhibition in 1590. He proceeded
B.A. 1595, and M.A. 1603. See Gordon Goodwin, “Eaton, John,” Dictionary of National Biography, 18851900, vol. 16 (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1885), 336-337.
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from the realm of justification in order to be assured that justification is free grace and a
sole gift from God.81 Eaton emphatically exclaimed, “[K]ill reason, a great and mighty
enemy of God.”82 According to him, believers are justified neither by “sense and
feeling,” nor by “faith indeed,” but only “by the blood of the Son of God.”83
By preaching the “excellency of Free Justification,” Eaton advanced the idea that
“the Devil is overthrown, his kingdom is destroyed; the law, sin, and death (wherewith as
most mighty and invincible tyrants, he hath brought all mankind in subjection under his
dominion) are wrested out of his hands.”84 Throughout The Honey-Combe Eaton
hammers on free justification purely sola gratia, while denying the teachings of Roman
Catholics (human preparation), Protestants (employing faith as an instrumental cause),
and Arminianism (making space for human participation in salvation). Since Eaton
believes these teachings to be “works of the Devil,” he forcefully declares the need to
“root up” the problem.85
Eaton develops his argument by borrowing from Scripture the analogy of a
wedding, defining justification of sinners: “by the power of God’s imputation [sinners
are] clothed with the wedding garment of Christ’s own perfect righteousness.”86 In his
mind this imputation not only consists of the complete and perfect righteousness of
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Christ’s substitutionary atonement on the cross but it is also actualized there.87 With this
Eaton radically alters the way that Reformed orthodox theologians had used Aristotle’s
fourfold causality to explain divine initiative in salvation. Eaton agrees that the material
cause is faith; the formal (or meritorious) cause is the active and passive obedience of
Christ; the efficient cause of justification is the Triune God and Jesus Christ; and the final
cause is God’s glory and grace.88 However, in his understanding of how the material
cause (faith) is performed in the realm of justification he departs radically from the
Reformed tradition.
In the traditional view, held for example by Anthony Burgess (d.1664), faith
functions as the “instrumental cause” so that sinners are justified through faith (not
active, but a receptive instrumental tool).89 However, in Eaton’s conception of
justification, faith functions as a tool to believe the already-achieved fact that “this
wedding-garment of Christ’s righteousness [actually did] make us thus perfectly holy and
righteous in the sight of God freely.”90 According to his logic, justification precedes faith
and faith acts to discern what is already done.91 Eaton’s “free justification in the sight of
Eaton states: “[B]y the second Adam, it [imputation] is mystically above sense, and feeling,
that it may be by the faith of God’s power, made so truly and really righteous to God-ward, that it cannot
but in time [emphasis added], by discerning Christ’s love inherently and actively, declare the same
afterwards to men-ward by sanctification.” See Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 293. For Eaton’s emphasis on
Christ’s atonement work, see Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 361-363.
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Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 2, 170, 182, 257. Not only he but also many other
opponents to antinomianism stress the instrumental causality of faith in justification. See Bedford, An
Examination, 5; Geree, The Doctrine of the Antinomians, 85-86; Bakewell, A Short View of the Antinomian
Errours, 1, 3. According to Baxter, the instrument of justification is the new covenant, not faith. On
Baxter’s denial of the instrumental cause of faith, see Baxter, Aphorismes of Justification (London, 1649),
219-224. Cf. Packer, The Redemption & Restoration of Man in the Thought of Richard Baxter, 254-255.
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Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 280. See also Crisp, Christ Alone Exalted, 2:198-199.
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Yet, there is a tension in Eaton’s view of faith; for sometimes Eaton speaks of justification by
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God” is conceptually similar to our definition of active justification; both provide the
objective content of faith, what we called earlier “the object of belief.” The critical
difference is that in the classic distinction between active and passive justification the
fullness of a believer’s justification includes the subjective appropriation by faith. As
Louis Berkhof puts it: “A purely objective [active] justification that is not brought home
to the sinner would not answer the purpose. The granting of a pardon would mean
nothing to a prisoner, unless the glad tidings were communicated to him and the doors of
the prison were opened.”92 It is this important point that Eaton misses. In his estimation,
justification is already actualized in the sight of God freely at the cross. Here “freely at
the cross” means that nothing (including faith, any kind of instrumental causality, or even
the aspect of passive justification) is necessary for a believer’s justification because
Christ has already done literally “everything” in the past (but not in eternity) in the sight
of God. This difference is crucial, for his argument undermines justification sola fide and
ends in an erroneous view of “sin.”
We see clearly how radical Eaton’s views were when we consider his comments
on sin and the believer. “God doth so remove away the sins of the faithful out of his
sight,” he says, “[so] that they may never return into his sight anymore.”93 Since God has
“cast all our sins into the bottom of the Sea,” there “remains no scar, nor any print

faith (but not as a meritorious condition). See Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 190-191.
92

Berkhof, ST, 517.

93
Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 30. Crisp also similarly states: “I speak of justification before
God . . . That a person justified before God is such a one, who when God himself makes search to try this
person, whether he be guilty, or not guilty of a crime, he finds no crime upon him; and upon the not finding
any crime upon him, he pronounceth him a just person.” See Crisp, Christ Alone Exalted, 2:190.
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thereof.”94 Eaton even assures us that “there is no sin in the Church anymore” if true
believers in the church believe what Christ did on the cross.95 Eaton therefore
passionately contends, “he [God] doth see no sin in his justified children.”96 While
Como’s claim that Eaton’s language here is “imputational” rather than “perfectionist”97
thus providing a more temperate reading, Eaton’s claim that God does not see sin at all in
the believer’s life goes far beyond the proper emphasis on the “reality” of Christ’s
righteousness being perfectly imputed to sinners.98 It was this that led Eaton’s
contemporaries to harshly rebuke him. For example, Thomas Bakewell (c.1618-) asserted
that “God sees all the sins of his justified children, both before and after conversion.”99
Burgess also took exception, saying that “the sins of godly men [can] not cease to be sins,
though they are justified”; for sin “sticks till death.”100 He strongly criticized Eaton’s
insistence that God does not see “sin in his justified children.”101 Justified people do sin,
God sees it and “a loving Father is very angry, and much displeased with it.”102 God
expresses His wrath against sin in His own, “God doth not punish his children, yet as a
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Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 34.
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Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 41.
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Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 35.
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Cf. Como, Blown by the Spirit, 176-218.
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Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 362.
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Bakewell, A Short View of the Antinomian Errours, 7.

Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 50, 73. Burgess further says: “even justified
persons afflicted by diseases [sins].” See Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 77.
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Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 35.

Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 46. Burgess directly quotes from Eaton’s HoneyBombe (p. 24) and then criticizes in the basis of what Eaton says. See Burgess, The True Doctrine of
Justification, 43.
102
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Father he is angry with them, and that makes him to chastise them” (emphasis in the
original).103 God’s wrath toward sin, according to Burgess, is not judicial punishment,
but a fatherly chastisement in a pedagogical sense.104 Burgess therefore concludes, “[I]t
is true . . . that if you suppose a justified person not to repent of his grievous sins
committed, you may also suppose him to die in the displeasure and eternal wrath of God”
(emphasis in the original).105
The practical consequence of Eaton’s argument would be that it sets aside our
Lord’s instruction that His followers are to pray among other things that He “forgive[s]
us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us.” Eaton maintains that a
daily prayer to beg for forgiveness of sin is “needless.”106 Having put on Christ’s
wedding garment of imputed righteousness the believer is “once justified, . . . justified
forever” (emphasis added).107 “[O]ur manifold daily infirmities” and “all the displeasure
and anger of God for our sins,” according to Eaton, are “done away, and utterly abolished
from between God and us.”108 Burgess counters that “it is the duty of justified persons to
pray for the forgiveness of their sins” because “we renew sin daily, therefore there is need
of a daily pardon” (emphasis in the original).109

103

Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 19.
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Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 118, 219.
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Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 84.
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Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 148.
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Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 251.

Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 408; there is a real tension in Eaton‘s understanding of prayer in
that he deems it useful for Christians so that they can have a better experience of forgiveness, including
assurance. (See The Honey-Combe, 154-156).
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Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 113, 115.
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There is an unintended consequence of Eaton’s thesis that sin is completely
eradicated in those who are justified in front of God; it also precludes the necessity for
sanctification. Eaton does mention the usefulness of sanctification elsewhere, so it is not
totally disregarded by him.110 This is why many scholars prefer to think of Eaton as a
moderate antinomian rather than a full-blown one.111
In summary, by strongly denigrating any human activity in the realm of
justification Eaton is saying that God does not see sin at all in those who are justified
before Him. However, at other times Eaton appears somewhat ambivalent since
elsewhere he concedes the need for sanctification, and even repentance and prayer.

3.4.2.3. How Eaton’s View Differs from Active Justification
Though there are obvious similarities between Eaton’s view and our understanding of
active justification, they are not identical. It is true that in both conceptions divine agency
is primary, justification precedes faith, and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is the
foundation for justification. However, Eaton fails to incorporate either the simultaneity of
active and passive justification or the necessity of passive justification sola fide to
complete his understanding of justification based on Christ’s imputed righteousness.
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Specifically, see Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 22, 296, 340, 458, 476, 483-484. Eaton even
contends elsewhere that there is still a usefulness and meaningfulness in daily prayer for three reasons:
through praying, (1) a more glorious forgiveness can be experienced; (2) a more comfortable feeling and
fuller assurance can be gained; and (3) the fruit of justification can be more vividly seen. See Eaton, The
Honey-Combe, 154-156.
111
See, e.g., Como, Blown by the Spirit, 176-218. Cf. Bozeman states: Eaton’s theology “was
less a radicalization of historic Puritan doctrine and more an oblique or tangential development whose
conscious effort was to obliterate that doctrine and replace it with an entirely new point of view.” See
Bozeman, “The Glory of the ‘Third Time,’” 654.
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Eaton only sees a portion of the dimension of active justification and misses the
dimension of passive justification altogether. Since Eaton’s The Honey-Combe was
published posthumously in 1642112 and the theological discussion about active and
passive justification took place in the period from about 1650 to 1690, more than likely
he was unaware of the distinction. Even if we restrict ourselves to a gentler criticism by
calling his formulations immature and imprecise, we should still be mindful of the
potentially fatal consequences of his views. In Eaton’s antinomian construct the principle
sola gratia describes the entire process of justification, not only by excluding Christian
practice and discipline but even sola fide itself from his understanding of justification. As
a result, passive justification is eclipsed by his one-sided emphasis of active justification.

3.4.3. Misuse: Opening the Door to Hyper-Calvinism
The distinction between active and passive justification was developed in part as a
response to the antinomianism of second-generation Reformed thinkers like Eaton. The
distinction offered greater theological precision, and its use by Reformed orthodoxy was
well established during the seventeenth century. Moving into the eighteenth century the
distinction did not disappear; in fact it was even more actively promoted by English
Baptists including John Gill (1697-1771) and John Brine (sometimes called Braine;
1703-1765).113 However, these men used the notion of active justification to propose that
The time of Eaton’s death is uncertain. 1641 has traditionally assigned by Anthony à Wood,
but its credibility has been doubted. Stephen Foster differently insisted that Eaton died before 1631. See
Graebner, “Protestants and Dissenters,” 140n3.
112

Timothy George, “John Gill,” in Theologians of the Baptist Tradition, ed. Timothy George
and David S. Dockery (Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 2001), 26. Cf. Trivett calls Braine
rather than Brine. See Edward Trivett, The Baptists Vindicated from Some Groundless and False Charges
113
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justification is the immanent act of God from eternity. This new idea moved the doctrine
of active justification into the service of hyper-Calvinism, a development that deserves
close scrutiny.
In order to buttress their claim that justification is the immanent act of God from
eternity, the English Baptists employed a hyper-Calvinist concept of active justification
that was neither sound nor appropriate, a usage that can reasonably be labeled a misuse or
even abuse. We will discover Brine’s doctrine of justification in his debate with Robert
Bragge (1665-1738),114 but first we need to rectify a common misunderstanding of
hyper-Calvinism.

3.4.3.1. A Brief Background of Hyper-Calvinism
A full exploration of the complex world of English Baptists and their connection to
hyper-Calvinism is beyond the scope of this study, so this section will merely summarize
what seems to be the broad scholarly consensus of the place of English Baptists in the

(Norwich, 1770), 4, 7. John Brine, baptist minister, was born at Kettering in 1703. Brine joined the baptist
ministry at Kettering, and after preaching for some time received a call to Coventry. There he remained till
about 1730, when he succeeded Mr. Morton as pastor of the baptist congregation at Curriers’ Hall,
Cripplegate. Brine died on 24 Feb. 1765 and was buried in Bunhill Fields. See J. H. Thorpe, “Brine, John,”
Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900, vol. 16 (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1885), 345-346.
Robert Bragge, a son of Robert Bragge (d.1704), was mostly called “Mr. Bragge of London”
(Brine also calls Bragge like this). Bragge served as the minister of the Independent church in Paved Alley,
Lime Street. Bragge finished his degree at Utrecht in 1685. See A. G. Matthews, ed., Calamy Revised,
Being a Revision of Edmund Calamy’s Account of the Ministers and Others Ejected and Silenced, 1660-2
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 70; T. S. James, The History of the Litigation and Legislation Respecting
Presbyterian Chapels and Charities in England and Ireland Between 1816 and 1849 (London, 1867), 707.
Bragge is the different person with the same name, Robert Bragge (1627-1704) who has been known as a
funeral preacher of Thomas Wadsworth and Ralph Venning. Cf. Robert Bragge, A Cry For Labourers in
Gods Harvest: Being a Sermon Preached Upon the Sad Occasion of the Late Funeral of that Eminent
Servant of Christ, Mr. Ralph Venning (London, 1674); idem, The Life and Death of the Godly Man:
Exemplified in a Sermon Preached (London, 1677).
114
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history of hyper-Calvinism. Rather than the thorough, fivefold definition provided by
James Garrett (supralapsarianism, the pactum salutis, justification from eternity, no
general offer of grace, and antinomianism115) we can use the more concise treatment of
the English Baptists’ denial of “duty-faith” and “duty-repentance” and the resulting
rejection of a “universal call” of the Gospel to unregenerate sinners as evidenced in the
writings of Curt Daniel, Iain Murray, and David Engelsma.116 Lewis Wayman (d.1764)
and Brine answered the “Modern Question” in the negative, representing English Baptists
who rejected the heretofore accepted understanding that reprobates who hear the Gospel
of Jesus Christ are then obliged to repent and place their faith in Jesus Christ.117 Once
this became the consensus among English Baptists, scholars began to define them as
hyper-Calvinists.118 More comprehensive definitions of hyper-Calvinism such as
Garrett’s assume that there are positive links between hyper-Calvinism and the doctrines
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Garrett, Baptist Theology, 89.
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Daniel, “Hyper-Calvinism and John Gill,” 746-767; Iain H. Murray, The Forgotten Spurgeon
(London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1966), 47; Engelsma, Hyper-Calvinism and the Call of the Gospel, 11.
Curt Daniel’s definition of hyper-Calvinism is useful: “Hyper-Calvinism is that school of Supralapsarian
‘Five Point’ Calvinism which so stresses the sovereignty of God by over-emphasizing the secret over the
revealed will and eternity over time, that it minimizes the responsibility of Man, notably with respect to the
denial of the word ‘offer’ in relation to the preaching of the Gospel of a finished and limited atonement,
thus undermining the universal duty of sinners to believe savingly with the assurance that the Lord Jesus
Christ died for them . . .” See Daniel, “Hyper-Calvinism and John Gill,” 767.
117

In 1737, the Rothwell Independent minister, Matthias Maurice, published a pamphlet, A
Modern Question Modestly Answered. Maurice’s question is whether repentance and faith are the duty of
unconverted sinners to believe in Christ, and his answer is “God does by His Word plainly and plentifully
make it the duty of unbelievers to believe in Christ.” See Matthias Maurice, A Modern Question Modestly
Answered (London, 1737), 3-4, 22. Brine dismisses this duty-faith and duty-repentance as “Arminian
tenets.” See John Brine, A Refutation of Arminian Principles (London, 1743). Brine’s Refutation is the
specific answer to the writing which is anonymously written by Abraham Taylor, a London Congregational
minster and theological tutor. See Abraham Taylor, The Modern Question Concerning Repentance and
Faith (London, 1742).
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Nettles, By His Grace and for His Glory, 390; Engelsma, Hyper-Calvinism and the Call of the
Gospel, 10-12; Raymond Brown, The English Baptists of the Eighteenth Century (London: Baptist
Historical Society, 1986), 74; Daniel, “Hyper-Calvinism and John Gill,” 767.
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of the pactum salutis, supralapsarianism,119 justification from eternity, and
antinomianism,120 but with these links Garrett runs the risk of overgeneralizing.
It appears that not all English Baptists of the eighteenth century can be definitely
labeled hyper-Calvinists; even John Gill (1697-1771) is not a clear-cut candidate.121

David Engelsma, for example, claims that neither supralapsarianism, nor emphasizing God’s
sovereignty inevitably yields hyper-Calvinism. (Hyper-Calvinism and the Call of the Gospel, 10). It is
certain that those who hold the supralapsarian view such as Theodore Beza (1519-1605), Jerome Zanchius
(1516-1590), William Ames (1576-1633), Franciscus Gomarus (1563-1641), etc. cannot be naturally
classified as hyper-Calvinist. Not only that, Herman Witsius (1636-1708), David Dickson (1583-1662),
Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669), Owen, Goodwin, etc. who concretely develop the doctrine of the pactum
salutis also cannot be charged as hyper-Calvinist.
119
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Wardlaw makes a link between eternal justification and antinomianism, designating the
doctrine of eternal justification as a “foolish dogma” which is held by many Antinomians. See Wardlaw,
Systematic Theology, 188-189. Curt D. Daniel observes the common misunderstanding on the relationship
between eternal justification and antinomianism: “Many writers have described or defined HyperCalvinism or Antinomianism in terms of the doctrine of eternal justification.” See Daniel, “HyperCalvinism and John Gill,” 305.
On the relationship between Gill and hyper-Calvinism, see Daniel, “Hyper-Calvinism and
John Gill”; idem, “John Gill and Calvinistic Antinomianism,” in The Life and Thought of John Gill (16971771): A Tercentennial Appreciation (New York: Brill, 1997), 171-190; Hong-Gyu Park, “Grace and
Nature in the Theology of John Gill (1697-1771)” (PhD diss., University of Aberdeen, 2001); Jonathan
Anthony White, “A Theological and Historical Examination of John Gill’s Soteriology in Relation to
Eighteenth-Century Hyper-Calvinism” (PhD diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2010); George,
“John Gill”; Robert W. Oliver, “John Gill (1697-1771),” in The British Particular Baptists 1638-1910, ed.
Michael A. G. Haykin (Springfield: Particular Baptist Press, 1998), 145-166; George Melvyn Ella, John
Gill and the Cause of God and Truth (Eggleston: Go Publications, 1995); idem, John Gill and Justification
from Eternity: A Tercentenary Appreciation (Eggleston: Go Publications, 1998). The key of controversy is
whether Gill can simply be bound together with John Skepp (d.1721), Joseph Hussey (d.1726), and Brine
who have been labelled as hyper-Calvinists without much doubt. Some (e.g., Toon, Sheehan, Ivimey,
McBeth, Sell, Armitage, Vedder, etc.) have tried to brand Gill as a hyper-Calvinist or even an antinomian
hyper-Calvinist. See Toon, The Emergence of Hyper-Calvinism, passim; R. J. Sheehan, “The Presentation
of the Gospel Amongst ‘Hyper-Calvinists,’” Foundations 25 (1982): 28-39; Joseph Ivimey, A History of
the English Baptists (London: Printed for the author, 1811), 3:440-450, 272-275; Leon McBeth, The
Baptist Heritage (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1987), 176-178; Sell, The Great Debate, 82; Thomas
Armitage, A History of the Baptists: Traced by Their Vital Principles and Practices (New York: Bryan,
Taylor, 1887), 561; Henry C. Vedder, A Short History of the Baptists (Philadelphia: American Baptist
Publication Society, 1897), 168-169. Others (e.g., Naylor, George, Nettles, Ella, etc.) have attempted to
rescue Gill from a pejorative mark as an antinomian hyper-Calvinist while pointing out the orthodox aspect
in Gill’s teaching. See Naylor, Picking Up a Pin for the Lord, 145, 179, 184; George, “John Gill,” 26-33;
Nettles, By His Grace and for His Glory, 89-106; Ella, John Gill and the Cause of God and Truth, 159-183,
254-257; idem, John Gill and Justification from Eternity, passim. Ella’s research has a point that in the
strong purposive intention, Gill’s doctrine of eternal justification is defended by force. Scholars such as
Garrett, Daniel, Cramp, etc. have objectively acknowledged that Gill is not antinomian, but nevertheless
still has a hyper-Calvinistic color to a certain degree. See Garrett, Baptist Theology, 100; Daniel, “HyperCalvinism and John Gill,” passim; idem, “John Gill and Calvinistic Antinomianism,” 187, 190; J. M.
Cramp, Baptist History: From the Foundation of the Christian Church to the Close of the Eighteenth
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Since we could not come to a firm decision regarding Gill, we chose the Particular
Baptist minister John Brine (1703-1765) as our representative of the type. With few
exceptions122 scholars consider Brine to be one of the purest advocates of hyperCalvinism.123 Brine’s “no” to the “Modern Question” stems from his confusing active
justification with justification from eternity, as well as his failure to distinguish the
logical from the temporal.

3.4.3.2. A Case Study in Hyper-Calvinistic Justification: John Brine
Brine set forth his position in his work A Defence of Eternal Justification (1732,
hereafter, A Defence),124 which was a polemic response to Robert Bragge’s A Plain
Scriptural Account (1732).125 Brine said that his purpose in writing A Defence was to

Century (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1869), 499-500. Muller comments that the
identification of Gill’s thought as “hyper-Calvinistic” is, at best, less than helpful. For labelling someone as
a “hyper-Calvinist,” which is assessing their theology by appeals to or comparisons to only Calvin, the
entire theological branding tends to neglect the breadth of the Reformed tradition. See Richard A. Muller,
“John Gill and the Reformed Tradition: A Study in the Reception of Protestant Orthodoxy in the Eighteenth
Century,” in The Life and Thought of John Gill (1697-1771): A Tercentennial Appreciation (New York:
Brill, 1997), 52. Thus, labelling someone as a “hyper-Calvinist” who is an English Baptist of the eighteenth
century is not a simple task. Specifically in Gill’s case, it was much more complicated, for there were
interpretative differences about whether Gill accepted or rejected the “essence” of hyper-Calvinism (viz.,
concerning duty-repentance, duty-faith, the general offer of grace, etc.). According to Nettles, Gill does not
offer a specific answer about the Modern Question unlike Brine. See Nettles, By His Grace and for His
Glory, 30. Yet, Engelsma points out that Gill denies the duty-faith and duty-repentance like Brine and
Wayman. See Engelsma, Hyper-Calvinism and the Call of the Gospel, 11.
For example, George Ella finds at least “moderate” Calvinistic teaching in Brine’s two
writings: John Brine, Motives to Love and Unity Among Calvinists (London, 1753); idem, An Antidote
Against a Spreading Antinomian Principle (London, 1750). See Ella, John Gill and the Cause of God and
Truth, 258.
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Brown, The English Baptists of the Eighteenth Century, 74-75; Engelsma, Hyper-Calvinism
and the Call of the Gospel, 11; Nettles, By His Grace and for His Glory, 30, 390; Garrett, Baptist Theology,
92, 107.
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John Brine, A Defence of the Doctrine of Eternal Justification, from Some Exceptions Made to
It by Mr. Bragge, and Others (London, 1732).

Robert Bragge, “A Plain Scriptural Account of a Sinner’s Justification Before God,” in A
Defence of Some Important Doctrines of the Gospel, in Twenty-Six Sermons. Most of Which Were Preached
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defend the theological and biblical validity of the doctrine of justification from eternity,
which “has been lately objected to by Mr. Bragge.”126 Brine added, “As I have reason to
believe Justification from Eternity to be a Scriptural doctrine, I think myself under
obligation to appear in its defence [sic].”127 To advocate the idea of eternal justification
against Bragge, Brine aggressively uses the notion of active justification.128 In
connecting active justification to eternal justification he appeals to Maccovius’ Πρῶτα
Πσεῦδα.129 Brine states, “When Christ, as a surety, engaged for the elect, they were
justified. ‘At the same time [that] Christ became a surety for us, and our sins were
imputed to him, we were absolved from guilt, and reputed just; that is actively justified:’
Which was from everlasting, or before the foundation of the world” (emphasis added).130
Unfortunately Brine’s appeal to Maccovius was a mistake. As Bavinck points out,
Maccovius does not place justification in eternity but contends that justification took
place after the Fall (therefore, in time) when the first promise (Gen 3:15) was given.131

at Lime-Street Lecture. by Several Eminent Ministers, vol. 2 (Glasgow, 1773), 59-138.
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Brine, A Defence, 3.
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Brine, A Defence, 4.
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Brine also explains the distinction of active/passive justification in his sermon. Cf. Brine,
Motives to Love and Unity Among Calvinists, 11-15.
“Quo tempore Christus factus est vas pro nobis, & peccata nostra ipsi imputata sunt, eo nos
sumus absoluti areatu, & reputati justi; hoc est, active justificati . . .” See Johannes Maccovius, “Πρῶτα
Πσεῦδα, sev prima falsa adversariorum, puta, Pontificiorum, Socinianorum, Lutheranorum, Arminianorum,
Anabaptistarum,” in Joannes Maccovius redivivus: seu manuscripta ejus typis exscripta, ed. Nicolaus
Arnoldi (Franeker, 1654), 120 (Armin., ch.10).
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Brine, A Defence, 16-17.

Bavinck states: “Maccovius expressly rejected and opposed it [eternal justification]. He does
accept that justification in an active sense occurred for all the elect in what is called the “maternal
promise,” Genesis 3:15, and finds proof for this in the phrase “before the ages” (Titus 1:2), which does not
refer to eternity but to ages of long ago. He, accordingly, treats the benefits in the following order: active
justification, regeneration, faith, passive justification, good works; but he nevertheless continues to
distinguish justification from its decree in eternity.” See Bavinck, GD, 3:589 (§48.430); RD, 3:583. In
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In order to connect active justification to eternal justification, Brine tries to graft
the eternal characteristic of justification onto that of election, arguing, “If there is a
personal election from eternity, there also may be a personal Justification from
eternity,”132 because “the elect were by God considered and viewed in Christ from
everlasting.”133 Brine’s critic Bragge thinks that Brine mistakes election and
predestination (decree in eternity) with justification (execution in time), supposing that
actual justification is terminated in election or in God’s predestination from eternity.134
Maccovius’ own words: “We have to know that of all the deeds of God that aim for our salvation,
predestination is the only immanent act in God. All other deeds of God, like justification, sanctification,
adoption and redemption (which approximately includes the forgoing deeds) are reckoned to be transient
acts. For these acts, together and separate, produce something, whether this be in a physical way or in a
moral way, as in those which are justified, adopted and redeemed. It is common in the schools on the other
side to state that predestination does not produce anything in him who is predestined” (Praeclare hoc probat
Wottonus Anglus, de Reconcil. part.1. l.1. c.3. num.12. Sciendum est, inquit, praedestinationem ex iis
omnibus Dei actionibus, quae ad nostrum salutem pertinent, actionem in Deo esse immanentem. Reliquas
autem omnes Dei actiones, cujusmodi sunt, Justificatio, Sanctificatio, Adoptio, &, quae has fere universas
complectitur, Redemptio, in transeuntibus actionibus numerari. Nam hae quidem omnes & singulae ponunt
aliquid, vel physice, vel moraliter saltem in Justificatis, Adoptatis, Redemptis. De praedestinatione autem
tritum est in Scholis, eam nihil ponere in praedestinato). See Maccovius, Collegia, 129-130 (from Beeke
and Jones, “Thomas Goodwin and Johannes Maccovius,” 143-144, 144n72). Cf. Van den Brink, “Johannes
Maccovius.” Yet, Henk van den Belt does not doubt that Maccovius holds the concept of eternal
justification. See Henk van den Belt, “Herman Bavinck and His Reformed Sources on the Call to Grace: A
Shift in Emphasis Towards the Internal Work of the Spirit,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29,
no. 1 (March 2011): 43-44.
132
Brine, A Defence, 38. See also Brine, A Defence, 34, 44, 51. At least at this moment, Gill and
Brine both are of the same mind: “Justification is by many divines distinguished into active and passive.
Active justification is the act of God; it is God that justifies. Passive justification is the act of God,
terminating on the conscience of a believer, commonly called a transient act, passing upon an external
object. It is not of this I shall now treat, but of the former; which is an act internal and eternal, taken up in
the divine mind from eternity, and is an immanent, abiding one in it” (emphasis added). See John Gill, A
Complete Body of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity; Or, a System of Evangelical Truths, Deduced from the
Sacred Scriptures (London, 1796), 298.
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Brine, A Defence, 15.

134
In the framework of “decree in eternity and its execution in time,” Burgess expresses his
concern with regard to the idea of justification from eternity: “[T]his [eternal justification] is to confound
the decree of God, and its execution. . . . it is a dangerous thing.” See Burgess, The True Doctrine of
Justification, 16, 99, 116. Heppe also clarifies that “the decree of justification is one thing, justification
itself is another.” See Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 557. On this, see also Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic
Theology, 682-685; Berkhof, ST, 517-519b; Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification, 158-161. Burgess also
clarifies: “We must not therefore apprehend of God, as having a new will to do a thing in time, which he
has not from eternity (as Vorstius and others blaspheme) but his will was from all eternity, that such a thing
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This is similar to the error Bavinck warns against, i.e., considering the logical distinction
between active and passive justification as a temporal order.135
Like Eaton, Brine’s perspective on faith denies its instrumental causality and
minimizes its role in justification. Brine fully agrees with Richard Baxter’s Aphorismes:
“[F]aith is not the instrumental cause. In this I am entirely of Mr. Baxter’s opinion, who
reasons thus: ‘If faith be an instrument, it is the instrument of God or man; not of man,
for man is not the principal efficient, he doth not justify himself; not of God, for it is not
God that believeth.’”136 Brine believes that if one is justified by faith as an instrumental
cause, faith finally “has a causal influence on our Justification,”137 and as a result, the
causal significance of Christ’s obedience and suffering for justification will be relatively
weakened and faint.138 Justification by faith is “only the comfortable knowledge or
perception of that gracious privilege” (emphasis added).139 For Brine, faith is only the
perception that the elect are already justified in eternity.140 In this scheme, faith does not
have any influence on being justified. Thus, in Brine’s argument passive justification sola

be in time accomplished by his wisdom.” See Burgess, The True Doctrine of Justification, 167. He further
adds: “[O]nly predestination is an immanent act of God, and all the rest, justification, regeneration,
glorification, are transient acts; for predestination thought it be an act of God choosing such an one to
happiness, yet it doth not work any real change or positive effect in a man, unless we understand it
virtually, for it is the cause of all those transient actions that are wrought in time.” See Burgess, The True
Doctrine of Justification, 168.
135

Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219.

136

Brine, A Defence, 10. Cf. Baxter, Aphorismes, 139 (thesis.56).

137

Brine, A Defence, 18.

138

Brine, A Defence, 18.

139

Brine, A Defence, 12.

Thus, Brine’s argument is quite similar to Eaton’s view on faith except explicitly placing
justification in eternity. Cf. Eaton, The Honey-Combe, 280.
140
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fide is significantly overshadowed if not effectively replaced by an eternal active
justification.
With a strong fear of Arminianism in his background, Brine minimizes the role of
faith in justification. For him passive justification sola fide must be repudiated and faith
no longer plays a significant role in justification.

3.4.3.3. Brine’s “Justification from Eternity” Is Not Active Justification
Unlike Eaton, Brine is well aware of the distinction between active and passive
justification.141 Although Brine’s doctrine of justification, which keeps this distinction in
mind, appears to be more organized and better formulated than Eaton’s, the outcome is
essentially the same. Both men endorse the idea of justification preceding faith. However,
for Brine justification is the immanent act of God from eternity; he therefore identifies
active justification as justification from eternity and even as God’s decree. Eaton does not
make this connection. His overall position is ambiguous while in comparison Brine’s is
relatively clear. From the perspective of Reformed orthodoxy as summarized in the
Westminster Confession of Faith, Brine is in error.142 His hyper-Calvinism nullifies all
that happens in the temporal realm, removes the important significance of justifying faith,
and destroys Reformed orthodoxy’s carefully tuned equilibrium between active and

141

Brine, A Defence, 16, 28.

142
According to WCF 11.4: “God did, from all eternity, decree to justify all the elect, and Christ
did, in the fullness of time, die for their sins, and rise again for their justification: nevertheless, they are not
justified until the Holy Spirit doth, in due time, actually apply Christ unto them.” (Emphasis added; Schaff,
ed., “The Westminster Confession of Faith,” 627).
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passive justification.

3.5. The Four Parallel Characteristics of Active Justification and Definitive Sanctification
With the previous study as a foundation, active justification can be characterized in four
ways. First, active justification is inseparable from passive justification. Active
justification means that sinners are first justified objectively in foro Dei. Passive
justification means that then and only then are sinners justified by faith as an instrumental
cause in foro conscientiae. Without active justification passive justification loses its
object and collapses; active justification is the pillar on which passive justification stands.
Antinomian and hyper-Calvinistic ideas of justification fail to acknowledge this
indivisibility; they stress only the dimension of active justification while neglecting the
essential aspect of passive justification. One potential outcome of ignoring the
inseparability of active and passive justification is antinomianism. A second outcome
would be the danger of placing the two dimensions in a temporal rather than a logical
framework, leading to the erroneous conception of justification from eternity.
Second, active justification is “objective” and “decisive,” i.e., it has a
“determinacy.” On the basis of active justification, passive justification is actualized, not
vice versa. The determinacy of active justification does not mean that justification is
terminated in active justification; the terms “determinacy” and “termination” are
different. While the former refers to the condition of being confirmed or settled, the latter
refers to the act of concluding or closing. Justification does not terminate in active
justification; if it did, passive justification would be meaningless. Rather, justification is
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first determined in active justification and then terminated in passive justification. Thus,
active justification is distinguished (but still inseparable) from passive or completed
justification. Justification is completed in passive justification sola fide, not in active
justification soli Dei.
Third, active justification is Christ-centered. Active justification soli Dei
provides the “object” of belief to which passive justification sola fide attaches and on
which it rests. The object is Christ’s righteousness and its imputation unto sinners.
Sinners are declared righteous when they believe what active justification offers. Thus,
active justification says that passive justification sola fide does not happen by faith per se
or in the act of believing, nor is it brought about by mere evangelical obedience. Rather,
active justification gives passive justification sola fide its true meaning when the believer
trusts in Christ’s meritorious obedience and satisfaction.
Fourth, active justification fundamentally establishes God’s absolute sovereignty
over justification. When active justification is properly understood and presented as
working in concert with passive justification, misguided attempts to overemphasize
God’s sovereignty in justification (e.g., the antinomian or hyper-Calvinistic teachings of
justification) cannot stand. The concept of active justification answers two crucial
questions, i.e., who is the ultimate author sola Dei of passive justification sola fide, and in
what does the sinner need to believe in order to be justified. The correct answers always
reinforce God’s sovereignty in salvation.
These same four core characteristics of active justification—i.e., inseparability,
determinacy, Christ-centeredness, and total reliance on God’s sovereignty in
justification—are found in parallel in definitive sanctification as seen in Chapter 2.
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Definitive sanctification and progressive sanctification are inseparable and indivisible.
The believer’s union with Christ envisages a holiness that is a fait accompli; definitive
sanctification is the condition of sharing Christ’s perfect holiness in the mystical union
with Christ. Definitive sanctification simply defines who the primary agent is—the Holy
Spirit—and where sanctification begins—with God. Both active justification and
definitive sanctification proclaim our salvation to be God-driven.

3.6. Summary
This chapter champions the importance and meaningfulness of active justification by
presenting its proper definition, key ideas, and biblical and historical foundations in a
theological context. The chapter shows some of the ways that active justification has
suffered from misunderstanding, neglect, and misuse, all of which have arisen in
theological debates within the church over the past several centuries. We saw that failing
to properly define and distinguish active from passive justification and to keep them in
balance with each other plays a major role in all three types of error.
Active justification is God’s divine act to justify sinners on the basis of Christ’s
perfect righteousness, an act that takes place objectively in foro Dei. Genesis 3:15, which
describes the protoevangelium and the Christ-centered divine promise, supports what
active justification essentially stands for. This verse introduces the notion, inculcated in
the idea of active justification, namely that God divinely commits and promises to justify
sinners on the basis of Christ’s righteousness. Romans 8:30a (“those whom he
predestined, he also called; and those whom he called he also justified”) and Romans
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3:24a (“they are now justified by his grace as a gift”) refer to the objective, decisive, and
free nature of justification on which the notion of active justification stands.
The distinction between active and passive justification has often been used to
preclude antinomian, neonomian, Arminian, and hyper-Calvinist theologians alike from
seeing justification exclusively one way or the other. Anti-Arminian John Eaton neglects
the proper distinction of active/passive justification; as a result, he inadvertently opens
the door to the antinomian perspective in the sense that passive justification is ignored
and underestimated in an extreme overemphasis on the aspect of active justification.
Hyper-Calvinist John Brine misuses the idea of active justification by equating it with
God’s immanent act from eternity. And more recently Lane Tipton misunderstands active
justification, claiming that it undermines the Reformation’s doctrine of justification sola
fide. However, active justification does not undermine the truth of justification sola fide;
rather it provides the object of belief for justification sola fide. Furthermore, in
recognizing that active and passive justification are inseparable and that believers’
justification is realized not in active justification but in passive justification sola fide,
Tipton’s criticism becomes untenable. His criticism arises out of a misunderstanding of
the core characteristics of active justification.

PART II
THE FOUR PARALLEL CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTIVE
JUSTIFICATION AND DEFINITIVE SANCTIFICATION

CHAPTER 4
PARALLEL CHARACTERISTIC NO. 1:
INSEPARABILITY IN HERMAN BAVINCK

The Dutch Reformed tradition is a rich venue in which to explore the idea and nature of
active/passive justification and definitive/progressive sanctification. More than in any
other theological tradition, Dutch Reformed theologians discuss this matter in a
thoughtful, well-ordered way.1 Although the idea of definitive sanctification has been
more fully developed since Murray, Dutch Reformed theologians prior to Murray also
touched on the analogous idea of definitive sanctification in their writings.2 Even so,
when they discuss active justification and the similar idea of definitive sanctification,
Dutch Reformed theologians do not approach it in perfect theological harmony. A
diversity of thought can be seen across the work of Bavinck, Comrie, Witsius, and
Kuyper.
Part II defines four parallel characteristics to explore how Dutch Reformed
theologians dealt with both active justification and definitive sanctification:
(1) Inseparability — The two-dimensional structure and indivisible nature of justification
(active/passive) and sanctification (definitive/progressive) as shown in Bavinck

1
In comparison to antinomian tradition in the 1630-40s and hyper-Calvinistic tradition in the
early 1700s, the argument with regard to active justification in Dutch Reformed theology, specifically in
the early 1900s when Bavinck’s first and second edition of Gereformeerde dogmatiek (1895-1901, 19061911, respectively) was published, is more concretely developed. The reasons are: (1) all issues are
historically well researched; (2) different theological opinions in a debate between the Afscheiding churches
and the Doleantie churches settle into shape to some degree at Utrecht 1905; and (3) even those who go off
the rails to a certain degree are still in Reformed tradition in the large picture.
2

Cf. Snoeberger, “Definitive Sanctification,” 184-188.
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(present chapter);
(2) Objectivity and Decisiveness in justification and sanctification as presented in Comrie
(chapter 5);
(3) Christ-centeredness in justification and sanctification in the light of Christ’s
meritorious and satisfactory work as found in Witsius (chapter 6);
(4) God’s sovereignty in salvation with the accent on God’s power as seen in Kuyper
(chapter 7).
By examining all four characteristics in parallel, the soteriological meaning and
significance of active justification and definitive sanctification will be fully revealed
(chapter 8).

4.1. Bavinck and the via media
Throughout his lifetime3 Bavinck tried to stand in two theological places at once in an
eclectic manner,4 e.g., between pietism and modernism, Kampen and Leiden, faith and
science, confessional/biblical theology and scientific/academic discipline, the Afscheiding
(or Secession) and the Doleantie (or the Grieving) tradition, etc.5 Bavinck never

3

For biography of Bavinck in Dutch, see Valentijn Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam: W.
ten Have, 1921); R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1966).
Bavinck’s biography has been nicely depicted in English by Gleason. See Ronald N. Gleason, Herman
Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian (Phillipsburg: P&R Pub., 2010).
See John Bolt, “The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman
Bavinck” (PhD diss., St. Michael’s College, Toronto School of Theology, 1982), esp. 38-78. Bolt’s
dissertation has recently reprinted: John Bolt, A Theological Analysis of Herman Bavinck’s Two Essays on
the Imitatio Christi: Between Pietism and Modernism (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2013).
4

5

The Afscheiding (or Secession) is an ecclesiastical movement that tried to reform within the
State Reformed Church (De Hervormde Kerk) but came to exist as a separate denomination apart from it.
The Afscheiding wanted to hold authoritative confessional church (affirming the Heidelberg Catechism, the
Belgic Confession, and the Canons of Dort) and reassert biblical authority against liberal critics. The
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completely rejects the modern scientific learning from Leiden under the teaching of
Johannes Scholten (1811-1885) and Abraham Kuenen (1828-1891),6 nor does he totally
rebuff the spirit of the Doleantie church where Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) stood.7 By
adhering to confessional/biblical theology, by no means does Bavinck exclude the
scientific/academic discipline that was the intellectual mainstream of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.8 Bavinck is always a man of his era, not uncritical or passively
receptive but methodical and judicious. Taking this into account, a re-evaluation of
Bavinck’s academic and theological style has been conducted by scholars who now see

Doleantie (or the Grieving) is a second Secession that ousted from the State Reformed Church after failing
to bring reform during the mid-1880s. See James D. Bratt, Dutch Calvinism in Modern America: A History
of a Conservative Subculture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 3-33; Hendrik Bouma, Secession,
Doleantie, and Union, 1834-1892, trans. Theodore Plantinga (Neerlandia: Inheritance Publications, 1995);
D. H. Kromminga, The Christian Reformed Tradition: From the Reformation Till the Present (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1943), 79-98; J. Mark Beach, “Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and ‘the
Conclusions of Utrecht 1905,’” Mid-America Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 13-16.
John Bolt, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam: Herman Bavinck’s Reception and
Influence in North America,” Calvin Theological Journal 38, no. 2 (2003): 267; George Harinck,
“‘Something That Must Remain, If the Truth Is to Be Sweet and Precious to Us’: The Reformed
Spirituality of Herman Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal 38, no. 2 (2003): 253; James Eglinton,
Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif (London: T&T Clark
International, 2012), 13-18. For a general survey of the major schools of Dutch Reformed theology in the
nineteenth century, see James Hutton Mackay, Religious Thought in Holland during the Nineteenth Century
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1911).
6

Van den Belt, “Herman Bavinck and His Reformed Sources on the Call to Grace,” 54-59;
Beach, “Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and ‘the Conclusions of Utrecht 1905,’” 13-17.
7

8
The title of Bavinck’s inaugural speech at the Theological School in Kampen in 1882 was
“Science of Holy Theology” (De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid). See Herman Bavinck, De
wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid (Kampen: G. Ph. Zalsman, 1883). As George Harinck mentions,
this speech “was not about piety but rather about science; he [Bavinck] did not mean the modernistic
theology but holy theology. Science and theology; they belong together.” See Harinck, “Something That
Must Remain,” 255. The subject which is dealt with, the relationship between theology and science, is
Bavinck’s favorite subject. See Herman Bavinck, “Godgeleerdheid en godsdienstwetenschap,” De Vrije
Kerk 18 (1892): 197-225. This has translated into English: Herman Bavinck, Essays on Religion, Science,
and Society, ed. John Bolt, trans. Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
2008), 49-60 (ch.3, “Theology and Religious Studies”). See also Bavinck’s inaugural speech at the Free
University of Amsterdam, December 17, 1902: Herman Bavinck, Godsdienst en godgeleerdheid
(Wageningen: Vada, 1902). Cf. Bolt, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 269.
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him as a moderate or eclectic thinker rather than an insular or clannish Fundamentalist,9
as an attentive and careful rather than antibiblical or modernized Scholastic.10 Bavinck’s
moderate tendency, however, does not mean he lacks a theological backbone, or holds an
inclusivism that tolerates any viewpoint without critical thinking. Bavinck’s ultimate
standard when following the via media is the Scriptures and a confessional/orthodox
Reformed theology.11 For Bavinck, any theological and intellectual thought that is not in
accordance with these standards should be carefully scrutinized and criticized, just like
that of the theology of his teachers, Scholten and Kuenen.12 Yet even with his opponents
Bavinck does not set aside academic courtesy; rather, he finds a positive way to dialogue
in an effort to find biblical truth.13 For example, when Bavinck became deeply concerned
about Kuyper’s idea of presumptive or immediate regeneration14 he published a total of

John Bolt, “The Bavinck Recipe for Theological Cake,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1
(2010): 11-12; idem, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 265; James Eglinton, “How Many
Herman Bavincks? De Gemeene Genade and the ‘Two Bavincks’ Hypothesis,” in The Kuyper Center
Review: Revelation and Common Grace, ed. John Bowlin, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 279301; idem, Trinity and Organism, 27-50.
9

10
Bolt, “The Bavinck Recipe for Theological Cake,” 12. In a review on Herman Bavinck als
Dogmaticus (see R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus (Kampen: Kok, 1961)), Cornelius Van
Til regards scholasticism as a problematic intellectual thought that not only places a human authority over
the divine authority, but also weakens the primacy of the Word and Christ. Van Til then argues that this kind
of scholastic tendency can be found in Bavinck’s theology. Although Van Til criticizes Bremmer’s
excessive criticism of Bavinck, Van Til still sees the limitation of Bavinck at least in terms of holding
scholastic tendency which can be said to be “modern activism.” See Cornelius Van Til, “Herman Bavinck
as a Theologian,” Westminster Theological Journal 24, no. 1 (1961): 48-64. Here, Van Til seems to regard
the term “scholasticism” as a particular theological or philosophical content, not as a method. Cf. van
Asselt et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 1-9.
11

On the careful investigation with regard to the sources that Bavinck usually uses, see Van den
Belt, “Herman Bavinck and His Reformed Sources on the Call to Grace”; idem, The Authority of Scripture
in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 267-273.
12

Harinck, “Something That Must Remain,” 253.

13

Van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture, 250.

14

Since the subject of regeneration controversy lies beyond the topic of this study, it will not be
dealt with in detail. Explained briefly, the idea of presumptive or presupposed regeneration (onderstelde
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forty articles between 29 March 1901 and 2 May 1901 in the periodical De Bazuin (The
Trumpet) in opposition to Kuyper’s view.15 In the process Bavinck did not assume an
aggressive position toward Kuyper; on the contrary, as Beach and Van den Belt
acknowledge, Bavinck’s anti-Kuyperian argument is mild and respectful.16
Bavinck’s aim was to hold to the via media in order to retain the “unity” of the
GKN church between the so-called “A” churches (Afscheiding) and “B” churches
(Doleantie).17 As Harinck points out, Bavinck preferred synthesis to antithesis, eclectic
compromise to strict dualism, and moderation to extremism.18 This characteristic of
Bavinck’s theological methodology, attitude, and spirituality, as Berkouwer defines it, can

wedergeboorte), which is often associated with Abraham Kuyper, refers to the notion that a principal
ground for administering infant baptism is that parents may presuppose their regeneration on the strength of
God’s promise. The dispute regarding immediate (or unmediated) regeneration is focused on whether the
use of means (e.g., the Word and sacraments) is needed (mediate regeneration) or not (immediate or
unmediated regeneration) when being regenerate in performing God’s saving and sovereign work. As
appeared in the Conclusions of Utrecht 1905 which was primarily formulated by Bavinck, Kuyper’s view is
challenged. For example, Acts, Article 158 declares: “According to the confession of our churches, the seed
of the covenant, by virtue of the promise of God, is to be considered regenerated and sanctified in Christ,
until the contrary should become evident from their doctrine and conduct as they grow up.” See Acta der
generale Synode van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, gehouden te Utrecht van 22 Augustus tot 7
September 1905 (Amsterdam: Höveker & Wormser, 1905), 84-85.
15
For the edited version in English, see Herman Bavinck, Saved by Grace: The Holy Spirit’s
Work in Calling and Regeneration, ed. J. Mark Beach, trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman (Grand Rapids:
Reformation Heritage Books, 2008).
16
Beach, “Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and ‘the Conclusions of Utrecht 1905,’” 12, 15;
Van den Belt, “Herman Bavinck and His Reformed Sources on the Call to Grace,” 54. Bavink’s respectful
attitude with Christian virtues is a valuable manner for those who are in a sharp theological debate with
opponents. For instance, Augustine is also one who tried to react to his opponents with Christian virtues. In
the context of anti-Donatists, Augustine endeavored to convey Christian “love” to Donatists who were
lacking to love in their arguments and behaviors. On this, see Jae-Eun Park, “Lacking Love or Conveying
Love? The Fundamental Roots of the Donatists and Augustine’s Nuanced Treatment of Them,” Reformed
Theological Review 72, no. 2 (August 2013): 103-121.
17

The GKN church refers to the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (De Gereformeerde
Kerken in Nederland). These churches were founded in 1892 in a merger of two distinct reformatory
groups within the Dutch State Reformed Church (De Hervormde Kerk), namely, the Afscheiding of 1834
and the Doleantie of 1886.
18

Harinck, “Something That Must Remain,” 250-252.
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be expressed in a single word: catholicity (Katholiciteit).19 Under the spirit of catholicity,
the so-called “Two Bavincks” hypothesis, which tries to place Bavinck in an
incompatible bipolar mode (e.g., Reformed and theological churchman vs. modern and
progressive academic), cannot be upheld.20 The spirit of catholicity, as Bolt well
describes, ultimately makes Bavinck a person who developed a faithfully religious
dogmatic theology by using the academic method and a precise scholastic distinction
eclectically.21
Bavinck’s method of via media in the spirit of catholicity leaves its unmistakable
mark throughout his theological writings.22 Bavinck’s moderate tendencies come into
plain view in particular when he gives his view of the topic of this paper, i.e., justification
and sanctification. Bavinck always deals with justification and sanctification, not as an

G. C. Berkouwer, “Katholiciteit. H. Bavinck,” in Zoeken en vinden: herinneringen en
ervaringen (Kampen: Kok, 1989), 40-70. For Bavinck’s own thinking about catholicity as his theological
method, see Herman Bavinck, “The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,” trans. John Bolt, Calvin
Theological Journal 27, no. 2 (1992): 220-251; Barend Kamphuis, “Herman Bavinck on Catholicity,” MidAmerica Journal of Theology 24 (2013): 97-104.
19

According to Yarnell, there are “two poles” in Bavinck’s thinking that seem to be
irreconcilable. See Malcolm B. Yarnell, The Formation of Christian Doctrine (Nashville: B & H
Academic, 2007), 49-59. Eglinton criticizes the “Two Bavincks” model by introducing the way of reading
Bavinck in an organic outlook. See Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 27-50.
20

Bolt, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 267-269. Beeke also states: Bavinck
“concluded with his own position, which was often a synthesis of other viewpoints arrived at through
painstaking scriptural exegesis and reasoning . . . Bavinck habitually sought to incorporate elements of
truth that he found in other theological systems.” See Joel R. Beeke, “The Atonement in Herman Bavinck’s
Theology,” in The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, Historical, and Practical Perspectives, ed. Charles H.
Hill and Frank A. James (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 324-345. In his dissertation, Hielema
also notes: “Bavinck’s use of the notion of duality is consistent with his theological method, which is one of
seeking for the balanced middle ground while avoiding extremes. This manner is apparent in his clear
rejection of monism and dualism in favour of duality.” See Sydney Jacob Hielema, “Herman Bavinck’s
Eschatological Understanding of Redemption” (PhD diss., Wycliffe College, 1998), 74.
21

22
For a helpful guide to research Bavinck’s publications, see Eric D. Bristley, Guide to the
Writings of Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008). On the
bibliography regarding Bavinck in English, see John Bolt, “Herman Bavinck Speaks English: A
Bibliographic Essay,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 117-126.

126

oversimplified single structure, but as a comprehensive, twofold, inseparable structure.
The reason Bavinck does this is to pay close attention to Scripture in order to avoid
falling into any of the radical arguments that have plagued the church throughout its
history, and to make a synthesis (rather than a mere antithesis) based on a sound biblical
and orthodox perspective.

4.2. Bavinck’s Soteriological Views
4.2.1. Bavinck and Definitive Sanctification
As well described by scholars, Bavinck was not only an excellent dogmatician, but also
an exceptional ethicist.23 Bavinck wrote his dissertation on ethics, De ethiek van Ulrich
Zwingli (The Ethics of Ulrich Zwingli),24 and prepared numerous writings on the
subject.25 Before being recognized for his theology and dogmatics, Bavinck had been
renowned for pedagogy, ethics, and educational philosophy.26 As an ethicist-

John Bolt, “Christ and the Law in the Ethics of Herman Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal
28, no. 1 (April 1993): 45-73; idem, A Theological Analysis; D. van Keulen, “Herman Bavinck on the
Imitation of Christ,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29, no. 1 (2011): 78-91; idem, “Herman
Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics: Some Remarks about Unpublished Manuscripts in the Libraries of Amsterdam
and Kampen,” The Bavinck Review 1 (2010): 25-56; Eglinton, “On Bavinck’s Theology of Sanctificationas-Ethics,” 167-188.
23

24

Herman Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli (Kampen: G. Ph. Zalsman, 1880).

See, e.g., Herman Bavinck, Hedendaagsche moraal (Kampen: Kok, 1902); idem, “Christian
Principles and Social Relationships,” in Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2008), 119-144; idem, “On Inequality,” in Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 145-164; idem, “Ethics and Politics,” in Essays on Religion, Science, and
Society (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 261-278; idem, “The Influence of the Protestant
Reformation on the Moral and Religious Condition of Communities and Nations,” in Alliance of the
Reformed Churches Holding the Presbyterian System. Proceedings of the Fifth General Council, Toronto,
1892 (London: Publication Committee of the Presbyterian Church of England, 1892), 48-55.
25

For Bavinck’s own perspective on educational philosophy and pedagogy, see Herman Bavinck,
“Trends in Pedagogy,” in Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008),
205-208; idem, “Classical Education,” in Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker
26
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dogmatician, Bavinck placed great emphasis on sanctification in his soteriology, stating
that “since the redemption that God grants and works out in Christ is meant to
accomplish complete deliverance from sin and all its consequences, it includes
sanctification and glorification from the very beginning.”27 Despite its doctrinal
importance, Bavinck’s views on sanctification have scarcely been acknowledged in the
scholarly field.28 In particular, the detailed examination of the relationship between
Bavinck’s view of sanctification and the idea of definitive sanctification has been almost
completely ignored;29 this neglect cries out for academic redress. Bavinck speaks of

Academic, 2008), 209-244; idem, Paedagogische beginselen (Kampen: Kok, 1904); idem, De nieuwe
opvoeding (Kampen: Kok, 1917); idem, De opvoeding der rijpere jeugd (Kampen: Kok, 1916). For the
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sanctification as a twofold structure with a Trinitarian perspective.30 His view of
sanctification is not only conceptually similar to the idea of definitive sanctification, but
also endorses the inseparability between passive sanctification (for Bavinck, an aspect of
definitive sanctification) and active (or progressive) sanctification. This issue will be
closely examined in the following three sections: (1) evangelical and legal sanctification;
(2) active and passive sanctification; and (3) the Trinitarian perspective on sanctification.

4.2.1.1. Evangelical Sanctification and Legal Sanctification
In his doctrine of sanctification Bavinck presents an idea that is almost identical to
definitive sanctification. In Magnalia Dei,31 Bavinck resolves sanctification into two
aspects: legalistic and evangelical. According to Bavinck, in legalistic sanctification
(wettische heiligmaking) “the believers proceed to sanctify themselves . . . by means of

sanctification in the ordo salutis. See Snoeberger, “Definitive Sanctification,” passim. Recently, Eglinton
investigates Bavinck’s view of sanctification in the dialectical structure, i.e., objective/subjective,
passive/active, gift/task, etc., but does not make a close connection to the idea of definitive sanctification.
See Eglinton, “On Bavinck’s Theology of Sanctification-as-Ethics.”
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In a general sense, the attempt to see theology in a comprehensive Trinitarian perspective is
still meaningful and valuable. See Kevin Vanhoozer, “The Triune God of the Gospel,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Evangelical Theology, eds. Timothy Larsen and Daniel J. Treier (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 25-27; Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in
Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004).
31
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their exertion and good works.”32 Evangelical sanctification (evangelische heiligmaking)
as revealed by God in the Gospel is “not only completely prepared by Christ but by His
Spirit is also applied to our hearts and worked out there.”33 Through this distinction
Bavinck affirms that even though in the “legal” sense sanctification is performed by
human agency, in the “evangelical” sense the ultimate author and performer of
sanctification is God in communion with Christ through the illumination of the Holy
Spirit. Bavinck clarifies it thus: “[I]t were truer to say that effort of the believers in
working towards their own sanctification is made possible only by the fact that it is a
work of God which He fulfills in them” (emphasis added).34 Bavinck’s emphasis on
God’s ultimate sovereignty and sole performance in sanctification directly supports his
theological motto “grace restores nature.”35 Bavinck enunciates it clearly here,
“Certainly, grace, so far from obliterating nature, restores it. Inasmuch as man because of
sin lacked the desire and the ability to walk in the ways of the Lord, he by virtue of the
re-creation is again inclined and equipped, at least in principle, to live uprightly not
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For the motif of “grace restores nature” under the context of Neo-Calvinism, see Herman
Bavinck, “Common Grace,” Calvin Theological Journal 24, no. 1 (1986): 35-65; idem, “The Catholicity of
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merely in some but in all the commandments of God.”36 Although human nature per se
is devoid of the ability to be holy due to sin, this does not mean that sanctification is
therefore completely unattainable. Rather, according to Bavinck, solely through (or as a
sole result of) God’s work to renew human nature, sanctification is both accessible and
applicable. That is, grace restores nature in the realm of sanctification. In terms of setting
the initial point of sanctification solely on God and His grace, definitive sanctification
and evangelical sanctification both stand on the same foundation.
As explained in Chapter 2, the definition of definitive sanctification can be
expressed using four terms: decisiveness, identity, condition, and ground. That is, in the
scheme of definitive sanctification, believers are objectively and definitively sanctified
apart from their own works when they are united with Christ (objectivity and
decisiveness, 1 Cor 6:11) and as a result, they are called saints (identity, 1 Cor 1:2). Those
who are definitively sanctified are in a state of being conformed and sharing in Christ’s
perfect holiness through mystical fellowship with Christ (condition, 1 Thess 4:4, 7; 2
Thess 2:13; 1 Pet 2:9). Definitive sanctification is the foundation of a progressive
sanctification that once begun takes an entire lifetime to complete (ground, John 17:17; 1
Thess 5:23; Phil 1:6).37 As shall be seen, Bavinck’s view of evangelical sanctification
matches these four characteristics.
First, Bavinck perceives the aspects of “objectivity” and “determinacy” that
denote the meaning of sanctification. Bavinck notes:
He [Christ] already was in communion with them [believers] and was their
36
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guarantor and mediator. And the whole church, comprehended in him as its
head, has objectively been crucified, has died, been resurrected, and glorified
with him. All the benefits of grace therefore lie prepared and ready for the
church in the person of Christ. All is finished [determinacy]: God has been
reconciled; nothing remains to be added from the side of humans. Atonement,
forgiveness, justification, the mystical union, sanctification, glorification, and so
on—they do not come into being after and as a result of faith but are objectively,
actively present in Christ [objectivity] [emphasis added].38
For Bavinck, sanctification therefore has a point that is objectively and definitively
accomplished in Christ. Bavinck further adds: “[T]he High Priest has sanctified Himself
for His people, in order that they too should be sanctified in truth (John 17:19), the
believers also immediately receive the name of holy ones or saints.”39 Yet Bavinck
makes clear that being named as a saint does not guarantee a sinless state; rather, it means
that the believer “becomes the property of the Lord, inasmuch as it has been sanctified in
Christ and become a temple of the Holy Spirit” (emphasis added).40 Believers being
identified as saints reveals the fact of their change in “lordship” from Satan to Christ. The
evangelical sanctification that Bavinck earnestly promotes describes the same fact that is
inherent in definitive sanctification. Bavinck speaks so clearly of the dimensions of
“decisiveness” and “objectivity” in sanctification in order to emphasize and affirm that
“objectively and subjectively, from beginning to end, the work of salvation is a work of
God’s grace and of his grace alone.”41 That is, the entire process of salvation (ordo
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salutis) is “his [God’s] work. He is the active agent” (emphasis in the original).42 This
idea erases self-endeavor as a means to gain holiness through self-righteousness or in a
“consistently nomistic way,” which Bavinck exhorts believers to avoid.43
Second, Bavinck infers his concept of the “identity” of God’s chosen people
from several biblical references. He states that in evangelical sanctification, believers are
“described as ‘saints,’ because by being called saints (cf. Rom. 1:17; 1 Cor. 1:2; “called
to be saints”), they stand in a special relationship with God and, taking the place of the
old Israel, they are ‘a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God’s own people’
(1 Pet. 2:9).”44 According to Bavinck, believers are saints because they “were elected in
Christ from before the foundation of the world . . . they have been sanctified by the one
sacrifice of Christ [emphasis added].”45 In this regard, the identity of God’s chosen
people is fundamentally rooted in eternal election and Christ’s sacrificial work. For
Bavinck the sole reason and way for believers to receive the identity as saints is by
having “imparted [Christ’s] full holiness and glory to us.”46 Therefore the identity of a
believer as a saint cannot be altered or shaken in its integrity by anything or anyone
because it is solidly grounded in the conviction that Christ “is a complete and allsufficient Savior. He does not accomplish his work halfway but saves us really and
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completely.”47 Unlike legal sanctification, evangelical sanctification speaks
authoritatively of the identity believers fundamentally have. Bavinck notes:
Evangelical sanctification, however, is just as distinct from legalistic
sanctification as the righteousness that is of faith differs from that which is
obtained by works. For it consists in the reality that in Christ God grants us,
along with righteousness, also complete holiness, and does not just impute it but
also inwardly imparts it by the regenerating and renewing working of the Holy
Spirit until we have been fully conformed to the image of his Son.48
Through mystical union with Christ, not through their own meritorious works, believers
have complete righteousness and holiness from Christ imputed to them and are
henceforward called saints. Defining this identity is crucial for Bavinck, for the necessity
and duty of performing progressive sanctification can be found in this identity such that
“the believers must become that which they are [holy] [emphasis added].”49
Third, having given the notion of definitive sanctification as indicative of the
“condition” of being conformed to and sharing in Christ’s perfect holiness through
mystical union with Christ, Bavinck expresses it this way:
[B]y their baptism [believers] have also been brought into fellowship with
Christ . . . they have been transferred into a state of holiness (1 Thess. 4:4, 7; 2
Thess. 2:13; 1 Pet. 2:9) and were therefore washed and sanctified (1 Cor. 6:11),
are temples of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 3:16; 6:19; 2 Cor. 6:16), with whom they
were marked with a seal for the day of redemption (2 Cor. 1:22; 5:5; Eph. 1:13;
4:30), made new creatures (2 Cor. 5:17; Eph. 2:10), children of God not only by
adoption but also by regeneration (John 1:12-13; 1 John 1:3), saints (Rom. 1:7;
etc.) and sanctified (Acts 20:32; 26:18; 1 Cor. 1:2; Heb. 2:11; 10:10, 14).
Sanctification, accordingly, is in the first place a work of God (John 17:17; 1
Thess. 5:23; Phil. 1:6), more specifically of Christ and his Spirit” [emphasis
added].50
47
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Unlike legal sanctification, evangelical sanctification signifies the “new state” (nieuwe
stand) of believers that is brought about only through mystical fellowship with Christ.51
According to Bavinck, the difference between legal and evangelical sanctification does
not lie in the content of the law per se, but on the “mode of sharing it [the law] [emphasis
added].” That is, those who are in a “new state” with Christ do not keep the law by their
own efforts and self-righteousness. Instead, in Christ God gives them “the perfect
sanctification along with the justification, and He gives this as an internal possession
through the regenerating and renewing operation of the Holy Spirit” (emphasis added).52
So the way to abide in the law for those who are in this “new state” is not through selfendeavor, but through the power of “perfect sanctification” that God gives them in Christ.
Still, Bavinck warns that perfect sanctification as a mode of retaining the new state does
not imply perfectionism in any sense.53 Even though believers in evangelical
sanctification are in a new state by union with Christ, they are still “called to purify
themselves from all pollution of flesh and spirit, to present their bodies as a living
sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God (Rom. 12:1; 2 Cor. 7:1), to crucify the flesh with all
its passions and desires.”54 But again, just as in definitive sanctification Bavinck says
that evangelical sanctification is about the believer’s “condition,” i.e., the state that
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“consists fully in believers being conformed to the image of the Son (Rom. 8:29; Gal.
4:19).”55
Fourth, in the same way that others use the term definitive sanctification as the
foundation for progressive sanctification, Bavinck uses the term evangelical
sanctification as the foundation for it. Bavinck points out that “God does not inject the
righteousness and holiness of Christ into us mechanically . . . but He works it out in us in
an organic way” (emphasis added).56 The organic approach appears in Scripture thus:
“[T]he kingdom of heaven is a gift of God (Luke 12:32) and yet it is a treasure of great
worth which must be sought after (Matt. 6:33 and 13:46)” (emphasis added). That is,
believers “have put on the new man, and must nevertheless constantly put him on (Eph.
4:24 and Col. 3:10).”57 One might think that evangelical sanctification with its once-forall nature and progressive sanctification with its ongoing nature are incompatible, but
Bavinck responds to this by pointing out that these two ideas “do not conflict. The one is
simply the ground [grondslag] and guarantee [waarborg, i.e., warranty] of the other”
(emphasis added).58 Thus Bavinck can conclude, “The believers can and they will
become holy because in Christ they are holy [emphasis added].”59
In sum, the idea of evangelical sanctification that Bavinck proposes bears a
striking resemblance to definitive sanctification as defined in chapter 2. Both ideas
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establish to the fullest extent God’s sovereignty in the realm of sanctification, remind us
of the ultimate identity of believers, confirm that the condition in which believers
fundamentally exist is the mystical union with Christ, and provide the foundation on
which progressive sanctification rests and performs.

4.2.1.2. Passive Sanctification and Active Sanctification
For Bavinck, evangelical sanctification, while focusing more on God’s sovereignty than
human participation in salvation, still does not entirely neglect the dimension of human
responsibility in sanctification. To avoid an unbalanced presentation of God’s
sovereignty and human responsibility, Bavinck proposes both ideas of sanctification,
passive and active sanctification. Unlike the distinction of active/passive justification that
is viewed from God’s side, Bavinck’s distinction of passive/active sanctification is
observed from the human side. That is, passive sanctification is a “gift” that is awarded
by God; therefore believers who receive this gift are passively sanctified solely by God’s
grace (John 17:17; 1 Thess. 5:23; Heb. 13:20-21).60 This makes “evangelical”
sanctification “passive” sanctification. Believers are passively sanctified.
Sanctification, however, “is not exhausted by what is done for and in
believers . . . in the first place it is a work and gift of God . . . but in the second place, an
active meaning, and people themselves are called and equipped to sanctify themselves
and devote their whole life to God (Rom. 12:1; 2 Cor. 7:1; 1 Thess. 4:3; Heb. 12:14; and
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so forth)” (emphasis added).61 Thus according to Bavinck this progressive dimension is
active sanctification. Believers have to actively sanctify themselves. Bavinck contrasts
active sanctification with “continued repentance” from the Heidelberg Catechism,62
stating that “continued repentance . . . is the negative side of the process that stands out,
in active sanctification it is the positive side that comes to the fore.”63 Yet Bavinck
thinks that those who are passively sanctified in the sense of evangelical sanctification
are simultaneously “active in both and can be active because, by regeneration at the
outset and by positive sanctification later on, believers receive the power of the Holy
Spirit.”64
Although Bavinck’s concept of passive justification apparently includes the idea
of definitive sanctification as the initial translation from death to life by God’s grace, his
passive justification extends its meaning even as far as glorification. In addition,
Bavinck’s idea of passive justification extends to God’s continuing and all-encompassing
work in making believers holy. This extended range of passive justification can best be
understood in the logical inseparability between passive and active sanctification as seen
below.
Bavinck acknowledges that passive (evangelical) and active (progressive)
sanctification are inseparable and indivisible, for “Scripture always holds on to both
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facets: God’s all-encompassing activity and our responsibility.”65 Bavinck expresses this
inseparability in a well-balanced exposition:
Just as in the preaching of the gospel, faith is a gift of God and yet people are
responsible for their attitude toward God (e.g., Rom. 9:1-29 and 9:30-10:21), so
here the possession of all the benefits of the covenant (forgiveness, adoption,
life, salvation) is secured before any kind of work, yet over and over and with
great urgency there is an insistence on good works as if those benefits can only
be obtained by these works. The kingdom of God is a gift granted by God
according to his good pleasure (Matt. 11:26; 16:17; 22:14; 24:22; Luke 10:20;
12:32; 22:29), yet it is also a reward, a treasure in heaven, which has to be
aggressively sought and gained by labor in the service of God (Matt. 5:12, 20;
6:20; 19:21; 20:1ff; and so forth). Believers are branches in the vine who cannot
do anything apart from Christ, yet at the same time they are admonished to
remain in him, in his word, in his love (John 15). . . . They are saints and
sanctified in Christ Jesus, and must nevertheless become holy in all their conduct
(1 Pet. 1:15; 2 Pet. 3:11), pursuing and perfecting their sanctification in the fear
of God (2 Cor. 7:1; 1 Thess. 3:13; 4:3), for without it no one will see the Lord
(Heb. 12:14).66
Just as with definitive and progressive sanctification, for Bavinck passive and active
sanctification are two dimensions of the same reality (“holiness”); neither of these can be
excluded or neglected. Bavinck believes that “Scripture definitely insists on
sanctification, both its passive and active aspects, and proclaims both the one and the
other with equal emphasis.”67 Bavinck further adds, “It sees no contradiction or conflict
between them but rather knits them together as tightly as possible as when it says that,
precisely because God works in them both to will and to do, believers must work out
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their own salvation in fear and trembling (Phil. 2:12-13).”68 From this viewpoint,
sanctification “both from the divine and the human side, is an organic process” (emphasis
added).69

4.2.1.3. Trinitarian Perspective on Sanctification
The preceding chapter showed that when Murray elaborates on the idea of definitive
sanctification, he tends to underscore the theme of “union with Christ” to a considerable
degree. Murray’s theme was the way that definitive sanctification is realized in believers.
However, Bavinck’s discussion looks at sanctification from a more comprehensive
Trinitarian perspective that recognizes God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit equally.
Bavinck argues convincingly that the beginning point of sanctification has to be
God.70 Just as with forgiveness of sin, sanctification is also God’s work and His gift.71
The two benefits of God’s grace, i.e., justification and sanctification, are “distinct from
each other,” yet “[not] for a moment separated.”72 Bavinck clearly believes that this
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duplex beneficium “rests on the fact that God is both righteous and holy.”73 God is
therefore the initiator and causa efficiens of sanctification.
God sanctifies believers through mystical union with Christ.74 According to
Bavinck this union is neither a pantheistic “substantial mingling” as mysticism interprets
it, nor a mere agreement in disposition, will, and purpose as Ritschl and rationalism
maintain.75 Rather, union with Christ “starts already in the pact of redemption (pactum
salutis). The incarnation and satisfaction presuppose that Christ is the head and mediator
of the covenant.”76 As Scripture expresses it, the mystical union is that “Christ lives and
dwells in believers (John 14:23; 17:23, 26; Rom. 8:10; 2 Cor. 13:5; Gal. 2:20; Eph. 3:17),
and that they exist in him (John 15:1-7; Rom. 8:1; 1 Cor. 1:30; 2 Cor. 5:17; Eph.
1:10ff).”77 Since Christ is “our sanctification in the same sense that He is our
righteousness,”78 believers are sanctified as soon as they enter into mystical fellowship
with Him. In justification, Christ is “granted to us juridically, in sanctification, ethically;
by the former we become the righteousness of God in him; by the latter he himself comes
to dwell in us by his Spirit and renews us after his image.”79 Therefore Christ is the
causa formalis and guarantor, and mystical union with him the causa materia and
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medium of sanctification.
However, this union is “not immediate but comes into being by the Holy Spirit.
Furthermore, the connection between justification and sanctification is also firmly
grounded in the Spirit.”80 According to Bavinck, God “actualizes this application of
salvation [ordo salutis] by the Holy Spirit” (emphasis added).81 Bavinck says that the
biblical evidence proves it is the Holy Spirit “who regenerates them [believers] (John 3:56, 8; Titus 3:5); gives life to them (Rom. 8:10); incorporates them into fellowship with
Christ (1 Cor. 6:15, 17, 19); brings them to faith (2:9ff; 12:3); washes, sanctifies, and
justifies them (6:11; 12:13; Titus 3:4); leads them (Rom. 8:14) . . . In a word, the Holy
Spirit dwells in them and they live and walk in the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:1, 4, 9-11; 1 Cor.
6:19; Gal. 4:6; and so forth).”82 Thus Bavinck affirms that believers are “being
‘sanctified in Christ Jesus’ (1 Cor. 1:2); and Jesus sanctifies his people by the Spirit (1
Cor. 6:11), who as such is now called the Holy Spirit and is the prime agent [or principle,
het principe] of sanctification” (emphasis added).83 The Holy Spirit is therefore the
prime executor of applicatio salutis, the motive of power and our spiritual companion
throughout the whole journey of sanctification.
For Bavinck, sanctification is neither the independent work of God nor of Christ
alone, but a harmonious and concordant act in which they associate with each other and
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with the Holy Spirit in one Holy Trinity. Bavinck clearly believes that the Trinitarian
perspective reflects the fullest expression of what Scripture says about sanctification’s
principle and biblical base.
In sum, Bavinck sees both passive (definitive) and active (progressive)
dimensions in sanctification. Even further, evangelical sanctification resembles quite
closely the idea of definitive sanctification. Reluctant to lean too much toward either
dimension while at the same time avoiding contentious debate, Bavinck relies on
synthesis rather than antithesis. Passive and active sanctification cannot be separated; the
two are always bound together; the twofold expression of sanctification is realized and
actualized in and through the Trinity.

4.2.2. Bavinck and Active Justification
The study of Bavinck’s doctrine of justification has not progressed to a thorough review
of his interpretation of the distinction between active and passive justification,84 though

Even though the distinction of active/passive justification plays an important role in Bavinck’s
doctrine of justification as shall be seen onward, nobody has satisfactorily dealt with it in detail. For
example, in his dissertation, Gleason only focuses on the theme of “justification sola fide” and the “unio
mystica” in chapter 5 where he talks about Bavinck’s view of justification. See Gleason, “The Centrality of
the Unio Mystica in the Theology of Herman Bavinck,” 147-161. On Gleason’s brief exposition of
Bavinck’s view of justification in light of his life, see Gleason, Herman Bavinck, 192-194, 202, 262-264,
340-341. Bolt briefly mentions Bavinck’s scholastic distinction of active/passive justification in a general
sketch of Bavinck’s theological method. See Bolt, “The Bavinck Recipe for Theological Cake,” 12.
Eglinton also briefly introduces the idea of active and passive justification when expounding on Bavinck’s
dialectical argument of sanctification. See Eglinton, “On Bavinck’s Theology of Sanctification-as-Ethics,”
183. Ortlund extensively discusses Bavinck’s doctrine of justification in eleven theses, but not mentioning
the distinction of active/passive justification. See Dane Ortlund, “‘A Benefit No Mind Can Fully
Comprehend’: Bavinck’s Doctrine of Justification,” Calvin Theological Journal 46, no. 2 (November
2011): 249-267. In analyzing the Conclusions of Utrecht 1905, Beach deals with Bavinck’s doctrine of
justification, but it only focuses on the doctrine of eternal justification in the debatable context with
Kuyper. See Beach, “Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and ‘the Conclusions of Utrecht 1905,’” 21-24,
55-59. On Bavinck’s position toward the idea of justification from eternity, see Beeke, “The Atonement in
Herman Bavinck’s Theology,” 332; Alvin L. Baker, Berkouwer’s Doctrine of Election: Balance or
84
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he himself addresses this distinction in a fairly substantial manner.85 Just as in his
discussion of sanctification, Bavinck deals with justification in a twofold sense, i.e.,
active and passive justification. He does not arrive at this distinction from his own
arbitrary speculations. Instead Bavinck finds it in the biblical voice, from church history,
and as a clear theological necessity. Compared to theologians before and after Bavinck
who looked into the distinction between active and passive justification (see previous
chapter),86 Bavinck’s discussion is well-developed and expansive. Bavinck’s arguments
regarding this distinction will be explored in six sections: (1) theological reaction; (2)
judicial decision (objective) and actual possession (subjective); (3) active justification as
acquisition and passive justification as application; (4) active versus eternal justification;
(5) the relationship of active justification to faith; and (6) significance of the distinction
between active and passive justification. We will also see the “inseparability” of active
and passive justification as a parallel characteristic of definitive and progressive
sanctification.

4.2.2.1. Theological Reaction
According to Bavinck, for Reformed theologians the raison d´être for the distinction

Imbalance? (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1981), 32-33; Berkouwer, Faith and
Justification, 143-168. Price tries to compare Bavinck’s doctrine of justification and Calvin’s, but his essay
carelessly identifies active justification with eternal justification. See Price, “John Calvin and Herman
Bavinck on the Doctrine of Justification in Relation to Ethics,” 138-149.
85
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See, e.g., Bavinck, GD, 4:182-186; 205-207 (§51.471, 475); RD, 4:200-204; 219-223.

See, e.g., Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 555-559; Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology,
2:669 (16.7.1); à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, 2:376; Rijssen, Summa theologiae elencticae
completa, 14.7 (p.186); Maccovius, Distinctiones, 13 (p.124-129); Berkhof, ST, 517.
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between active and passive justification is to escape from two erroneous theological
positions, i.e., nomism and antinomianism.87 Bavinck sees that each error throws the
doctrine of justification out of balance. Nomism diminishes or neglects the dimension of
active justification by giving faith, experience, and conversion through human agency too
prominent place in the sphere of justification.88 On the other hand, as seen in Eaton’s
argument89 the antinomianists rely completely on God’s absolute sovereignty as revealed
in the dimension of active justification. Bavinck acknowledges that with the rise of
nomism and antinomianism, “active justification retained its own important place.”90
Against the nomistic belief that the ground of justification has shifted “from God to the
human agent, from Christ’s righteousness to the activities of faith, from the gospel to the
law,” the distinction and inseparability of active from passive justification move the
center of gravity toward God who is the ultimate consummator of justification. Against
the antinomian precept that overlooks the subjective aspect of justification by wrongly
overemphasizing the dimension of objective justification, the distinction and
inseparability of active and passive justification move the center of gravity of justification
back toward the human who by faith is the secondary agent of justification. Choosing
synthesis over antithesis as his theological method,91 Bavinck uses the distinction

Bavinck, GD, 4:184-185 (§51.472); RD, 4:202-203. “Maar toen het nomisme en antinomisme
opkwam, zag men zich tot begripsontleding verplicht, en onderscheidde men een justificatio activa en
passiva, om beide dwalingen te vermijden.”
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On the detailed argument regarding the problem of nomism, see Bavinck, GD, 4:168-177
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89

On this, see section 3.4.2.2 of this study.
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between active and passive justification as the theological tool to correct both the
nomistic and antinomian errors.

4.2.2.2. Judicial Decision (Objective) and Actual Possession (Subjective)
In Magnalia Dei, Bavinck does not use the precise terminology “active” or “passive”
justification but explains these dimensions using the terms “objective” and “subjective.”92
Before giving a detailed definition of these terms, Bavinck first explains why justification
is urgently necessary for sinful humans. He notes that “all men without exception are
guilty of transgressing the law of God, and are deserving of the punishment which He has
appointed for such transgression.”93 Since “all are born unclean; all are all gone aside,
and there is none that does good, no, not one,”94 but they are “not the ones who must
bring it [justification] into being,” therefore, the perfect righteousness that is required
must “come from outside ourselves in Christ Jesus.”95 In light of this, several times
Bavinck emphasizes the mechanism of justification, i.e., “the righteousness which
justifies us is a righteousness of God through faith in Christ; neither in whole nor in part
is it dependent upon our works but is in its entirety perfect and adequate, a gift of God,
the free gift of grace.”96
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According to Bavinck, justification contains two dimensions: the legal or judicial
decision and its actual possession. There is a causal relationship in these: “We can get
possession of it [justification] by judicial decision, and we can, on the basis of such a
court ruling, sooner or later take possession of it” (emphasis added).97 That is, the legal
declaration forms the foundation for realizing actual possession, not vice versa. Bavinck
recognizes that even though the legal right and the actual possession “coincide,” there
nevertheless remain large differences between the two. First, “property is the legal,
possession the actual.” Second, human beings first “must have a right to something in
order to possess it and use it.”98 Applying this principle to the subject of justification,
believers cannot legally possess righteousness without the forensic declaration and
approval of God. According to Bavinck, the legal verdict is “objective justification;” its
actual possession is “subjective justification.” Bavinck adds:
In a sense the justification of the sinner has already taken place in the counsel of
election. It is objectively pronounced in the resurrection of Christ who was
delivered up for our sins and raised for our justification (Rom. 4:25), and in the
gospel which proclaims the glad tidings that in the death of Christ God stands in
a relationship of reconciliation and peace to the world (2 Cor. 5:19). And
subjectively this justification comes to man in the internal calling and is on his
own part, accepted in faith [emphasis added].99
Here again, Bavinck does not explicitly use the terms active and passive justification, but
what he says is precisely the distinction of active/passive justification as spelled out in
Gereformeerde dogmatiek (to be seen later).100 Although justification has two
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dimensions, they are by no means separated because they are “one link [ééne schalm] in
the chain of salvation” (emphasis added).101 That is, Bavinck believes that “justification
in the tribunal of God, accordingly, comes to expression in time through faith in the
consciousness of man.”102 Thus Bavinck holds that objective justification is actualized
and terminated in the sphere of subjective justification, and the two dimensions are never
disconnected or detached from each other;103 they are “coupled with simultaneity in
time.”104

4.2.2.3. Active Justification as Acquisition and Passive Justification as Application
Bavinck defines the idea of active and passive justification as follows:
Active justification already in a sense occurred in the proclamation of the gospel,
in the external calling, but it occurs especially in the internal calling when God
by his word and Spirit effectually calls sinners, convicts them of sin, drives them
out toward Christ, and prompts them to find forgiveness and life in him.
Logically this active justification precedes faith. It is, as it were, the effectual
book review on Magnalia Dei. Steffens writes: “His book, being a popularized system of Reformed
doctrine, appears in an humble dress. None but a learned man could have written this book, but he has
hidden his tools. He gives us the results but not the process of his work. Although the author has laid aside
his scientific armor, he speaks to his readers in a scholarly manner.” See Nicholas M. Steffens, “Review of
Magnalia Dei by Herman Bavinck,” The Princeton Theological Review 8 (1910): 508.
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à Brakel also maintains that the relationship between active justification and passive
justification is inseparable: “’t Is een en dezelfde daad; ’t onderscheid is alleen in het opzicht, hoe ze
gedaan, of hoe ze ontvangen wordt; dus kan men ze niet van elkaar scheiden; waar de actieve is, daar is ook
de passieve, en wederom waar de passieve is, daar is ook de actieve [These are one and the same act. The
difference pertains only to the manner in which it is performed or how it is received. One therefore also
cannot separate them. Wherever there is active justification there will also be passive justification, and vice
versa, wherever there is passive justification there will also be active justification].” See à Brakel, De
redelijke godsdienst, XXXIV.LIII.1; The Christian’s Reasonable Service, 2:376.
Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219. “[E]r is hier een prioritas ordinis, doch een
simultaneitas temporis.”
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proclamation of God’s Spirit that one’s sins are forgiven, so that persons are
persuaded in their hearts, believingly accept—dare to accept and are able to
accept—that word of God and receive Christ along with all his benefits. And
when these persons, after first, as it were, going out to Christ (the direct act of
faith), then (by a reflex act of faith) return to themselves and acknowledge with
childlike gratitude that their sins too have been personally forgiven, then, in that
moment, the passive justification occurs by which God acquits believers in their
conscience and by his Spirit bears witness with their own spirits that they are
children of God and heirs of eternal life.105
In this way active justification is objective. It occurs solely through the benefit from
Christ’s satisfactory death and resurrection and is completely apart from the human
agent; therefore, it logically precedes subjective faith. Passive justification is subjective.
It occurs in the conscience of believers who by faith believe what active justification has
wrought. “This objective and active justification,” according to Bavinck, “was made
known in the gospel from Genesis 3:15 on and in the resurrection of Christ (Rom.
4:25).”106 The ultimate defeat of the power of Satan by Christ107 and the resultant effect
of His victory constitute the very content of objective and active justification. Bavinck
further explains active justification as “the righteousness of God in terms of which he
acquits believers is objectively revealed in the gospel, apart from the works of the law
and before faith (Rom. 1:17; 3:21), as is also the reconciliation that God brought about in
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Christ between himself and the world (2 Cor. 5:19).”108 So Bavinck says that active
justification is rooted in union with Christ and in the imputation of Christ’s righteousness
unto sinners,109 explaining the meaning of active justification, “when they [sinners] were
given to Christ and Christ was given to them, when their sin was imputed to Christ and
his righteousness was imputed to them.”110 For Bavinck, active justification is the
acquisition (verwerving) of redemption, and passive justification is the application
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The recent theological voices that regard the traditional doctrine of imputation as an
unsatisfactory idea and un-Pauline language among a diverse range of evangelical Pauline scholars have
raised a theological concern among proponents of the doctrine. For example, Gundry states that “in biblical
theological quarters its second half [of double imputation], the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to
believers, is losing support—with good scriptural reasons and possibly with a good theological benefit.”
See Gundry, “The Nonimputation of Christ’s Righteousness,” 17. Carson’s response to Gundry’s argument,
see D. A. Carson, “The Vindication of Imputation: On Fields of Discourse and Semantic Fields,” in
Justification: What’s at Stake in the Current Debates, ed. Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier (Downers
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on the Question of Imputation,” in Justification: What’s at Stake in the Current Debates, eds. Mark
Husbands and Daniel J. Treier (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 137-152. Against John Piper, N.
T. Wright also has complaints that “the ‘imputed righteousness’ of Christ . . . is on the one hand a
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found stated as such anywhere in Paul.” See N. T. Wright, Justification: God’s Plan & Paul’s Vision
(Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 46. For Piper’s understanding on the notion of imputation, see
John Piper, The Future of Justification: A Response to N.T. Wright (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2007);
idem, Counted Righteous in Christ: Should We Abandon the Imputation of Christ’s Righteousness?
(Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2002). However, as Eddy, Beilby, and Enderlein appropriately point out, even
though the term imputation per se may be missing in Pauline texts as opponents insist, the concept is
substantially implied in a number of Pauline texts (e.g., Rom 4:3-8; 2 Cor 5:21; Phil 3:9). See Paul R.
Eddy, James K. Beilby, and Steven E. Enderlein, “Justification in Contemporary Debate,” in Justification:
Five Views (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2011), 76.
Bavinck, GD, 3:589 (§48.430); RD, 3:583. Bavinck adds elsewhere that since believers’ guilt
is imputed to Christ, Christ may be called a sinner as Luther and Calvin do. However, it is meant only in
the objective sense, as Paul puts, that Christ was made to be sin and became a curse (2 Cor 5:21; Gal 3:13;
Isa 53:12). “[T]he apostle was not asserting that Christ was a sinner and an accursed person in himself but
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therefore not occur in Christ’s case; nor was he subject to spiritual death, to the inability to do any good and
the inclination to all evil . . . The ‘substitution of persons,’ which took place between Christ and his own,
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voluntarily entered into the same relation to the law and its demands in which we stood as a result of our
transgression” (emphasis added). See Bavinck, GD, 3:390 (§46.390); RD, 3:400.
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(toepassing) of redemption. Through Christ’s suffering and death, believers “acquired the
astonishing blessing that all his benefits, hence also the forgiveness of sins would be
applied personally and individually to all his own” (emphasis added).111 Thus Bavinck
argues that “the acquisition [active justification] necessarily entails the application
[passive justification].”112 “[T]he acquisition and the application are so tightly connected
that the former cannot be conceived or exist apart from the latter and vice versa.”113 Yet
even this organic interrelationship follows the rule of priority. If active justification
which acquires the righteousness of Christ is understood as a “gift” objectively granted
by God, and passive justification is its “acceptance” by faith, then “the objective act of
donation is prior to the subjective act of acceptance.”114 In this sense, Bavinck’s
argument follows Wyttenbach’s where active is the first and passive the second
justification.115

4.2.2.4. Active Versus Eternal Justification
Bavinck’s view of active justification provides sound theological direction for dealing
with two common misunderstandings: (1) confusing the meaning of active justification
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with justification from eternity, and (2) seeing active and passive justification as a
temporal rather than a logical order. Bavinck’s solution for dealing with these
misunderstandings is founded on recognizing the logical and inseparable relationship
between active and passive justification. Bavinck chooses the more traditional view of
active justification,116 holding that any attempt to define it as eternal justification is a
theological mistake. In his opinion, the error occurs in thinking that the distinction
between active and passive justification is a temporal rather than logical order.117 For
Bavinck, justification did not occur in eternity in the dimension of active justification, but
was realized and terminated in time in the dimension of passive justification, through the
logical pairing of active with passive justification. Bavinck notes, “active justification
first occurred only in the internal calling before and until faith [thus, not in eternity], but
the intimation of it in human consciousness (in other words, passive justification) came
into being only through and from within faith.”118 Bavinck does see “precious truth”
(kostelijke waarheid) in the idea of justification from eternity since not only election but
also the pactum salutis, the atonement of the Mediator, is from eternity.119 Nevertheless,
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Thus, contra Brine’s argument. See section 3.4.3.2 of this study.

“Men moet nl. wel overwegen, dat de genoemde onderscheiding een logische, doch geen
temporale betekenis heert.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219. Price makes the same mistake
to equate active justification with eternal justification. According to Price, Bavinck’s view of active
justification, which appears in RD, 4:202, is “that which takes place ‘from eternity, in the resurrection of
Christ, in the gospel, before and after the gift of faith, but sums up everything in a single concept.’” See
Price, “John Calvin and Herman Bavinck on the Doctrine of Justification in Relation to Ethics,” 147.
However, it is not what Bavinck means about active justification; for Bavinck continually warns that the
distinction of active/passive justification is a logical distinction. Price also tends to regard the idea of
justification from eternity as an indispensable building block to form antinomianism. See Price, “John
Calvin and Herman Bavinck on the Doctrine of Justification in Relation to Ethics,” 148. Yet, this is not
always to be as examined in section 3.4.2.1 of this study.
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Bavinck eventually realized the theological error in the idea of justification from eternity
when he finally understood that it violates the established theological principle of a
“decree in eternity and its execution in time.”120 Bavinck states, “[A]lthough this
justification of the sinner, this acquittal, is based solely on the righteousness which is in
Christ [who appointed from eternity], it does in time through faith become operative in
the consciousness of man and effects important change there.”121 Bavinck further adds:
If one says that justification, as an immanent act in God, necessarily has to be
eternal, indeed identical with the God who justifies, one must bear in mind that
in that sense everything—including the creation, incarnation, satisfaction, calling
and regeneration—is eternal, and that one who for that reason began to speak of
eternal creation, and so forth, would give rise to much misunderstanding. . . .
Now this interpretation in fact comes down completely to the common
distinction between the decree and its execution. The counsel of God and all the
decrees summed up in it are undoubtedly eternal ‘immanent acts,’ but the works
of God ad extra—creation, providence, government, redemption, justification,
and so forth—are in the nature of the case acts that pass from one condition to
another (actus transientes). As works they do not belong to the order of reason
(ratio ordinis) but to the order of execution (executio ordinis).122
Bavinck thinks that even though the decree to justify occurs in God’s eternal immanent
act, its execution is God’s work ad extra that occurs in time.123 That is, the eternal decree

voor de zijnen insluit, is van eeuwigheid.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:199 (§51.475); RD, 4:216. Here, Bavinck
quotes Kuyper’s Het werk van den Heiligen Geest, 2:222ff.
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Similarly, Turretin also states: “[A]lthough we do not deny that our justification was decreed
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of justification is one thing, and justification itself another.124 If these two are
indistinguishable, the distinction between God’s work ad intra and God’s work ad extra
are obscured. The result would be a series of odd conclusions, e.g., eternal creation,
eternal incarnation, eternal redemption, etc.125 As Bavinck properly points out, the idea
of eternal justification and the distinction between active and passive justification have
fundamentally different natures in terms of their method of dividing the aspects of
justification. Eternal justification and its counterpart, time-based justification, have a
temporal distinction while active/passive justification have a logical distinction. Bavinck
concludes that the distinction between active and passive justification “has no temporal
significance” (emphasis added).126 Since there is no common ground between the ideas
of eternal justification and active justification, Bavinck believes that they cannot
coexist.127

4.2.2.5. The Relationship of Active Justification to Faith
Before discussing the relationship of faith specifically to active justification, Bavinck first

actual justification takes place in time and follows faith.” See Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology,
2:683 (9.9.3).
124

J. van Genderen and W. H. Velema, Concise Reformed Dogmatics, 621-623; Berkhof, ST,

125

Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 555.

126

Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219.

518.

127
“Zo nam men dan gemeenlijk aan, dat, indien er al met enig goed recht van een
rechtvaardiging in het besluit van God, in de opstanding van Christus, in het Evangelie gesproken kon
worden, de justificatio activa toch eerst plaats had in de vocatio interna, vóór en tot het geloof.” See
Bavinck, GD, 4:185 (§51.471); RD, 4:203.
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had to investigate the role of faith generally in the realm of justification. He saw that faith
“has only the role of a receiving agency, like that of the hand which accepts something;
by it the soul places its dependence solely in Christ and His righteousness.”128 Even
though justification sola fide is an incontestable biblical truth, Bavinck still keeps strict
watch over any attempt to regard faith as the ground for justification as nominians were
wont to do.129 Bavinck maintains that justification sola fide must be understood as
justification ἐκ πίστεως (through faith, Rom 1:17) or διὰ πίστεως (through faith, Rom
3:22) or πίστει (by faith, Rom 3:28), but never διὰ πίστιν (on account of faith).130 For
Bavinck, faith “does not justify by its own essence or act because it itself is
righteousness, but by its content, because it is faith in Christ, who is our righteousness”
(emphasis added).131 Bavinck emphasizes that faith per se neither has any ability nor
should it ever be considered the basis of justification. For “if our faith, which is often
little and weak and hidden under an overlay of doubt and fear, is the ground for our
justification, the Christian life is a life of continual fear [voortdurende angst] and
uncertainty [onzekerheid].”132 Thus, the content, i.e., the object of faith should be Jesus

128
Bavinck, MD, 522; ORF, 459. See also Herman Bavinck, “Philosophy of Religion (Faith),” in
Essays on Religion, Science, and Society, ed. John Bolt, trans. Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 25-31.

“[H]et geloof nooit als grond van de rechtvaardiging voorgesteld.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:194
(§51.473); RD, 4:211.
129

“De gerechtigheid, de rechtvaardiging is ἐκ of διὰ πίστεως of πίστει, Rom.1:17; 3:22, 26, 28,
30; Gal. 2:16; 3:8, 24; Phil. 3:9 enz., maar nooit διὰ πίστιν.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:193 (§51.473); RD, 4:211.
130

Bavinck, GD, 4:193 (§51.473); RD, 4:211. Bavinck similarly states elsewhere, “[F]aith
justifies because in Christ it comes to share in a righteousness which is just as perfect and adequate as that
which is demanded by the law but which God through grace by way of the gospel now grants in Christ
(Phil. 3:9). It justifies not by its own intrinsic moral worth but by its content, namely, the righteousness of
Christ.” See Bavinck, MD, 523; ORF, 461.
131

132

Bavinck, GD, 4:195 (§51.473); RD, 4:212.
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Christ “who has been presented by God as a propitiation through the power of His blood
(Rom. 3:25), who has borne the curse for us (Gal. 3:13), who was made sin for us (2 Cor.
5:21), who died, was raised, and is seated at the right hand of God as our intercessor
(Rom. 8:34), who is made righteousness unto us (1 Cor. 1:30), and in whom we are made
the righteousness of God (2 Cor. 5:21).”133 That is, justification does not occur as a result
of or by faith per se, but with a view to faith,134 that is counted or reckoned as
righteousness to the believer solely by virtue of Christ’s satisfaction and righteousness as
the content or object of faith (Gen 15:6; Rom 4:3, 5, 6, 22; Gal 3:6).135
For Bavinck the fact that active justification logically precedes faith is not
problematic.136 Still, Bavinck foresees that the idea of active justification might be
questioned because it is not justification “from” (uit) or “by” (door) faith, as Scripture
regularly puts it, but “to” (tot) faith.137 The objection is that active justification which
precedes faith is not supported by Scripture which affirms only justification sola fide.138
133
Bavinck, MD, 524; ORF, 460-461. Cf. HC (Q&A 61): “Why do you say that you are
righteous only by faith? Not that I am acceptable to God on account of the worthiness of my faith, for only
the satisfaction, righteousness, and holiness of Christ is my righteousness before God. I can receive this
righteousness and make it my own by faith only.”
134
“[D]e rechtvaardigmaking met andere woorden geschiedde niet uit of door, maar tot het
geloof.” See Bavinck, GD, 3:589 (§48.430); RD, 3:583.

Bavinck, MD, 522; ORF, 460. Bavinck similarly notes elsewhere: “Along the righteousness
that God granted in Christ and on the basis of which he justified Christ as mediator of the covenant for all
his own in his resurrection, there is no room for a justification consisting in faith or love. If there were, the
latter would nullify the former.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:194 (§51.473); RD, 4:211.
135

“Deze actieve rechtvaardigmaking gaat dan in logische orde aan het geloof vooraf.” See
Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219. Thus, pace Tipton’s argument. See section 3.4.1.2 of this study.
136

“Tegen deze onderscheiding wordt van nomistische zijde de bedenking ingebracht, dat de
justificatio activa dan niet is een rechtvaardigmaking uit en door, gelijk de Schrift zich steeds uitdrukt, maar
tot het geloof.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219.
137

This objection is similar to Tipton’s complaint about the idea of active justification. Cf.
Tipton, “Biblical Theology,” 8-10.
138
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However, Bavinck finds that such an objection, “can be readily refuted.”139 For “[w]hile
there is here a priority of order, it is coupled with simultaneity in time. Concretely the
two coincide and always go together.”140 Bavinck adds:
Active justification has a tendency, so to speak, to communicate itself in faith
and by faith to bring about its own acceptance. How could a benefit of Christ be
to our advantage if it did not enter into our possession? How could a prison
inmate benefit from his acquittal if he was not informed of it and the prison
doors were not opened for him? And what advantage would there be for us in a
justification in the eternal decree, in the resurrection of Christ, and in the
proclamation of the gospel, if God did not personally impart it to us in the
internal call by faith? . . . Active and passive justification, accordingly, cannot be
separated even for a second, and—in Scripture, in the writings of the Reformers,
and in practical instruction—are combined in a single term.141
In other words, active justification occurs with a view to faith, and justification is actually
terminated and realized through and by that faith in the dimension of passive justification.
If justification were terminated in active justification, it would certainly violate the
biblical principle of justification sola fide. But if justification is actualized in passive
justification through and by faith, which is brought about on the objective foundation of
active justification (viz., God objectively justifies sinners solely on the basis of Christ’s
death and resurrection), justification sola fide and active justification are compatible, not
contradictory. That is, active justification does not in fact neglect faith; rather, it grounds
what occurs in justification on account of faith or on the basis of faith. For Christ and
only Christ is all the benefit and righteousness that allows sinners to be justified,142 and
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Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219.

140

Bavinck, GD, 4:203 (§51.475); RD, 4:219.

141

Bavinck, GD, 4:204 (§51.475); RD, 4:220. Cf. Berkhof, ST, 517.

“Als nu de Schrift van deze rechtvaardigmaking in sensu concreto zegt, dat zij geschiedt uit
en door het geloof, dan wil ze daarmee niet te kennen geven, dat ze door dat geloof wordt voortgebracht en
bewerkt, want immers is Christus al onze gerechtigheid, en alle weldaden van het genadeverbond zijn
142
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this is what active justification clearly states.

4.2.2.6. Significance of the Distinction between Active and Passive Justification
Why does the logical distinction between active and passive justification matter? Bavinck
divides the answer to this question into three reasons. Each reason in its own way
fundamentally secures God’s place in justification, a position that has often been attacked
by diverse forms of nomism, subjectivism, and rationalism, etc. All of these forms
overemphasize the role that humans play in justification.143
First, active justification clarifies what or who is the beginning point of
justification. Bavinck states that the notion of active justification “enables us, against all
forms of nomism, to maintain the rich and joyful content of the gospel that God is
gracious and abounding in steadfast love and that in Christ he has brought about a
complete righteousness in which we can rest both in life and in death and that in no way
needs to be augmented or increased by us.”144 Active justification therefore informs us of
the basis on which justification is founded, i.e., not the human side, but the divine side.
Viewed this way, religion becomes the foundation of morality (de religie wordt de
grondslag van de moraal), not vice versa.145 That is, the beginning of justification is that
“God on his part, freely and out of unconditional compassion, enters into a relationship

vruchten van zijn werk en van zijn werk alleen.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:204 (§51.475); RD, 4:220.
143
On the problem of nomism in the sphere of justification, see Bavinck, GD, 4:168-171
(§51.469); RD, 4:186-189.
144

Bavinck, GD, 4:205 (§51.475); RD, 4:220-221.

145

Bavinck, GD, 4:205 (§51.475); RD, 4:221.
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with us, admits us into his fellowship [by Christ] despite all our trespasses, and assures us
of his eternal and unchanging favor” (emphasis added).146 Active justification therefore
explains that the door of justification is first opened by God at his good pleasure, not by
human beings.
Second, active justification not only makes God the initial point of justification,
but also makes it clear that the “whole process” of justification is also governed and
controlled by God.147 Active justification strictly forbids any possibility that at any stage
justification occurs by the sinner’s self-examination or inner pious experience.148
Bavinck knows that if sinners could come to the tribunal or judgment seat of God and be
justified through their own process of self-examination it would be “anthropomorphic”
(antropomorfistisch) and “unworthy of God” (Gode onwaardig).149 Thus, Bavinck
affirms that in active justification “the basis of faith exists outside of us in the promise of
God. Those who build upon it will not be put to shame.”150
Third, Bavinck asserts that the distinction between active and passive
justification provides a valuable opportunity to observe closely the role and nature of
faith in justification. The biblical truth that justification is in one sense through and by
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Bavinck, GD, 4:205 (§51.475); RD, 4:221.

147
Yet, emphasizing God not only as the beginning point, but also as the governor of the whole
process of justification does not mean that Bavinck’s view of justification is far from the Trinitarian
perspective. Rather, Bavinck sees the process of justification in the Trinitarian outlook: “Pater justificat
effective, Filius meritorie, Spiritus Sanctus applicative.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:188 (§51.472); RD, 4:205.
Bavinck here cites de Moor’s Commentarius perpetuus in Johannis Marckii. Compendium theologiae
Christianae didactico-elencticum (Leiden, 1761-1771), 4:562.
148

Bavinck, GD, 4:205 (§51.475); RD, 4:221.
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Bavinck, GD, 4:205 (§51.475); RD, 4:221.
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Bavinck, GD, 4:205 (§51.475); RD, 4:221.
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faith (i.e., passive justification) has allowed neonomian or other kinds of nomistic
persuasions to improperly add human “merit” so that faith might then function as the
meritorious cause of justification. Bavinck speaks against thinking of faith as the
meritorious cause, stating that “[f]aith, therefore, is not the material or formal cause of
justification; it is not even a condition or instrument (instrumental cause) of
justification.”151 However, this does not mean that Bavinck totally rules out faith as an
instrumental cause in justification, for he does mention the importance of justification
“through faith” (διὰ πίστεως).152 Bavinck’s consideration of faith’s role as an
instrumental cause of justification is found in two contexts. In the first, Bavinck
emphasizes faith as an instrumental cause when he is speaking of the distinction between
active and passive justification.153 Faith can be neither the formal nor the instrumental
cause in active justification, for active justification is unaffected by faith. But in the
sphere of passive justification, Bavinck allows that justification does occur by way of a
childlike faith, which even then does not originate in the believer but emanates from
“wholly outside us in Christ.”154 In the second context, Bavinck intentionally focuses

Bavinck, GD, 4:206 (§51.475); RD, 4:221. “Het geloof is daarom geen causa materialis of
formalis, het is zelfs geen conditio of instrumentum (causa instrumentalis) van de rechtvaardigmaking”
(emphasis added).
151

“Wel staat Phil. 3:9, dat Paulus τὴν διὰ χριστοῦ, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην, bezat ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει,
op grond van zijn geloof, maar de gerechtigheid, welke Paulus bezat, wordt duidelijk omschreven als διὰ
πίστεως, ἐκ θεοῦ; alleen zegt hij, dat hij die gerechtigheid van God voor zichzelf bezat op de grondslag van
het geloof.” See Bavinck, GD, 4:194 (§51.473); RD, 4:211.
152

153

Ortlund does not sufficiently analyze why Bavinck reconsiders faith as the instrumental cause
in the distinction of active and passive justification. Cf. Ortlund, “A Benefit No Mind Can Fully
Comprehend,” 255-256.
“Maar als de gerechtigheid, op grond waarvan wij gerechtvaardigd worden, geheel buiten ons
ligt in Christus Jezus, dan kan ze vanzelf de onze alleen worden, doordat wij ze kinderlijk aannemen.” See
Bavinck, GD, 4:206 (§51.475); RD, 4:221.
154
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more on what the object and content of faith are rather than on faith’s role itself as the
instrumental cause. For Bavinck, “faith that justifies is precisely the faith that has Christ
as its object and content.” Bavinck elaborates on what exactly the object and content of
faith are:
Faith is not a condition on which, and not an instrument or organ by which, we
receive this benefit, but the very act of accepting Christ and all his benefits as he
by his Word and Spirit offers himself to us, and faith therefore includes the
consciousness that he is my Lord and that I am his possession. Faith therefore is
not an instrument in the true sense, one that serves as the means by which a
person accepts Christ, but is a sure knowledge and firm confidence that the Holy
Spirit works in one’s heart and by which he [the Spirit] persuades and assures
people that, despite all their sins, they share in Christ and all his benefits
(emphasis added).155
For Bavinck, to be justified one does not lean on one’s own faith in an instrumental
sense. Rather, there must be the certain knowledge by God’s grace that the Word and
Spirit allow the believer to accept Christ and all his benefits. That is the kind of faith that
Bavinck presents.156
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Bavinck, GD, 4:206 (§51.475); RD, 4:221-222.
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Cf. Belgic Confession, art. 22: “We believe that, to attain the true knowledge of this great
mystery, the Holy Spirit kindles in our hearts an upright faith, which embraces Jesus Christ with all His
merits, appropriates Him, and seeks nothing more besides Him. For it must needs follow, either that all
things which are requisite to our salvation are not in Jesus Christ, or if all things are in Him, that then those
who possess Jesus Christ through faith have complete salvation in Him. Therefore, for any to assert that
Christ is not sufficient, but that something more is required besides Him, would be too gross a blasphemy;
for hence it would follow that Christ was but half a Savior. Therefore we justly say with Paul, that we are
justified by faith alone, or by faith apart from works. However, to speak more clearly, we do not mean that
faith itself justifies us, for it is only an instrument with which we embrace Christ our righteousness. But
Jesus Christ, imputing to us all His merits, and so many holy works which He has done for us and in our
stead, is our righteousness. And faith is an instrument that keeps us in communion with Him in all His
benefits, which, when they become ours, are more than sufficient to acquit us of our sins.”
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4.3. Summary
In this chapter the first parallel characteristic of definitive sanctification and active
justification, i.e., “inseparability,” was examined through the writings of Herman
Bavinck, who held that definitive sanctification and active justification could not be
logically separated from progressive sanctification and passive justification respectively.
Bavinck, a moderate and eclectic thinker, sees the two sides of both
sanctification and justification in the biblical voice, church history, and theological
necessity. In Bavinck’s thinking, evangelical sanctification (passive sanctification) is
similar to the idea of definitive sanctification. Evangelical sanctification also has the
dimensions of objectivity and decisiveness, reveals the fundamental identity of believers,
shows the condition to which believers belong, and becomes the foundation for accessing
the dimension of progressive sanctification. Active sanctification is logically paired with
passive (evangelical) sanctification in a manner similar to the way that definitive
sanctification is logically paired with progressive sanctification; the human agent
becomes actively devoted to sanctification throughout life. For Bavinck the two
dimensions of active and passive sanctification cannot be separated, for they are not only
two dimensions of the same reality “holiness,” but also are one aspect of an organic
chain.
As with sanctification, Bavinck’s view of justification also has a twofold
perspective: active and passive justification. Together these ideas avoid nomistic and
antinomistic error because they provide a balance between God’s side and the human side
without overemphasizing either in the realm of justification. Active justification is a
judicial and objective decision made solely by God; passive justification is the actual and
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subjective possession of it. Thus active justification is an acquisition of redemption;
passive justification is an application of this acquisition. The distinction between active
and passive justification is not temporal, but logical. If it were understood to be a
temporal order, the idea of eternal justification which violates the framework “decree in
eternity and its execution in time,” would have to be allowed. In the logical order
between active and passive justification, “actual” justification is terminated and realized,
not in active justification, but in passive justification sola fide. Active justification and
passive justification are never separated, for they are logically one aspect in the sequence
of salvation and need to be understood as one organic process.
In the next chapter, the second parallel characteristic of definitive sanctification
and active justification, i.e., “objectivity and decisiveness,” will be examined with
Alexander Comrie.

CHAPTER 5
PARALLEL CHARACTERISTIC NO. 2:
OBJECTIVITY AND DECISIVENESS IN ALEXANDER COMRIE

Through his soteriology Alexander Comrie (1706-1774) helped to establish the meaning
and validity of the “objective” and “decisive” dimensions of salvation. To that end, in Het
A. B. C. des Geloofs (the ABC’s of faith) Comrie puts forward a conception of
sanctification that is remarkably similar to the definition of definitive sanctification
presented in Chapter 3 of this study.1 In Brief over de rechtvaerdigmakinge des zondaars
(Letter Concerning the Sinners’ Justification, hereafter Brief)2 Comrie also defines
justification of the sinner from its objective inception using the distinction between active
and passive justification. In this chapter we will deal briefly with Comrie in the context of
the Nadere Reformatie and the theological conflicts of his time; we will then analyze
Comrie’s use of a concept analogous to definitive sanctification. We will go on to
compare his concept of active justification to eternal justification and compare his views
to those of Eaton and Brine who we saw going over this ground in Chapter 3; Comrie’s

1

Alexander Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, of verhandeling van de benamingen des
saligmakenden geloofs volgens de letteren van het alphabet (Leiden, 1746). For the English translation, see
Alexander Comrie, The ABC of Faith, trans. M. J. Banfield (Ossett: Zoar Publications, 1978). Hereafter the
Dutch and English edition will be respectively cited as Het A. B. C. des geloofs and The ABC of Faith.
Subsequent quotations will be taken mostly from Banfield’s translation, but if necessary, the translation
will be modified in consultation with the original Dutch text. When quoted from the Dutch text, the original
spelling, italics, capitalization, and punctuation will be retained in quoted passages. Comrie mentions that
the nature of “faith,” which is treated throughout Het A. B. C. des geloofs, is neither historical faith, nor
faith of miracle, but “saving faith” (zaligmakende geloof). See Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, XVII.
2
Alexander Comrie, Brief over de rechtvaerdigmakinge des zondaars: door de onmiddelyke
toereekening der borggerechtigheit van Christus, 2nd ed. (J. Bloemsma, 1832). Hereafter this edition will
be cited as Brief followed by page number. When quoted from the Dutch text, the original spelling, italics,
capitalization, and punctuation will be retained in quoted passages.
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methodology is more complex and nuanced than theirs. This last comparison will
produce a second line of criticism of Comrie’s view of justification. Clarification of the
meaning of active justification was originally intended to resolve a series of
misunderstandings; his resolution of these misunderstandings further refines Comrie’s
view of salvation. Thus the overall goal of this chapter is to analyze his work in this
regard.

5.1. Comrie in the Nadere Reformatie, the Dutch Further Reformation
Although he held an excellent reputation among the theologians of the Nadere
Reformatie such as Willem Teellinck (1579-1629), William Ames (1576-1633), Gisbertus
Voetius (1589-1676), Herman Witsius (1636-1708), and Wilhelmus à Brakel (16351711), Comrie wrote in relative obscurity. Abraham Kuyper saw Comrie as a theologian
of whom others were “inexplicabl[y] ignoran[t].”3 The “ignorance” or neglect of Comrie
that Kuyper noticed in 1882 continues to this day.4 He may have gone unnoticed simply
Abraham Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: His Life and Work in Holland,” Catholic Presbyterian 7
(1882): 20. Even in Handbook of Dutch Church History (recently translated into English from Handboek
Nederlandse Kerkgeschiedenis), Comrie is briefly mentioned just twice. See Herman J. Selderhuis, ed.,
Handbook of Dutch Church History (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 380, 397. For short
biographical information about Comrie, see Joel R. Beeke, “Comrie, Alexander (1706-1774),” in Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 899-900.
3

4

Dissertations which primarily deal with Comrie and his theology are still few. In the Dutch
language, A. G. Honig and J. H. R. Verboom’s published dissertations can be counted. See A. G. Honig,
Alexander Comrie (Utrecht: Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, 1892); J. H. R. Verboom, Dr. Alexander
Comrie: predikant et woubrugge: zijn leven en werken, alsmede de historie van zijn gemeente (Utrecht: De
Banier, 1964). In the English language, Joel R. Beeke’s dissertation deals partly with Comrie and his
doctrine of faith in the theological subject of assurance in one of the chapters. See Joel R. Beeke, “Personal
Assurance of Faith: English Puritanism and the Dutch ‘Nadere Reformatie’: From Westminster to
Alexander Comrie (1640-1760)” (PhD diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 1988). Beeke’s
dissertation has been reprinted in several forms. See Joel R. Beeke, Assurance of Faith: Calvin, English
Puritanism, and the Dutch Second Reformation (New York: P. Lang, 1991); idem, The Quest for Full
Assurance: The Legacy of Calvin and His Successors (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1999). In his master
thesis, G. R. Mauritz deals with Comrie’s doctrine of justification in comparison to Gisbertus Voetius’ view

165

because all the writers who were part of the Nadere Reformatie are generally undervalued
outside their movement, either because they were eclipsed by other traditions or due to
critical assessments of the Nadere Reformatie per se.
Comrie and the other Nadere Reformatie theologians wrote from roughly 1600 to
1750.5 The term Nadere Reformatie literally means a “nearer,” “more intimate,” or
“more precise” Reformation.6 A variety of traditions co-existed with theirs including
Dutch Puritanism, Dutch Pietism, Dutch Second Reformation, and English Puritanism.
The Nadere Reformatie and English Puritanism are closely related theologically and
historically,7 but scholars recognize a difference in that the English Puritans were more

of justification. See G. R. Mauritz, “Rechtvaardigmaking voor of na het geloof? Alexander Comrie’s visie
op de rechtvaardigmaking van eeuwigheid getoetst aan zijn citaten van Gisbertus Voetius in de Brief over
de rechtvaardigmaking” (Master Thesis, University of Utrecht, 2012).
Cornelis Pronk, “The Dutch Puritans,” Banner of Truth 154-155 (August 1976): 5-7. For a
concise introduction to the leading figures in the Nadere Reformatie, see S. D. van Veen, Voor
tweehonderd jaren: schetsen van het leven onzer gereformeerde vaderen (Utrecht: Kemink, 1886); K.
Exalto, De kracht der religie: tien schetsen van gereformeerde “Oude Shrijvers” uit de 17e en 18e eeuw
(Urk: De Vuurtoren, 1976); Joel R. Beeke, “Biographies of Dutch Second Reformation Divines,” Banner of
Truth 54.2 (1988) through to 56.3 (1990); Jan van Vliet, The Rise of Reformed System: The Intellectual
Heritage of William Ames (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2013), 162-184. For a general historical background,
see A. T. van Deursen, Plain Lives in a Golden Age: Popular Culture, Religion, and Society in
Seventeenth-Century Holland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); A. C. Duke, Reformation
and Revolt in the Low Countries (London: Hambledon Press, 1990), 269-293.
5

Joel R. Beeke, “The Dutch Second Reformation (Nadere Reformatie),” Calvin Theological
Journal 28, no. 2 (1993): 300.
6

7

The most evident continuity between the Nadere Reformatie and English Puritanism is the
emphasis on the need for a personal and ecclesial life of practical holiness. For the relationship between
English Puritanism and the Nadere Reformatie, see Keith L. Sprunger, Dutch Puritanism: A History of
English and Scottish Churches of the Netherlands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Leiden:
Brill, 1982); idem, The Learned Doctor William Ames: Dutch Backgrounds of English and American
Puritanism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972); Douglas MacMillan, “The Connection between
17th Century British and Dutch Calvinism,” in Not by Might nor by Power: Papers Read at the 1988
Westminster Conference (London: Westminster Conference, 1988), 22-31. Dutch writers often translated
English Puritan writings into the Dutch language. See Willem J. op’t Hof, Engelse pietistische geschriften
in het Nederlands, 1598-1622 (Rotterdam: Lindenberg, 1987). Comrie also translated several books such as
W. Marshall’s The Mystery of Gospel Sanctification, T. Boston’s View of the Covenant of Grace, and T.
Shepard’s The Parable of the Ten Virgins. See Walter Marshall, De verborgentheit van de euangelische
heiligmaking, trans. Alexander Comrie (Leiden, 1739); Thomas Boston, Een beschouwing van het verbond
der genade, trans. Alexander Comrie (Leiden, 1741); Thomas Shepard, De gelijkenis der tien maagden,
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interested than the Nadere Reformatie in reforming church and government;8 Dutch
Puritanism differs from the Nadere Reformatie in this as well.9 The Nadere Reformatie
also has much in common with Pietism in that they both stress individual piety and a
vigorous Christian life,10 so some scholars have identified the Nadere Reformatie as a
type of Pietism.11 However, here again their differing views of the role of religion in
government as well as their attitude toward Protestant orthodoxy sets the Nadere
Reformatie apart from Pietism.12 Equating the Nadere Reformatie with Dutch Pietism

trans. Alexander Comrie (Leiden, 1743). Cf. J. P. Lilley, “Alexander Comrie,” in The Thinker: A Review of
World-Wide Christian Thought, vol. 7 (New York: The Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1895), 490491.
Pronk, “The Dutch Puritans,” 1; Joel R. Beeke, “Evangelicalism and the Dutch Further
Reformation,” in The Advent of Evangelicalism: Exploring Historical Continuities, eds. Michael A. G.
Haykin and Kenneth J. Stewart (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2008), 151-152; idem, Puritan Reformed
Spirituality (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2004), 291-294; idem, “The Dutch Second
Reformation (Nadere Reformatie),” 304.
8

9

Dutch scholars tend to pay attention to an endemic Dutch phenomena as the source to promote
the Nadere Reformatie. For example, C. Graafland admits that the Nadere Reformatie is influenced by
English Puritanism in a fairly large measure, but not in an exclusive measure because of the existence of
other non-English factors. See C. Graafland, “De invloed van het puritanisme op het ontstaan van het
reformeerd pietisme in Nederland,” Documentatieblad Nadere Reformatie 7, no. 1 (1983): 2.
10

Fred Ernest Stoeffler, The Rise of Evangelical Pietism (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 9-23; Martin
Prozesky, “Emergence of Dutch Pietism,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 28, no. 1 (1977): 29-37.
11

See, e.g., James Tanis, Dutch Calvinistic Pietism in the Middle Colonies: A Study in the Life
and Theology of Theodorus Jacobus Frelinghuysen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968). This tendency is
highly influenced by Heinrich Heppe and Albrecht Ritschl’s classification. Cf. Heinrich Heppe, Geschichte
des pietismus und der Mystik in der reformirten Kirche, namentlich der Niederlande (Leiden: Brill, 1879);
Albrecht Ritschl, Geschichte des Pietismus, 3 vols. (Bonn: Marcus, 1880).
As Beeke points out, Pietism in German Lutheranism was more concerned with the believer’s
inner life than with transforming society, whereas the Nadere Reformatie was very much concerned with
both. Not only that, Pietism was generally opposed to doctrinal precision which is emphasized by
Protestant scholastic theology, whereas the Nadere Reformatie tried to formulate a precise doctrine of
Reformed orthodoxy. See Beeke, “Evangelicalism and the Dutch Further Reformation,” 163. However,
some writers pose the pietism of the Nadere Reformatie against scholastic orthodoxy. See, e.g., C.
Graafland, “Gereformeerde Scholastiek VI: De invloed van de scholastiek op de Nadere Reformatie,”
Theologia Reformata 30 (1987): 109-131, 313-340; idem, “De gereformeerde orthodoxie en het piëtisme in
Nederland,” Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 19 (1965): 478-479. The scholarship has attempted to
prove a continuity between the Nadere Reformatie and Protestant Reformed scholastic orthodoxy. On this,
see Muller, After Calvin, 74-75, 91; idem, PRRD, 1:31-32, 66-67, 81-83; Beeke, “Personal Assurance of
Faith”; idem, “The Dutch Second Reformation (Nadere Reformatie)”; Adriaan C. Neele, Petrus Van
12
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also is not workable.13 The term “Dutch Further Reformation” fits the Nadere
Reformatie14 because the movement sprang up within the Nederduits Gereformeerde
Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church) as a reaction to the absence of a “living” faith. Despite
criticisms to the contrary, Dutch Further Reformed theologians did wish to more
precisely further reform the public life of the church, society, and state at least to some
extent,15 but these Dutch divines mainly wanted to further apply the spirit of the
Reformation to the believers’ own life and experience.16 Comrie’s main interest was this

Mastricht (1630-1706): Reformed Orthodoxy: Method and Piety (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 1-26. Neele notes:
“the Nadere Reformatie is a subcategory of seventeenth-century confessional orthodoxy with a strong
notion of piety.” See Neele, Petrus Van Mastricht, 16.
13
Pronk is reluctant to classify the Nadere Reformatie as “Pietism” since he thinks that “Pietism
represents more the movement in Germany, the Hutterites with Count Zinzendorf, etc., which had a
Lutheran background.” See Pronk, “The Dutch Puritans,” 1.
14

See Bartel Elshout, The Pastoral and Practical Theology of Wilhelmus À Brakel (Grand
Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 1997), 9; Fred van Lieburg, “From Pure Church to Pious Culture:
The Further Reformation in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic,” in Later Calvinism. International
Perspectives, ed. W. Fred Graham (Kirksville, 1994), 409-429; Beeke, “Evangelicalism and the Dutch
Further Reformation,” 147. The best English translation of the Nadere Reformatie, according to Jonathan
Gerstner, may be “Continuing Reformation.” See Jonathan Neil Gerstner, The Thousand Generation
Covenant: Dutch Reformed Covenant Theology and Group Identity in Colonial South Africa, 1652-1814
(Leiden: Brill, 1991), 75.
C. Graafland, W. J. op ’t Hof, and F. A. van Lieburg, “Nadere Reformatie: opnieuw een
poging tot begripsbepaling,” in Documentatieblad Nadere Reformatie 19/2 (1995), 108, which is the
periodical issued by Stichting Studie der Nadere Reformatie for in-depth study of the Nadere Reformatie,
stating that “De Nadere Reformatie is die beweging binnen de Nederlandse Gereformeerde Kerk in de
zeventiende en achttiende eeuw, die in reactie op de verfl auwing van of een gebrek aan levend geloof de
persoonlijke geloofsbeleving en godsvrucht centraalstelde en van hieruit inhoudelijke en procedurele
reformatieprogramma’s opstelde, bij de bevoegde kerkelijke, politieke en maatschappelijke organen
indiende en/of in aansluiting hierbij zelf een verdere hervorming van kerk, samenleving en staat in woord
en daad nastreefde.” For the nature of the Nadere Reformatie, see W. van ’t Spijker, “De Nadere
Reformatie,” in De Nadere Reformatie: beschrijving van haar voornaamste vertegenwoordigers, eds. T.
Brienen and K. Exalto (’s-Gravenhage: Boekencentrum, 1986), 6-16; Gerstner, The Thousand Generation
Covenant.
15

16

For the relationship between Calvinism and Dutch Reformed theology, see Herman Paul and
John de Niet, “Issus de Calvin: Collective Memories of John Calvin in Dutch Neo-Calvinism,” in Sober,
Strict, and Scriptural: Collective Memories of John Calvin, 1800-2000, eds. John de Niet, Herman Paul,
and Bart Wallet (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 67-96; W. Robert Godfrey, “Calvin and Calvinism in the
Netherlands,” in John Calvin: His Influence in the Western World (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982), 95122; Walter Lagerway, “The History of Calvinism in the Netherlands,” in The Rise and Development of
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desire to be more precisely and further reformed in one’s personal life.17
Critical assessment of the Dutch Further Reformation has been mixed.18 Joel
Beeke,19 Richard Muller,20 Ernest Stoeffler,21 J. H. R. Verboom,22 Jonathan Gerstner,23
Adriaan Neele,24 and others view the Nadere Reformatie positively as a mature Dutch
Reformed orthodoxy with a strong notion of piety. Others have a more negative view;
even though he basically shares the spirit of the Nadere Reformatie, Abraham Kuyper
regards the movement’s “old writers” as “too pietistic,” even equating them with
Methodism.25 As a theologian who emphasizes reforming and transforming the whole of
church, culture, and society, Kuyper would prefer that the Nadere Reformatie express a

Calvinism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959), 63-102.
17
Abraham Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: His Conflict in Holland,” Catholic Presbyterian 7
(1882): 192-193.
18

Cf. Beeke, “The Dutch Second Reformation (Nadere Reformatie),” 322-327.

Beeke, “The Dutch Second Reformation (Nadere Reformatie),” 300, 322; idem, “Assurance of
Faith: A Comparison of English Puritanism and the Nadere Reformatie,” in Puritan Reformed Spirituality
(Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2004), 288-307.
19

Muller, PRRD, 81-83, 158 (notes that “both the Puritan piety and the piety of the Nadere
Reformatie stand not as developments opposed to confessional orthodoxy and scholastic exposition of
doctrine but rather as developments integral to confessional orthodoxy that addressed issues of spirituality
in literary genres that were not specifically ‘scholastic.’”); idem, After Calvin, 18, 31.
20

“[The Dutch Further Reformation] was by and large a thoroughly responsible, evangelical
movement.” See Stoeffler, The Rise of Evangelical Pietism, 178.
21

22

Verboom, Dr. Alexander Comrie, 185ff.

“[In the Dutch Further Reformaton,] the absolute necessity of the truths of the Word of God
[is] applied in individuals lives, in the church’s mode of worship, and in the society as a whole.” See
Gerstner, The Thousand Generation Covenant, 75.
23

Neele characterizes the Nadere Reformatie “as a Dutch movement with strong emphasis on
peity and a theological diversion of the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, partly due to Protestant
Scholasticism.” See Neele, Petrus Van Mastricht (1630-1706), 48.
24

25

Abraham Kuyper, The Work of the Holy Spirit, trans. Henri de Vries (New York: Funk &
Wagnalls, 1900), xii.
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stronger desire for universal transformation rather than their narrower focus on individual
piety.26 The emphasis on individual piety in the Dutch Further Reformation has been an
object of concern since Kuyper; E. D. Kraan sees a strong tendency toward
“subjectivism” in the Nadere Reformatie.27 Van der Linde regards the Dutch Further
Reformation as a “radical” form of individualistic pietism.28 C. Graafland maintains that
the excessive emphasis on the individual’s spiritual contemplation which marked the
Nadere Reformatie fails to a disturbing degree to embrace the broader aspects of the
theology of that time.29 Yet the unique value of the Nadere Reformatie, which integrates
confessional orthodoxy and scholastic precision of doctrine with pious spirituality, should
not be tainted by these negative assessments.30 Comrie should be respected for the value

Pronk evaluates that “although much good was accomplished under the leadership of this
genius [Kuyper], eventually the preoccupation of the neo-Calvinists with cultural involvement led to the
neglect of vital religion.” See Pronk, “The Dutch Puritans,” 8. See also William Young, “Historic
Calvinism and Neo-Calvinism,” Westminster Theological Journal 36, no. 1 (1973): 48-64; Beeke, “The
Dutch Second Reformation (Nadere Reformatie),” 321.
26

E. D. Kraan, “De Heilige Geest en het na-reformatorische subjectivisme,” in De Heilige Geest,
eds. J. H. Bavinck, Brillenburg Wurth Gerrit, and P. Prins (Kampen: Kok, 1949), 228-263.
27

“De radikale, gereformeerde reformatie, die preciesheid wenst in plaats van vrome (onvrome)
algemeenheden, een piëtisme dus, een bewust wijden van het hele leven aan God.” See S. van der Linde,
“De betekenis van de Nadere Reformatie voor kerk en theologie,” Kerk en Theologie 5 (1954): 215-225.
28

C. Graafland, “Het eigene van het gereformeerd pietisme in de 18e eeuw in onderscheid van de
17e eeuws,” Documentatieblad Nadere Reformatie 11 (1987): 37-53. On Graafland’s negative assessment
of the Nadere Reformatie, see also C. Graafland, “Kernen En Contouren van de Nadere Reformatie,” in De
Nadere Reformatie: beschrijving van haar voornaamste Vertegenwoordigers, eds. T. Brienen and K.
Exalto (’s-Gravenhage: Boekencentrum, 1986), 349-367 (esp. 352, 366).
29

30

Since the Nadere Reformatie is grasped as a subcategory of post-Reformation Reformed
orthodoxy (ca.1520-ca.1725), the negative evaluation on post-Reformation Reformed orthodoxy could also
influence upon appraising the Nadere Reformatie. For discussion regarding the negative assessment on
Reformed orthodoxy and the scholarly response toward this evaluation, see Richard A. Muller, “Calvin and
the ‘Calvinists’: Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities Between the Reformation and Orthodoxy 1,”
Calvin Theological Journal 30, no. 2 (1995): 345-375; idem, “Calvin and the ‘Calvinists’: Assessing
Continuities and Discontinuities Between the Reformation and Orthodoxy 2,” Calvin Theological Journal
31, no. 1 (1996): 125-160; idem, After Calvin, 3-46; idem, PRRD, 27-146.
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of his theology from within the Dutch Further Reformation.

5.2. Comrie and Theological Conflict
The main opposing viewpoints to Comrie’s theology were rationalism, the
Enlightenment, Arminianism, and neonomianism. Comrie rejected the rationalistic
teaching of Antonius van der Os (1722-1807), minister of Zwolle, who ignored the
authoritative church confessions and biblical teachings such as the imputation of Christ’s
righteousness and the punishment of eternal death as a result of original sin.31 Comrie
portrayed Van der Os as a Socinian-minded Remonstrant (Sociniaansch gezinden
Remonstrant).32 Jan van den Honert (1693-1758),33 a professor at Leiden from 1734
who stood somewhere between orthodoxy and the Enlightenment,34 labels Comrie’s
view of justification as a form of eternal justification.35 However, throughout his Brief36
Comrie defended his position with vigor and success; the next section will examine this

31

R. A. Bosch, Het conflict rond Antonius van der Os: predikant te Zwolle 1748-1755 (Kampen:
IJsselakademie, 1988); Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: His Conflict in Holland,” 192-198; Geoffrey Thomas,
“Alexander Comrie: Contender for the Faith,” Banner of Truth 65-66 (March 1969): 29-30.
32

Comrie, Brief, 55.

On Van den Honert’s biographical information, see Jan Pieter de Bie, Jakob Loosjes, and L. A.
van Langeraad, Biographisch woordenboek van protestantsche godgeleerden in Nederland (’s-Gravenhage,
1931), 4:232-246.
33

Thus, according to Johannes van den Berg, “some Pietists accused him [Van den Honert] of
rationalist traits in his theology, the more liberal theologians saw in him an intolerant defender of the
Calvinist system.” See Johannes van den Berg, Religious Currents and Cross-Currents: Essays on Early
Modern Protestantism and the Protestant Enlightenment, eds. Jan de Bruijn, Pieter Holtrop, and Ernestine
G. E. van der Wall (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 217.
34

The content of Van den Honert’s letter which contains his objection to Comrie’s doctrine of
justification is included in Comrie, Brief, 55-69.
35

36

The present study will use the 1892 edition rather than the 1761 edition.
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in detail.
Comrie joined Nicholas Holtius (1693-1773) in writing ten dialogues entitled
Examen van het ontwerp van tolerantie (An Examination of the Design of Tolerance,
1753-1757),37 opposing Arminian attempts to invalidate Reformed doctrines established
in the Synod of Dort (1618-1619). Comrie especially guards against any form of
Arminianism that alters the Reformed doctrine of justification. Comrie is also sensitive to
neonomianist teaching that if a sinner’s obedience to the gospel is the foundation of
justification on the basis of Christ’s righteousness, then this obedience constitutes a “new
law” (neonomos) that the sinner must follow.38 Comrie believes that Arminian and
neonomian teachings give human agency too prominent a place in salvation.39 As
Kuyper points out, the sharpest theological conflict in Comrie’s time was the issue of
how to best harmonize God’s grace and human responsibility in soteriology.40 Against

37

Alexander Comrie and Nicolaus Holtius, Examen van het ontwerp van tolerantie: om de leere
in de Dordrechtse synode anno 1619, vastgesteld met de veroordeelde leere der remonstranten te
verenigen, voorgesteld in eenige samenspraken, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Nicolaas Byl, 1753). This book
pseudonymously consists of ten dialogues between Orthodoxu (Comrie himself), Pantanechomenus
(representative of general tolerance for reconciling between Calvinism and Arminianism), Adiaphorus (the
apathetic group), Philalethes (an adoring companion), and Euruodius (a Latitudinarian). Cf. Thomas,
“Alexander Comrie: Contender for the Faith,” 32. According to Paul H. A. M. Abels and Aart de Groot,
Comrie and Holtius “set forth the Examination as if it was issued on behalf of the society of ‘The
Proponents of the Dutch forms of unity.’” See Paul H. A. M. Abels and Aart de Groot, “The Eighteenth
Century,” in Handbook of Dutch Church History, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 2015), 380.
In this regard, it is understandable why Comrie translated Isaac Chauncy’s book into Dutch
who is an active opponent of neonomianism. See Isaac Chauncy, De Leere der Waarheit, die na de
Godtzaligheit is, gegrondt op de Heilige Schriftuur, volgens den leidraadt van den kleinen Catechismus der
Westmunstersche Godtgeleerden, trans. Alexander Comrie (Leyden, 1757).
38

39

Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance, 215, 225.

Kuyper notes: “[T]he controversy between Rome [emphasizing human responsibility] and
Protestantism [emphasizing God’s sovereignty] always had been, and still was in Comrie’s time, as it is in
ours . . .” See Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: His Conflict in Holland,” 198.
40
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opinions that were tipped toward human agency, Comrie constantly emphasized the
definitive and decisive dimension of salvation.

5.3. Comrie’s Soteriological Views
5.3.1. Comrie and Definitive Sanctification
Comrie’s views on sanctification have been studied relatively little, especially compared
to his work on justification.41 This may be in part because Comrie’s view of
sanctification is less controversial than his more complex conception of justification
which draws more attention not only from his contemporaries but also from later
interpreters.42 Yet Comrie’s view of sanctification deserves to be thoroughly examined
here since he leans heavily on the importance of the “objective and decisive” aspect. This
emphasis is seen in his Het A. B. C. des Geloofs in which he discusses the diverse
dimensions of the Christian faith. This section examines (1) Comrie’s presentation of an
idea analogous to definitive sanctification and (2) the “causal” language in his treatment
of sanctification.

41
Comrie’s view of sanctification is not addressed even in Honig and Graafland’s work which
are specifically focused on Comrie’s doctrinal view. Even in chapter 2 which dealt with Comrie as a
dogmatist, Honig paid attention only to Comrie’s view of regeneration, faith, justification, and
predestination, not to sanctification. Cf. Honig, Alexander Comrie, 182-252. Graafland also dealt with
Comrie’s doctrinal view in a comprehensive outlook, but did not specifically take notice of the subject of
sanctification. Cf. C. Graafland, “Alexander Comrie (1706-1774),” in De Nadere Reformatie: beschrijving
van haar voornaamste vertegenwoordigers, ed. T. Brienen et al. (’s-Gravenhage: Boekencentrum, 1986),
315-347.
42

This point will be dealt with in detail in the next section.
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5.3.1.1. Four Core Characteristics in Comrie’s Definitive Sanctification
As seen in the preceding chapter, the core characteristics of definitive sanctification can
be described using four features: objectiveness and decisiveness, identity, condition, and
definitive sanctification as the ground of progressive sanctification.43
Comrie first sees sanctification as grounded on an “objective” foundation, which
by definition cannot begin with the believer. To be sanctified believers need to belong to
Christ in and through mystical union with him, but “they were not by nature belonging
unto Christ, O no; [for] they are of their father the devil, children of wrath, even as others
(Eph. 2:3).”44 Comrie therefore says, “[T]here will be no union [with Christ], unless He
first on His side lays hold. It is God who first loves, and therefore He draws with
lovingkindness” (emphasis added).45 Strictly speaking, the believer’s sanctification
through union with Christ is neither controlled by the believers’ willingness to
participate, nor based on any subjective ground as its origin. Rather, the beginning point,
not process, of union with Christ is totally “objective” in that the believer is not at all
involved in God’s eternal counsel (pactum salutis).46 For Comrie, both the definitive and
progressive dimensions of sanctification start with God: “[A]ll God’s mercies and

43

For this, see chapter 2 of this study.

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 17; The ABC of Faith, 14. “[Z]ij waren niet Christus’
eigendom van nature, o neen, zij zijn uit hun vader, de duivel, kinderen des toorns, gelijk anderen, Eféze 2:
3.”
44

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 17-18; The ABC of Faith, 14. “[E]r zal geen vereniging zijn,
tenzij Hij eerst van zijn kant aangrijpt. Het is toch God die eerst liefheeft, en daarom trekt Hij in
goedertierenheid.”
45

“[Z]ij Gods gelegde fondament onder het oog krijgen, zoals dat gelegd is in de vrederaad, in de
dood van de Middelaar, en in de aanbieding van het Evangelie.” See Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 125;
The ABC of Faith, 134.
46
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blessings produce a desired effect in the hearts of God’s children, to incite them to the
practice of virtues from a renewed principle [een vernieuwd beginsel], and to bring them
with godly [people].”47 In addition, Comrie sees that both the “objective” and “decisive”
dimensions of sanctification are grounded in Christ’s perfect holiness. Believers can
experience perfect holiness only when they share in Christ’s holiness, inasmuch as “it
[holiness] is fulfilled in Christ [in Christus . . . voldaan], and is for their [believers]
benefit, to sanctify them, and to conform them unto Him.”48 There is a particular point at
which the believers’ sanctification is decisively accomplished and fulfilled by virtue of
sharing in Christ’s perfect achieved holiness. Yet as Comrie stresses below, this decisive
dimension of sanctification neither minimizes the necessity of progressive sanctification,
nor defines a state of sinlessness. Rather, it means that sanctification is first based on the
objective and decisive ground of Christ’s accomplished work, the pactum salutis, etc., not
on any unstable, subjective ground.
Second, Comrie speaks of the “identity,” i.e., who believers fundamentally are in
definitive sanctification. Comrie affirms that “believers are holy since they are renewed
in all the powers of their soul; they are created in God’s image in knowledge,

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 63; The ABC of Faith, 64. According to Beeke, this “renewed
principle” (een vernieuwd beginsel) is the habitus of faith. This means the “principle, capacity, ability
(potentia), faculty, ‘increated’ (ingeschapen), and inherent (inklevende) habit of faith.” By actus, Comrie
meant “activities, such as saving knowledge, saving assent, and saving confidence, which flow out of the
habit or principle of faith. Thus, the habit of faith is infused into the soul by God, whereas the acts of faith
make faith a practical reality.” Yet, Beeke mentions that this habitus-actus distinction does not approve of a
split concept of faith. Rather, this distinction emphasizes the unity of oneness (eenheid). See Beeke, The
Quest for Full Assurance, 218-227. In this regard, the habitus-actus distinction and its unity of oneness
seem to be similar to the distinction of definitive (principle of sanctification) and progressive sanctification
(practical reality of sanctification) and their inseparable nature.
47

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 44; The ABC of Faith, 46. “Zij beginnen Zijn heiligheid te
zien. O! die is in Christus ook voldaan, en is ten beste van hen, om hen te heiligen, en met Zich
gelijkvormig te maken.”
48
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righteousness and true holiness.”49 Comrie points to the scriptural truth that those who
are created in God’s image in holiness become “a Royal Priesthood [Koninklijk
Priesterdom] and a holy and peculiar people [een heilig en verkregen volk] (Jer. 23:5).”50
Comrie believes that through “sprinkling clean water upon [them], sinners are sanctified
(1 Cor 6:11) and can be cleaned (Ezek 36:25) and washed of all filths of the daughters of
Zion (Isa 4:4).”51 For Comrie, knowing who believers fundamentally are (identity) is a
crucial matter, inasmuch as this is the driving force for progressing toward the sanctified
life and putting on unassailable armor against sin in spiritual combat.52
Third, for Comrie definitive sanctification is also a “condition” or a mode of
being in which the believer is conformed and shares in Christ’s perfect holiness in and
through union with Himself. Comrie sees that through the power of the Holy Spirit, the
believers’ state (staat) and condition (toestand) before God is irrevocably changed.53
This new state of the believer refers to putting on the armor of light (Rom 13:12) in
contrast to the “state of nature, the pitch-black darkness, in which every unregenerate
sinner lives.”54 Comrie urges believers to adhere to Christ no matter what else may

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 62; The ABC of Faith, 63. “. . . de gelovigen zijn heilig,
omdat zij vernieuwd worden in al de vermogens van hun ziel; zij zijn naar Gods evenbeeld geschapen in
kennis, in gerechtigheid en ware heiligheid.”
49

50

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 5; The ABC of Faith, 2. In the Enlgish translation, the word
“a Purchased People” is added.
51

See Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 9-10; The ABC of Faith, 6.

52
See Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 13; The ABC of Faith, 9. “[G]elijk het zaligmakende
geloof Jezus als een kleed aandoet, zo doet het ook aan de wapenen des lichts, om in de geestelijke krijg
tegen zonde, satan en wereld te strijden.”
53

See Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 28; The ABC of Faith, 29.

54

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 13; The ABC of Faith, 9.
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“Aanhangen” (stick or affix).55 Yet Comrie warns that this condition of sticking to Christ
in communion and union with Him must not be misunderstood as a “melting” of the soul
into the Divine Being as the pantheist Platonists and Mystics describe it.56 Instead,
Comrie describes union with Christ as accomplished when He first approaches and is
united with believers, then they place their faith in Him.57 Our understanding should not
be tainted by thinking that the believer’s imperfect and corrupted nature could somehow
play the initial part in conforming us to Christ’s perfect holiness. Rather, we should cling
to the idea that Christ’s perfect holiness “constitutes their [believers] riches, in making
them to be conformed to His image, whereby they are to be sanctified, are to increase in
glory and remain constant [emphasis added].”58
Fourth, Comrie points out that in definitive sanctification we see the foundation
for progressive sanctification. By this he means that salvation is never based on the
human being’s own will or strength, but rather only and ever on God’s. According to
Comrie, believers do not and cannot strive for sanctification on their own since they are

55

See Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 15-18; The ABC of Faith, 12-15. See also the section of
Aankleven (cleave): Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 24-27; The ABC of Faith, 23-25.
“. . . evenwel zo niet te verstaan is, gelijk de Platonischen en de Mystieken drijven, alsof de
zielen van dezulken één met God waren, door een insmelten in het Goddelijke Wezen.” See Comrie, Het A.
B. C. des geloofs, 15-16; The ABC of Faith, 12. According to Kuyper, union with Christ is neither
mechanical union, nor matrimonial union; rather, this is “mystical union” as a result of indwelling of the
Holy Spirit. Cf. Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: His Conflict in Holland,” 201.
56
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Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 16-17; The ABC of Faith, 13. Comrie does not want granted
faith to be thought as an efficient cause or actus of union with Christ. On Comrie’s view of faith, see also
Comrie, Brief, 118-120.
Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 33; The ABC of Faith, 34-35. “Zijn heiligheid is ook hun
rijkdom, om hem Zijn beeld gelijkvormig te maken, waardoor zij geheiligd zullen worden, in heiligheid
toenemen en bestendig blijven.”
58
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powerless (onmachtig) and incapable (onbekwaam) of any good thought or work.59
Comrie makes it clear that “nothing can be pleasing to God unless it first comes down
from Him who is the Father of lights and the Giver of every good and perfect gift.”60
Comrie militates against the individual’s religious and spiritual activities (e.g., worship,
prayer, sacrament, benevolence, etc.) being the foundation of salvation, inasmuch as
these are fundamentally weak and trembling.61 In Comrie’s conception the individual’s
exercise of sanctification is an “approximate” work (nabijkomend werk), not a “right”
work (recht werk).62 Instead, the true work of carrying on progressive sanctification is to
first remember what Christ has definitively done for believers, thereby discerning their
ultimate identity and in what condition they remain. Comrie therefore lays emphasis on
the objective and decisive foundation of both justification and sanctification, i.e., a
“covenant of peace in the death of the Mediator and in the setting-forth of the Gospel.”63

5.3.1.2. Causal Language
Comrie’s emphasis on the objective and decisive dimension of sanctification can also be
seen in his use of causal language. Over against the teachings of Baruch Spinoza (1632-

59

See Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 77; The ABC of Faith, 79.

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 77; The ABC of Faith, 79. “Het is klaar, dat Gode niets
behagen kan, of het moet eerst van Hem afdalen, die de Vader der lichten en Gever van alle gaven en
volmaakte giften is.”
60

61

See Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 124-125; The ABC of Faith, 132-133.

Banfield translated the term nabijkomend werk into an “almost-work.” See Comrie, Het A. B.
C. des geloofs, 24; The ABC of Faith, 22.
62

63

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 125; The ABC of Faith, 134.
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1677) and Pontiaan van Hattem (1641-1706), whom Comrie felt taught the unacceptable
doctrine (gruwelijke leer) that man is totally passive,64 Comrie insists that “true teaching
regards God as the first, but man also as [the] second cause of all his doings.”65 For
Comrie, both determinism (neglecting the secondary cause) and libertarianism
(overemphasizing the power of the secondary cause) are erroneous. Comrie believes that
the dimension of progressive sanctification (subjective as secondary cause) is firmly
grounded in the dimension of definitive sanctification (objective and decisive as primary
cause). Even in progressive sanctification where human agents work and act throughout
the remainder of their lifetime, God’s grace on the basis of Christ’s objective and
decisive work is still the first cause. Comrie notes that “sanctification must certainly grow
each of the graces [progressive sanctification] in a true Christian who is set upon true
holiness [definitive sanctification].”66 Believers first become “holy” people by virtue of
union with Christ’s perfect holiness, then on this basis they live a sanctified life
commensurate with who they are. Because of definitive sanctification believers can and
do carry on sanctification progressively for the rest of their lives.

64

According to Winfried Schröder, theologians were troubled even more by van Hattem than any
others for three reasons: (1) van Hattem was heavily indebted to Spinoza; (2) van Hattem had managed to
gather a large group of partisans including Spinozists; and (3) van Hattem had taught the most pernicious
doctrines from Spinoza’s system. On the relationship between Spinoza and Pontiaan van Hattem, see
Winfried Schröder, “‘. . . Spinozam Tota Armenta in Belgio Sequi Ducem’: The Reception of the Early
Dutch Spinozists in Germany,” in Disguised and Overt Spinozism Around 1700: Papers Presented at the
International Colloquium Held at Rotterdam, 5-8 October 1994, eds. Wiep Van Bunge and Wim Klever
(Leiden: Brill, 1996), 157-169. For a detailed discussion about Spinoza and the Netherlanders, see H. J.
Siebrand, Spinoza and the Netherlanders: An Inquiry into the Early Reception of His Philosophy of
Religion (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1988).
Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 147; The ABC of Faith, 160. “. . . de ware leer God als de
eerste, maar de mens ook als een tweede oorzaak van al zijn doen aanmerkt.”
65

Comrie, Het A. B. C. des geloofs, 78; The ABC of Faith, 80. “. . . heiligheid moet elk van de
genade in een waar christen, die gezet is op ware heiligheid, inderdaad groeien.”
66
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Causal language is even more evident in Comrie’s discussion of justification. Just
as in sanctification, Comrie defines the objective and decisive dimension while observing
the distinction between active and passive justification. This will be laid out in the next
section.

5.3.2. Comrie and Active Justification
Reviews of Comrie’s concept of justification have been mixed. Graafland points out that
Comrie’s doctrine of justification is somewhat ambivalent, even appearing to allow
justification from eternity, thus inviting criticism from his contemporaries.67 Also
concerned about Comrie’s supposed acceptance of justification from eternity, K. Exalto
contends that Comrie depends more on deductive and logical reasoning rather than on
Scripture, and in so doing has moved far from Reformed teaching.68 Gerrit A. van den
Brink also criticizes Comrie’s view of imputation, believing that Comrie errs in seeing
the fundamental cause of justification in the immediacy of the imputation of Christ’s
righteousness without the aspect of faith.69 Van den Brink regards Comrie as a “Dutch
representative of English antinomianism” for downplaying the instrumental role of faith
in his later writings.70 According to J. van Genderen and W. H. Velema, even though the

67

Graafland, “Alexander Comrie (1706-1774),” 337-338.

68
K. Exalto, “Genadeleer En Heilsweg,” in Theologische aspecten van de Nadere Reformatie,
eds. T. Brienen, K. Exalto, and C. Graafland (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1993), 198.

Gerrit A. van den Brink, “‘Elke daad is een werk’, Alexander Comrie (1706-1774) over de
verschillen tussen de remonstrantse en de gereformeerde rechtvaardigingsleer,” Theologia Reformata 55,
no. 2 (2012): 146-164.
69

Gerrit A. van den Brink, “Comrie en het Antinomianisme,” Documentatieblad Nadere
Reformatie 30, no. 2 (2006): 112-156. Recently, Van den Brink tries to find the doctrinal similarities
between John Cotton (1585-1652) who was in the midst of the most vehement controversy which occurred
in Massachusetts in New England during the years 1636-1638 and Comrie. See Gerrit A. van den Brink,
70
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motivation for Comrie’s view of justification is laudable its doctrinal development is an
“artifact.”71 Criticism from Comrie’s contemporaries, e.g., the Leiden professors Joan
van den Honert and Jan Jacob Schultens (1716-1778), closely relates to this as well.72
Indeed most criticisms of Comrie’s views on justification arise from his supposed
theology of eternal justification and imputation.
G. H. Kersten does distinguish Comrie’s view of justification from antinomian
tenets which he characterizes as “deny[ing] the necessity of subjective justification.”73
Kuyper expresses tepid agreement with Comrie’s doctrine of justification stating that
“[f]or my part, at least, I keep to the exquisite distinction [of active/passive
justification].”74 But Kuyper continues, “Nor is the preceding exposition of Comrie’s
“The Act or Habit of Faith? Alexander Comrie’s Interpretation of Heidelberg Catechism Question 20,” in
Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology 1560-1775, ed. Aaron C. Denlinger
(London: T & T Clark, 2015), 253-270. Van den Brink also asserts that there is a doctrinal discontinuity
between Comrie’s early writing (esp., Verhandeling van enige Eigenschappen van het zaligmakend geloof
[1744]) and his later writings (Stellige en praktikale verklaaringe van den Heidelbergschen Catechismus
[1753], Examen van het ontwerp van tolerantie [1753-1759], and Brief [1761]). Van den Brink argues that
even though Comrie was situated in the Reformed mainstream in his early writing Eigenschappen, his
theological position which appeared through the later writings shifted into the doctrinal antinomianism in
the way that the whole order of salvation perceives as “one-sided God’s work.” See Gerrit A. van den
Brink, “Tegenwicht of Tegenstelling? Het belang van de eigenschappen voor de Comrie-Interpretatie,”
Documentatieblad Nadere Reformatie 36, no. 2 (2012): 180-186. On Comrie’s later wrtings, see Alexander
Comrie, Stellige En Praktikale Verklaaringe van Den Heidelbergschen Catechismus, Volgens de Leere En
Gronden Der Reformatie (Amsterdam: Nicolaas Byl, 1753); idem, Examen; idem, Brief.
71

Van Genderen and Velema, Concise Reformed Dogmatics, 622.

72

G. H. Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics: A Systematic Treatment of Reformed Doctrine, trans. Joel
R. Beeke (Grand Rapids: Netherlands Reformed Book, 1980), 2:416-417; Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie,”
196. For a brief explanation about van den Honert and Schultens, see Selderhuis, Handbook of Dutch
Church History, 375.
Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:417. Kersten adds, “The turmoil stirred up by the Arminians,
among whom were the Leiden professors Vanden Honert, Jr. and Schultens, against Comrie and Holtius,
caused even Vander Groe to take his pen to oppose the doctrine of justification from eternity, but when he
heard that Comrie and his colleagues soundly maintained the necessity of justification by faith, he gave up
the task.” See Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:416-417 (emphasis in the original).
73

Here, Kuyper cites Johannes Hoornbeeck’s (1617-1666) exposition of the distinction between
active and passive justification: “Active justification is the act of the justifying God; passive justification is
its termination and application to individual believers. Justification was destined from all eternity in the
74
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views [of justification] to be considered as an unreserved and entire approval of his
argumentation.” In Kuyper’s opinion, Comrie’s “method of treating his subject (as an
antithesis to its negative) is always one-sided.”75 Nevertheless, Kuyper praises the part
that Comrie’s overall theology and clear language play in defending Dutch churches from
rationalism, especially in comparison to the ineffective German mediating theology of his
time.76 Bavinck is generally neutral, but he often cites Cromrie’s Brief for its analysis of
the distinction between active and passive justification.77
When evaluating Comrie’s treatment of the habitus and actus of faith, Beeke
asserts that “[i]f Comrie erred in emphasizing justification from eternity too strongly, he
did so within the boundaries of historic Reformed faith.”78 According to Beeke, Comrie
did not go as far out of the way as Kuyper, staying within his “mediating position” in
asserting that justification is not fully actualized in eternal justification (in the decree of
God) and in collective justification (in the resurrection of Christ), but must also include
passive justification sola fide (in the court of consciousness).79 J. P. Lilley, A. G. Honig,

Divine decree; it was promised soon after the Fall; it was realized in the death and resurrection of Christ
(Rom. viii. 34) (merited by Christ through His death; declared and ratified by God in His resurrection); it is
applied and manifested in the heart of the believer; and it shall hereafter be gloriously consummated in the
day of final and universal judgment.” See Johannes Hoornbeeck, Summa controversiarum religionis cum
infidelibus, haereticis, schismaticis, 2nd ed. (Utrecht, 1658), 815-816. Cf. Abraham Kuyper, “Alexander
Comrie: Lessons from His Career,” Catholic Presbyterian 7 (1882): 279 (note.*).
75

Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: Lessons from His Career,” 279n*.

Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: Lessons from His Career,” 280-284. In the discussion regarding
faith in a comparative context between à Brakel and Comrie, Kuyper adds in The Work of the Holy Spirit,
“Following the line of Augustine, Calvin, Voetius, [and] Comrie, one goes safest.” See Kuyper, The Work
of the Holy Spirit, 396.
76

77

See, esp., Bavinck, GD, 4:203-207 (§51.475); RD, 4:219-223.

78

Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance, 239.

79

Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance, 239. Cf. Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:421.
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and J. H. R. Verboom also generally approve of Comrie.80
The lack of consensus in the theological community regarding Comrie’s doctrine
of justification is a by-product of Comrie’s complex presentation; when this complexity
is resolved a positive picture of Comrie’s concept of justification emerges. However, one
key criticism levelled against Comrie is his supposed acceptance of justification from
eternity. The next section focuses on exposing his true theology as elucidated in his Brief;
at the same time this study will fully reveal Comrie’s conception of active justification.
Our commentary is divided into four topics: (1) Comrie’s distinction between active and
passive justification; (2) his actual concept of eternal justification; (3) his view of the
difference between active and eternal justification; and (4) his causal language. In the end
we will see that just as in his definition of sanctification, Comrie uses complex and
nuanced methods to present the “objective” and “decisive” dimension of justification.

5.3.2.1. Comrie Distinguishes between Active and Passive Justification
Comrie introduced his distinction between active and passive justification in the foreword
to Brief. Here he wrote, “God, who justifies the ungodly is active [dadelijk,
“immediate”], and he who is justified and receives the testimony of the forgiveness of his
sins is passive [lijdelijk] with respect to the works of God” (emphasis in the original).81

80

Lilley, “Alexander Comrie”; Honig, Alexander Comrie; Verboom, Dr. Alexander Comrie.

81
Comrie, Brief, iv. “. . . Godt, die den godtloozen rechtvaerdigt, dadelijk is, en die
gerechtvaerdigt wordt, en het getuigenis van de vergevinge zijner zonden ontvangt, in opzigt tot de
werkinge Gods, lijdelijk.” For the same exposition of the distinction, see Maccovius, Collegia, 423-425;
Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2:669 (16.7.1); à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service,
2:376. For a detailed discussion of the distinction of active/passive justification, see chapter 3 of this study.
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Referencing Voetius, Comrie specified that wherever the term “justification” appeared in
Brief it always includes both active and passive dimensions of justification.82 For
Comrie, active justification is “the establishment of the divine sentence itself, the New
Covenant, the promise, and the announcement of it from the side of God,”83 while
passive justification signifies the “inspiration, proclamation, and revelation of that
sentence in the heart of redeemed.”84 Active justification is established in the pactum
salutis between God and Christ for all the elect from eternity.85 Comrie adds that in
active justification, “the ungodly does nothing whereby he would stimulate God or make
active unto his justification, which is still clearer from this, that the whole work of a
sinner is ruled out the causes of justification.”86 Comrie finds in Paul’s letters that the
sinner’s justification cannot be realized by human works.87 Thus Comrie opposes
Arminian and Roman Catholic teachings, both of which stress human works in
justification. Comrie has in view the “objective” ground in which God and His works
mark the beginning of justification rather than it beginning in human beings and their
works.

Comrie, Brief, 83. Here, Comrie cites Voetius’ Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, 5
vols. (Utrecht, 1648-1667), 5:610.
82

Comrie, Brief, 83. “. . . zy [active justification] beteekent de vaststelling zelve van het
Goddelijk vonnis, en alzoo van het nieuwe Verbond, de belofte, en de uitspraak daar van, van de zyde
Gods.”
83

Comrie, Brief, 83. “. . . zy [passive justification] beteekent de inboezeminge, bekendmaking,
openbaringe van dat vonnis in de herten der verlosten.”
84

85

See Comrie, Brief, 87.

Comrie, Brief, iv-v. “. . . de godtlooze niets doet, of werkt, waar door hij Godt tot zijne
rechtvaerdigmakinge zoude opwekken of werkzaam maken: het welk daar uit nog klaarder is, dat alle werk
des zondaars wordt uitgesloten buiten de oorzaken der rechtvaerdigmakinge.”
86

87

See Comrie, Brief, i.
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Unlike Brine, who we saw in Chapter 3 regards justification as completed either
in the active dimension or even in eternity and who rejects the idea of passive
justification altogether,88 Comrie says just the opposite:
I have never taught nor thought . . . that eternal justification, as this is an
intrinsic act of God in Himself, is justification in its complete
engagement. . . . On the contrary, I have taught in the Characteristics of
Faith [Eigenschappen des Geloofs] that to suppose justification in its
completeness of eternity would be Antinomian [emphasis in the original].89
Comrie holds that the sinner’s justification is actually completed in in foro conscientiae.
He makes it clear that he opposes the view that justification is completed perfectly in
eternity.90 Further distancing himself,91 Comrie states that “we are not perfectly
justified, until we are immediately and personally made partakers of the benefit in the
employment or application of it to ourselves through faith” (emphasis in the original).92
In Comrie’s view a sinner’s justification is begun in active and terminated in passive
justification.93 Comrie also says that the completion of justification “could neither
88

See, esp., Brine, A Defence, 15-17, 33-34.

89
Comrie, Brief, 88. “. . . heb ik nooit geleert, nog gedagt . . . dat die eeuwige
Rechtvaerdigmakinge, zoo als die een inblijvende daad Gods in zig zelven is, de Rechtvaerdigmakinge in
haar volkomen beslag is . . . In tegendeel heb ik geleert in de Eigenschappen des Geloofs, dat het stellen
der Rechtvaerdigmakinge in hare volkomentheit van eeuwigheit Antinomiaans zoude zijn . . . .” Here
Eigenschappen des Geloofs refers to Alexander Comrie, Verhandeling van Eenige Eigenschappen Des
Zaligmakenden Geloofs (Leiden: Johannes Hasebroek, 1747).
90

Yet, note that English antinomian theologians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did
not exclusively hold the idea of eternal justification. Rather, their main interest was to place justification
before faith, to emphasize free justification, and to assert the status of complete elimination of sin. For a
detailed discussion regarding this, see chapter 3 of this study.
Comrie’s view is certainly far from practical antinomianism, which seeks and has the
“lawless” tenets, inasmuch as Comrie severely criticizes people who deny the obligation unto obedience
and dispute the Law and calls them “atheists” (atheïsten). See Comrie, Brief, 37.
91

92
Comrie, Brief, 97. “. . . wij evenwel niet volkomen gerechtvaerdigt zijn tot dat wij dadelijk en
personeel deelachtig gemaakt worden deze weldaadt, in de toepassinge ofte applicatie daar van aan ons
zelve door het geloove . . .”
93

On Comrie’s argument that the completeness of justification is realized in foro conscientiae,
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happen from eternity nor in the resurrection of Christ, but took place by God for us with
regard to the application at a certain point of time.”94 After seeing Comrie’s reference to
the necessity of passive justification in time van den Honert recanted his earlier criticism,
writing to Comrie that “this matter [eternal justification] does not touch Rev. Holtius and
Dr. Comrie together, but only Rev. Holtius . . . because [unlike Comrie] Rev. Holtius has
kept this matter outside of any communication of Classis and placed in a document which
has published without any knowledge, visitation, and approbation of the respected
Classis.”95
In sum, Comrie affirms both active and passive justification in his soteriology.
For him the terminal point of justification is not found in the objective ground of active
justification but in passive justification in foro conscientiae.

5.3.2.2. Comrie’s View of Eternal Justification
Comrie’s frequent assertion of the objective foundation of justification led to criticism by
those who assumed that Comrie must have held to the idea of justification from eternity.
Comrie does mention the tenet of eternal justification, but his concept should not be seen
as exclusively eternal since he also speaks of the dimension of passive justification sola

see also Comrie, Eigenschappen, 229-262 (Heb 10:22); idem, Heidelbergschen Catechismus, 488-491.
Comrie, Brief, 103. “. . . nog van eeuwigheit nog in Christus opstandinge konnende
geschieden . . . maar van Godt, met opzigt op de toepassinge, ter bepaalder tijd . . .”
94

95
Comrie, Brief, 59. “. . . dit stuk niet Do. Holtius en Doct. Comrie t' samen, maar Do. Holtius
alleen raakt . . . omdat Do. Holtius dit stuk buyten alle communicatie der Classis gehouden, en in een
Schriftuur geplaatst heeft, dat . . . buyten alle voorkennis, visitatie, en approbatie der Weleerw. Classis
uytgegeven.” Van den Honert’s letter can be found in Brief, 55-69. For Kersten’s comment on van den
Honert’s withdrawal of criticism to Comrie, see Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:416-417.
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fide. Thus there seems to be a conflict within Comrie’s doctrine of justification, a tension
that provoked criticism not only from Comrie’s contemporaries but also from later
interpreters.96 In order to properly understand Comrie’s complex position, two important
distinctions can be entertained: (1) the distinction between complete justification from
eternity and the decree to justify in eternity and (2) the distinction between justification in
sensu diviso (in the distributive sense) and justification in sensu concreto (in the concrete
sense).
First, when Comrie uses the term “justification from eternity”
(Rechtvaerdigmakinge van eeuwigheit), he actually has in mind the “decree to justify in
eternity.” For Comrie, God’s eternal decree to justify sinners is objective and firmly fixed
inasmuch as this decree is grounded in the ideas of divine simplicity, the absoluteness of
the Godhead, and the immutability of God’s will.97 Comrie says that “everything, which
we are made partakers [of] in time [including justification], should be considered as
effects of which God had allowed and assigned in Himself from Eternity by an absolute
and eternal stipulation of His will according to His Counsel as God, is utterly eternal.”98
Here Comrie is distinguishing between justification from eternity (i.e., justification which
had already been completed in eternity) and the decree to justify in eternity.99 When
Cf. Exalto, “Genadeleer En Heilsweg,” 198; Graafland, “Alexander Comrie (1706-1774),”
337-338; Genderen and Velema, Concise Reformed Dogmatics, 622.
96

97

See, esp., Comrie, Brief, 74-79.

Comrie, Brief, 75-76. “. . . alles, dat wij in de tijt deelagtig gemaakt worden, moet aangemerkt
worden als uitwerkingen van het geene Godt ons in zig zelfs van Eeuwigheit toebedagt en toegelegt hadde,
door een zoo volstrekt eeuwige bepalinge van zijn wil na zijnen raadt, als Godt volstrekt eeuwig is.”
98

Heppe notes, “The decree of justification is one thing, justification itself is another.” See
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 557. Herman Hoeksema also mentions that denying eternal justification is
evidently not correct if eternal justification refers to God’s eternal decree to justify in the eternal counsel of
God. See Hoeksema, Reformed Dogmatics, 502. According to Kersten, God’s eternal decree to justify is
99
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Comrie appears to be speaking just of justification from eternity, he is actually speaking
of the effect of the decree more than its eternality. For him, God’s eternal decree is the
objective basis for justification, the reality of which for the sinner occurs in time.100
However, by speaking so often and at such length of the completeness, immutability, and
absolute finality of God’s eternal decree to justify, Comrie could be misconstrued as
endorsing the “completion” of justification in eternity. In addition, although Comrie does
distinguish the intrinsic act in God (ad intra) from the extrinsic act of God (ad extra) in
justification,101 his statements on the “absoluteness” of the eternal intrinsic act of God
still make it sound as though he believes justification is completely finalized from
eternity just as his critics have charged.102 In answer to this criticism, Comrie replies in
Brief that the “benefit [of justification] is to be actually seen as this is received its
fulfillment and completion in our conscience through a certain confidence which the
Holy Spirit works in our heart that the forgiveness of sin and eternal or blissful
righteousness are offered to us from God” (emphasis added).103 If there is a tension in
Comrie, it is not between justification from eternity and justification in time, but his

necessary since this can be the firm ground of progressive sanctification. See Kersten, Reformed
Dogmatics, 2:419-420.
100

See Comrie, Brief, 76.

“. . . en dus, hoe inblijvende in Godt op zich zelfs aangemerkt, nogtans, ten aanzien van de
uitvoering, gewroehten buiten Godt, en van Godt essentialiter onderscheiden.” See Comrie, Brief, 75.
101

A radical version of this is Brine’s position. According to Brine, justification is the immanent
act of God in eternity and therefore, essentially there is no room for passive justification. See Brine, A
Defence, 15, 34, 44, 51.
102

103
Comrie, Brief, 142. “. . . eigentlijk op die weldaadt gezien wordt, zoo als die hare voltooijinge
en volmakinge in onze conscientie ontvangt, door het zekere vertrouwen, dat de H. Geest in onze herten
werkt, dat de vergevinge der zonde, de eeuwige gerechtigheit an zaligheit, van Godt aan ons geschonken
zijn.”
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major emphasis on the absoluteness of God’s decree to justify in eternity (or eternal
intrinsic act) over the dimension of passive justification in time.
Second, Comrie’s view of eternal justification needs to be understood in the
distinction between justification in the distributive sense (in sensu diviso) and
justification in the concrete sense (in sensu concreto). According to Comrie, justification
consists of three parts: (1) from eternity; (2) in the resurrection or in the imputation; and
(3) in the conscience.104 For Comrie justification from eternity signifies the eternal
decision to justify from the pactum salutis through Christ’s surety; justification in the
resurrection or the imputation means the application of the righteousness of Christ to
sinners in union with Him; and justification in the conscience stands as the terminal point
of the sinners’ justification.105 Comrie asserts that each of these three parts is perfect in
the distributive sense. Yet Comrie also holds that the perfection of each part in the
distributive sense should not be understood as the completion of justification in the
concrete sense, for the completeness of justification is only achieved in the concrete sense
when all three parts are perfectly united.106 Comrie states, “We are speaking of
justification as a totality [TOTUM; geheel aanzien], which receives its perfection when

104

See Comrie, Brief, 17.

“… hoe gij de weldaadt [i.e., the benefit of justification] beschouwt, ofte zoo als die van
eeuwigheit uit het Verbondt met Christus, en ons in Hem als zijn zaadt, voortvloeit, door de acceptatie van
des Borgs bemiddelinge, in welke de persoons verwisselinge tusschen Hem en ons geschiedit is, ofte mede
in zijne opstandinge, ofte ook in de onmiddelijke toerekeninge van zijne geregtigheit en genoegdoeninge
door eene overgaande daadt Godts tot ons, en het termineeren van dezelve in de conscientien . . .” See
Comrie, Brief, 17.
105

106
“. . . wij ieder van deze essentieele deelen, in sensu diviso, een zekere volmaaktheit (NB. niet
volkomentheit in sensu concreto) toeschrijven: welke volmaaktheit van een ieder deel in sensu diviso,
wanneer zij in sensu concreto door vereeniginge met elkander zamengevoegt worden, de volkomentheit
van de weldaad uitmaken.” See Comrie, Brief, 17.
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all the parts, belonging to the whole in order to properly set therewith the totality, are
gathered or combined with one another in its perfection.”107 In other words, the
completeness of justification occurs neither from eternity, nor in the resurrection, nor in
the conscience alone. Rather, the completeness of justification, according to Comrie, is
accomplished only when each part is comprehensively integrated into the others.108
It could only be said that Comrie supports the idea of eternal justification if his
statements on the perfection of justification from eternity in the distributive sense in fact
referred to the idea of eternal justification. But Comrie does not conceive of eternal
justification in that sense. He does not say that justification is completely terminated in
God’s eternal immanent act, and he never rejects the dimension of passive justification as
Brine asserts.109 For as Comrie argued, justification cannot be realized in its totality in
the concrete sense if perfect justification in foro conscientiae is omitted from the
distributive sense.

5.3.2.3. Comrie’s View of the Distinction between Active and Eternal Justification
Does Comrie try to equate the idea of active justification with eternal justification as did

Comrie, Brief, 17. “wij sprekende van de rechtvaerdigmakinge, die als een TOTUM, een
geheel aanzien, hetwelk zijne volkomentbeit ontvangt, wanneer alle de deelen, tot het geheel behoorende,
om een geheel eigentlijk daar te stellen, in zijn volkomentheit met elkander zamengevoegt ofte
gecombineert worden.”
107
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According to Kuyper, a mystical way, not an intellectual way, is necessary in order to
integrate each part of justification into a totality. This mystical way, for Kuyper, is union with Christ. See
Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: His Conflict in Holland,” 201.
Kersten also points out that Comrie’s view of eternal justification is not exclusive. See
Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:417. Cf. Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance, 239.
109
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Brine?110 The answer is no. Comrie’s view of active justification precludes eternal
justification when defined as the completion and finalization of justification in eternity.
Comrie’s concept of active justification speaks only of justification from God’s
perspective on the basis of God’s eternal decree; this is quite different from eternal
justification in the exclusive sense.111 For Comrie, justification is fully realized not in
eternity nor even in active justification but in passive justification in time. Comrie writes:
I still disavow that justification, by an intrinsic act of God in Himself,
includes the entire benefit in its perfection. Since, by the intrinsic act of
God, nothing is placed outside the Being of God without transferring acts of
the executing providence, whereby that, which is in God of all eternity, is
gained its effect in time and is placed thereby outside God. . . . Although the
[intrinsic] act in itself is so perfect because it is ended as God Himself, no
intrinsic act of God . . . has its perfectness before God’s efficiency or actual
execution.112
In his writings Comrie does dwell on the completeness and absoluteness of God’s decree
in eternity more than its execution in time. However, Comrie also says that God’s
immanent and intrinsic act, though absolute and perfect, does not exert an effect on the
temporal affairs of creatures unless it is effectively applied in time. In this Comrie sees
On Price’s identification between active justification and eternal justification, see Price, “John
Calvin and Herman Bavinck on the Doctrine of Justification in Relation to Ethics,” 147.
110
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This is also a view of Johann Heinrich Heidegger (1633-1698). According to Heidegger,
active justification should be distinguished from eternal justification. Heidergger notes: “Neque illa [active
justification] proprie ab aeterno peragitur, quia Deus decretum justificandi aeternum non ante fidem
exequitur; sed in tempore, partim in Coelo, post absolutas in cruce passiones Christi . . . partim in
conscientia nostram, simul atque credimus in Christum, & sentential absolutionis velut ad fidem nostram
pronuntiatur.” See Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Corpus theologiae christianae (Tiguri, 1732), 2:303
(Loc.XXII, par.79). For van den Honert’s citation about Heidegger, see Comrie, Brief, 59n(a).
Comrie, Brief, 88-89. “. . . ik nog ontkenne dat de rechtvaerdigmakinge bij een inblijvende
daad God in zig zelven de geheele Weldaad in hare volkomenheit bevat: alzoo door de inblijvende daad
God niets buiten het wezen Gods gestelt wordt, zonder overgaande daden der uitwerkende Voorzienigheit,
waardoor het geen in Godt van alle eeuwigheit is, zijn effect bekomt in deu tijd, en buiten Godt daargestelt
wordt . . . geen inblijvende daad Gods . . . [of]schoon die daad in zig zelven zo volmaakt is als Godt zelve
tot dat einde waartoe ze is, hare volkomenheit heeft, voor en aleer Gods efficientie, of dadelijke
uitwerkinge.”
112
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the framework of the “decree in eternity and its execution in time.”113 Comrie does not
see the execution of God’s decree in time as inferior to the decree itself. He says that
God’s work ad extra (execution) should be based on God’s work ad intra (decree) in
terms of causality. Comrie thus affirms that “the sole regulation of the act of His will is
only grounded in His freedom, sovereign, absolute, and almighty pleasure”114 as the
ultimate purpose of God’s decree.
Unlike Brine, Comrie states that “we by no means confuse it [the dimension of
active justification] with God’s predestination or decree of election, [there] being a
distinction between [them].”115 In Brine’s argument active justification, predestination,
election, and eternal justification are all regarded as the same idea which is then folded
into the immanent act of God in eternity, an act which was already made in eternity.116
However, while Comrie agrees that these ideas are all included in the intrinsic act of God
on the basis of God’s immutable, absolute, and complete nature, they are not all a single
idea.117 Instead, Comrie argues that the idea of active justification is neither about God’s
eternal determination regarding election and reprobation (predestination), nor about the

113
Voetius also guards that the decree and its execution should not be confused, saying that “[a]n
decretum justificationis partem aut momentum aliquod faciat in ipsa justiftcatione? Resp. Neg. Neque enim
confundi debeat vocatio, regeneratio, justificatio, adoptio aut justificatio, cum decreto; interna actio cum
emanante externa; aut geterna cum temporaria; aut decretum seu voluntas Dei cum executione et re volita:
quod exemplo decreti executionis; aut decreti salvationis declarari potest; quae ab ipsa creatione, et ab ipsa
salute distinguuntur.” See Voetius, Selectarum disputationum theologicarum (Utrecht, 1669), 5:281 (Probl.
de Justif. Part 1). For van den Honert’s citation about Voetius, see Comrie, Brief, 58-59n(a).

Comrie, Brief, 85. “. . . de eenige bepalinge van zijn wils-daad alleen gegrondt in zijn
vrijmagtig, Souverein, volstrekt oppermagtig welbehagen.”
114

115
Comrie, Brief, 83. “. . . verwarren wij die geenzints met Godts Praedestinatie ofte besluit der
Verkiezinge, zijnde een onderscheidt daar tusschen.”
116

Cf. Brine, A Defence, 15-17, 38.

117

See Comrie, Brief, 86.
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perfect completion of a sinner’s justification in eternity (eternal justification). Rather, the
notion of active justification is about the establishment and announcement of the divine
sentence from God’s side regarding a sinner’s justification.118
In sum, Comrie does not confuse the idea of active justification with eternal
justification, predestination, or election. Even though these ideas are all included in
God’s intrinsic act, their nature and execution are not the same.

5.3.2.4. Causal Language
Just as with definitive sanctification, Comrie’s views on justification can also be
understood through his use of causal language. Comrie sees the absoluteness of God’s
eternal decree to justify and the corresponding idea of active justification as the “primary
and efficient” cause of justification. Comrie’s avid defense of this idea is a key part of his
theological reaction to the historical context of his day. Against the views of Socinianism,
Arminianism, and neonomianism, all of which leave room for human work or merit to
some extent in justification,119 through his explanation Comrie asserts that the sinner’s
justification is primarily based on the immutable, objective, divine foundation and
promise, not on shifting subjective human work. Comrie holds that God and His work is
the primary cause of everything.
Comrie also applies this causality to the role of faith in justification. Comrie

118
119

See Comrie, Brief, 83.

Throughout Brief, Comrie mentions the view of Socinianism ten times; Arminianism,
seventeen times; and neonomianism, seven times.
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makes a distinction between the habitus (habit) and actus (act) of faith.120 The habitus of
faith refers to the principle which makes possible believing. The actus of faith is the
actual human activity of believing.121 This activity of believing (gelooven) should flow
out of the habit or principle of faith (geloof).122 Throughout his discussion of
justification, Comrie is careful to guard against any possibility that the actus of faith
might be confused with the primary or efficient cause of justification. Comrie believes
that if the actus of faith played a leading role in justification, this would make
justification human-merited or human-centered.123 Comrie uses the concept of
“immediate imputation”124 to push back against the idea that acts of faith must be added
to Christ’s righteousness for sinners to be justified. He shows that imputation is not
controlled or directed by the actus of faith when he says that “as we are only righteous
before God in this [immediate] imputed righteousness and satisfaction, so we, having
become righteous as ours through imputation from God without our help, also only

120

Comrie, Heidelbergschen Catechismus, 430. For a detailed discussion about this distinction,
see Beeke, The Quest for Full Assurance, 218-231; Maarten Wisse, “Habitus Fidei: An Essay on the
History of a Concept,” Scottish Journal of Theology 56, no. 2 (2003): 172-189.
121

See Comrie, Heidelbergschen Catechismus, xxviii, 429-432.

122

See Comrie, Heidelbergschen Catechismus, 429.

“. . . men dit ontkent, men noodzakelijk in den mensche, zonder de ingestorte
Goloofshebbelijkheit, welke in de kragtige roeping in hem ingewrogt wordt, een natuurlijk vermogen moet
stellen, het zij in de conscientie, het zij ip het verstant, waar door men, zonder een nieuw levensbeginsel, uit
de natuur tot de genade zoude konnen opklimmen.” See Comrie, Brief, 133.
123

The term “immediate imputation” is not referring to imputatio immediata in the notion of
imputatio peccati, namely, the way of how to attribute sinfulness to mankind. Whereas imputatio mediata
(mediate imputation) refers to the divine attribution of sinfulness to mankind because of hereditary or
natural corruption of all people, imputatio immediata (immediate imputation) refers to the divine attribution
of sinfulness to mankind because of the Fall. See Muller, Dictionary, 149 (s.v. imputatio). Differently, the
term “immediate imputation” here is related with the role of faith in the imputation, namely, whether faith
is needed (mediate imputation) or not (immediate imputation) to be imputed.
124
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receive and rest thereon unto salvation” (emphasis added).125 Comrie says that this
imputation occurs “without our help” (zonder ons toedoen) and “without any prior act by
us” (zonder enige voorafgaande daad van ons) as well.126 If active justification did
require anything more than the imputation of Christ’s perfect righteousness, e.g. any
human activity or merit, imputation would mean nothing. Even so, it is undeniable that
Comrie’s reluctance to make room for actus of faith in justification, no matter how
understandable, attenuates to some degree the instrumental role of faith in imputation.127
However, Comrie does not totally reject the instrumental cause of faith in his
discussion of justification. He holds that justification is understood in a fourfold causal
structure: (1) God’s grace (internal prompting cause); (2) Christ’s active and passive
obedience (material or meriting cause); (3) immediate imputation (formal cause); and (4)
faith (instrumental cause).128 Faith is needed not in the realm of active justification (the
area of the second and third cause as presented right above),129 but in passive

Comrie, Brief, 101. “. . . gelijk wij in deze toegerekende Geregtigheit en Genoegdoeninge
alleen rechtvaerdig voor Godt zijn, wij zoo ook alleen die, als de onse van Godt door toerekeninge zonder
ons toedoen geworden zijnde, aannemen, ende daar op ter zaligheit berusten.”
125

126

See Comrie, Brief, 104.

For this reason, Comrie’s view of the role of faith in the imputation has been fairly criticized.
For example, Graafland evaluates that Comrie’s view finally weakens the need for actus of faith. See
Graafland, “Alexander Comrie (1706-1774),” 338. According to Van den Brink, Comrie’s view, which sees
faith not as an instrument of justification in the imputation, bears a striking likeness to the antinomian
tenets not in a practical perspective, but in a doctrinal perspective. See Van den Brink, “Comrie en het
Antinomianisme,” 133-139; idem, “‘Elke daad is een werk,’” 158; idem, “The Act or Habit of Faith?
Alexander Comrie’s Interpretation of Heidelberg Catechism Question 20,” 260-264.
127

See Comrie, Brief, 26. For a detailed discussion regarding Comrie’s fourfold causality of
justification, see Honig, Alexander Comrie, 232; Exalto, “Genadeleer En Heilsweg,” 196; Beeke, The
Quest for Full Assurance, 240-241.
128

129

For Comrie, the imputation is the important content and sphere of active justification. To
explain this, Comrie cites Lucas Trelcatius (1542-1602): “FORMA justificationis, Active sumptae, est
Actualis Justitiae Christi, gratuita imputatio; qua meritum & Obedientia Christi nobis applicantur, vi
communionis arctissimae, qua ille in nobis, & nos in illo.” See Lucas Trelcatius, Scholastica, et methodica,
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justification (the fourth cause). Comrie states that “faith [is] the instrumental cause
[instrumenteele oorzaak], through which we only receive this benefit [salvation],
appropriate to us, and rest thereon unto beatitude” (emphasis in the original).130 Comrie
elaborates on several different aspects of faith as a means (middel) of justification. There
is: (1) a united means (verenigde middel); (2) a keeping means in union with Christ
(houdend middel in de vereniging met Christus); (3) a receiving means (ontvangend
middel); (4) an accepting means (aannemend middel); (5) a leaning and resting means
(leunende en berustende middel), and so forth.131 Through faith as a means, believers can
unite with Christ, retain this union, and rest on the benefit of salvation. In the sphere of
passive justification, faith as a means or instrumental cause is necessary, for “this benefit
[of justification] has not its perfection, if faith of the elect is not added to it” (emphasis in
the original).132 Still, Comrie firmly believes that faith should not be a primary and
efficient or meritorious cause of justification. As he notes:
If one places faith as a preceding habit and act or activity before God by a
transferring act and faith justifies us immediately and personally by the
imputation of the righteousness and satisfaction of Christ, one changes the
whole nature of the causes, making the second the first and the first the
second . . . If God justifies us firstly upon or out of or by faith as antecedent,
God is no longer the first. . . . [But] God is always the first and nothing
depends outside of Himself in His works [emphasis in the original].133
locorum communium s. theologiae institutio didacticè & elencticè in epitome explicata (London, 1604), 90.
Cf. Comrie, Brief, 144.
Comrie, Brief, 26. “. . . het geloove als de instrumenteele oorzaak, waar door alleen wij deze
weldaad ontvangen, ons toeeigenen, en daar op tot zaligheit berusten.”
130

131

See Comrie, Brief, 151-152.

Comrie, Brief, iv. “. . . deze Weldaad hare volkomenheit niet heeft, zoo daar niet bijkome het
Geloove der uitverkorenen.”
132

Comrie, Brief, 123-124. “. . . zoo men het geloove als eeue voorafgaande hebbelijkheit, daadt,
ofte werkzaamheit stelt, eer Godt ons door een overgaande daadt dadelijk en persooneel regtvaerdigt door
toerekeninge van de geregtigheit en genoegdoeninge Christi, zoo verandert men de geheele natuur der
133
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For Comrie, the sinner’s justification becomes real and gracious only when it is properly
understood in the correct causality. Every secondary cause of justification (e.g., faith,
good works, the notion of passive justification, etc.) is based on or aroused as an effect of
the primary cause of justification, i.e., God’s grace, the eternal decree, and active
justification.

5.4. Summary
This chapter examined Comrie’s discussion of “objectivity and decisiveness,” the second
characteristic of definitive sanctification and active justification.
Comrie’s writings on sanctification included a strong resemblance to definitive
sanctification. First, he clearly believed that it is unmistakably the beginning point of
sanctification. Second, Comrie speaks of who believers are (their identity) in that
beginning; third, in what state believers are (condition) in that beginning, and finally
what is the basis (foundation or ground) of progressive sanctification in that beginning.
Comrie’s ultimate purpose in presenting this perspective on sanctification is to emphasize
the objective and decisive dimension as the primary or efficient cause of sanctification.
Comrie’s methodical approach to understanding and reporting on the objective
and decisive aspect of salvation carries on into his study of the active dimension of
justification. Comrie’s emphasis on the absoluteness of God’s eternal decree to justify
has been mischaracterized as an affirmation of justification in eternity. However, he

oirzaken: makende de tweede de eerst, en de eerste de tweede . . . wijl, zoo Godt ons eerst regtvaerdigt op
het Geloove, ofte uit ofte door het Geloove, als een voorgaande, hij niet langer de eerste . . . hij altoos de
eerste is, en van niets buiten zig in zijne werkinge afhangt . . .”
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focuses on active justification as the tool to define the objective and decisive beginning of
justification, which he believes is firmly rooted in God’s eternal decree to justify and not
in justification from eternity in the exclusive sense. For Comrie, active justification is not
identical to justification in eternity, nor with predestination or election per se. Instead, a
sinner’s justification is completed and terminated only when each part, i.e., justification
in eternity, in the resurrection or imputation, and in the conscience, is perfected in the
distributive sense and then is perfectly integrated into a whole in the concrete sense. The
emphasis on active justification was intended only to secure the objective and decisive
ground of justification which had been shaken by several erroneous teachings of his day;
Comrie also believed strongly that God and His work have to be the primary and efficient
cause of justification.
We examined in Bavinck the first parallel characteristic, the “inseparability” of
definitive from passive sanctification and active from passive justification, Chapter 4.
The second characteristic, the “objective and decisive” nature of definitive sanctification
and active justification, we just treated in Comrie. Now in Witsius we will consider the
third parallel characteristic, “Christ-centeredness” in sanctification and justification.

CHAPTER 6
PARALLEL CHARACTERISTIC NO. 3:
CHRIST-CENTEREDNESS IN HERMAN WITSIUS

In His matchlessly perfect life, death, and resurrection, Jesus Christ rises above every
other consideration in salvation. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the dimensions of
active justification and definitive sanctification, for without Christ the foundations on
which these stand would be hopelessly shattered. Active justification is the condition of
the believer relying entirely on God’s promise, which is only fulfilled in Christ and His
righteousness. Definitive sanctification is the condition of the believer sharing in Christ’s
perfect holiness only through union with Him. Christ is the intrinsically vital element in
both dimensions, so Christ and His work is by far the most significant parallel
characteristic we can study.
This chapter will examine Christ-centeredness1 as seen in the soteriology of
Dutch Reformed theologian Herman Witsius (1636-1708).2 Witsius’ writings themselves

Here, the term “Christ-centered” is not intended to refer to a kind of “central dogma” or
“Christocentric” deduction, which emphasizes Christ and theological Christocentrism by way of excluding
other theological loci as the theologies of the nineteenth centuries, e.g., Schleiermacher, Schweizer, Ritschl,
Barth, etc. On this issue, see Muller, After Calvin, 94-98. Rather, the term “Christ-centered” here refers to a
soteriological Christocentrism, which places Christ and his work at the center of redemption and its
profound benefits, e.g., regeneration, justification, sanctification, etc. The proper tendency of the
theological Christ-centeredness was not uncommon in the context of the seventeenth century. For example,
when Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) discussed on scientia Dei (the knowledge of God), he tried to see
scientia Dei under the Christological context in a concrete sense. On this, see Jae-Eun Park, “Stephen
Charnock’s Christological Knowledge of God in A Discourse of the Knowledge of God in Christ,” The
Confessional Presbyterian 10 (2014): 73-81.
1

2

For biographical information and brief theological position of Witsius, see J. van Genderen,
“Herman Witsius (1636-1708),” in De Nadere Reformatie: beschrijving van haar voornaamste
Vertegenwoordigers, ed. T. Brienen et al. (’s-Gravenhage: Boekencentrum, 1986), 193-218; idem, Herman
Witsius: bijdrage tot de kennis der gereformeerde theologie (s’Gravenhage: Guido de Bres, 1953); Gerrit
A. van den Brink, Herman Witsius en het Antinomianisme: met tekst en vertaling van de Animadversiones
Irenicae (Apeldoorn: Instituut voor Reformatienderzoek, 2008), esp., 121-129; Joel R. Beeke and Randall
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center on Christ’s saving work. In this context, Witsius describes the ideas of justification
and sanctification by exploring how Christ fills the mystical “spaces” between definitive
and progressive sanctification and between active and passive justification. After briefly
looking at Witsius’ theological character in its historical context, we will examine in
detail the way in which his concepts of definitive sanctification and active justification
focus on Christ. From this analysis we can conclude that: (1) definitive sanctification is
the condition or state into which a believer is ushered to share in Christ’s perfect holiness
in union with Him; and (2) only Christ’s perfect life, death, and resurrection counts
toward the believer’s active justification. These conclusions point to a purely “Christcentered” salvation.

6.1. Witsius as Theological Arbiter
Witsius himself said that his most well-known works, Animadversiones irenicae ad

J. Pederson, “Herman Witsius,” in Meet the Puritans with a Guide to Modern Reprints (Grand Rapids:
Reformation Heritage Books, 2006), 807-823. The same content of “Herman Witsius” in Meet the Puritans
also can be found in Beeke, Puritan Reformed Spirituality, 331-352; Joel R. Beeke and Patrick D. Ramsey,
An Analysis of Herman Witsius’s the Economy of the Covenants Between God and Man, Comprehending a
Complete Body of Divinity (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2002), iii–xxiv. Middleton and
Toplady both introduce Witsius’ educational background and life by extracting chiefly from Dr. Marckius’
Latin oration which was delivered at the interment of Witsius before the University of Leiden. See Erasmus
Middleton, “Herman Witsius, D. D.,” in Evangelical Biography: Or, An Historical Account of the Lives
and Deaths of the Most Eminent and Evangelical Authors or Preachers (London, 1816), 156-169;
Augustus Toplady, “The Life of Herman Witsius, D. D.,” in The Works of Augustus M. Toplady, vol. 4
(London, 1825), 60-84.
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controversias (1696)3 and De oeconomia foederum Dei (1685),4 were intended to be a
moderate and conciliatory approach toward reconciling a series of controversies between
English neonomians and antinomians of the seventeenth century. Witsius wrote, “Let us
now sacrifice to peace and harmony, after we have provided for the truth.”5 Most
scholars recognize Witsius as an irenic theologian6 who pursued theological synthesis
and arbitration between neonomians (esp., Baxterian Daniel Williams) and antinomians
(e.g., Tobias Crisp), and between Voetians and Cocceians.7 Witsius avoided arguments

3

Herman Witsius, Animadversiones irenicae ad controversias (Ultrajecti, 1696). Hereafter this
edition will be cited as Animadversiones. Animadversiones has been translated into English by Thomas Bell
with notes. See Herman Witsius, Conciliatory, or Irenical Animadversions on the Controversies Agitated in
Britain, trans. Thomas Bell (Glasgow, 1807). Hereafter this edition will be cited as Conciliatory.
Subsequent quotations will be taken mostly from Bell’s translation, but if necessary, the translation will be
modified in consultation with the original Latin text. The original spelling, italics, capitalization, and
punctuation will be retained in quoted passages.
4
Herman Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei cum hominibus, libri quatuor (Leeuwarden: J.
Hagenaar, 1685). Hereafter this edition will be cited as De oeconomia foederum Dei. De oeconomia
foederum Dei has been translated into English by William Crookshank. See Witsius, Economy. Subsequent
quotations will be taken mostly from Crookshank’s translation, but if necessary, the translation will be
modified in consultation with the original Latin text. The original spelling, italics, capitalization, and
punctuation will be retained in quoted passages. D. Patrick Ramsey and Joel Beeke’s analysis of Witsius’
The Economy of the Covenants is helpful to overview the whole theological structure of De oeconomia
foederum Dei. See Beeke and Ramsey, An Analysis of Herman Witsius’s the Economy.
5

Witsius, Animadversiones, 134 (X.XI); Conciliatory, 115.

“We kunnen Witsius een theoloog van de synthese noemen.” See Genderen, “Herman Witsius
(1636-1708),” 195. “Meer en meer ontpopt Witsius zich als een gematigd en vredelievend theoloog.” See
van den Brink, Herman Witsius en het Antinomianisme, 126. See also Joel R. Beeke, “The Life and
Theology of Herman Witsius,” in Puritan Reformed Spirituality (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage
Books, 2004), 339; D. Patrick Ramsey, “Meet Me in the Middle: Herman Witsius and the English
Dissenters,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 19 (2008): 144-148. Thomas Bell, who is a translator of
Animadversiones into English, also regards Witsius as a “peace maker.” See Witsius, Conciliatory, 11
(translator’s preface).
6

7

For a seventeenth century theological debate between Voetians and Cocceians, see W. J. van
Asselt, “Expromissio or Fideiussio? A Seventeenth-Century Theological Debate Between Voetians and
Cocceians about the Nature of Christ’s Suretyship in Salvation History,” Mid-America Journal of Theology
14 (2003): 37-57; idem, “Voetius en Coccejus over de rechtvaardiging,” in De onbekende Voetius:
voordrachten wetenschappelijk symposium, Utrecht, 3 Maart 1989, ed. J. van Oort, et al. (Kampen: Kok,
1989), 32-47; idem, The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669) (Leiden: Brill, 2001),
passim.
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that criticized the “other’s” voice subjectively without a thorough analysis. In his preface
to Animadversiones, Witsius named three personal difficulties he found in defining the
theological differences between neonomians and antinomians: (1) most requests delivered
to Witsius for theological analysis contained subtle, nuanced arguments in English, so
Witsius had some difficulty grasping their meaning: “I [Witsius] have scarce a tolerable
knowledge of your language [English]”;8 (2) Witsius also found the “greatest intricacy”9
in the often contentious arguments among the theological parties; and (3) Witsius
believed that to a certain degree both the neonomians and antinomians “had understood
the same thing, but in a different manner of expression.”10 Already facing the difficulty
of deciphering the theological subtleties of the debates, Witsius also had to find ways to
avoid being caught up in the generally disputatious discussions. Animadversiones and De
oeconomia foederum Dei are expressions of Witsius’ strong desire not to argue for
argument’s sake, but to preserve a balanced objectivity toward the neonomian and
antinomian arguments.11 Witsius accomplished this by relying on a clear presentation of
the twofold nature of sanctification and the distinction between active and passive
justification.

8

Witsius, Animadversiones, 6 (prologus); Conciliatory, 8 (preface).

9

Witsius, Animadversiones, 6 (prologus); Conciliatory, 8 (preface).

10

Witsius, Animadversiones, 7 (prologus); Conciliatory, 8 (preface).

11
One of the reasons why England designated Witsius as an arbitrator of the controversy
between neonomians and antinomians is that Witsius’ De oeconomia foederum Dei was widely read
throughout England at that time. On this, see van den Brink, Herman Witsius en het Antinomianisme, 127128.
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6.2. The “Covenant of God with the Elect” in Witsius’ Soteriology
De oeconomia foederum Dei includes four books: the “Covenant of Works,” the
“Covenant of Grace,” the “Means of Grace,” and the “Covenant of God with the Elect.”
Conventional scholarship has paid the most attention to the covenants of works and
grace;12 Witsius’ doctrine of the pactum salutis which appears in Chapters I-III of Book
2, has drawn particular attention.13 The covenant of God in the elect has received
relatively little mention,14 but the treatment of justification and sanctification contained
in this book of De oeconomia foederum Dei is an important part of this study.
Animadversiones is also important, because in addressing the controversies between
neonomians and antinomians Witsius presents a twofold idea that is analogous to the
dimensions of definitive and progressive sanctification, and draws a similar distinction
between active and passive justification.15 His distinctions are grounded in the ontology
See, e.g., Richard A. Muller, “The Covenant of Works and the Stability of Divine Law in
Seventeenth-Century Reformed Orthodoxy: A Study in the Theology of Herman Witsius and Wilhelmus à
Brakel,” Calvin Theological Journal 29, no. 1 (April 1994): 75-100; Jeffrey Scott, “Herman Witsius and
the Economy of the Covenant of Works: A Sketch of His Doctrine,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 22
(January 2011): 145-159; John Bolt, “Why the Covenant of Works Is a Necessary Doctrine: Revisiting the
Objections to a Venerable Reformed Doctrine,” in By Faith Alone: Answering the Challenges to the
Doctrine of Justification, eds. Gary L. W. Johnson and Guy P. Waters (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), 171190; William Stacy Johnson and John H. Leith, eds., Reformed Reader: A Sourcebook in Christian
Theology (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 228-232.
12

See, e.g., J. Mark Beach, “The Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis in the Covenant Theology of
Herman Witsius,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 13 (2002): 101-142; Richard A. Muller, “Toward the
Pactum Salutis: Locating the Origins of a Concept,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 18 (2007): passim;
B. Hoon Woo, “The Pactum Salutis in the Theologies of Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius”
(PhD diss., Calvin Theological Seminary, 2014).
13

Given that Witsius’ discussion of the covenant of God with the elect is related to soteriological
blessings (e.g., election, effectual calling, regeneration, faith, justification, sanctification, etc.), Fesko also
dealt with Witsius’ view of justification, sanctification, and union with Christ. See Fesko, Beyond Calvin,
340-379. Here, Fesko argues that Witsius’ position of justification and sanctification is closer to the socalled doctrinal antinomians rather than the neonomians. On the relationship between Witsius and the
English antinomians, see Gerrit A. van den Brink, “Calvin, Witsius (1636-1708), and the English
Antinomians,” Church History and Religious Culture 91, no. 1-2 (January 2011): 229-240.
14

15

For a brief discussion regarding the structure and content of Animadversiones, see Ramsey,
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of Christ and His meritorious work, so their essence is quintessentially Christ-centered.

6.3. Witsius’ Soteriological Views
6.3.1. Witsius and Definitive Sanctification
Just as we saw in Bavinck and Comrie in the preceding chapters, Witsius advances an
idea that is analogous to definitive sanctification. This section examines how Witsius’
conception corresponds to definitive sanctification in three ways: (1) the conventional
twofold, and Witsius’ fourfold definition of sanctification; (2) the believer’s condition “in
Christ”; and (3) “evangelical” perfection as an analogy to definitive sanctification.

6.3.1.1. Twofold and Fourfold Sanctification
In De oeconomia foederum Dei Witsius comments: “[S]anctification is sometimes held
forth as a blessing from God to man, 1 Thess. v. 23. ‘And the very God of peace sanctify
you wholly;’ [and] sometimes as man’s duty towards God, 1 Thess. iv. 3. ‘For this is the
will of God, even your sanctification’” (emphasis added).16 Witsius spells out the
distinction as follows:
The former [blessing from God to man] God powerfully works in us,
according to the purpose of his gracious decree; the latter [man’s duty
towards God] he justly requires of us, by the will of his holy command.
When sanctification denotes the first implantation of spiritual habits, it is a
mere blessing from God, in procuring what we do not co-operate with him,
but receive it from him. As it signifies the activity, or lively exercise of
“Meet Me in the Middle,” 148-160. For a historical and theological background of Animadversiones and its
translation into Dutch with the original Latin text, see van den Brink, Herman Witsius en het
Antinomianisme.
16

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XV (p. 342); Economy, 2:7.
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infused habits, and their corroboration and progress, so far we are active;
but then it is as we are acted upon under God, and dependently on him.17
For Witsius, the “blessing from God to man” focuses on its monergistic nature in the
sense that the Holy Spirit first unilaterally sanctifies believers, and then they are passively
blessed only on the basis of what God has done beforehand. His conception of “man’s
duty” in sanctification involves the human’s sanctifying activity cooperating with and
building on God’s initial activity, all the while remembering and believing what God had
previously done. Witsius’ objective and unilateral blessing from God to man equates to
the notion of definitive sanctification, and his description of man’s continuous
collaborative duty is analogous to progressive sanctification. Witsius acknowledges that
sanctification starts from the divine side just as portrayed in definitive sanctification, and
he marks the blessing of sanctification from God to man as one dimension and man’s
duty in sanctification as the other. He does not however imply that there is a sharp divide
between them. As did Bavinck,18 Witsius also emphasizes that “these things [blessing
from God to man and man’s duty to God] can never be separated”19 for man’s duty
(progressive sanctification) must always be grounded in the blessing from God to man
(definitive sanctification).
Witsius also breaks down sanctification into four dimensions.20 The first part is

17

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XV (p. 342-343); Economy, 2:7.

18
For the detailed discussion regarding the inseparable nature between definitive and progressive
sanctification, see chapter 4 of this study.
19
20

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XV (p. 343); Economy, 2:7.

Witsius also explained justification in the fourfold causality in De oeconomia foederum Dei,
III.VIII.XXXIII-XLVII. This will be discussed later in detail.

205
the “commencement” (initium), when “sin is expelled, [and] virtue or holiness is
introduced.”21 The second part is the “new life” which is brought forward from the first
part and acts and works in one’s spiritual life. The third part consists of “mortification”
and “vivification”; at the commencement of sanctification, the believer experiences the
old man destroyed and the new man revived. Witsius also refers to a fourth part he calls
“consummation” (consummatio), the “complete sanctification of the whole man.”22 In
this fourfold concept of sanctification the first part is analogous to the notion of definitive
sanctification in terms of denoting the beginning point of sanctification; the second and
third parts represent progressive sanctification; and the last part is the final glorification
when the believer’s sanctification is complete.
Witsius’ view of sanctification is not monolithic but multidimensional. Whether
described as twofold or fourfold, the events from the “blessing from God to man” to the
“duty of man” or from the “commencement” to the “consummation” of sanctification, are
analogous to definitive and progressive sanctification respectively.

6.3.1.2. The New State of Being in Christ
We have already seen both Comrie and Bavinck describe definitive sanctification in
terms of the believer’s new “condition” of conforming to and sharing in Christ’s perfect
holiness through union with Him. By this they mean that definitive sanctification consists
of two things: (1) the condition and (2) being in Christ. Witsius has no argument with this

21

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XLV (p. 351); Economy, 2:17.

22

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XLV (p. 351); Economy, 2:18.
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view of sanctification.
For Witsius, being “in Christ” is itself the condition. It is a vital way to explain
how the sinner enters into and remains in sanctification. Witsius says that “… perfect
holiness is required for the right to happiness. In Christ therefore we are righteous and
holy, not by our own personal or inherent righteousness and holiness, but by things that
are Christ’s” (emphasis added).23 If believers not united with Christ, their supposed
“new life” of being grafted onto Christ would be invalid.24 “Lest any arrogant mind think
that human beings might arrive at the summit of sanctification by virtue of their own
endeavors,” Witsius warns, [it is] only by being “in Christ” that the pinnacle may be
reached. Witsius expresses forcefully that any human effort toward sanctification that
diminishes the meaning of “being in Christ,” is at best misleading and at worst could
even be blasphemous.25 One’s view of sanctification must be completely Christ-centered
not human-centered in terms of its merit, origin, and progress. Furthermore, even if
sanctification is understood as a spiritual self-examination, believers can only truly
examine and prove themselves when they are in Christ.26 Witsius believes that the
sinner’s blemishes and iniquities are definitively removed, not because of their natural

Witsius, Animadversiones, 75 (VI.VII); Conciliatory, 70. “. . . sanctitas Christi nostra est; eo
adspectu quatenus consummata sanctitas requiritur ad jus beatitudinis. In Christo itaque justi & sancti
sumus, non nostra personali aut inhaerente justitia & sanctitate, sed ea quae Christi est . . .”
23

24

See Witsius, Animadversiones, 73 (VI.IV); Conciliatory, 62-63.

“Si quis eo se in virtutis ac sanctimoniae studio profecisse jactaret, ut summum illius apicem
non minus quam ipse Christus attigisset, is non mendacii solum & intolerabilis arrogantiae, sed & insaniae
& blasphemiae, merito ab omnibus postularetur.” See Witsius, Animadversiones, 76 (VI.IX); Conciliatory,
71.
25

26

See Witsius, Animadversiones, 207 (XVI.XV); Conciliatory, 171. Here, Witsius mentioned 2
Cor 13:5: “Examine yourselves to see whether you are living in the faith. Test yourselves. Do you not
realize that Jesus Christ is in you?--unless, indeed, you fail to meet the test!”
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inclination nor by any human effort, but because “these are covered with the most perfect
righteousness and holiness of Christ.”27 This unmistakable state of “being in Christ”
reveals itself in two activities: imitating and following. Witsius notes: “[W]e are to
distinguish between imitation, whereby we are said to be μιμηταί (imitators) of Christ, 1
Cor. xi. 1; and between following, by which we are commanded to follow Christ”
(emphasis in the original).28 The “former [imitating] denotes a conformity to an example:
the latter [following], the attendance of servants, going after their masters.”29 The state of
being “in Christ” requires both the believers’ passivity (receiving the divine conferment)
and activity (fulfilling the responsibility) in that Christ first stretches out His hand for
union with believers, then they adhere to this union in imitating and following “in
Christ.”30
Second, a believer who is in the state or condition of being “in Christ,” is
definitively changed from the position of a slave to sin into that of a chosen and called
saint by being conformed to Christ’s perfect holiness.31 This definitive condition,
according to Witsius, occurs within believers when they share in the perfect holiness of
Christ the divine exemplar. This definitive condition is a “real act” (actio realis) of God
in Christ, which brings a “change of state” (mutatio status) of believers’ quality, habits,

27

Witsius, Animadversiones, 215 (XVI.XIX); Conciliatory, 176.

28

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XC (p. 365); Economy, 2:34.

29

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XC (p. 365); Economy, 2:34.

30

According to Witsius, union with Christ is not just a superficially united event, but the special
and unique event that Christ and believers become the “oneness.” See Witsius, De oeconomia foederum
Dei, III.VIII.XXXI (p. 287); Economy, 1:407.
31

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.IX (p. 341); Economy, 2:5.
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and actions.32 Commenting on Rom 6, Witsius says that the most important change of
state is mortification of the old man, which means “the destruction of the dominion of sin
and the purging of corruptions.”33 Here he elaborates on this condition of mortification:
Our old man is crucified with him [Christ], that the body of sin might be
destroyed; not only some actions and parts of it, but that entire compound,
made up of depraved habits, thoughts, lusts, words, and actions; as a body is
made up of its members, that henceforth we should not serve sin.34
Those who are in Christ are definitively dead to sin in every respect (Rom 6:2). Yet
Witsius also says that the believer’s definitive condition is not merely negative, i.e. “dead
to sin,” but also positive, “This putting off and this mortification of the old man is always
accompanied with the putting on, or vivification of the new man, by which are denoted all
those qualities wherein the excellency of the divine image is placed” (emphasis in the
original).35 Thus, the definitive state of conforming to Christ’s perfect holiness in union
with Christ, is being a new man. There is an unbridgeable gap between the old man and
the new man.36 The new man is not merely different from but is totally contrary to the
old man in terms of quality, nature, behavior, and mind.37
The definitive condition of being in Christ, which is also the condition of being a
“Sanctificatio est actio realis, quae peragitur influxu hyperphysico, & cujus terminus est
mutatio status quoad qualitatem, tam habituum, quam actionum.” See Witsius, De oeconomia foederum
Dei, III.XII.XIII (p. 342); Economy, 2:6.
32

33

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XXVIII (p. 346); Economy, 2:12.

34

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XXVIII (p. 346); Economy, 2:12.

35

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XXXI (p. 347); Economy, 2:12.

In this regard, Witsius’ view on “dead to sin” is not idealistic, which would interpret this in a
symbolic, theological, and baptismal sense, but realistic, namely, the old man is actually and really
crucified and destroyed, as interpreted by Moo, Schreiner, Fitzmyer, Käsemann, Murray, etc. On this, see
section 2.3.1.1 of this study.
36

37

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XLIII (p. 350); Economy, 2:17.
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new man and saint, is brought about as a direct result of being conformed to Christ’s
perfect holiness. In definitive sanctification believers are passively united with Christ by
the imputation of His perfect holiness; in progressive sanctification believers actively live
in union with Christ by imitating, following, and sharing in Christ’s perfect holiness.38
Both forms of union begin with Christ, inasmuch as believers unite with Christ’s perfect
holiness, “not by their own virtue or strength, nor by any innate principle of natural life,
but by supernatural grace and the virtue of Christ.”39
Witsius defines one dimension of sanctification as the believer’s “condition” of
being “in Christ, attuned and [in compliance] with Christ’s pattern of perfect holiness.”40
In this condition the believer is dead to sin and alive as the new man. This condition is
brought about solely by things that Christ has, not by anything that believers have either
by nature or by human acquisition. Witsius’ Christ-centered definition of the believer’s
condition of “being in Christ” is analogous to definitive sanctification.

6.3.1.3. Relation to Perfection or Completion of Sanctification
Referencing Paul, Witsius argues that believers must not be afraid to say that “we are

38

On the discussion that Christ should be the example and model of the new sanctified man, see
Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XXXII-XXXIII, XLIV (p. 347-348, 350-351); Economy,
2:13, 17.
39

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.LXIX (p. 352); Economy, 2:26.

Witsius does not try to place believers’ “definitive condition” in the specific stage of the ordo
salutis. Rather, the nature of this condition, for Witsius, is inclusive and comprehensive in that believers
who are called saints are placed in this definitive condition in sharing with Christ’s perfect holiness in
union with Christ. Thus, this condition is not just confined in the specific order of the ordo salutis, but can
be comprehensively applied to believers and their condition which participate in the whole stage of the
ordo salutis.
40
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complete in Christ” (Col 2:10).41 Yet although believers who are in union with Christ are
decisively dead to sin, this does not mean that the believers’ definitive condition refers to
a totally sinless status in this life. Instead, this means that as HC 60 says in so many
words,42 since God imputes to believers the perfect satisfaction, righteousness, and
holiness of Christ, He grants to believers as if they have never had nor ever committed
any sin and as if they themselves had accomplished all the obedience which Christ
accomplished for them.43 In other words, believers are perfect and complete in Christ as
a result of God passing over (πάρεσιν) the sins which they previously committed (Rom
3:25).
Witsius applies the meaning of “perfection” as it is used in Scripture when
describing the believers’ definitive condition in Christ. Witsius finds that the word
“perfection” has at least five different meanings in Scripture: (1) perfection in sincerity;

41
Witsius, Animadversiones, 77 (VI.X); Conciliatory, 71. See also Witsius, De oeconomia
foederum Dei, III.XII.CXXV (p. 377); Economy, 2:49. Cf. Col 2:10: “. . . ἐστὲ ἐν αὐτῷ πεπληρωμένοι . . .
(. . . you have come to fullness in him. . .).”
42
Cf. HC 60 (from Schaff): “Q: How art thou righteous before God? A: Only by true faith in
Jesus Christ; that is, although my conscience accuse me that I have grievously sinned against all the
commandments of God, and have never kept any of them, and that I am still prone always to all evil, yet
God, without any merit of mine, of mere grace, grants and imputes to me the perfect satisfaction,
righteousness, and holiness of Christ, as if I had never committed nor had any sin, and had myself
accomplished all the obedience which Christ has fulfilled for me, if only I accept such benefit with a
believing heart.” See also Witsius, Animadversiones, 77-78 (VI.X); Conciliatory, 72.

Witsius quoted Chrysostom’s words from Homily, XVII. Rom 10: “Μὴ τοίνυν φοβηθῇς,
φησὶν, ὡς τὸν νόμον παραβαίνων, ἐπειδὴ τῇ πίστει προσῆλθες· τότε γὰρ αὐτὸν παραβαίνεις, ὅτε δι’ αὐτὸν
τῷ Χριστῷ μὴ πιστεύσῃς· ὡς, ἂν πιστεύσῃς αὐτῷ, κἀκεῖνον ἐπλήρωσας, καὶ πολλῷ πλέον ἢ ἐκέλευσε·
πολλῷ γὰρ μείζονα δικαιοσύνην ἔλαβες” (Bell’s translation: “Therefor be not afraid, says he, after thou
hast transgressed the law, since thou hast come to the faith: for then thou transgressest it, when by reason of
it thou dost not believe in Christ: but if thou believest in him, thou hast also fulfilled it, and much more than
it had required: for thou hast received a far greater righteousness.” See Witsius, Animadversiones, 77
(VI.X); Conciliatory, 71-72. Cf. Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene And Post-Nicene Fathers: The Homilies of St.
John Chrysostom, trans. J. B. Morris and W. H. Simcox (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2012), 11:471486.
43
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(2) perfection in subjective and objective parts; (3) comparative perfection; (4) perfection
in degree; and (5) evangelical perfection. The first meaning refers to an unfeigned heart
with no hypocrisy (Job 1:1). The second consists of two parts: “subjective” perfection
applies to the whole man, i.e., believers are sanctified in spirit, soul, and body (1 Thess
5:23), and “objective” perfection applies to the whole law which all must observe (Luke
1:6). The third meaning of perfection refers to the comparison between those who have
reached maturity in sanctification versus those who are less mature (1 John 2:12-13). The
fourth definition, “authentic” perfection, refers to the sense that the entire law of God is
kept without fail and every depraved lust is rooted out. Authentic perfection is impossible
to fully obtain in this life. The fifth meaning is an “evangelical” perfection, which is
God’s unfathomable grace covering the believer. This perfection cannot be obtained by a
human endeavor, but only through absolute obedience and perfect holiness in union with
Christ.44
In presenting these five components of the believer’s perfection, Witsius holds
that the definitive condition of conforming to Christ’s perfect holiness is nearest to the
definition of “evangelical perfection.”45 The core meaning of evangelical perfection is
that Christ in his perfect holiness is the only meritorious and efficient cause of
sanctification for believers. In Witsius’ view, evangelical perfection shares the meaning
of definitive sanctification that the beginning point of sanctification is Christ, not the

44

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.CXXIV (p. 376-377); Economy, 2:48-49
(III.XII.CXXV).
As shown in chapter 4, Bavinck also talks about the meaning of “evangelical sanctification,”
which is similar to Witsius’ notion of “evangelical perfection.” Cf. Bavinck, MD, 544; ORF, 479.
45
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human being.
For Witsius the believer’s conforming to Christ’s perfect holiness does not
constitute a sinless state in this life, nor does it equate to sanctification through the
believer’s fulfilling the law by their own efforts. Rather, the believer’s sanctification is an
“evangelical perfection” which is solely grounded in Christ. This evangelical perfection
is also analogous to definitive sanctification.

6.3.1.4. The Christ-Centered and Trinitarian Perspective of Sanctification
Although Witsius’ view of sanctification is significantly tilted toward a Christ-centered
perspective its tendency is not exclusively focused on Christ while ignoring or
underestimating the work of God the Father and the Holy Spirit. Rather, the believer’s
sanctification is a Trinitarian work. Witsius notes: “The Father predestinated us to
holiness which Christ purchased for us by his blood and infused into us by the efficacy of
the Holy Spirit”46 (emphasis added).
Each person in the Trinity works distinctively according to their unique function
and role in the believer’s sanctification. The author and efficient cause of sanctification is
no other than God the Father (Ezek 20:12, 1 Thess 5:23, Isa 63:11).47 God is the ultimate
starting point of a believer’s sanctification, inasmuch as “[u]ncreated infinite holiness is

Witsius, Animadversiones, 215 (XVI.XX); Conciliatory, 176-177. “. . . ea sanctitas ad quam a
Patre praedestinati sumus, quam suo nobis sanguine meruit Christus, quaeque nobis infunditur efficacitate
Sancti Spiritus . . .”
46

“Auctor & Efficiens Sanctificationis Caussa Deus est.” See Witsius, De oeconomia foederum
Dei, III.XII.XLVII (p. 351); Economy, 2:18.
47
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the source of that which is created and finite [holiness].”48 Witsius also points out that
when Scripture speaks of sanctification the Holy Spirit is immediately ascribed as an
active agent (2 Thess 2:13 and Titus 3:5).49 Witsius says that the Holy Spirit renews, and
having definitively saved carries on in sanctifying the believer throughout his life. In the
sphere of sanctification. Christ’s work is unique and crucial since “the Lord Jesus,”
Witsius reasons, “is a most powerful means of sanctification” (emphasis added).50 Christ
is the effective and powerful means for a believer’s sanctification because only He can
mediate between God and human beings. Christ’s mediation in sanctification consists of
“impetration” and “application.”51 First, Christ’s impetration is related to His
incarnation, which actually performs to prove the merit that qualifies him to purchase the
believer’s sanctification. Second, Christ’s application means that Christ applies the
benefits of impetration to believers in union with Himself. Through this application
believers crucify their “old man” on the cross and revive into the new life by virtue of
Christ’s death and resurrection.52 Witsius uses this idea of Christ’s impetration and
application to describe the indispensable means of being given and then owning the
sanctified life. Witsius’ perspective on Christ’s unique role in the Trinity as mediator is
completely Christ-centered.

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XLVII (p. 351); Economy, 2:18. “Increata,
Infinita Sanctitas, creatae & finitae fons.”
48

49

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XLVIII (p. 352); Economy, 2:18-19.

50

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.CVIII (p. 370); Economy, 2:41 (III.XII.CIX).

“Interim & Christo Mediatori hic quoque suae speciales partes sunt, tum quoad impetrationem,
tum quoad applicationem.” See Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.XLIX (p. 352); Economy,
2:19.
51

52

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.XII.L (p. 352-353); Economy, 2:19-20.
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Witsius’ Christ-centered perspective of the Trinity in sanctification is displayed
in Christ’s unique impetration and application. Christ the God-man acts as mediator in
accomplishing the believer’s sanctification.

6.3.2 Witsius and Active Justification
Christ-centeredness is also seen in Witsius’ distinction between active and passive
justification. In this section we will examine Witsius’ conception of active justification in
three ways: (1) Witsius’ eclecticism; (2) his distinctions; and (3) his Christ-centered
perspective. Through these we will see that Witsius’ Christ-centered perspective is
inherent in active justification.

6.3.2.1. Witsius’ Eclecticism
Witsius uses an eclectic approach to arbitrate the antinomian and neonomian perspectives
on justification.53 He scrutinizes their theology in light of Scripture, offering objective

53

In the theological and philosophical context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
eclecticism was not uncommon. This means that no one held completely an exclusive or one-sided
argument, which totally excludes a specific aspect of the whole theological or philosophical established
aspects. For example, even though Aristotelian philosophy widely prevailed throughout the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, this does not mean that Platonic philosophy had completely died out in that time.
Rather, there was the unique philosophical tendency to build Platonism in the Reformed perspective, such
as Theophilus Gale (1628-1678). On this, see Jae-Eun Park, “Theophilus Gale’s Reformed Platonism:
Focusing on His Discourse of ‘Creation’ and ‘Providence’ in The Court of the Gentiles,” Mid-America
Journal of Theology 24 (2013): 121-142. For a detailed analysis on the so-called “Christian
Aristotelianism” and its relation to eclecticism, see Richard A. Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy,
‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy,” Nederlands Archief Voor
Kerkgeschiedenis 81, no. 3 (2001): 306-325. The core policy of eclecticism in the Reformed orthodoxy is
to evaluate a certain theological or philosophical dimension in light of Scripture and then decide whether it
is acceptable or not. In Witsius’ case, the antinomian and neonomian perspectives on justification are
criticized, rejected, or accepted in light of Scripture under the eclectic manner.
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criticism but still approving of their arguments when they are in line with scriptural
truth.54 For example, in discussing whether the elect are united with Christ before or after
faith, Witsius does not answer it as an “either or”; his response secures both divine
sovereignty and human responsibility in salvation. Focusing his response on the role of
Christ, he describes a distinction between a “true and real” and a “mutual” union:
By a true and a real union, which is only passive on their part, they [the
elect] are united to Christ when his Spirit first takes possession of them, and
infuses into them a principle of new life. . . . Since faith is an act flowing
from the principle of spiritual life, it is plain, that in a sound sense, it may be
said, an elect person is truly and really united to Christ before actual
faith. . . . By the mutual union, which, on the part of an elect person, is
likewise active and operative, whereby the soul draws near to Christ, joins
itself to him, applies, and in a becoming and proper manner closes with him
without any distraction, is made by faith only. This is followed in order by
the other benefits of the covenant of grace, justification, peace, adoption,
sealing, perseverance, etc.55

Witsius disagrees with both the neonomian and antinomian perspectives on justification.
He points out the problem with neonomianism: “[H]e [Daniel Williams] perhaps chooses
to call faith a condition of justification; while I consider it as an instrument” (emphasis in
54
With regard to Witsius’ attitude, while Ramsey thinks that Witsius stands on the balanced
ground between antinomianism and neonomianism under the guidance of scriptual truth, Fesko and van den
Brink consider that Witsius’ theological position tends to be close to the so-called “doctrinal
antinomianism” in the sense that since the argument that justification precedes faith is accepted by Witsius,
this inevitably leads to undermining human responsibility in the arena of salvation. Cf. Ramsey, “Meet Me
in the Middle,” 144-148; Fesko, Beyond Calvin, 378-379; van den Brink, “Calvin, Witsius (1636-1708),
and the English Antinomians,” passim. Yet, it needs to be noted that Witsius’ usage of the distinction
between active and passive justification is his effort to stay away from both antinomian and neonomian
errors.

Witsius, Animadversiones, 72-73 (VI.III-IV); Conciliatory, 68. “Vera & reali unione, sed quae
ab ipsorum parte duntaxat passiva est, uniuntur Christo, quando Spiritus Christi eos primum occupat, &
novae vitae principium infundit . . . quum fides sit actus ex principio spiritualis vitae emanans, palam est,
sano sensu dici posse, quod homo electus vere & realiter Christo unitus sit ante actualem fidem. . . . At
mutua unio, quae ab hominis electi parte quoque actuosa & operosa est, qua anima ad Christum accedit, ei
se adjungit, applicat, ac decenter & apte adhaerescit absque ulla distractione, ea demum per fidem sit.
Atque hanc ordine consequuntur caetera foederis gratiae sic bona, Justificatio, Pax, Adoptio, Obsignatio,
Conservatio &c.”
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the original).56 Witsius reasons that even though believers are justified by faith, this
justification is never obtained by any worth or merit of faith on their part, nor by
causality or condition of faiths as the neonomians argued. Witsius asserts that believers
are justified when through faith they are acknowledged and receive merit which can only
come from the imputation of Christ’s perfect righteousness.57 Witsius finds that the
neonomian error lies in its weakening of the power of Christ’s imputation by relying on
human works or merit.
Witsius also criticizes the antinomian belief that God no longer sees sin at all in
justified people. Witsius writes, “God does not altogether forget sin: for nothing slips out
of his knowledge or memory. . . . That forgetfulness is not natural, but legal. God is not
ignorant of the fact; but he removes the punishment and the fear of punishment.”58 Here
Witsius asserts that God remembers ongoing sin in the justified because as already seen
in Burgess, Rutherford, and Bakewell,59 “He remembers as a father to chastise, not as a
judge to condemn.”60 God sees sin “with anger and wrath, not the wrath of a rigid and a
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Witsius, Animadversiones, 139 (X.XII); Conciliatory, 118 (X.XIII, paginated by a wrong
number, 108).
57

Witsius, Animadversiones, 138-139 (X.XII); Conciliatory, 117-118 (X.XIII).

58

Witsius, Animadversiones, 165 (XIII.XIII); Conciliatory, 137-138. Here, Witsius directly
quoted the words of Charnock, which appears in A Discourse of the Pardon of Sin (Ps 32:1-2). Cf. “That
God will not exact the debt of thee. God doth not absolutely forget sin, for what he knows never slips out of
his knowledge. So that his not remembering is rather an act of his will than a defect in his understanding.
As when an act of oblivion is passed, the fact committed is not physically forgotten, but legally, because
the fear of punishment is removed. God puts them out of the memory of his wrath, though not out of the
memory of his knowledge.” See Stephen Charnock, “A Discourse of the Pardon of Sin,” in The Complete
Works of Stephen Charnock (Edinburgh, 1864), 5:436.
For a detailed analysis on Burgess, Rutherford, and Bakewell’s response to Eaton’s antinomian
argument regarding sin, see section 3.4.2.2 of this study.
59

60

Witsius, Animadversiones, 165 (XIII.XIII); Conciliatory, 138.
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condemning judge, but of a holy and an angry father.”61 Thus Witsius argues against the
idea that “the justified have no need of grief, repentance, confession, and prayers in order
to obtain the pardon of sins, which are of daily infirmity,”62 for this would undermine
human responsibility. Those who are justified by God’s grace can only respond with
grateful penitence and obedience.
In seeking to rationalize the neonomian and antinomian positions while
correcting their errors, Witsius employs the distinction between active and passive
justification. He hopes his readers will see as proper the theological integration of the
antinomian idea of “justification before faith” with the neonomian concept of
“conditionality of faith.” Witsius does not throw out justification before faith entirely but
equates it to the dimension of active justification, rejecting the idea that human faith or
effort or merit by itself could justify the believer.63

6.3.2.2. Witsius’ Distinctions in Justification
In De oeconomia foederum Dei, Witsius introduces three distinctions in order to clarify
his theology of justification. First, Witsius describes the conventional distinction between
active and passive justification:
The distinction between active and passive justification is well known. The
former is that sentence of God, by which he declares his having received
Witsius, Animadversiones, 165-166 (XIII.XIV); Conciliatory, 138. “Videt etiam cum ira &
excandescentia, non rigidi & condemna|turi judicis, sed sancti & indignantis Patris.”
61

62
63

Witsius, Animadversiones, 169 (XIII.XVIII); Conciliatory, 141.

In Animadversiones, Witsius did not explicitely speak of the distinction between active and
passive justification. Instead, in De oeconomia foederum Dei, Witsius dealt with the distinction in a more
detailed manner. See Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.VII.XVI (p. 162-163); Economy, 1:248.
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satisfaction from Christ, and pronounces that all the elect are made free
from guilt and obligation to punishment, even before their faith, so far as
never to exact of them any payment. The latter is the acknowledgment and
sense of that most sweet sentence, intimated to the conscience by the Holy
Spirit, and fiducially apprehended by each of the elect. The one precedes
faith, at least as to that general article which we just proposed; the other
follows it [emphasis in the original].64
For Witsius, active justification is God’s declaration and sovereign decision to
unequivocally and unilaterally justify sinners, but only through the imputation of Christ’s
righteousness to them prior to the subjective exercise of human faith; this equates to
“objective” justification. Passive justification is the sinner’s acknowledgement and
acceptance by faith that they are justified solely on the basis of God’s declaration and
promise; this is “subjective” justification. William Crookshank, who translated De
oeconomia foederum Dei into English, appended a footnote citing alternate names for
active and passive justification, i.e., decretive or virtual justification and actual
justification respectively. Crookshank wrote that decretive or virtual (active) justification
references God’s eternal decree and purpose but is not executed until these dimensions
are applied to the individual believer. Actual (passive) justification signifies that
justification is realized through faith in the efficacy of active justification.65

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.VII.XVI (p.162-163); Economy, 1:248. “Nota est
distinctio inter justificationem activam & passivam. Illa, est sentential illa Dei, qua sibi per Christum
satisfactum profitetur, omnesque electos a reatu & solvendi debito immunes pronuntiat, etiam ante ipsorum
fidem. Hac, est agnitio & sensus dulcissimae illius sententiae, per Spiritum Sanctum cordi intimatae, & a
quoque electorum fiducialiter apprchensae. Altera fidem praecedit, saltem quoad istum, quem mox
proposuimus, generalem articullum; altera sequitur.”
64

“Others distinguish the justification of the elect, into that which is decretive, virtual and actual.
The first is God’s eternal purpose to justify sinners in time, by the righteousness of Christ; but God’s eternal
purpose to justify the elect is one thing, and the execution of it another. There was also a virtual
justification upon Christ’s having made satisfaction; and justification is actual when the elect sinner is
enabled to believe in the Son of God, and by faith is united to him” (emphasis in the original). See Witsius,
Economy, 1:248n*.
65
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The second distinction or “article”66 that Witsius employs is the distinction
between a “general” and “particular” sentence.67 The general sentence is the first Gospel
promise and God’s declaration that in His eternal counsel and decree, God had purposed
to justify the ungodly but only through Christ’s surety. The general sentence is not
confirmed until Christ’s satisfaction and payment is fully made.68 Meanwhile, the
particular sentence is an application of the general sentence to the individual believer.
The particular sentence is proclaimed in the elect who are justified through faith by virtue
of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. The distinction between general and
particular sentences bears a strong resemblance to the distinction between active and
passive justification.
The third distinction is between justification in foro coeli (in the court of heaven)
and in foro conscientiae (in the court of conscience).69 Witsius notes: “[T]hat sentence of
God, which was pronounced in the court of heaven [in foro coeli], is intimated and
insinuated to the conscience by the Holy Spirit; so that the believer knows, feels, and

Witsius used the term “article” when he explained several distinctions. Crookshank’s note:
“The word articulus is of various significations; but it is plain from the sequel, that the author [Witsius]
here uses it for a moment or period, so that he here gives us a very distinct account of the Time of
justification” (emphasis in the original). See Witsius, Economy, 1:248n+.
66

The distinction between general and particular sentence also can be found in Rijssen’s Summa
theologiae, 14.7 (p.186).
67

68
Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.LVII-LVIII (p. 296-297); Economy, 1:419-420.
See also Fesko’s analysis on this, see Fesko, Beyond Calvin, 352-354. Witsius endorses the traditional
formulation “decree in eternity and its execution in time.” See Witsius, Animadversiones, 61-64 (V.II);
Conciliatory, 60-61. Elsewhere Witsius speaks of the formulation “promise and its execution” as the idea
of “decree in eternity and its execution in time.” See Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.I.XIV
(p.196); Economy, 1:290-291.
69

As already examined in chapter 3 of this study, the distinction between in foro Dei (or coeli)
and in foro conscientiae was common in the theological context of the seventeenth century. Cf. William
Twisse, Vindiciæ Gratiæ , 2.4.4 (p. 79).
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experiences that his own sins are forgiven.”70
However, the individual aspects of these pairs do not operate apart from one
another. Believers are not justified exclusively by active justification, general sentence, or
justification in foro coeli. Rather, believers are justified in a synthesis in that “the sinner,
being actively and passively justified, is admitted to familiar converse with God and to
the mutual participation of the most delightful friendship [with God]” (emphasis in the
original).71 That is to say, only when people are justified actively [from God’s side] and
passively [from humanity’s side] can they have an authentic relationship as a friend of
God.

6.3.2.3. Christ-Centered Active Justification
Witsius’ active justification and its equivalent general sentence and justification in foro
coeli are plainly Christ-centered. In active justification, God “declares His having
received satisfaction from Christ and pronounces that all the elect are made free from
guilt and obligation to punishment” (emphasis added).72 In the general sentence, the first
Gospel promise will be fulfilled through Christ’s suretyship. In the covenant with the
elect, Satan is surely condemned and sinners’ debts are surely written off.73 In the court

70
Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.LX (p. 297); Economy, 1:421. “. . . sentential
illa Dei pronunciata in foro coeli, intimatur, & insinuator conscientiae per Spiritum Sanctum; ita ut fidelis
sciat, sentiat, experiatur, remissa sibi peccata sua esse.”
71
Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.LXI (p. 298); Economy, 1:421. “. . . peccator
active & passive justificatus, admittitur ad familiare Dei commercium, mutuumque jucundissimae amicitiae
confortium.”
72

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.VII.XVI (p. 162); Economy, 1:248.

73

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.LVII (p. 296); Economy, 1:420.
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of heaven [in foro coeli] or in the court of God [in foro Dei], the Christ-centeredness of
active justification is proclaimed. Without Christ and his work, all these ideas—active
justification, general sentence, and justification in foro coeli—lose their meaning and
purpose.
Witsius’ attention to Christ credits the whole merit of justification to Christ
himself. He strongly affirms that if justification requires the full remission of sins, the
Gospel depends entirely on the satisfaction and merit of Christ.74 In order to emphasize
that Christ and His work are at the center of justification, Witsius focuses on who Christ
is:
He [Jesus Christ] is called ‘the righteous or just servant of God,’ Isa. liii. 11.
Not only as holy and without sin in himself, but as one who had also
fulfilled all that righteousness to which he bound himself by his voluntary
engagement, whereby, tho’ he was the son, yet he became the servant of
God, and by his resurrection was declared to have performed the whole, and
so was exalted to that state, that he might be able to justify many, or procure
righteousness for many, by virtue of his own righteousness.75
Jesus Christ is the justified one who solely possesses perfect righteousness by virtue of
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Witsius, Animadversiones, 171-173 (XIII.XX); Conciliatory, 143.

75

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.IV (p. 278); Economy, 1:396.
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His perfect atonement.76 In Christ’s mediation and suretyship77 He imputes His own
perfect righteousness to sinners. “[The] inherent righteousness [justitia inhaerens], which
can be brought from human efforts and works is not the foundation of justification from
its own worthiness.”78 Rather, only Christ’s righteousness (justitia Christi) is the
foundation and groundwork of justification (Gen 22:18, Eph 1:3, and Rom 8:17).79
Witsius explains the meaning of Rom 3:24—all are freely justified (δωρεὰν) by God’s
grace80—that “in respect of God it is of pure grace, which as we just said, admits of no
partnership with our works. In respect of us, it is freely, without anything in us as the

In the scholarly field on the doctrine of atonement, the so-called “non-violent atonement” has
received attention. This perspective argues that a kind of violent image evidently exists in the penal
substitutionary atonement, inasmuch as Jesus Christ had to die miserably on the cross according to God the
Father’s will and plan. Thus, this perspective insists that any kind of violent image should be removed from
the Christian doctrine of atonement. One of the radical versions of this perspective is a “Divine Child
Abuse” theme, which is argued by a Feminist theologian, Joanne Carlson Brown. According to Brown, the
doctrine of penal substitution shows the bloody image that the feeble son Jesus Christ was brutally sacrified
and abused on the cross because of a tyrannical and despotic father’s will. See Joanne Carlson Brown,
“Divine Child Abuse?” Daughters of Sarah 18 (Summer 1992): 24-28; Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole
R. Bohn, Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989).
However, the “Divine Child Abuse” theme can be readily criticized when considering Christ’s
“intentionality” in that Christ’s cross was completely a voluntary act and Christ was a subject, not an object
of the cross event under the covenant and the pactum salutis. Witsius also paid attention to Christ’s
“voluntary engagement” when he explained Christ’s satisfaction as the ground of justification. On criticism
to the “non-violent atonement,” see Margo G. Houts, “Atonement and Abuse: An Alternate View,”
Daughters of Sarah 18 (Summer 1992): 29-32; John R. W. Stott, The Cross of Christ (Downers Grove: IVP,
1986); Richard J. Mouw, “Violence and the Atonement,” in Must Christianity Be Violent?: Reflections on
History, Practice, and Theology, eds. Kenneth R. Chase and Alan Jacobs (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press,
2003), 159-182.
76

77

On Christ’s suretyship, see Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.V.IV (p. 134); Economy,

1:208-209.
78
Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.XXIV (p. 285); Economy, 1:404. See also
Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.LXV (p.299); Economy, 1:422.
79

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.LXVI (p. 299); Economy, 1:423.

NRSV translates δωρεὰν into “as a gift” rather than “freely,” namely, “they are now justified
by his grace as a gift.”
80
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cause of it” (emphasis in the original).81 Here, Witsius’ emphasis on “free” justification
does not carry the antinomian idea of free justification that excludes any human role
(specifically faith) in justification, overemphasizing God’s free grace as opposed to the
Arminian’s overstressing man’s duty.82 Rather, Witsius’ view of “free” justification
confirms that (1) in active justification, human works and righteousness cannot contribute
anything in the tribunal of God;83 (2) only God Himself “justifies sinners, that is, acquits
them from sin and from being liable to eternal death, and adjudges them a right to eternal
life”84 (emphasis in the original); (3) the sinners’ debt is removed and they are finally
made just and righteous solely through Christ’s perfect righteousness imputed to them;85
and (4) faith is “the MEAN by which we receive the righteousness of Christ, and
justification depending thereon is FAITH and that ONLY” (capitalization in the
original).86 Thus, Witsius emphasizes free justification and Christ-centered justification
as both speaking to the same issue that sinners are by no means justified by their own
ability or capacity, but solely by Christ’s meritorious work, which is promised in active
justification.

81

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.XLI (p. 290); Economy, 1:411.

On the antinomian error regarding “free justification,” see Eaton’s argument in section 3.4.2.2
of this study.
82

83

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.LIV (p. 295-296); Economy, 1:418.

84

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.XXVIII (p. 286); Economy, 1:406.

85

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.XXX (p. 287); Economy, 1:406-407.

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.VIII.XLVII (p. 292); Economy, 1:413. “MEDIUM,
quo justitiam Christi, & justiticationem ex ea pendentem, accipimus, FIDES est, & quidem SOLA.” For
Witsius’ perspective on faith in salvation in detail, see Herman Witsius, A Treatise on Christian Faith,
trans. Madan (London: E. Dilly, 1761). This is an extracted and translated version from Witsius’ Latin
work on the subject of faith by Rev. Madan. Here Witsius argued that faith is needed for union with Christ,
justification, sanctification, etc.
86
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6.4. Foundation of Witsius’ Christ-Centered Soteriology
Witsius provides five grounds for his Christ-centered justification and sanctification: first,
the covenant of grace; second, the pactum salutis; third, Christ’s suretyship; fourth, the
actuality of Christ’s satisfaction; and fifth, a Trinitarian formula. These five ideas give
Witsius’ Christ-centered soteriology its solid foundation.
First, Witsius’ Christ-centered view of God’s promise to give sanctification and
justification to believers is grounded in the covenant of grace. As Witsius defines it:
The covenant of grace is a compact [conventio] between God and the elect
Sinner; God on his part declaring his free good-will concerning eternal
salvation, and everything relative thereto, freely to be given to those in
covenant by and for the Mediator Christ; and man on his part consenting to
that good-will by a sincere faith [emphasis in the original].87
The Gospel is deeply rooted in the covenant of grace which was made by God with His
good will; salvation is freely conferred through the person and work of Christ the
Mediator. Thus the believer’s justification and sanctification is the Christ-centered fruit of
the covenant of grace.
Second, Witsius’ Christ-centered view is firmly grounded in the pactum salutis.
He argues that believers procure salvation and all its benefits through the wonderful
compact between Father and Son.88 This miraculous agreement is “the will of the Father,

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.I.V (p. 102); Economy, 1:169. “Foedus gratiae est
conventio inter Deum & electum Peccatorem, Deo declarante liberum beneplacitum suum de salute
aeterna, omnibusque eo pertinentibus; foederatis gratis dandis, per & propter Mediatorem Christum:
homine autem per sinceram fidem beneplacito illi astipulante.”
87

88

Witsius, Animadversiones, 175 (XIV.III); Conciliatory, 146. Here, Witsius insists that
although there is a controversy of whether believers actually participate in the covenant of grace in a direct
sense or only Christ as the representative head of all the elect undertakes all covenantal works, one thing
that both parties agree with is that a believer’s salvation is procured by the pactum salutis: “In eo, nisi
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giving the Son to be the Head and Redeemer of the elect; and the will of the Son,
presenting Himself as a sponsor or suretyship for them.”89 The covenant of grace,
Witsius reasons, consists of two agreements: first the pact between God the Father and
Christ (the pactum salutis) and second the covenant between God and the elect. Witsius
believes that God’s immutable promise giving salvation and its benefits to believers is
more closely related to the first, stating that “the former agreement is between God and
the Mediator: the latter, between God and the elect. This last presupposes the first, and is
founded upon it.”90 According to Witsius, without the pactum salutis the covenant
between God and the elect is not effective.
Third, a basis for Witsius’ Christ-centered view of justification and sanctification
is Christ’s suretyship. Witsius explains categorically why only Christ can be the mediator
and suretyship for believers: Jesus Christ alone has a perfect life to offer up for believers,
is the God-man, has an infinite degree of love for us, and through the hypostatic union of
the divine and human is able to accomplish the greatest work that anyone has ever
attempted.91 Under Christ’s suretyship He “has offered himself in order to accomplish
the will of God, by which we are sanctified, Heb. x. 10.”92

fallor, utrimque conveniunt, ut agnoscant admirandam illam Patris & Filii de salute electorum procuranda
conventionem, in qua Filius electos omnes repraesentavit, ea pro iis facturus quae ipsis caeteroquin
facienda incumberent.”
89

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.II.II (p. 103); Economy, 1:169.
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Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.II.I (p. 103); Economy, 1:169.
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Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.V.IV (p. 134); Economy, 1:208-209.

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.V.III (p. 133); Economy, 1:208. “. . . Christum se
obtulisse, ut perficeret voluntatem illam Dei, per quam sanctificamur. Heb. 10. 10. . .”
92
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Fourth, Witsius’ Christ-centered justification and sanctification is based on the
actuality of Christ’s satisfaction. Witsius maintains that “the Lord Jesus obtained for the
elect, by his satisfaction, an immunity from all misery, and a right to eternal life, to be
applied unto them in effectual calling, regeneration, sanctification, conservation, and
glorification” (emphasis in the original).93 In order to confer these soteriological benefits
to believers, the effect of Christ’s satisfaction must be actual and real, not just possible or
hypothetical. Witsius writes, “[T]he effect of Christ’s satisfaction was not a bare
possibility of the remission of our sins, and of our reconciliation with God, but an actual
remission and reconciliation, an abolition of the dominion of sin, and finally salvation
itself” (emphasis in the original).94 According to Witsius, the theology of Arminius errs
in arguing that Christ’s satisfaction brings about the impetration (impetratio) of remission
of sins rather than the actual remission of sins.95 Witsius says that “this assertion of
Arminius is inconsistent with theological truth. For the Scripture nowhere declares that
the fruit of Christ’s death is a possibility of the remission of sins”96 (emphasis added).
Witsius believes that if the actuality of Christ’s satisfaction is not assured, believers’
soteriological benefits will also not be realized or even attainable.
Fifth and finally, Witsius’ Christ-centered view of salvation is fundamentally

93
Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.VII.III (p. 155); Economy, 1:239. “Electis impetravit
D. Jesus satisfactione sua immunitatem ab omni miseria, & jus ad vitam aternam, applicanda ipsis in
Vocatione efficaci, Regeneratione, Sanctificatione, Conservatione, Glorificatione.”

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.VII.III (p. 155); Economy, 1:239. “. . . effectum
satisfactionis Christi non esse nudam possibilitatem remissionis peccatorum nostrorum & reconciliationis
nostri cum Deo, sed remissionem & reconciliationem actualem, abolitionem dominii peccati, & denique
salutem ipsam . . .”
94

95

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.VII.X (p. 158-159); Economy, 1:243-244.

96

Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.VII.XIII (p. 160); Economy, 1:245.

227

grounded in the work of the Trinity. In explaining the covenant of God with the elect,
Witsius writes:
The Economy of the Persons of the Trinity in the covenant of grace claims
also our attention. The Father is held forth as the principal Author of it,
“who was in Christ reconciling the world to himself,” 2 Cor. v. 19. and
appointed the elect to be heirs of himself, and joint heirs with his Son, Rom.
viii. 17. The Son is not only Mediator, and executor of the Covenant, but is
himself also the Testator, who by his death ratified the testament of grace,
Luke xxii. 29. Heb. ix. 16 and the distributer of all the blessings of it. “I
give unto them eternal life,” John x. 28. The Spirit brings the elect to Christ
and in Christ to the possession of the benefits of the covenant, intimates to
their consciences the holy pledges, the sure mercies of David, and is the seal
and earnest of their complete happiness, 1 Cor. xii. 3, 11, 13. Eph. i. 13, 14
[emphasis in the original].97
Witsius maintains that no person in the Trinity can be underestimated or ignored in the
doctrine of salvation because the covenant of God with the elect is performed by the
participation of each Person in the Trinity. That said, Christ’s work is unique in the
sphere of salvation, for the material cause of justification is no other than Christ’s perfect
righteousness,98 and the effect of sanctification is the believer’s imitating and following
Christ’s perfect pattern of holiness.99 In Witsius’ thinking, Trinitarian participation in
Christ-centered salvation does not contradict; rather, the latter performs on the basis of
the former.
Thus Witsius establishes solid theological foundations for his Christ-centered
view of justification and sanctification. From the covenant of grace and pactum salutis,
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Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.I.IV (p. 102); Economy, 1:286-287.

“Res illa, propter quam justificamur, quam nonnulli MATERIAM justificationis nostrae
vocant, est sola perfecta Christi justitia” (capitalization in the original). See Witsius, De oeconomia
foederum Dei, III.VIII.XXXVII (p. 288); Economy, 1:489.
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Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei, II.V.X (p.136-137); Economy, 1:212. See also Witsius,
De oeconomia foederum Dei, III.I.II (p. 192-193); Economy, 1:285-286.
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Christ’s suretyship and the Trinitarian participation, Christ’s satisfaction is actualized and
realized.

6.5. Summary
This chapter examined the third parallel characteristic of Christ-centeredness in active
justification and definitive sanctification through the writings of Herman Witsius. He
shows that justification and sanctification cannot be considered at all apart from Christ
and His work.
Witsius’ “blessing from God to man” and the “commencement of sanctification”
is similar to definitive sanctification. These ideas demonstrate that the beginning point of
sanctification does not belong to the human, but to the divine. According to Witsius,
those who are called saints are in a “definitive condition” of sharing in and conforming to
Christ’s perfect holiness in union with Christ. This definitive condition does not convey
the idea of a state of sinlessness, but to the “evangelical perfection” where Christ’s
perfect holiness alone provides the credit and merit for the believer’s holiness. Witsius’
analogies to definitive sanctification are entirely Christ-centered.
Witsius describes three pairs of dimensions to explain justification: active and
passive justification, general and particular sentence, and justification in foro coeli and in
foro conscientiae. The ideas of “general sentence” and “justification in foro coeli”
strongly resemble the idea of active justification. Active justification and its analogous
ideas are firmly grounded on the covenant of grace, the pacutim salutis, Christ’s
suretyship, and the actuality of Christ’s satisfaction. By citing Christ’s satisfaction and
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imputation as the only way for believers to be justified, Witsius shows that salvation is
entirely Christ-centered. The credit and merit of justification belongs to none other than
Christ alone.
Although Witsius’ concept of active justification and definitive sanctification is
entirely Christ-centered, this does not exclude Trinitarian participation. On the contrary,
Christ’s role as mediator and surety comes to the fore in explaining the Father’s ability
and willingness to justify and the Holy Spirit’s ability and willingness to sanctify.

CHAPTER 7
PARALLEL CHARACTERISTIC NO. 4:
GOD’S SOVEREIGNTY IN SALVATION IN ABRAHAM KUYPER

The inseparability of active and passive justification and of definitive and progressive
sanctification, the objective and decisive nature of active justification and definitive
sanctification, and the Christ-centeredness of every dimension of salvation, all rest under
the umbrella of God’s salvific sovereignty; these characteristics certainly affirm the
principle that salvation is ultimately God-driven. Still, it is in God’s sovereign rule itself
that we see most clearly God as the unmistakable Author and Agent of both justification
and sanctification.
This chapter will examine this fourth parallel throughout the writings of
Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920).1 More than any other topic, Kuyper’s main interest is to
proclaim God’s absolute sovereignty over every aspect of salvation. After touching on
the “zeitgeist” rampant during Kuyper’s era, we will discuss how in opposition to the
spirit of his time which attempted to move human sovereignty into first place, Kuyper’s
perspective on the distinction between active and passive justification as well as the

1
Many have devoted themselves to write Kuyper’s biography. In the English language, see Jan
de Bruijn, Abraham Kuyper: A Pictorial Biography, trans. Dagmare Houniet (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2014); James D. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2013); Richard J. Mouw, Abraham Kuyper: A Short and Personal Introduction (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2011); James Edward McGoldrick, God’s Renaissance Man: The Life and Work of Abraham
Kuyper (Darlington: Evangelical Press, 2000); Frank Vandenberg, Abraham Kuyper (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1960). In the Dutch language, see Jeroen Koch, Abraham Kuyper: een biografie (Amsterdam:
Boom, 2006); G. Puchinger, Abraham Kuyper: de jonge Kuyper (1837-1867) (Franeker: Wever, 1987); P.
Kasteel, Abraham Kuyper (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1938); J. C. Rullmann, Abraham Kuyper: een levensschets
(Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1928); H. S. S. Kuyper and J. H. Kuyper, De levensavond van Dr. A. Kuyper
(Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1921); W. F. A. Winckel, Leven en arbeid van Dr. A. Kuyper (Amsterdam: Uitgave
W. Ten Have, 1919).
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concept of definitive sanctification centers on the fundamental truth that the sinner’s
righteousness and holiness are entirely supervised by God.

7.1. Kuyper against Human-centered Ideas
7.1.1. Mixed opinions of Kuyper
In order to understand Kuyper’s soteriology properly, we must first examine the zeitgeist
of his times since Kuyper reacted strongly against the spirit of his age.2 As Bolt points
out, Kuyper actively struggled with the “principle” or “life system”3 he labeled
modernism. In contemporary terms modernism can be recognized theologically as
“liberalism,”4 intellectually as “free individualism,”5 religiously as “anthrocentric,”6
and philosophically as “rationalism” or “romanticism.”7 As James Bratt points out, these

2
For a detailed analysis on the zeitgeist of Kuyper’s age, see L. Praamsma, Let Christ Be King:
Reflections on the Life and Times of Abraham Kuyper (Jordan Station: Paideia Press, 1985), 7-27;
McGoldrick, God’s Renaissance Man, 20-35; Peter S. Heslam, Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham
Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 11-17.
3
John Bolt, “Abraham Kuyper as Poet: Another Look at Kuyper’s Critique of the Enligtenment,”
in Kuyper Reconsidered: Aspects of His Life and Work, eds. Cornelis van der Kooi and Jan de Bruijn
(Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1999), 30-31.

Lagerway, “The History of Calvinism in the Netherlands,” 88-89; Dirk Jellema, “Abraham
Kuyper’s Attack on Liberalism,” The Review of Politics 19, no. 4 (1957): 480. Basically, theological
liberalism refers to the textual criticism, a demythologization of biblical text, a rejection of biblical miracle,
philosophical determinism, etc.
4

Dirk Jellema, “Abraham Kuyper’s Answer to ‘Liberalism,’” Reformed Journal 15, no. 5
(1965): 11. Free individualism refers to the intellectual tendency to emphasize the autonomy and freedom
of human self when self chooses or decides something.
5

Edward E. Ericson, “Abraham Kuyper: Cultural Critic,” Calvin Theological Journal 22, no. 2
(1987): 210-211.
6

Praamsma, Let Christ Be King, 21-27; Lagerway, “The History of Calvinism in the
Netherlands,” 86-87. The term “romanticism” is not a simple word to define. Sometimes the term is
understood as a negative value in a religious-philosophical sense that human being or human self or feeling
is occupied in a high place rather than any others, or the uniqueness of individuality is emphasized in unity
of totality (such as Friedrich Schleiermacher’s thought). Sometimes the term is understood as a neutral
7
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“modern” ideas did not develop independently from one another but were mixed and
blended so that the intellectual idea of modernism emerged all through the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.8 Kuyper was an aggressive opponent of all of these “modern”
permutations.
Kuyper’s attitude toward and relationship with modernism has been appraised in
different ways. Some are of the opinion that Kuyper did not stand up to modern ideas or
principles and his intellectual and philosophical reasoning was eventually overwhelmed
by the modern spirit. Cornelis Pronk says that Kuyper is substantially “speculative” and
“idealistic” due to the influence of modern philosophy.9 W. H. Velema also criticizes the
idealism and romanticism that he says are embodied in Kuyper’s writings, referring
specifically to the “pitfalls” of Kuyper’s thought.10 Johannes Stellingwerf also examined

value when this is grasped under the context of literature or rhetoric structure. Meanwhile, the term is
understood as a positive value in terms of seeking an individual’s truth and beauty in unity or enjoying
making an antithesis as the coincidentia oppositorum (Cf. Jan de Bruijn, “Abraham Kuyper as a
Romantic,” in Kuyper Reconsidered: Aspects of His Life and Work, eds. Cornelis van der Kooi and Jan de
Bruijn (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1999), 42-52). Romanticism is a huge philosophical idea, which is
embedded throughout works in the nineteenth century. For example, Schleiermacher’s soteriology can be
expressed as a romanticized soteriology due to its deep association with romanticism. On this, see Jae-Eun
Park, “Schleiermacher’s Perspective on Redemption: A Fulfillment of the coincidentia oppositorum
between the Finite and the Infinite in Participation with Christ,” Journal of Reformed Theology 9, no. 3
(2015): 270-294. For a general analysis on romanticism, see Oskar F. Walzel, German Romanticism, trans.
Alma Elise Lussky (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1932).
James D. Bratt, “Abraham Kuyper: Puritan, Victorian, Modern,” in Kuyper Reconsidered:
Aspects of His Life and Work, eds. Cornelis van der Kooi and Jan de Bruijn (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij,
1999), 53-68.
8

Cornelis Pronk, “F. M. Ten Hoor: Defender of Secession Principles against Abraham Kuyper’s
Doleantie Views” (ThM Thesis, Calvin Theological Seminary, 1987), 102-104. As a member of the
Secession, Pronk criticizes the Doleantie tradition, which is largely driven by Kuyper. For the
ecclesiological segmentation of the Netherlands, see D. G. Hart, Calvinism: A History (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2013), 233-240; Bouma, Secession, Doleantie, and Union, 1834-1892.
9

W. H. Velema, “Abraham Kuyper - Born 150 Years Ago: A Study in Strengths and Pitfalls,”
Reformed Ecumenical Synod Theological Forum 16 (1988): 12.
10
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the intellectual kinship between Kuyper’s thinking and romanticism.11
However, others think that Kuyper was successful in standing against modernism
and secularism. According to Rex Ambler, by emphasizing God’s sovereignty as the first
principle of everything, Kuyper overcomes not only the spirit of the French Revolution
(“Liberté, égalité, fraternité”),12 but also theological liberalism which was pressed by
Profs. Scholten, Kuenen, Rauwennof et al., his teachers at Leiden University.13
According to Ronald Rewerts, like Barth in Germany and Forsyth in England, Kuyper in
the Netherlands was a “watchman” who successfully resisted modernism and
secularism.14 Edward Ericson also regards Kuyper not as a “modern” man, but as a
traditionalist who maintained a negative opinion of romanticism amid the
Enlightenment.15 Others including M. Langley, S. Volbeda, H. Beets et al. even write
about Kuyper in uncritical and laudatory terms.16
However, the subjective criterion of Kuyper’s success or failure in opposing

11
Johannes Stellingwerff, Dr. Abraham Kuyper en de Vrije Universiteit (Kampen: Kok, 1987),
esp., 253-282.

One of the fundamental spirits of the French Revolution is the idea of “Reason is the Supreme
Being.” On the French Revolution, see William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Philip Dawson, ed., The French Revolution (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1967).
12

Rex Ambler, “The Christian Mind of Abraham Kuyper,” in Puritan Papers: Volume 4, 19651967 (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2001), 201-205.
13

Ronald M. Rewerts, “The Significance of Abraham Kuyper for Reformed Theology,” Trinity
Journal 7 (1977): 160.
14

15

Ericson, “Abraham Kuyper: Cultural Critic,” 227.

16
McKendree R. Langley, “A Sketch of Abraham Kuyper’s Life,” Reformed Ecumenical Synod
Theological Forum 16 (1988): 4-8; S. Volbeda, “Abraham Kuyper as a Theologian,” The Banner 72
(1937): 1014-1015; Henry Beets, “Dr. Abraham Kuyper,” The Banner 42 (1907): 520-521. As a
lamentation, Beets writes about Kuyper once again after Kuyper’s death. See Henry Beets, “Dr. Abraham
Kuyper,” The Banner 55 (1920): 730-31.
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modernism is an oversimplification of the impact of his thinking for two reasons. First,
Kuyper was, as Bratt points, out a blend of Puritan, Victorian, and Modern thought.17 In
other words, Kuyper cannot be defined simplistically nor understood as totally outside
the spirit of his age.18 This does not mean that Kuyper completely surrendered to the
zeitgeist; rather it means that Kuyper’s anti-modernism (read “Calvinism”) was a reaction
to the plethora and volume of the myriad of modern ideas. In fact, Kuyper “used the
Modernist moment to cultivate a Calvinist stance.”19 Second, opinions vary based on
which aspect of Kuyper is emphasized. For example, most positive evaluations of Kuyper
exclude the mention of any of his more controversial theological statements, merely
acknowledging Kuyper’s insightful worldview.20 On the other hand, many negative
appraisals of Kuyper emphasize one or another of Kuyper’s theological opinions without
objectively considering his significant cultural contributions.21 A more balanced and less
prejudiced attitude toward Kuyper’s virtues and shortcomings in both life and thought is
necessary in order to fairly critique the man.22

17

Bratt, “Abraham Kuyper: Puritan, Victorian, Modern,” 54.

Bolt tries to see Kuyper’s thought neither under Scholasticism, nor Romanticism, but under the
theme of “poet.” Cf. Bolt, “Abraham Kuyper as Poet,” 41.
18

19
Bratt, “Abraham Kuyper: Puritan, Victorian, Modern,” 68. Bratt notes: “His Calvinism was
genuine, his proposals distinct from most others being offered around him. Yet he could not and would not
escape those surroundings. He cultivated a baroque voice to overcome Victorian sentimentality; he clung to
Victorian order to enter the Modern age; he used the Modernist moment to cultivate a Calvinist stance.”
20
See, e.g., R. D. Henderson, “How Abraham Kuyper Became a Kuyperian,” Christian
Scholar’s Review 22 (1992): 22-35.

See, e.g., William Young, “Historic Calvinism and Neo-Calvinism,” The Westminster
Theological Journal 36, no. 1 (1973): 48-64; idem, “Historic Calvinism and Neo-Calvinism,” The
Westminster Theological Journal 36, no. 2 (1974): 156-173.
21

Relatively, a balanced viewpoint on Kuyper is this: Wilhelm Kolfhaus, “The Significance of
Abraham Kuyper for Reformed Theology,” Evangelical Quarterly 2 (1930): 302-312; Rewerts, “The
Significance of Abraham Kuyper for Reformed Theology”; McGoldrick, God’s Renaissance Man, 227-245
22
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Besides the confusion surrounding the extent of Kuyper’s ties to modernism,
some of his more controversial theological views need to be addressed. It does appear
that Kuyper’s perspectives on immediate regeneration and eternal justification stems
from the influence of modernism,23 but this may actually be a sign of the extra emphasis
he places on God’s sovereignty in salvation in reaction to the strong current of humancentered ideas in which he found himself.

7.1.2. Kuyper’s Proposition
Everywhere in his writings24 in building a God-centered soteriology Kuyper persistently
rejects any human-centered ideas or modern principles.25 In Modernism,26 Kuyper
argues that even though modernistic ideas seem to be “fabulously beautiful” they
ultimately have a “deceptive beauty” because modernism is “devoid of all reality.”27 For

(conclusion part); Beach, “Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and ‘the Conclusions of Utrecht 1905.’”
23

Cf. Pronk, “F. M. Ten Hoor,” 102-104.

24
For a detailed analysis on Kuyper’s works, see Tjitze Kuipers, Abraham Kuyper: An Annotated
Bibliography 1857-2010, ed. Wim Janse (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
25

Kuyper begins with modernism due to his education at Leiden. Yet, through several
experiences (e.g., reading Yonge’s book, The Heir of Redclyffe, pastoring at Beesd, meeting with Pietje
Baltus, etc.), Kuyper experiences conversion and finally turns back to traditional Calvinism. For Kuyper’s
spiritual journey, see Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat, 3-63; Henderson,
“How Abraham Kuyper Became a Kuyperian”; Puchinger, Abraham Kuyper; G. Puchinger and George
Harinck, eds., Abraham Kuyper: His Early Journey of Faith, trans. Simone Kennedy (Amsterdam: VU
University Press, 1998); Justus M. van der Kroef, “Abraham Kuyper and the Rise of Neo-Calvinism in the
Netherlands,” Church History 17, no. 4 (1948): 316-334. Cf. Charlotte M. Yonge, The Heir of Redclyffe
(New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854).
Abraham Kuyper, “Modernism: A Fata Morgana in the Christian Domain,” in Abraham
Kuyper: A Centennial Reader, ed. James D. Bratt, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 87124 (hereafter, Modernism). The original Dutch text is Abraham Kuyper, Het modernisme een Fata
Morgana op christelijk gebied (Amsterdam: H. de Hoogh, 1871).
26

27

Kuyper, “Modernism,” 91.
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Kuyper there are three “realities” missing from modernism: (1) God (Absolute Reality);
(2) prayer in petition (religious activity); and (3) divine government (divine
providence).28 For Kuyper, by underestimating or ignoring such crucial realities
modernism is no more than a “painful” thought.29
Kuyper asserts that modernists violate the first principle of θεολογία since they
rely on human subjectivity, inevitably elevating man’s sovereignty over God’s in their
theology. In Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology30 Kuyper criticizes Schleiermacher and
Hegel, leaders of theological movements which were significantly influenced by
modernism.31 Kuyper says that the first principle of θεολογία should be the thinking of
God, not the speaking of man.32 Yet, Kuyper sees Schleiermacher’s “psychologicempiric” and Hegel’s “speculative” theological methods as beginning with the feeling
and reasoning of human beings, and so they are “falsifications of the conception of
theology.”33 Kuyper further notes:
Thus, in both schools, everything that had so far been known by the name of
theology was in principle destroyed. There were no longer two, God and
28

Kuyper, “Modernism,” 107-110.

29

Kuyper, “Modernism,” 89.

30

Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles, trans. Hendrik de Vries
(New York: Scribner’s, 1898). The original Dutch text is Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopæ die der heilige
godgeleerdheid: Inleidend deel (Amsterdam: J. A. Wormser, 1894).
31

In the introductory note of Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology, Benjamin B. Warfield mentions
that Kuyper actively fights with Mediating or Ethical Theology throughout his whole life. See Benjamin B.
Warfield, “Introductory Note,” in Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles, trans. Hendrik de Vries
(New York: Scribner’s, 1898), xi-xix. Warfield’s note also appears in Benjamin B. Warfield, “Dr. Abraham
Kuyper,” in Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield (Nutley: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub.
Co., 1970), 447-454.
32

Kuyper, Encyclopedia, 229 (III.I. §56).

Kuyper, Encyclopedia, 228, 330 (III.I. §56, §63). Cf. Park, “Schleiermacher’s Perspective on
Redemption,” 279-285.
33
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man, the former of whom has imparted knowledge of Himself to the latter;
there was, in fact, nothing else, but man, in whom alone, according to the
speculative school, “the Ever-Immanent Spirit” (der ewigimmanente Geist)
came to consciousness of himself; and who according to the subjectiveempiric school, experienced subjective perceptions, from which he formed
for himself subjective representations of a religious character.34
In Lectures on Calvinism,35 Kuyper champions Calvinism as the legitimate life system
and principle to uphold against modernism. Against the spirit of the French Revolution,
“Ni dieu ni maître!” (Neither God nor master!), and the central tenet of modernism,
“building a world from the data of the natural man,” Kuyper emphasizes that a man’s life
is lived in the Divine presence, the central tenet of Calvinism.36 According to Kuyper,
modernism “wages war for the sake of the glory of man, being inspired not by the
humble mind of Golgotha, but by the pride of Hero-worship.”37 Many religions which
embrace modern ideas promote the view that existence is merely for “man’s sake, aiming
at his safety, his liberty, [and] his elevation.”38 However, Calvinism is “diametrically
opposed to all this.”39 Kuyper notes:
The starting-point . . . is God and not Man. Man is the instrument and
means, God alone is here the goal, the point of departure and the point of
arrival, the fountain, from which the waters flow, and at the same time, the
ocean into which they finally return . . . . First stands the confession of the
34

Kuyper, Encyclopedia, 314-315 (III.I. §63).

35

Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1931). Six lectures
(Calvinism a Life-system, Calvinism and Religion, Calvinism and Politics, Calvinism and Science,
Calvinism and Art, and Calvinism and the Future) were delivered at Princeton University in 1898 under the
auspices of the L. P. Stone Foundation.
Kuyper, Lectures, 25. Heslam’s interpretation on Kuyper’s Stone Lectures is helpful. See
Heslam, Creating a Christian Worldview, 85-250.
36

37

Kuyper, Lectures, 19.

38

Kuyper, Lectures, 44.

39

Kuyper, Lectures, 45.
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absolute Sovereignty of the Triune God; for of Him, through Him, and unto
Him are all things.40
Kuyper thinks that unlike modernism which initiates from the human being, Calvinism
begins with God, processes through God, and is accomplished only by God (Rom 11:36).
Thus, according to Kuyper God-centered Calvinism rather than human-centered
modernism is the only valid principle and life system.41
Once again, Kuyper’s goal is to advance the idea of God’s absolute sovereignty
over not only theology but also one’s entire worldview and life system.42 From this
perspective one can see why many scholars have correctly pointed out that the “emphasis
on God’s sovereignty” is Kuyper’s fundamental theme running through the every aspect
of his thought. Although each scholar may have given Kuyper’s emphasis on God’s

40

Kuyper, Lectures, 46.

41
In line with this, Kuyper contrasts between Darwin’s natural selection and divine election. See
Abraham Kuyper, “Election and Selection,” in The Independent, vol. 51 (1899), 1693-1694; idem,
“Evolution,” in Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader, ed. James D. Bratt (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1998), 403-440.
42
The concept of sphere sovereignty (souvereiniteit in eigen kring) will not be discussed in detail
in this study as its scope is beyond the study. Stated briefly, sphere sovereignty refers to the notion that each
sphere of life owns its own unique responsibilities and boundaries. In the concept of sphere sovereignty in
Neo-Calvinism, all created orders and structures are designed and supervised by God. For Kuyper’s writing
on sphere sovereignty, see Abraham Kuyper, Souvereiniteit in eigen kring: rede ter inwijding van de Vrije
Universiteit den 20sten October 1880 gehouden in het koor der Nieuwe Kerk te Amsterdam (Amsterdam: J.
H. Kruyt, 1880). This has been partially translated into English: Abraham Kuyper, “Sphere Sovereignty,”
in Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader, ed. James D. Bratt, trans. George Kamp (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1998), 461-490. On the secondary literatures on sphere sovereignty, see George Harinck, “A
Historian’s Comment on the Use of Abraham Kuyper’s Idea of Sphere Sovereignty,” The Journal of
Markets & Morality 5, no. 1 (2002): 277-284; Richard J. Mouw, “Some Reflections on Sphere
Sovereignty,” The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 19, no. 2 (1998): 160-182; James D. Bratt, “Sphere
Sovereignty Among Abraham Kuyper’s Other Political Theories,” in The Kuyper Center Review: Politics,
Religion, and Sphere Sovereignty, ed. Gordon Graham (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 34-49; Timothy I.
McConnel, “Common Grace or the Antithesis? Towards a Consistent Understanding of Kuyper’s ‘Sphere
Sovereignty,’” in On Kuyper: A Collection of Readings on the Life, Work, and Legacy of Abraham Kuyper,
eds. Steve Bishop and John H. Kok (Sioux Center: Dordt College Press, 2013), 303-316; D. H. Th.
Vollenhoven, “Sphere Sovereignty for Kuyper and For Us,” in On Kuyper: A Collection of Readings on the
Life, Work, and Legacy of Abraham Kuyper, eds. Steve Bishop and John H. Kok (Sioux Center: Dordt
College Press, 2013), 317-321.
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sovereignty a different name, e.g., “principal thinking,”43 a “theocentric character,”44
“the fundamental principle,”45 “[a] strong belief,”46 “the ideas of God’s greatness,”47
“[the] absolute sovereignty,”48 etc., their meaning is essentially the same, i.e., that God
exerts sovereign authority over everything.

7.2. Kuyper’s Soteriological Views
Kuyper’s maximal emphasis on the sovereignty of God is evident throughout his
soteriology.49 For Kuyper, the idea that no one other than God Himself saves sinners
cannot be overstated. The fourth parallel characteristic of sanctification and justification,
the transcendence of God’s sovereignty in salvation, is Kuyper’s fundamental message
permeating both definitive sanctification and active justification.

7.2.1. Kuyper and Definitive Sanctification
In Het werk van den Heiligen Geest,50 Kuyper finds it difficult to conceive of
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Bratt, Dutch Calvinism in Modern America, 17.
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McGoldrick, God’s Renaissance Man, 112.
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Ambler, “The Christian Mind of Abraham Kuyper,” 209 (emphasis in the original).
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Kuyper’s maximized sense has often become the focal point of criticism to Kuyper’s
soteriology. This will be dealt with in detail in a later section.
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Abraham Kuyper, Het werk van den Heiligen Geest, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: J. A. Wormser,
1888-9). Kuyper’s Het werk has been translated into English by Henri de Vries: Kuyper, The Work of the
Holy Spirit. Hereafter the Dutch and English edition will be respectively cited as Het werk and Work.
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sanctification as merely about the Christian life.51 Even though sanctification has much
to offer in this regard,52 Kuyper says that it must also be included in the confessions and
ranked with all the other established doctrines such as reconciliation and atonement.53
For Kuyper, sanctification is not only a doctrine but a mystery. When he speaks of
sanctification as a mystery his intent is “to cut off at once every representation which
makes ‘sanctification’ to consist of the human effort to make oneself holy or holier”54
(emphasis added). Kuyper’s strong opposition to Arminianism and synergism underlies
his whole understanding of sanctification. Kuyper’s view of God-driven sanctification
can be seen in his view of: (1) a twofold framework of sanctification; (2) the role of the
human in sanctification; and (3) the relation of perfectionism to sanctification.

7.2.1.1. The Twofold Framework of Sanctification
In Het werk van den Heiligen Geest Kuyper defines sanctification by distinguishing

Subsequent quotations will be taken mostly from de Vries’ translation, but if necessary, the translation will
be modified in consultation with the original Dutch text. When quoted from the Dutch text, original
spelling, italics, capitalization, and punctuation will be retained in quoted passages.
51

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:4; Work, 432.

In Kuyper’s understanding, sanctification occurs throughout wholly and all of a person. The
soul and consciousness are sanctified beforehand rather than the human body. See Kuyper, Het werk, 3:29,
100; Work, 448, 490.
52
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“Uitgangspunt van alle beter inzicht en allen richtiger gang te dezen moet dus gezocht in
terugkeer tot de besliste uitspraak, dat de ‘heiligmaking’ zelve een stuk der leer, een integreerend deel van
onze belijdenis, evengoed als het bloed der verzoening een mysterie, en dus in vollen zin een dogma is.
Niet genoeg kan het nog jarenlang voor de ooren der gemeente in haar saamvergaderingen herhaald
worden: ‘En nu komen we tot het dogma der heiligmaking.’” See Kuyper, Het werk, 3:4; Work, 433.

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:8; Work, 435. “Met dit te zeggen is al aanstonds bedoeld, dat dient
afgesneden elke voorstelling, alsof ‘heiligmaking’ bestaan zou in een zeker heilig of heiliger maken van
iemands eigen persoon.”
54
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between the terms “sanctification” (heiligmaking) and “holiness” (heiligheid). According
to Kuyper, holiness “has reference, not to personal dispositions and desire, but to the
sum-total of all the holy works required by the law.” But sanctification “refers not to any
work of the law, but exclusively to the work of creating holy dispositions in the heart”55
(emphasis in the original). Thus for Kuyper sanctification is not related to the human’s
good works but holiness is. Kuyper adds:
Sanctification is God’s work [werk van God] in us, whereby He imparts to
our members a holy disposition, inwardly filling us with delight in His law
and with repugnance to sin. But good works are acts of man [daden van
menschen], which spring from this holy disposition. Hence sanctification is
the source of good works, the lamp that shall shine with their light, the
capital of which they are the interest. Thus, “sanctification” and “good
works” are entirely different things. “Sanctification” is a work of God;
“good works” are of men. “Sanctification” hides in secret; “good works”
come out. “Sanctification” imparts something to man; “good works” take
something out of him. “Sanctification” forces the root into the ground; to do
“good works” forces the fruit out of the fruitful tree [emphasis in the
original].56
Kuyper’s definition of “sanctification” (heiligmaking) as solely God’s work makes it the
object of “holiness” which matches the idea of definitive sanctification. Likewise he
55
Kuyper, Het werk, 3:40; Work, 454. “Heiligmaking toch en heiligheid zijn twee. Heiligheid . . .
ziet niet op den heiligen zin en lust, die in den persoon kleeft, maar beduidt de volle som van alle heilige
werken, die de wet eischt. Heiligmaking daarentegen ziet op geen enkel verdienend wetswerk, maar doelt
uitsluitend op het inbrengen in uw persoon van heilige gezindheid.”
56
Kuyper, Het werk, 3:93-94; Work, 485-486. “De heiligmakinge is een werk van God aan en in
onzen persoon, waardoor Hij ons heiligen zin in onze leden inprent, en ons alzoo inwendig vervult met lust
tot zijn wet en met afkeer van de zonde. Maar de goede werken zijn daden van menschen, die uit dezen
ingeprenten heiligen zin voortvloeien. Zoo brengt dan de gave der heiligmaking ons de bron aan, waaruit
straks de wateren der goede werken vlieten zullen; brengt ze ons de lampe, waarvan straks het licht der
goede werken uit zal stralen; en schenkt ons het kapitaal, waarvan de interessen in onze goede werken
worden afgeworpen. Zoo zijn dus ‘heiligmaking’ en ‘goede werken’ twee geheel verschillende zaken.
‘Heiligmaking’ is een werk Gods, ‘goede werken’ een doen van menschen. ‘Heiligmaking’ schuilt in het
verborgene, ‘goede werken’ treden naar buiten. ‘Heiligmaking’ brengt iets in den mensch, ‘goede werken’
brengen iets uit den mensch. ‘Heiligmaking’ is het indrijven in den bodem van den wortel, ‘goede werken
doen’ is het uitdrijven uit het vruchthout van de vrucht.” Cf. De Vries translated “‘Heiligmaking’ schuilt in
het verborgene, ‘goede werken’ treden naar buiten” into “‘Sanctification’ works internally; ‘good works’
are external.” See Kuyper, Work, 485.
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defines “holiness” (heiligheid) as man’s participation, making it the practical fruit of
sanctification which is analogous to progressive sanctification.
Kuyper also distinguishes between “perfect in parts” (volkomenheid in deelen)
and “imperfect in degrees” (onvolkomenheid in trappen) in sanctification.57 Kuyper
illustrates this with a metaphor: an infant, though very small and immature, is fully
human in every way (“perfect in parts”). Yet the infant is not perfect in degrees since it
has not yet attained its full growth and maturity (“imperfect in degrees”). From the
perspective of “perfect in parts” the infant does not appear to need to grow, but from the
point of view of “imperfect in degrees” the infant obviously must grow and increase in
every respect.58 Kuyper applies this metaphor to sanctification. When God turns
believers into saints by implanting one vital principle (één levensbeginsel) into their
hearts, believers are perfectly sanctified, i.e., “perfect in parts.”59 Nevertheless, believers
still must work out their sanctification since they are still immature in the sense of
“imperfect in degrees.” Kuyper elaborates:
In this sense sanctification is a perfect work; not externally, but on God’s
part, in that He causes the sanctifying principle to affect every member. He
does not first sanctify the will, then the understanding, or first the soul and
then the body; but His work embraces the entire new man at once. But
sanctification is imperfect in the degree of its development. When for then
years God has wrought in us, the holy desire must be much stronger than in
the beginning. This is the result of growth, of gradual increase, despite
many ups and downs, almost imperceptible. Hence there are steps,
ascending from less to more with reference to the new man; and descending
from more to less in the dying of the old; but in both a gradual change, ever
57

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:68-75; Work, 468-473.

58

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:68; Work, 468.

Kuyper’s view on the nature of the old and new man is a realistic view in a sense that the old
man is entirely and completely changed in its nature into (literally!) the new nature. See Kuyper, Het werk,
3:82-83; Work, 478.
59
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farther from Satan and nearer to God [emphasis in the original].60
From God’s position the believer’s sanctification in parts is perfect and complete at once,
but from the human’s position sanctification is still imperfect and must be developed by
degrees. Kuyper further argues that the proper priority of “perfect in parts” and
“imperfect in degrees” is that “perfect in parts” is acquired first as the precondition of the
required “imperfect in degrees.” For without “perfect in parts” (i.e., unless God first
sanctifies), “imperfect in degrees” (gradual development) is impossible.61 Kuyper’s
version of sanctification that is “perfect in parts” is clearly reminiscent of definitive
sanctification, and imperfect sanctification in degrees obviously suggests of the idea of
progressive sanctification.
Kuyper uses another metaphor in E Voto Dordraceno62 to describe the twofold
structure of the believer’s moral life, i.e., root (wortel) and branch (tak).63 The believer’s
life, according to Kuyper, should bear spiritual fruit on the branch, but branches must be
sustained by their roots. The root is Christ and the branch is the believer’s moral life. Any
disposition toward developing the believer’s sacred life comes from the “root” of Christ
and his power, not from the branch per se.64 The efficient cause of the branch bearing
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Kuyper, Het werk, 3:69-70; Work, 469.

61

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:75; Work, 472-473.

62
Abraham Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno: toelichting op den Heidelbergschen Catechismus, 3rd
ed., 4 vols. (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1892). Hereafter this edition will be cited as E Voto followed by volume
and page number. When quoted from the Dutch text, the original spelling, italics, capitalization, and
punctuation will be retained in quoted passages.
63

Kuyper, E Voto, 2:396 (Sunday XXIV, Chap. VI).

“Ons zedelijk leven heeft dus tweeërlei: het heeft een leven in den tak en een leven in den
wortel, en die wortel is Christus. En gelijk nu bij een plant, uit den wortel het sap opstijgt en in de twijgen
indringt en ze tieren doet, zoo ook is het bij Gods kind. Ook zijn zedelijk leven begint niet in de takken en
twijgen van zijn eigen overlegging en neiging, maar komt uit den wortel op. Niet die takken beheerschen
64
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fruit in the believer’s holy life is based on the root of Christ and his merit. Here we see
that Kuyper’s “root” of moral life is analogous to definitive sanctification and his
“branch” of moral life matches the idea of progressive sanctification.
In De gemeene gratie65 Kuyper defines sanctification using a third metaphor i.e.,
the “germ,” the “root,” and the “branch.” According to Kuyper, just like a tree the human
being consists of three components: the germ of new life (levenskiem), the root (wortel),
and the branch (tak).66 Life is first sparked by the hidden, latent “germ” which God
germinates. “I” (ik), the “root,” develops in the ground until it can finally stretch out its
“branches” from the root into the world.67 For Kuyper, the germ of self is the inner core
(kern) of ego and the behavior of self is the periphery (omtrek).68 Kuyper argues that
when God sows new seed (nieuwe zaad) or germ (kiem) into the inner core of ik, the core
is sanctified into the self’s new habit (hebbelijkheid) now being not against God but
toward God.69 Nevertheless, the periphery of “I” is still exposed to the world so the

den wortel, maar die wortel beheerscht de takken. En alzoo komt het, dat het werk Gods in zijn kind
doorgaat.” See Kuyper, E Voto, 2:396 (Sunday XXIV, Chap. VI).
65

Abraham Kuyper, De gemeene gratie, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: Höveker & Wormser, 1903).
Hereafter this edition will be cited as De gemeene gratie followed by volume and page number. When
quoted from the Dutch text, the original spelling, italics, capitalization, and punctuation will be retained in
quoted passages.
66

Kuyper, De gemeene gratie, 2:327.

“Ge kunt een plant u dus voorstellen als bestaande uit drie deelen: 1. de levenskiem; 2. de
wortels die zich in den grond uitbreiden, en 3. de takken die zich in de lucht uitspreiden. Op den mensch
overgebracht, is dan dit eerste, de levenskiem, zijn verborgen ik; zijn die wortels de innerlijke ontwikkeling
van zijn wezen, waardoor hem de levenssappen uit God toekomen, en zijn die takken de levensuitingen
waarmee hij uitkomt in de wereld.” See Kuyper, De gemeene gratie, 2:327.
67

Kuyper, De gemeene gratie, 2:306. Berkouwer criticizes Kuyper’s distinction between the
center of self and the periphery of self since Berkouwer thinks that this is a denial of the Spirit’s operation
in the whole of man. See Berkouwer, Faith and Sanctification, 61.
68

69

Kuyper, De gemeene gratie, 2:308.
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ceaseless effort of struggling with the world is still needed even if the core of ik is
decisively sanctified. In this framework, the transformation of the inner core where it
remains in a sanctified condition is solely the work of God, and the endeavor of the
periphery to develop in sanctity is the work of the human being. Here again the germ is
analogous to definitive sanctification and the development of the ik matches the idea of
progressive sanctification.
In Dictaten dogmatiek70 Kuyper proposes a threefold structure for sanctification:
origin (oorsprong), process (voortgang), and completion (voltooiing).71 Here the original
worker of sanctification is no one but God.72 God’s will to sanctify His people is already
determined in the eternal decree so it is by definition external to them.73 In Kuyper’s
thinking God Himself plans, works, and supervises His people’s sanctification at every
stage. Kuyper avoids any synergistic method of sanctification, arguing instead that
human beings should be played like an instrument in God’s hand (als instrument in Gods
hand).74 To run in a Pelagian or Arminian direction to gain sanctification is to overlook
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Abraham Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek: College-Dictaat van een der Studenten, 5 vols. 2nd ed.
(Grand Rapids: J. B. Hulst, 1910). Dictaten dogmatiek is a manuscript of Kuyper’s doctrinal teaching taken
down by his students. This includes the doctrine of God (vol. 1); Bible and creation (vol. 2); providence,
sin, and covenant (vol. 3); soteriology, ecclesiology, and sacraments (vol. 4); and eschatology (vol. 5).
Hereafter this edition will be cited as Dictaten dogmatiek followed by volume and page number. When
quoted from the Dutch text, the original spelling, italics, capitalization, and punctuation will be retained in
quoted passages.
71

Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:145 (Locus de salute, §9. De sanctificatione). According to
Kuyper, sanctification occurs in the threefold sphere, namely, in the consciousness, habit, and actions. See
Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:134.
“Wie werkt de heiligmaking? De werker is eeniglijk en alleenlijk God, van het eerste begin tot
't allerlaatste einde.” See Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:144.
72
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Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:141.

Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:144. Kuyper seems to keep in mind here the danger of “Ethical
Theology,” which teaches that through good works and a highly moral life, believers can reach
sanctification and holiness by their own efforts. Cf. Kuyper, Encyclopedia, Preface; idem, Het werk, 3:34;
74
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the fact that sanctification is entirely God’s act of grace.75 Kuyper believes that
sanctification is not something that is obtained by works alone; rather, sanctification is
the process which starts with the new life implanted originally by God76 and continues in
a process that is entirely completed only in the eschaton.77 In his threefold framework the
“origin” (oorsprong) is analogous to definitive sanctification, and the “process”
(voortgang) of sanctification is analogous to progressive sanctification.
Kuyper opposes any Arminian or ethical teaching that sanctification is
substantially man’s work or achievement;78 saying that if it were significantly directed or
aided by man’s effort, this sanctification would be desolate (troosteloos) and godless
(goddeloos).79 The only reason human beings can even participate in progressive
sanctification is not because it is in their own nature but rather because God gives them
the power and capacity.80
In Kuyper’s representations of sanctification (heiligmaking), the terms “perfect in

Work, 451.
75

Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:142.

“Heiligmaking is niet, dat wij eens goed werk doen, maar het is het opschieten in ons van het
ingeplante nieuwe leyen met takken en vruchten.” See Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:149.
76

77

On Kuyper’s eschatology, see Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 5:3-327 (Locus de consummatione
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Kuyper, Het werk, 3:34; Work, 451.

79

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:34; Work, 451.

saeculi).

“Waar geen sprake is van enkele heilige daden, maar van het in ons aanbrengen van een zin en
neiging, die den ouden mensch haat en vliedt (na eertijds dien ouden mensch juist gemind en nageloopen te
hebben) kan er nooit sprake zijn van iets, wat wijzelven deden; want wijzelven kunnen bij ons hart niet bij;
we hebben over onzen inwendigen persoon geen macht, en missen elk middel om zelf, persoonlijk, een
andere neiging in ons teweeg te brengen; en zelfs waar we ons inbeelden, dat we dit wel doen, rust deze
inbeelding op niets dan zelfbedrog. Alleen de Schepper, omdat Hij Schepper is, kan dit werk in ons tot
stand brengen; en waar dit werk komt, daar komt het dus ook onwederstandelijk.” See Kuyper, Het werk,
3:90-91; Work, 483.
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parts” (volkomenheid in deelen), “root” (wortel), “germ of life” (levenskiem), and
“origin” (oorsprong) all refer to God who is the initiator of the believer’s sanctification;81
this is the very picture of definitive sanctification. The terms “holiness” (heiligheid),
“imperfect in degrees” (onvolkomenheid in trappen), “branch” (tak), change in the
“periphery” (omtrek) of self, and “process” (voortgang) of sanctification refer to the
human need for gradual development in holiness throughout life, a concept which is
identical to progressive sanctification.82

7.2.1.2. The Role of Human Beings in Progressive Sanctification
Although Kuyper uses a wide variety of terms and ideas to emphasize God’s authority to
the fullest, he does not totally ignore the role of human beings in sanctification. Of course
Kuyper does maintain that God alone works in the dimension of definitive sanctification,
but he also acknowledges that human beings have their role in the dimension of
progressive sanctification.
In order to explain the necessity of human activity in sanctification, Kuyper
compares “nothing” (niets) to “something” (iets). Kuyper argues that “if man is nothing
in the absolute sense, as some fondly proclaim, then God cannot work in him; for He
cannot work in nothing. In nothing, one can make nothing and nothing can be

Bratt points out Kuyper’s God-centered view on sanctification: “Real sanctification, just like
real justification, was a finished act of God.” See Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian
Democrat, 106.
81

82

Berkouwer criticizes Kuyper because Berkouwer thinks that Kuyper understands the twofold
sanctification (God’s gift and believer’s obligation) in an unreconciled contradiction. See Berkouwer,
Faith and Sanctification, 22-23. Yet, this criticism does not seem to be quite right as shall be shown below.
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implanted”83 (emphasis in the original). Rather, Kuyper asserts that “since man is a being
[wezen], man must be something”84 (emphasis in the original). Nevertheless in reality a
human being is still nothing before God. Kuyper explains that the human’s nothingness
before God is something like the saints’ perpetual “self-denial,” which always has in
mind that compared to God man has no value.85
Only if one confesses and admits that one’s own self is nothing before God can
one be something as significant as an instrument in God’s hand. Kuyper opposes both
mystical and Pelagian perspectives of the human being since the former basically holds
that “man is nothing” and the latter maintains “man is anything.”86 Kuyper proposes that
man is a very significant “something,” but only as an instrument from God’s point of
view.87 In this sense Kuyper can say that “God is pleased to use man as an instrument
under his own ability and responsibility to incite him to activity”88 (emphasis in the
original). Kuyper further notes:
The Lord alone performs the work from the beginning to the end. But He
performs it partly by the aid of means; and the instrument chosen is often
man himself, who cooperates with God. And to this human instrumentality
the Scripture refers when, in connection with sanctification, it admonishes
us to good works. As in nature God gives the seed and the forces in the soil
and rain and sunshine to mature the fruit of the earth, while at the same time
83

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:62; Work, 464.
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Kuyper, Het werk, 3:62; Work, 464.
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Kuyper, Het werk, 3:63; Work, 465.
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Kuyper, Het werk, 3:63; Work, 465.

“[D]e mensch is wel terdege een zeer beteekenend iets, mits ge hem maar altoos als volstrekt
afhankelijk instrument in de hand van zijn Grod aanziet.” See Kuyper, Het werk, 3:64; Work, 465.
87

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:96; Work, 487. “. . . het Gode behaagt, ook den mensch als instrument te
gebruiken, en aan den mensch onder zijn eigene verantwoordelijkheid en bekwaamheid een prikkel tot het
doen . . .”
88
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He uses the farmer to perfect His work, so it is also in sanctification: God
causes it to work effectually; but He employs the human instrument to
cooperate with Him, as the saw works together with him that handles it
[emphasis in the original].89
In this sense sanctification is not just a gift imparted, but also a duty imposed.90 Like the
farmer, the human being should cultivate his “crops” as prescribed by sanctification using
the common grace that God provides. However, Kuyper warns against thinking that by
God using man as an instrument God somehow depends upon man to fulfill his own
sanctification, saying “[t]his is impossible; by nature man can mar sanctification, but
never further it”91 (emphasis added). Rather, Kuyper sees God’s boundless grace in
using a totally unqualified man as an instrument of sanctification.
Kuyper’s concept of progressive sanctification is expressed in the terms “selfpurification” (zelfreiniging) or “repudiation” (verloochening).92 Here the role of human
beings is definitely in view, yet Kuyper cautions us to avoid letting the intent (bedoeling)
of self-purification be misconstrued:
Yet the intention must be strongly considered; the Church has always taught
that a work could not be called good unless it is directed to the glory of God.
This is a vital point which must animate and give direction to the whole
matter: only to the glory of God. Every other intention makes the “good”
work evil. The “glory of God” is the solid brand that should never be
missing. Even the effort to do good works is impossible without Soli Deo
Gloria [emphasis in the original].93
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Kuyper, Het werk, 3:97; Work, 488.
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Kuyper, Het werk, 3:95; Work, 487.

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:97; Work, 488. “Dit kan daarom niet, overmits de mensch van nature wel
heiligmaking bederven, maar ze nooit bevorderen kan.”
91
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On “self-purification” (zelfreiniging), see Kuyper, De gemeene gratie, 2:325-331 (XLIII). On
“repudiation” (verloochening), see Kuyper, Het werk, 3:115-123 (XVI); Work, 502-507. De Vries
translated verloochening into “self-denial.”

Kuyper, Het werk, 3:115; Work, 502. “Toch moet ook met die bedoeling wel terdege gerekend
worden; want de kerke Christi heeft er alle eeuwen door steeds op aangedrongen, dat nooit eenig werk in
93
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Here Kuyper maintains that self-purification and repudiation are fundamentally intended
for the glory of God; “self-glorification” or a “self-made man” attitude have no place at
all.
The fact that God is sovereign over every aspect of sanctification does not
preclude a role for human beings, at least in the dimension of progressive sanctification.
God uses human beings as instruments to fulfill sanctification. As God’s instruments
human beings are more than nothing (niets); we are in fact made over into something
(iets) significant.

7.2.1.3. Kuyper on Perfectionism
Believers in the definitive condition of “sanctification” (heiligmaking, not heiligheid)
through the implanting of the germ of life (levenskiem) by God are also in the condition
of “perfect in parts” (volkomenheid in deelen). Although the first aspect of sanctification
is completely finished in our being “perfect in parts,” Kuyper argues that this definitive
condition does not at all imply a sinless perfection. In Perfectionism,94 Kuyper points out

onze schatting als goed zou gelden, tenzij het gericht ware op Gods eer. Dit groote punt moet er dus
bijkomen en moet er inzitten en moet de stuur aan heel het werk geven. Eeniglijk tot Gods eer. Al wat er
anders door ons mee bedoeld wordt, maakt het van ‘goed’ kwaad. De ‘eere Gods’ is het vaste merk, dat
nooit mag ontbreken. Zonder het Soli Deo Gloria kan geen poging zelfs tot eenig goed werk bestaan.” Note
that De Vries did not translate the sentence “De ‘eere Gods’ is het vaste merk, dat nooit mag ontbreken” in
Work.
Abraham Kuyper, “Perfectionism,” in Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader, ed. James D.
Bratt, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 141-163. Kuyper writes about “perfectionism”
in an eighteen-part series in De Heraut. The series was originally published as Volmaakbaarheid in De
Heraut from March 17 to August 4, 1878. The series also appears in a book: Abraham Kuyper,
“Volmaakbaarheid,” in Uit het Woord: Stichtelijke bijbelstudien, 2nd ed., 6 vols. (Amsterdam: Höveker &
Wormser, 1879), 2:61-163. Vriend’s translation covers four of the eighteen parts.
94
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two superficial aspects: first, perfectionism is superficial compared to what God’s
holiness actually requires, and second, perfectionism is superficial compared to the
gravity of sin’s corruption.95 Kuyper maintains that perfectionism grossly understates
both of these, i.e., God’s standard of holiness and our total depravity are far greater than
our capacity even to understand.96 In other words, perfectionism diminishes the need for
progressive sanctification, which is the aspect of “imperfect in degrees” that can only be
accomplished over a lifetime.97 What is more, perfectionism places far too much
confidence in human nature.98 Perfectionists display an unconscionable haughtiness in
thinking that God’s absolutely perfect holiness could be theirs in this life.99 They
completely miss the uniqueness of God’s attribute in this respect; their low view of
holiness is insufficient.100

7.2.2. Kuyper on Active Justification
Kuyper’s definition of justification has been criticized because many see it as an
endorsement of justification from eternity.101 In fact, Kuyper’s overly strong emphasis on
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Kuyper, “Perfectionism,” 146-147.
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Kuyper, “Perfectionism,” 147.
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Kuyper, Het werk, 3:69-70; Work, 469.

Kuyper’s perspective on sin in relation to Christology can be seen in his devotional essays or
sermons. See, e.g., Abraham Kuyper, When Thou Sittest in Thine House: Meditations on Home Life, trans.
John Hendrik De Vries (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1929); idem, The Death and Resurrection of Christ:
Messages for Good Friday and Easter, trans. Henry Zylstra (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1960).
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Kuyper, “Perfectionism,” 147.

“De fout der Perfectionisten is dus, dat zij dat kleine stukje der heiligmaking aanzien voor de
geheele heiligmaking.” See Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:157.
100

101

See, e.g., Young, “Historic Calvinism and Neo-Calvinism,” 60; van Genderen and Velema,
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God’s sovereignty does give the impression that he favors an “exclusive” eternal
justification. However, since Kuyper also includes the idea of active justification he does
not rule out passive justification or faith from his overall view of justification. This
section further reveals Kuyper’s complex perspective.

7.2.2.1. Active Justification and Objective Justification
Although Kuyper says relatively little about the distinction between active and passive
justification, a direct reference is found in his writings about Comrie. Here Kuyper states,
“I keep to the exquisite distinction [between active and passive justification],” in refuting
the “English Free Grace sect.”102 Kuyper holds that active justification is “the act of the
justifying God” and passive justification is “its termination and application to individual
believers.”103
Even though Kuyper seldom uses the exact terms “active” and “passive”
justification, the concepts are inherent throughout his writings. For example, Kuyper
distinguishes between objective justification (objectieve rechtvaardiging) and subjective

Concise Reformed Dogmatics, 621-623; Berkouwer, Faith and Justification, 143-168; Pronk, “F.M. Ten
Hoor,” 107. For the works, which try to look at both strengths and weaknesses (esp., eternal justification)
of Kuyper’s theology, see Rewerts, “The Significance of Abraham Kuyper for Reformed Theology,” 162;
Praamsma, Let Christ Be King, 119; Beach, “Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and ‘the Conclusions of
Utrecht 1905,’” 21-22, 55-59; Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:421.
Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: Lessons from His Career,” 279n*. Here, the English Free Grace
sect might refer to English antinomianism, which excessively highlights free grace in salvation while
underestimating any participation on the part of the believer. For a detailed discussion on antinomianism,
see section 3.4.2 of this study.
102

Kuyper, “Alexander Comrie: Lessons from His Career,” 279n*. Here Kuyper borrows
Hoornbeek’s exposition from his Summa Controversiarum in order to describe the nature of the distinction.
103
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justification (subjectieve rechtvaardiging).104 Objective justification is the “judicial act
ante fidem [before faith]” since the decision in the court of God does not rely on the
sinner’s decision in faith.105 On the other hand, subjective justification is the acceptance
and awareness within one’s own consciousness by faith (door het geloof) of being
objectively justified.106
Kuyper also distinguishes between “justification itself” (rechtvaardigmaking
zelve) and its “its publication” or “its promulgation” (afkondiging).107 “Justification
itself” refers to the divine decision that occurs in the holy judgment seat of God (in de
heilige vierschaar Gods). This is completely objective because it originates entirely from
outside the sinner. On the other hand, “its publication” refers to “a specific moment in
our life when for the first time justification [which occurs in foro Dei] is promulgated to
our own consciousness”108 (emphasis in the original). This is the subjective aspect of
justification occurring in foro conscientiae. If “justification itself,” which occurs in foro
Dei, is a fact then there must also be a certain moment where this becomes a living fact in

104
Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:64 (Locus de salute, §4. De justificatione). The distinction of
objective/subjective justification also appears in Bavinck as seen in chapter 4. See Bavinck, MD, 521; ORF,
459.
105
“De justificatio is eene rechterlijke uitspraak en die is niet afhankelijk van het al of niet
aannemen van hem . . . des Heeren is niet afhankelijk van hetgeen de mensch in zijn geloof doet . . .” See
Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:64.

“Er is dus tweeërlei te onderscheiden: de rechterlijke daad ante fidem en het besef van
gerechtvaardigd te zijn en dat laatste komt alleen als de justificatio door het geloof is aangenomen.” See
Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:64.
106
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Kuyper, Het werk, 2:222-223; Work, 370.

Kuyper, Het werk, 2:222; Work, 370. “Wel is er een bepaald moment in ons leven, waarin
deze rechtvaardigmaking voor het eerst in onze eigen consciëntie wordt afgekondigd.”
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consciousness.109 Kuyper argues that “in order to become a living fact, it must have
existed before”110 (emphasis added). That is, objective justification is the grounds for
subjective justification in every respect.
Kuyper proposes several versions of this distinction in order to emphasize that a
sinner’s subjective justification does not and cannot originate in any ability or capacity of
the sinner’s own consciousness, but is only grounded in the objective decision that occurs
in the court of God. Kuyper therefore states: “[O]ur righteousness is not something that
needs to be the product of our own soul’s labor.”111 In opposition to modern soteriology
which puts the human being’s role higher than God’s, Kuyper consistently emphasizes
through the concept of active justification that a man’s legal status is “determined not by
his actual condition, nor by his own declaration, but by the sovereign under whom he
stands”112 (emphasis in the original). Kuyper uses the distinction between
active/objective justification and passive/subjective justification to further emphasize
God’s sovereignty over justification. Kuyper elaborates as follows:
The sovereignty which reposes in an earthly king is only borrowed, derived,
and laid upon him; but the sovereignty of the Lord our God is the source
and fountainhead of all authority and of all binding force. If it belongs to the
very essence of sovereignty, that by the ruler’s decision alone the status of
his subjects is determined, then it must be clear, and it cannot be otherwise
than that this very authority belongs originally, absolutely, and supremely to
our God. Whom He judges guilty is guilty, and must be treated as guilty;
and whom He declares just is just, and must be treated as just. Before He
entered Gethsemane, Jesus our King declared to His disciples: “Now are ye
109
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Kuyper, Het werk, 2:223; Work, 446. “. . . onze gerechtigheid niet iets is, dat product van den
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clean through the word which I have spoken unto you.” And this is His
declaration even now, and it shall forever remain so. Our state, our place,
our lot for eternity depends not upon what we are, nor upon what others see
in us, nor upon what we imagine or presume ourselves to be, but only upon
what God thinks of us, what He counts us to be, what He, the Almighty and
Just Judge, declares us to be [emphasis in the original].113
Only the concept of active justification allows us to fully grasp the truth that God’s
authoritative sovereignty extends over justification. In sum, Kuyper uses the distinction
of active/passive justification in order to secure God’s sovereignty in the arena of
justification. For Kuyper objective” (versus “subjective”) justification and “justification
itself” (versus “its publication”) have the same meaning as active justification.

7.2.2.2. Active Justification and Justification from Eternity
Kuyper’s conception of justification is composed of several steps; his idea of eternal
justification is contained in these steps. Kuyper lays out five steps in justification in E
Voto: (1) God’s sovereign decision of the Council (Gods vrijmachtig Raadsbesluit); (2)
the resurrection of Christ (opstanding van Christus); (3) implanting of the ability for faith
(inplanting van het geloofsvermogen); (4) actual faith (daadwerkelijk geloof); and (5) the
day of judgment (den dag des oordeels).114 The last four steps of justification are based
on the first, i.e., God’s free decision in the eternal Council.115 Since in Kuyper’s five-step
process the decision with regard to a sinner’s legal status is made in eternity, he does
argue that “the sinner’s justification need not wait until he is converted, nor until he has
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become conscious, nor even until he is born.”116 Kuyper’s perspective is deeply
grounded in his understanding of election.117 Kuyper upholds the supralapsarian
perspective on election, maintaining that God’s decree of election is prior to the Fall. For
him this is the cor ecclesiae (the heart of the church), inasmuch as he thinks that this is
the most emphatic way to present the sovereignty of God and the fullness of Christ’s
efficacy.118 As a supralapsarian Kuyper believes that God’s eternal decree to justify
sinners is already decided before the world and human beings are even created.119
However, in Kuyper’s fivefold justification, the actual (werkelijk) justification occurs not
in the first step but in the third step, i.e., the moment that God implants the capacity for
faith in sinners.120 Given that for Kuyper actual or full justification occurs in foro
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Kuyper, Het werk, 2:222; Work, 369. “. . . dan is het hieruit tevens duidelijk, waarom de
rechtvaardigmaking van den zondaar volstrekt niet behoefde te wachten op zijn bekeering, ja, zelfs niet op
zijn bewustzijn, zijn aanzijn of geboorte.”

In this study, Kuyper’s doctrine of election will not be dealt with in detail as it is beyond the
scope of this paper. Stated briefly, Kuyper holds supralapsarianism, which maintains that God’s decrees of
election and reprobation logically precede the Fall. Some might think that those who hold
supralapsarianism also defend the idea of eternal justification because both emphasize God’s eternal
decision rather than any others. Yet, as Beach points out, this has not always happened. For example,
Geerhardus Vos, who is a supralapsarian, denies the idea of justification from eternity. See Vos,
Systematische theologie, 24, 98. Cf. Beach, “Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and ‘the Conclusions of
Utrecht 1905,’” 58n180. Historically speaking, supralasarians, e.g., Beza, Zanchius, Ames, Gomarus, etc.,
do not defend eternal justification. On Kuyper’s doctrine of election and the theological controversies
between supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism in the Dutch context, see Willem van der Schee,
“Kuyper’s Archimedes’ Point: The Reverend Abraham Kuyper on Election,” in Kuyper Reconsidered:
Aspects of His Life and Work, eds. Cornelis van der Kooi and Jan de Bruijn (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij,
1999), 102-110; Beach, “Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and ‘the Conclusions of Utrecht 1905,’” 1721, 53-55.
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conscientiae, not in foro Dei,121 the first step of justification (God’s sovereign decision
of the Council) refers to active justification, and the third and fourth steps of justification
(implanting the capacity for faith and applying actual faith) refer to passive justification.
In Dictaten dogmatiek, Kuyper presents an even more complex structure of
justification, i.e., nine steps: (1) divine decree (goddelijk besluit); (2) eternally fixed in
the constitutio Mediatoris (van eeuwigheid vastgemaakt in de constitutio Mediatoris); (3)
active and passive offering (actieve & passieve offerande); (4) the resurrection of Christ
(opstanding van Christus); (5) implanting of ability for faith (inplanting van het
geloofsvermogen); (6) preaching of the Gospel (prediking van het Evangelie); (7) faith in
conversion (geloof in de bekeering); (8) the effect of faith in continuing conversion
(werking van het geloof in voortgaande bekeering); and (9) the last judgment (laatste
Oordeel).122 According to Kuyper, the first to the fourth steps represent objective
justification, and the fifth to the eighth steps represent subjective justification. In this
ninefold structure, the completion of justification (not in an eschatological sense, but in
the sense of realization) does not occur in the first step, namely, in God’s eternal decree,
but begins from the fifth step, which is the implanting of the capacity of faith in foro
conscientiae. Kuyper states, “[J]ustification therefore flows with faith by which
justification is affirmed in foro conscientiae and is adopted from the same source [God’s
eternal decree to justify].”123 Kuyper further proposes that God’s eternal decree to justify

geloofsvermogen inplant.” See Kuyper, E Voto, 2:340 (Sunday XXIII, Chap. VIII).
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Here, actual or full justification refers to the actual realization of the change of legal status in
one’s own consciousness and perception.
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Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:45 (Locus de salute, §4. De Justificatione).
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as the opus immanens is not a mere “abstract judicial conclusion” (abstracte rechterlijke
conclusie) which has no tangible place in reality, but the divine promise as ad extra that
will be realized in the sinner by God’s sovereign power.124
The distinction between active and passive justification is logical, not
temporal.125 If active justification is understood as the eternal termination of justification
outside of time, this could be called the exclusive idea of justification from eternity,
which is certainly problematic.126 However, since Kuyper refers to the dimension of
passive justification (viz., justified by faith in foro conscientiae),127 we can say that
Kuyper does not hold this exclusive view of eternal justification.128 Nevertheless, the
reason Kuyper’s critics still regard him as maintaining the idea of exclusive eternal
justification is that he tends to overemphasize the first step of justification (God’s eternal
decree to justify)129 and its immutability and firmness as the ultimate source of all the

zij in fore conscientiae betuigd en aangenomen wordt, uit dezelfde bron.”
“De justificatie ab aeterno is dus een opus immanens ad extra (d.w.z. zulk een inblijvend
werk, dat eens exeuns worden zal). Deze justificatio ab aeterno kwam als opus immanens in Gods wezen
tot stand, niet door de abstracte rechterlijke conclusie, maar in verbinding met de souvereine
scheppersmacht des Heeren nl. met die macht Gods, waardoor Hij in het supremum judicium den mensch
zoo kan doen komen, als Hij wil, dat deze er komen zal.” See Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek, 4:61.
124

125

For a detailed discussion on the nature of active justification, see chapter 3 of this study.

126
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theological history.
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between the two is always upon the former. See Abraham Kuyper, “Conservatism and Orthodoxy: False
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Eerdmans, 1998), 80-82.
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other steps,130 and to some degree this overemphasis seems to hint at Kuyper’s
overlooking or underestimating the importance of passive justification., i.e., the
actualization of the eternal decree by faith in foro conscientiae. In this sense there is a
tension in Kuyper between active justification (where God has justified in foro Dei, but
justification has not yet been fully realized in foro conscientiae), and exclusive eternal
justification (where God finishes the act of justifying in eternity).
All the succeeding steps in Kuyper’s complex concept of justification, including
the sinner’s justification that is realized and actualized in foro conscientiae, are solidly
grounded in the first step, God’s eternal decree to justify in foro Dei. Unfortunately
Kuyper’s overemphasis on this first step overshadows and obscures his endorsement of
passive justification.

7.2.2.3. Active Justification and Faith
Kuyper is well aware of the contradiction between his view that God has justified sinners
in the tribunal of God from eternity before faith and his simultaneous conviction that
sinners are justified by faith alone.131 Strictly speaking, the former concept does not
require faith, but the latter does. Kuyper does not try to resolve this; instead, he leaves it

framework, decree in eternity and its execution in time, should be kept. See Beach, “Abraham Kuyper,
Herman Bavinck, and ‘the Conclusions of Utrecht 1905,’” 57.
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Kuyper, E Voto, 2:339 (Sunday XXIII, Chap. VII). According to Bavinck, there are
differences concerning the order of God’s decree between Comrie and Kuyper. While justification follows
election and the covenant of grace in Comrie’s thought, justification logically precedes the covenant of
grace in Kuyper’s thought. See Bavinck, GD, 4:200n5 (§51.475); RD, 4:216n125.
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as a “contradictory” (tegenstrijdig) truth or antimony, saying that “Holy Scripture reveals
to us these two equally solid, but seemingly contradictory truths, with equally firm
resolution: (1) that, on the one hand, He has justified us in His own judgment-seat from
eternity; and (2) that, on the other hand, in conversion we are justified only by faith”132
(emphasis in the original). In this tension, Kuyper speaks of both aspects of faith, namely,
that “faith itself is fruit, effect, and consequence of our justification; while it is also true
that, for us, justification begins to exist only as a result of our faith.”133 Kuyper does not
explicitly name it, but this study shows that faith as both the cause and effect of
justification is seen in the distinction between active and passive justification. Active
justification in foro Dei becomes the object of passive justification sola fide in foro
conscientiae.
Kuyper appeals to faith in salvation, saying, “In the way of salvation, everything
depends upon faith; hence a correct conception of faith is the matter of utmost
importance”134 (emphasis in the original). However, the correct conception recognizes
that faith per se is by no means a sufficient basis for justification.135 The principium

Kuyper, Het werk, 2:224; Work, 371. “. . . de Heilige Schrift ons deze twee even vaste, maar
schijnbaar tegenstrijdige waarheden met even stellige beslistheid openbaart. Eenerzijds, dat Hij ons
gerechtvaardigd heeft in zijn heilige vierschaar voor eeuwig. En anderzijds, dat wij pas gerechtvaardigd
worden door het geloof, als we ons bekeeren.”
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Kuyper, Het werk, 2:224; Work, 371. “. . . het geloof zelf een vrucht en gevolg en uitvloeisel
is van onze rechtvaardigmaking, en dat toch niettemin omgekeerd onze rechtvaardigmaking voor ons pas
begint te bestaan als gevolg van ons geloof.”
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Kuyper, Het werk, 2:233; Work, 378. “. . . den weg der zaligheid aan het geloof schier alles
hangt, is het dan ook zoo van het hoogste belang, dat we ons begrip van wat geloof zij . . .”
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alles afdoende is.” See Kuyper, E Voto, 2:344 (Sunday XXIII, Chap. VIII).
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actionis (the principle of action) of justification is the will of God; the causa movens
(moving cause) of justification is not the opus hominis (the work of man), but the opus
Christi (the work of Christ).136 Kuyper believes that there is no causa meritoria
(meritorious cause) of justification at all in man, but solely in Christ.137 Kuyper’s strong
emphasis on divine sovereignty in salvation is vividly reflected throughout Kuyper’s
whole discussion of faith in justification.
However, Kuyper places more emphasis on the effect of faith in foro Dei as
represented in active justification rather than the instrumental cause of faith in foro
conscientiae as depicted in passive justification. Faith is enabled by what was decided in
the Council of God, and is activated in foro conscientiae,138 i.e., faith functions as
sinners become conscious that they were justified in foro Dei.139 In this logical flow,
faith functions not as the instrumental cause in passive justification, but as the effect of
what happened in active justification.140 Ultimately this is the tension between the faith
that reflects (afspiegelen) in one’s consciousness what happened in active justification,
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Thus, Kersten criticizes Kuyper’s perspective on faith, which understands as becoming
conscious of the dimension of active justification. See Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:421.
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and the faith through which (διά) sinners are justified in passive justification.141

7.3. God’s Sovereignty in Salvation
Kuyper’s emphasis on God’s sovereignty in justification and sanctification has made him
the object of criticism. In addition to those previously cited, William Young says that
Kuyper’s excessive magnification of God’s sovereignty merely contains a “metaphysical
category” of theology that does not intimately connect it to the individual.142 G. C.
Berkouwer also regards Kuyper’s overuse of the sovereignty of God in salvation as
“abstract” and “speculative.”143
However, we have also seen that Kuyper leaves room for man’s activity to
somewhat mitigate his extreme dependence on God’s sovereignty in justification and
sanctification. Rather than placing Kuyper outside the orthodox or confessional
perspectives, Bratt points out that the emphasis on God’s sovereignty may simply be the
“common root” or bridge between orthodox or confessional and activist or progressive
soteriology.144 Kuyper’s emphasis on God’s sovereignty could also be an effective
hermeneutical foundation for understanding his soteriology. Kuyper seeks to (1) reject
“any and every claim of those who would contribute the smallest part to their own
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salvation or sanctity by any endeavor on their part”;145 (2) refute Methodism, saying that
“the Work of the Holy Spirit may not be displaced by the activity of the human spirit”;146
and (3) confess that all things exist “for the sake of God. For, as the Scripture says, He
has created all things for Himself.”147 Kuyper simply desires to show that God and his
sovereignty is at the center of everything. This is why Kuyper’s soteriology is so vigorous
in defense of God’s sovereignty in justification and sanctification.148

7.4. Summary
Kuyper’s fundamental theme carried through both active justification and definitive
sanctification is his emphasis on a proper understanding of the transcendent role of God’s
sovereignty in salvation. This theme runs all through Kuyper’s thinking and writing.
Kuyper uses a variety of terms to describe the aspects of definitive and
progressive sanctification and the distinction between them. In addition to
“sanctification” (heiligmaking) itself, “perfect in parts” (volkomenheid in deelen), moral
life as a “root” (wortel), the “germ” of life (levenskiem), and the “origin” (oorsprong) of
sanctification are very similar to the idea definitive sanctification. Beside the term
“holiness” (heiligheid) itself, “imperfect in degrees” (onvolkomenheid in trappen), moral
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Abraham Kuyper for Reformed Theology,” 306-309; Praamsma, Let Christ Be King, 109.

264
life as a “branch” (tak), changes in the self’s “periphery” (omtrek), and the “process”
(voortgang) of sanctification all point to progressive sanctification. When Kuyper speaks
of that instant when the believer’s condition becomes “perfect in parts” he does not mean
that the gradual development of sanctification is unnecessary, nor does he suggest that
believers are perfectly sinless in this life. Rather, Kuyper says that the divinely gracious
act of definitive sanctification makes possible the necessary lifelong effort of believers to
increase in sanctity.
Kuyper also uses a variety of terms to describe justification. His idea of
“objective justification” and “justification itself” refers to the concept of active
justification, and “subjective justification” and “its publication” (or “its promulgation”)
represent passive justification. His complex fivefold and ninefold depictions of
justification both use as their first step God’s eternal decree to justify; on this firm
foundation sits faith, the recognition by sinners of what was performed on their behalf in
foro Dei.
Kuyper offers all of these ideas in order to make it abundantly clear that he
recognizes and distinguishes between what God alone does and what human beings can
and cannot do in the realm of salvation. Most importantly for him, through his writings
on active justification and definitive sanctification Kuyper vividly portrays both the
sovereign ruler and the beginning point of salvation.
Throughout Kuyper’s works, the fourth parallel characteristic of active
justification and definitive sanctification, i.e., God’s sovereignty in salvation, is on full
display. All of the other characteristics of inseparability, objectivity and decisiveness, and
Christ-centeredness that were examined in chapters 4 through 6 are also required to fully
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understand divine sovereignty in salvation, so in that respect the other parallels are
included within this last one.

PART III
THE SOTERIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACTIVE
JUSTIFICATION AND DEFINITIVE SANCTIFICATION

CHAPTER 8
THEOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACTIVE
JUSTIFICATION AND DEFINITIVE SANCTIFICATION

The four parallel characteristics of active justification and definitive sanctification are not
merely speculations or abstractions with no theological or practical application.1
Theologically they help us to properly understand God’s sovereignty in balance with
human responsibility in both justification and sanctification. Practically they help to
strengthen the believer’s assurance and perseverance (Section 8.2.1), while avoiding the
errors of either triumphalism or defeatism (Section 8.2.2).

8.1. Theological Significance
8.1.1. Providing a Balanced Soteriology
The need for balance between God’s sovereignty and human responsibility in justification
and sanctification has not been universally accepted in church history, and it remains
elusive even today. For example, in reacting to the Arminian or semi-Pelagian viewpoints
that embraced a synergistic formula, the antinomian perspective moved to the opposite

As Turretin points out, theology has a “theoretico-practical” nature, which means that theology
needs to have a concrete theoretical foundation, and based on that, praxis is naturally revealed and
manifested. See Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:5-23. In light of Turretin’s observation, the
notions of active justification and definitive sanctification, as shall be seen, also have a theoretico-practical
nature. In fact, throughout the Reformed tradition, all doctrinal ideas are related to Christian praxis. Even
the doctrine of predestination in the Reformed tradtion, which seems to be speculative as some critics pose,
has a theoretico-practical nature as well. On this, see Jae-Eun Park, “John Knox’s Doctrine of
Predestination and Its Practical Application for His Ecclesiology,” Puritan Reformed Journal 5, no. 2 (July
2013): 65-90.
1

268
extreme, forcing a radical dependence on sovereignty and free grace.2 Then in reaction to
the antinomian stand, the neonomian perspective swung the pendulum the other way,
reintroducing the need for human responsibility and activity into the doctrine of
justification but failing to recognize God’s absolute rule. This polarization is evident in
the conflict between hyper-Calvinism which overemphasizes God’s activity in salvation,
and Arminianism in which human responsibility dominates.3
This unbalanced view has continued into the modern era. For example, the
debate between “Lordship Salvation” and “Free Grace” is an extension of the contrasting
perspectives on God’s sovereignty and human responsibility.4 The Free Grace school of
thought dismisses Lordship theology as nomism or legalism because Lordship affirms
human responsibility along with God’s sovereignty. On the other hand, the adherents of
Lordship Salvation see in Free Grace’s denial of the need for faith, repentance, obedience
or yieldedness an irresponsible “cheap grace.”5 In fact, Lordship Salvation reflects only

2

See section 3.4.2 of this study.

3

See section 3.4.3 of this study.

The “lordship salvation” debate was first ignited between Everett F. Harrison and John R. W.
Stott in Eternity magazine due to the issue of accepting Christ as Savior or Lord. See Everett F. Harrison,
“Must Christ Be Lord to Be Savior? NO!” Eternity (September 1959): 14, 16, 48; John R. W. Stott, “Must
Christ Be Lord to Be Savior? Yes!” Eternity (September 1959): 15, 17-18, 36-37.
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Zane Hodges is a representative of the “free grace” school of thought. See Zane Clark Hodges,
The Gospel under Siege: A Study on Faith and Works (Redencion Viva, 1981); idem, Absolutely Free: A
Biblical Reply to Lordship Salvation (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1989). For the supportive argument for
Hodges’ view, see Livingston Blauvelt, Jr., “Does the Bible Teach Lordship Salvation,” Bibliotheca Sacra
143, no. 569 (1986): 37-45. Against Hodges’ view, John MacArthur, even though he dislikes to use the
term, holds the “lordship theology” view. See John F. MacArthur, The Gospel According to Jesus: What
Does Jesus Mean When He Says “Follow Me”? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988). For advocates of
MacArthur’s view in the evangelical circle, see J. I. Packer, Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God
(Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1961); James Montgomery Boice, Christ’s Call to Discipleship
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1986); Millard J. Erickson, “Lordship Theology: The Current Controversy,”
Southwestern Journal of Theology 33, no. 2 (1991): 5-15; John Piper, Desiring God: Meditations of a
Christian Hedonist (Portland: Multnomah Press, 1986); idem, “Putting God Back Into Faith,” The Standard
79 (February 1989): 54-55. The book, which was edited by Michael Horton, tries to find a wise middle path
5
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an apparent antinomy between the sola fide narrative in Romans and faith without works
is dead faith in James.6 The theological tug-of-war between God’s sovereignty and
human responsibility in salvation is also found in Norman Shepherd,7 Lewis Sperry

in the debate in light of the Reformation spirit. See Michael S. Horton, ed., Christ the Lord: The
Reformation and Lordship Salvation (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1992). To grasp the very nature of
the lordship salvation controversy, see also Randall C. Gleason, “The Lordship Salvation Debate,”
Evangelical Review of Theology 27, no. 1 (2003): 55-72; Alan Day, “The Lordship Salvation Controversy,”
The Theological Educator 45 (1992): 23-29.
6

The tension between James and Paul should not be understood as a sharp theological difference;
rather, this needs to be grasped in the terminological difference regarding “works.” While “works,” for
Paul, refers to the “works of the law,” which he rejects, “works” for James refers to genuine good deeds
that result from the fruits of true faith. Peter Davids’ presentation about this is helpful: “In reality, both
James and Paul had similar ideas on the role of good works in the Christian life, but since they ministered
in different spheres socially and geographically, they addressed different concerns and used their
overlapping terminology differently.” See Peter Davids, “James and Paul,” in Dictionary of Paul and His
Letters, eds. G. F. Hawthorne, R. P. Martin, and D. G. Reid (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1993),
459. Cf. Eddy et al., “Justification in Contemporary Debate,” 72.
7
Norman Shepherd writes that “the exclusive ground of the justification of the believer in the
state of justification is the righteousness of Jesus Christ, but his [believer] obedience, which is simply the
perseverance of the saints in the way of truth and righteousness, is necessary to his continuing in a state of
justification.” See Norman Shepherd, “Thirty-four Theses on Justification in Relation to Faith, Repentance,
and Good Works,” 21 entry, presented to the Presbytery of Philadelphia of the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church, November 18, 1978, available from http://www.hornes.org/theologia/norman-shepherd/the-34theses, accessed November 19. 2014. Therefore, in Shepherd’s understanding, there is a high possibility to
arrive at a conclusion that obedience (works) functions as much as the instrumental cause as is faith. See
also Shepherd, “The Relation of Good Works to Justification in the Westminster Standards,” 10-28, paper
presented to the faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary, October 1, 1976, available from
http://trinity-pres.net/essays/ns23-1976NSGoodWorksAndJustificationInTheWestminsterStandards.pdf,
accessed November 19, 2014. Shepherd more recently argues about the conditionality of works, saying that
“faith, repentance, obedience, and perseverance are indispensable to the enjoyment of these blessings [the
new covenant]. They are conditions” (emphasis added). See Norman Shepherd, The Call of Grace: How
the Covenant Illuminates Salvation and Evangelism (Phillipsburg: P & R Pub., 2000), 50. The spirit of
Shepherdism is closely associated with Federal Vision theology or the Auburn Avenue Theology. Since
Federal Vision theology per se is a huge topic, this study will not deal with it in detail. For the argument of
Federal Vision and its debate, see J. Steven Wilkins and Duane Garner, eds., The Federal Vision (Monroe:
Athanasius Press, 2004); E. Calvin Beisner, ed., The Auburn Avenue Theology, Pros and Cons: Debating
the Federal Vision (Fort Lauderdale: Knox Theological Seminary, 2004).

270
Chafer,8 and in the Keswick movement.9 Broadly speaking, these all lay claim to some
degree of human responsibility and activity in salvation, so their soteriology has been
viewed as encroaching on God’s absolute sovereignty.
Thus the debate over the relationship between God’s sovereignty and human
responsibility in justification and sanctification has often proven contentious, with the
proponents advancing their arguments strongly one way or the other.10 However, God’s
sovereignty and human responsibility should both be seen as vital in salvation.
First, the distinctions between active and passive justification and between
definitive and progressive sanctification serve to strike a proper balance. God’s absolute
sovereignty is the “object” and human responsibility the “subject” in both justification
and sanctification. The inseparability of object from subject is what unifies active with
passive justification and definitive with progressive sanctification. God’s sovereignty in

8
See, esp., vol. 7 of Chafer's Systematic Theology and Ryrie, “Contrasting Views of
Sanctification.” The Chaferian concept of sanctification involves in overconfidence in the sanctifying
ability of humankind; as a result, it has often been charged as the “quintessence of Arminianism.” See
Warfield, “Review of He That Is Spiritual,” 322-327. For a detailed exposition regarding the different
perspectives on sanctification between Warfield and Chafer, see Gleason, “B. B. Warfield and Lewis S.
Chafer on Sanctification,” 241-257.
9

See section 2.1 of this study. Cf. Barabas, So Great Salvation, 21, 84, 108. For a typical
devotional exposition of Keswick teaching, see McQuilkin, The Life of Victory and the Baptism of the Holy
Spirit. For vigorous criticism for Keswick’s teaching, see Warfield, Perfectionism, and Packer, Keep in Step
with the Spirit.
In scholastic theology, one of the attempts to find a compromise between God’s sovereignty
and human responsibility is the usage of scientia media (middle knowledge). In the contrasting context
between predestination and human free will, Arminian thinkers advocate the idea of scientia media,
inasmuch as they think that scientia media is placed between scientia necessaria and scientia voluntaria so
as to guarantee creative space for the participation of human decision-making as part of God’s knowledge
and will. Yet, the idea of scientia media cannot create a balance between God’s sovereignty and human
responsibility as advocates claim; rather, scientia media, which essentially depends on future conditional
contingencies, inevitably has a potential to lessen divine sovereignty. On this, see Jae-Eun Park, “John
Plaifere (d.1632) on Conditional Predestination: A Well-mixed Version of scientia media and Resistible
Grace,” Reformation & Renaissance Review 18.2 (2016): forthcoming.
10
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its objective dimension is maintained in full measure, while human responsibility in its
subjective dimension is also completely affirmed; there is no need or room for either
antinomian or neonomian arguments.
Second, the causal relationship between active and passive justification and
between definitive and progressive sanctification also serves to strike a proper balance.
God’s sovereignty is the “cause” and human responsibility the “effect” in both
justification and sanctification.11 Active justification and definitive sanctification are
properly understood as the prima causa (first cause) and passive justification and
progressive satisfaction the causa secunda (second cause) of salvation.12 The first cause
is solely a divine promise and act which is objective and decisive, so the believer’s
justification and sanctification stand not on precarious subjective ground, but on
unshakable objective ground.

8.1.2. Securing an Appropriate Understanding of God’s Sovereignty in Salvation
Even apart from the historical Pelagian or Arminian perspectives, there have been several
other fairly recent discussions among New Testament scholars undermining the idea of
God’s absolute sovereignty in justification and final judgment. For example, several

11
Muller, Dictionary, 244 (s.v. prima causa): “[T]he first cause; viz., God as the cause of all
things, i.e., the uncaused cause or noncontingent, necessary being whose causal activity sets in motion all
contingent causes and their effects” (emphasis in the original).
12
Muller, Dictionary, 63 (s.v. causae secundae): “[S]econd causes; secondary, as distinct from
and subordinate to primary causality, viz., the order of finite causality. It is a truism of scholastic theology
that God does not act immediately, but mediately, through secondary or instrumental causes. The world
does not experience sudden divine interventions but rather the effecting of the divine will in and through
the finite order of the universe” (emphasis in the original).
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writers, e.g., Kent Yinger, N. T. Wright, et al. have been influenced by “covenantal
nomism,”13 arguing in varying degrees that even though divine righteousness and grace
are the initial grounds for entry into the new covenant, believers’ obedience and
adherence to the law are required in order to remain in the new covenant.14 For these
scholars the experiential transformation of the individual based on continuing obedience
and Spirit-led activity is the basis of justification and final judgment. Although he
disagrees with Sanders’ covenantal nomism, Chris VanLandingham also argues that
while the believer’s deeds throughout their lifetime are not viewed by God as merits per
se, they are still criteria for justification at the last judgment.15 Those who see a close

13
Covenantal nomism, which is claimed by E. P. Sanders, basically argues that the Judaism of
the first century was not a legalistic religion. Rather than becoming God’s people through keeping the law
or works of the law, Jewish people in the first century were already God’s people through God’s election
and covenantal grace. Yet, for them, works were necessary in order to maintain their stand in that covenant.
See E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1977), 75, 420, 438-442, 544. Sanders’ argument is not totally new. The previous seed
already exists in the thought of G. F. Moore and Albert Schweitzer. Cf. G. F. Moore, Judaism in the First
Centuries of the Christian Era: The Age of Tannaim, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927);
Albert Schweitzer, Die mystik des Apostels Paulus (Tübingen: Mohr, 1930).

Yinger writes: “[S]alvation is not earned by human initiative, but is given by God’s grace; and
it is contingent upon continuance in the faith and obedience which are required by that relationship. Such
obedience remains a condition for the maintenance of righteousness and for final justification. . . . [O]ne’s
outward behavior (one’s work or way) will correspond to, and be a visible manifestation of, inward reality.
The eschatological recompense according to deeds confirms, on the basis of deeds, one’s justification”
(emphasis in the original). See Kent L. Yinger, Paul, Judaism, and Judgment According to Deeds
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 289-290. In a similar vein, Wright also clarifies that “this
[covenantal theme] means that they are declared, in the present, to be what they will be seen to be in the
future, namely the true people of God. Present justification declares, on the basis of faith, what future
justification will affirm publicly (according to [Rom] 2:14-16 and 8:9-11) on the basis of the entire life”
(emphasis added). See N. T. Wright, What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real Founder of
Christianity? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 129. In the later writing, Wright expresses somewhat
differently on what he said before: “The present verdict gives the assurance that the future verdict will
match it; the Spirit gives the power through which that future verdict, when given, will be seen to be in
accordance with the life that the believer has then lived” (emphasis in the original). See Wright,
Justification, 251.
14

15
Chris VanLandingham, Judgment & Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul
(Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2006), 15. He further maintains that “God’s grace and mercy may be
present throughout a person’s life, working on his or her behalf; but one’s deeds determine approbation at
the final judgment” (emphasis added). See VanLandingham, Judgment & Justification, 15.
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relationship between human works and the final justification may not overtly teach a
form of legalism or merit theology.16 Rather, they propose that one’s deeds are the way
that one is walking in the Holy Spirit through faith.17 Their argument is worthwhile at
least as a warning against pursuing “cheap grace.” Nevertheless, their language—
specifically, on the basis of works, works determine, works confirm the future
justification, etc.—may to lead to the erroneous conclusion that works might have some
role in initiating justification. Justification is rooted in Christ and His imputed
righteousness.18 Works cannot be the foundation nor even an instrumental cause of
justification; they are merely a necessary confirmation of faith in Christ and manifest
fruits of that faith.19 Also, if works were the basis of justification it would seriously
weaken God’s sovereignty in salvation, which by definition is the gift of God alone based
on His free will and pleasure. Works (genuinely good and moral deeds) are the grateful
response of those who receive and enjoy God’s free gift by faith.

Yinger clarifies, “One’s works of obedience are not viewed as merits, each to be recompensed
in atomistic fashion, but instead are the observable manifestations of the covenant loyalty of the unseen
heart” (emphasis added). See Yinger, Paul, Judaism, and Judgment, 285.
16

17
Yinger, Paul, Judaism, and Judgment, 285. John Piper also acknowledges this point in
Wright’s argument, saying that “[w]hen he [Wright] says ‘by work,’ he does not mean by legalism or by
merit or by earning, but by the obedience of our lives that is produced by the Holy Spirit through faith.”
See Piper, The Future of Justification, 104.
18
See WCF 11.1.2: “Those whom God effectually calls, He also freely justifies; not by infusing
righteousness into them, but by pardoning their sins, and by accounting and accepting their persons as
righteous; not for anything wrought in them, or done by them, but for Christ’s sake alone; nor by imputing
faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them, as their righteousness; but by
imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them, they receiving and resting on Him and His
righteousness by faith; which faith they have not of themselves, it is the gift of God” (emphasis added). See
Schaff, ed., “The Westminster Confession of Faith,” 626.
19

See Piper, The Future of Justification, 110; Gaffin, By Faith, Not by Sight, 98.
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In sum, the ideas of active justification and definitive sanctification show that
works cannot be the basis of justification and the final judgment. These also reinforce
God’s sovereignty in redemption.

8.2. Practical Significance
The concepts of active justification and definitive sanctification not only have theological
significance but have practical application as well. They provide believers with a sound
sense of assurance and perseverance, and they allow the believer to overcome either
spiritual triumphalism or defeatism.

8.2.1. Providing Sound Assurance and Perseverance
The distinctions between active and passive justification and between definitive and
progressive sanctification recognize the objective and subjective dimensions of assurance
and perseverance. Stated briefly, discussions revolve around (1) whether genuine
assurance is based on objective grounds or subjective evidence; and (2) whether eternal
security, the objective basis of perseverance, is permanent or not.
Several scholars including R. T. Kendall, Basil Hall, M. Charles Bell, et al.
maintain that the doctrine of assurance of the post-Reformers resolves into experimental
subjectivism, self-introspection, voluntarism, and anthropocentrism.20 However others,

20

See R. T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979); idem, “The Puritan Modification of Calvin’s Theology,” in John Calvin: His Influence in the
Western World, ed. W. Stanford Reid (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982), 199-214; idem, “In the Teaching
of William Perkins and His Followers,” in Living the Christian Life: Being Papers Read at the 1974
Conference (Warboys: Westminster Conference, 1974), 45-60; Basil Hall, “Calvin against the Calvinists,”
in John Calvin, ed. G. E. Duffield (Appleford: Sutton Courtenay, 1966), 19-37; M. Charles Bell, Calvin
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e.g., Beeke, Muller, Letham, et al. argue on the basis of WCF 1821 and Puritan or
Reformed orthodox tradition that genuine assurance is grounded primarily in the divine
truth of the promises in Christ, and only secondarily on the inward evidence of saving
grace and the testimony or witness of the Spirit.22 These scholars contend that when
post-Reformation writers employ syllogismus practicus23 their syllogism is not
dependent on man’s subjective ability or merit, but rather on God’s living Word, Christ,

and Scottish Theology: The Doctrine of Assurance (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1985).
“. . . II. This certainty is not a bare conjectural and probable persuasion, grounded upon a
fallible hope; but an infallible assurance of faith, founded upon the divine truth of the promises of salvation,
the inward evidence of those graces unto which these promises are made, the testimony of the Spirit of
adoption witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God; which Spirit is the earnest of our
inheritance, whereby we are sealed to the day of redemption. III. This infallible assurance doth not so
belong to the essence of faith, but that a true believer may wait long, and conflict with many difficulties
before he be partaker of it . . . IV. True believers may have the assurance of their salvation divers ways
shaken, diminished, and intermitted . . . yet are they never utterly destitute of that seed of God, and life of
faith, that love of Christ and the brethren, that sincerity of heart and conscience of duty, out of which, by
the operation of the Spirit, this assurance may in due time be revived, and by the which, in the meantime,
they are supported from utter despair.” See Schaff, ed., “The Westminster Confession of Faith,” 637-640
(WCF 18.2-4).
21

See Joel R. Beeke, “The Assurance Debate: Six Key Questions,” in Drawn into Controversie:
Reformed Theological Diversity and Debates within Seventeenth-Century British Puritanism, eds. Michael
A. G. Haykin and Mark Jones (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 263-283; idem, “Personal
Assurance of Faith: The Puritans and Chapter 18.2 of the Westminster Confession,” Westminster
Theological Journal 55, no. 1 (1993): 1-30; idem, “Does Assurance Belong to the Essence of Faith? Calvin
and the Calvinists,” Master’s Seminary Journal 5, no. 1 (March 1994): 43-71; idem, The Quest for Full
Assurance; idem, Assurance of Faith; Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition, 244-276 (the section of
“Calvin, Beza, and the Later Reformed on Assurance of Salvation and the ‘Practical Syllogism’”); Robert
Letham, “Faith and Assurance in Early Calvinism: A Model of Continuity and Diversity,” in Later
Calvinism: International Perspectives, ed. W. Fred Graham (Kirksville: Sixteenth Century Journal
Publishers, 1994); idem, The Westminster Assembly, 283-288; idem, “Saving Faith and Assurance in
Reformed Theology: Zwingli to the Synod of Dort” (PhD diss., University of Aberdeen, 1979); idem, “The
Relationship Between Saving Faith and Assurance of Salvation” (ThM Thesis, Westminster Theological
Seminary, 1976).
22

“The basis form of the syllogismus (here taken from Francis Turretin) is as follows: Quisquis
vere credit et resipiscit electus sit; Atqui ego credo, etc.; Ergo electus sum: ‘Whoever truly believes and
becomes of a right spirit is elect; But in fact I believe, etc.; Therefore I am elect’ (Institutio theologiae, IV.
Xiii.4). This basis logical form, in a multitude of varieties drawn from studies of the problems and
temptations of daily life, is also found in the Puritan casuistry of ‘cases of conscience,’ all of which were
developed specifically for the sake of self-examination and personal assurance of salvation.” See Muller,
Dictionary, 293 (s.v. syllogismus practicus).
23
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and the work of the Spirit.24 Thus the believer’s real assurance is based on the object,25
but simultaneously on the subject, which is ultimately rooted in the object of faith.26
Scott Hafemann describes this duality of assurance in the context of perseverance when
he writes: “[P]erseverance is visible in a real change of life in real people in the midst of
the real world (Titus 2:14). Perseverance is not a continuing mental assent to the truth of
events in the past; it is a continuing and active obedience to God’s will as the expression
of a growing trust in his promises”27 (emphasis in the original). Genuine assurance is
revealed not only in the essence of faith, but also in the fruit of faith.28 This leads to
“once really saved, always saved, as seen precisely in what you do!”29 The core of
genuine assurance includes the idea that even the subjective “what you do” is planted in
the objective truth of the Word and divine promise of God.30
The distinctions between active and passive justification and between definitive
and progressive sanctification provide assurance of salvation. They speak of what the

24

Beeke, “The Assurance Debate,” 273-276; Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition, 258-

272.
25

Yet, this does not mean that the objective ground is not the ultimate ground of assurance. D. A.
Carson articulates: “The ultimate ground of assurance is never more than Jesus himself, Jesus and his death
and resurrection on our behalf. The ground of Christian assurance is the object of Christian faith”
(emphasis in the original). See Carl F. H. Henry et al., “What Are the Biblical and Practical Implications of
the Doctrine of Assurance?,” The Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 2 (Spring 1998): 67.
R. M. Hawkes, “The Logic of Assurance in English Puritan Theology,” Westminster
Theological Journal 52, no. 2 (1990): 247-261.
26

Carl F. H. Henry et al., “What Are the Biblical and Practical Implications of the Doctrine of
Assurance?” 69.
27

28

Louis Berkhof, The Assurance of Faith (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1939), 49-68.

Carl F. H. Henry et al., “What Are the Biblical and Practical Implications of the Doctrine of
Assurance?” 70.
29

30

Beeke, “Personal Assurance of Faith,” 20-22.
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objective ground of assurance is and also how to remain assured in real life. If assurance
is the inward evidence of the definitive working of the Holy Spirit that allows the
justified believer to know that they have been saved, progressive sanctification
continually displays the evidence of the Spirit in the justified believer’s life. What is
more, active justification (justified in foro Dei) provides assurance of the believer’s legal
status through the inner testimony of faith; this communicates to believers the objective
reality of justification. In this sense active justification offers ontological-objective
grounds for personal assurance. Still, genuine assurance is rooted in both the objective
and the subjective, i.e., the active/definitive and the passive/progressive aspects of
salvation.
With respect to the second question above, i.e., whether eternal security (the
objective basis of perseverance) is permanent or not, the doctrine of assurance is closely
related to the “perseverance of the saints.”31 The idea of eternal security also provides
the objective ground of personal assurance. Discussions on the validity of the doctrine of
perseverance have for the most part been between the Calvinist and Arminian
traditions.32 The debates come down to whether believers can fall away from salvation
once they have been regenerated, justified, and adopted by God. The classical Calvinistic
According to Grudem, the Reformed tradition prefers to use the term “perseverance of the
saints”; the baptist tradition frequently uses the term “eternal security.” See Grudem, Systematic Theology,
789. Hoekema prefers to use the expression perseverance of “true believers” because he thinks that the term
“saints” contains various meanings and is therefore ambiguous. See Hoekema, Saved by Grace, 236. In this
study, the term “perseverance of the saints” and “eternal security” are interchangeably used.
31

32

See J. Matthew Pinson, ed., Four Views on Eternal Security (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002).
This book presents a classical Calvinist view of perseverance of the saints (by Michael Horton), a moderate
Calvinist view (by Norman Geisler), a Reformed Arminian view (by Stephen Ashby), and a Wesleyan
Arminian view (by J. Steven Harper). See also Kirk R. MacGregor and Kevaughn Mattis, eds.,
Perspectives on Eternal Security: Biblical, Historical, and Philosophical Perspectives (Eugene: Wipf &
Stock, 2009).
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teaching is, “They whom God hath accepted in his Beloved, effectually called and
sanctified by his Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace;
but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved.”33 The
Remonstrants, followers of Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), answered: “True believers
can fall from true faith and can fall into such sins as cannot be consistent with true and
justifying faith; not only is it possible for this to happen, but it even happens
frequently.”34 Opinions differ sharply because certain scriptural passages appear to
support opposing sides, e.g., John 10:27-28 (the impossibility of falling way)35 and
Hebrews 6:4-6 (the possibility of falling away).36 An effective way to reconcile John
10:27-28 with Hebrews 6:4-6 without weakening the message of either is to say that there

33
WCF 17.1, see Schaff, ed., “The Westminster Confession of Faith,” 636. See also Berkhof, ST,
545-549; Hoekema, Saved by Grace, 234-256; Loraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1932), 182-201; Murray, Redemption, Accomplished and Applied, 189-198;
Bavinck, GD, 4:253-257 (§52.484); idem, RD, 4:266-270.
34
This is Anthony Hoekema’s translation of the fifth article of the Sententiae Remonstrantium,
which was delivered at the 34th session of the Synod of Dort, on December 17: “Vere fideles possunt a vera
fide excidere et in istiusmodi prolabi peccata, quae cum vera et iustificante fide consistere non possunt; nec
potest hoc tantum fieri, sed et non raro fit.” See Peter Y. De Jong, Crisis in the Reformed Churches: Essays
in Commemoration of the Great Synod of Dort, 1618-1619 (Grand Rapids: Reformed Fellowship, 1968),
228. For the full text of the Sententiae Remonstrantium, see The Synod of Dort, Acta synodi nationalis, in
nomine Domini nostri Iesu Christi...Dordrechti habitae anno M.DC.XVIII. et M.DC.XIX (Hanau, 1620),
116-119. For the Arminius’ view on perseverance and the possibility of apostasy, see Keith D. Stanglin,
Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation: The Context, Roots, and Shape of the Leiden Debate, 1603-1609
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 130-139. According to Stanglin, in contrast to the opinion that true believers could
not possibly fall away from salvation, for Arminius it is possible for believers to lose faith. Yet, Stanglin
further argues that “Arminius was less clear regarding whether apostasy actually happens.” See Stanglin,
Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation, 141.
35
“My sheep hear my voice. I know them, and they follow me. I give them eternal life, and they
will never perish [οὐ μὴ ἀπόλωνται]. No one will snatch them out of my hand.” Here John uses the double
emphatic negative form οὐ μὴ with the aorist subjunctive to express the strongest possibility of not ever
perishing. Cf. Andreas J. Köstenberger, John, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 311.
36
“For it is impossible to restore again to repentance those who have once been enlightened, and
have tasted the heavenly gift, and have shared in the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the goodness of the word
of God and the powers of the age to come, and then have fallen away, since on their own they are
crucifying again the Son of God and are holding him up to contempt.”
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is a logical possibility of falling away from salvation, but this cannot actually happen to
true believers because the grace of God prevents them from falling away.37 This is the
precondition that allows believers to persevere, i.e., they must be true and genuine
believers beforehand.38 This is not fully achieved by human ability or effort per se.
Rather, as the Canons of Dort clearly state (fifth head, art. 8), “It is not in consequence of
their own merits or strength, but of God’s free mercy, that they do not totally fall from
faith and grace, nor continue and perish finally in their backslidings.”39 Thus, the very
nature of perseverance is to believe in the greatness of God’s grace and its powerful
efficacy throughout the life of the “true” believer.
Many critics of the doctrine of perseverance believe that the principle of “once
saved always saved” could lead to moral self-indulgence and may promote a gospel of
“laissez-faire.”40 Their objection is valid only if the doctrine is understood in the
antinomian sense where the necessity of progressive sanctification is neglected in favor
of the erroneous principle of “once justified, God does not see sin anymore.” However,
the critics are mistaken if it is acknowledged that true believers who, having tasted the
joy of the perseverance of the saints, perpetually struggle with sin throughout their entire

Erickson, Christian Theology, 1005. Erickson further articulates: “Although they [true
believers] could abandon their faith and consequently come to the fate described in Hebrews 6, the grace of
God prevents them from apostasizing. God does this, not by making it impossble for believers to fall away,
but by making it certain that they will not. Our emphasis on can and will not is not inconsequential. It
preserves the freedom of the individual. Believers are capable of repudiating their faith, but will freely
choose not to” (emphasis in the original). See Erickson, Christian Theology, 1005.
37

38

Hoekema, Saved by Grace, 235.

39

Schaff, ed., “The Canons of the Synod of Dort,” 594.

40

See, e.g., Robert Shank, Life in the Son: A Study of the Doctrine of Perseverance (Springfield:
Westcott Publishers, 1960), 64.
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life while embracing the guidance of the Spirit.41 By definition active justification and
definitive sanctification mean that true believers have met the necessary precondition for
the perseverance of the saints; they are therefore inseparable from God’s grace. Thus
through their objective dimensions active justification and definitive sanctification
uphold the lifelong assurance of believers in their perseverance to glory.

8.2.2. Overcoming Spiritual Triumphalism and Defeatism
An erroneous view of justification and sanctification can lead to two additional practical
problems. On one hand, spiritual triumphalism occurs when believers are convinced that
God’s free grace alone justifies and sanctifies them, forgetting what people who have
truly received that free grace still must do. Triumphalism is “defeated” when God brings
to mind the dimensions of progressive sanctification and passive justification, thus
allowing the believer to fully participate in the new life in Christ.
On the other hand, spiritual defeatism occurs when believers become frustrated
due to the power of sin in their lives to the point that they forget who they really are and
to whom they ultimately belong, i.e., the decisive and definitive justification and
sanctification they have already received. While triumphalism is rooted in an antinomian
view of justification as evidenced by spiritual arrogance, defeatism grows from an
overdeveloped sense of guilt and compunction that forgets the believer’s once-for-all
justified identity. Defeatism is “defeated” when God brings to mind the paramount place
of active justification and definitive sanctification that occurs through the believer’s

41

Murray, Redemption, Accomplished and Applied, 192.
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union with Christ. This proclaims the certainty of the divine promise, i.e., the identity
(holiness) and legal status (righteousness) of the true believer.
The Christ-centeredness of these ideas plays a decisive role in conquering both
triumphalism and defeatism, inasmuch as believers are able to win the battle only when
they lean entirely on Christ and His satisfactory work of atonement, not on their own
effort or merit. There is no room left in the heart of the true believer for triumphalism or
defeatism since Christ occupies that space.
Active justification and definitive sanctification also have practical ecclesiastical
significance. Believers who are actively involved in church or other supposed spiritual
activities may fall into a baseless triumphalism, but other believers may suffer defeatism
due to hidden sin. The concepts of active/passive justification and definitive/progressive
sanctification can be a steadying influence keeping them from falling into these
debilitating spiritual states, reminding them of who they really are and what they can and
should do in faith.
Spiritual defeatism is overcome when the believer is focused on the importance
of active justification and definitive sanctification, and spiritual triumphalism is undone
when the believer is reminded of the necessity of passive justification and progressive
sanctification. These are valuable pastoral tools to aid church members who fall into
either triumphalism or defeatism.

8.3. Summary
Active justification and definitive sanctification have theological and practical
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significance in four areas. These concepts are theologically meaningful in that their
inseparability and causal relationship provide the balance between God’s sovereignty and
human responsibility, and their objective dimensions reinforce God’s absolute
sovereignty, refuting the idea that works might be the basis of justification in the final
judgment. They are of practical benefit in that they provide assurance to the saints of their
perseverance and provide pastors with the tools to reassure true believers who are
uncertain of their salvation, and to exhort parishioners against spiritual arrogance.

CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

This study has been written in response to criticisms of the concepts of active justification
and definitive sanctification. These objections fall into three categories: biblical,
theological, and practical.
The first criticism claims that the concepts of active justification and definitive
sanctification are biblically unsupported. Section 2.3.1 of this study shows that the
meaning of Romans 6:2-14, specifically, “dead to sin” (v. 2), “old self was crucified” (v.
6), and “For whoever has died is freed from sin” (v. 7a), and 1 Corinthians 1:2
ἡγιασμένοις (“to those who are sanctified”), and 1 Corinthians 6:11 ἡγιάσθητε (“you
were sanctified”), directly support the idea of definitive sanctification. This concept
defines believers’ identity (who they really are) and lordship (whom they fundamentally
belong to) in a way that matches the biblical texts. Section 3.2 of the study defines active
justification as God’s divine commitment and promise to justify sinners on the basis of
Christ’s righteousness just as Genesis 3:15 maintains.
The second criticism claims that the terms active justification and definitive
sanctification cause theological confusion. This study argues that when these ideas are
properly defined and presented they provide theological clarity, not confusion. This is
demonstrated through four characteristics shared by active justification and definitive
sanctification.
First, as examined in Herman Bavinck (chapter 4), the inseparability of active
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and passive justification and of definitive and progressive sanctification answers the
objection that active justification contradicts justification sola fide, as well as the concern
that definitive sanctification might neglect the importance of progressive sanctification.
According to Bavinck, the believer’s “actual” justification is not terminated and realized
in the realm of active justification in foro Dei, but in passive justification sola fide in foro
conscientiae which rests on the objective ground of active justification. Active
justification does not contradict but rather provides the object of what is believed in
justification sola fide. In addition, Bavinck maintains that progressive sanctification rests
on the objective ground of definitive sanctification (evangelische heiligmaking—
“evangelical sanctification”) signifying that believers truly are saints in Christ. In this
regard, definitive sanctification does not minimize progressive sanctification but rather
provides the objective foundation for it by informing believers of their identity, namely,
who they really are in Christ. Thus active justification is distinct but inseparable from
passive justification, and definitive sanctification is distinct but inseparable from
progressive sanctification.
Second, Alexander Comrie (chapter 5) reveals the decisive and objective nature
of active justification and definitive sanctification. Active justification is often
misunderstood as identical to eternal justification, or regarded as the theological
foundation for antinomianism which neglects the aspects of passive justification and
progressive sanctification. This error is found in the hyper-Calvinism espoused by John
Brine (Section 3.4.3) and also in the English antinomianism held by John Eaton (Section
3.4.2). However, Comrie correctly maintains that the concepts of active justification and
eternal justification are not identical, for eternal justification would be viable only if the
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distinction between active and passive justification is a temporal rather than logical order.
Moreover, when the decisive and objective reality of salvation is presented in “causal”
language, namely, objective reality as the primary and efficient cause of subjective
reality, the antinomian error which pays attention exclusively to objective reality while
ignoring subjective reality is made null and void.
Third, Herman Witsius (chapter 6) highlights the Christ-centered nature of active
justification and definitive sanctification, which is tightly bound to the believer’s union
with Christ and His meritorious work. The critics assert that definitive sanctification
produces confusion because there is no conceptual difference between forensic and
definitive sanctification. They also cling to the idea that definitive and progressive
sanctification merely serve to create two distinct moments in the ordo salutis. These
objections are erased when definitive sanctification is correctly defined as the “condition”
or “state” of sharing in and conforming to Christ’s perfect holiness in union with Him
rather than as a part of a certain “order” or “sequence” in the ordo salutis (esp., chapter
2).
Fourth, in Abraham Kuyper (chapter 7), we see the understanding that God’s
sovereignty in salvation is absolute. In his soteriology Kuyper dedicated himself to
separate God’s complete salvific authority from the zeitgeist, which was deeply
embedded in modern principles. Kuyper employed several distinctions to buttress the
ideas of definitive sanctification and active justification, i.e., “perfect in parts”
(volkomenheid in deelen) and “imperfect in degrees” (onvolkomenheid in trappen) or his
fivefold and ninefold aspects of justification. His emphasis on God’s redemptive
sovereignty is the core idea that infuses all four characteristics—i.e., inseparability,
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objectivity or decisiveness, Christ-centeredness, and God’s absolute sovereignty, for all
are fundamentally designed to express a God-driven justification and sanctification.
The third criticism of active justification and definitive sanctification is that they
do not provide any practical benefit for believers. This study shows that these ideas are
practically and pastorally helpful to the believer and pastor (chapter 8). The distinctions,
causal relationships, and objective/subjective dimensions of active and passive
justification and definitive and progressive sanctification provide a practical theological
perspective for the believer to clearly comprehend the balance between God’s
sovereignty and human responsibility. That understanding provides not only a solid
foundation for the believer’s assurance of perseverance, but also the motivation for
withstanding spiritual triumphalism or defeatism.
Thus this study concludes that the concepts of active justification and definitive
sanctification are biblically warranted, theologically meaningful, and practically relevant,
resonating with the indisputable truth that ours is a truly God-driven salvation. Soli Deo
gloria!

THESES FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE
Theses Pertaining to the Ph.D. Dissertation

1. No one other than God Himself justifies and sanctifies!
2. Active justification and definitive sanctification affirm a uniquely and absolutely Goddriven salvation.
3. Active justification and definitive sanctification are biblically supported.
4. Active justification and definitive sanctification bring theological clarity, not confusion,
when properly understood and applied.
5. Active justification and definitive sanctification are of practical and pastoral benefit to the
believer.
6. Active justification and definitive sanctification affirm that the believer’s justification and
sanctification rest on an objective and decisive foundation that is inseparable from
passive justification and progressive sanctification respectively.
7. Active justification and definitive sanctification are the objects of faith, revealing both
the ability and the need for human responsibility and activity in salvation.
8. Active justification and definitive sanctification rely entirely on Christ’s perfect
righteousness and holiness and are governed entirely by God’s sovereignty.

Theses Pertaining to the Ph.D. Coursework
9. The fundamental roots of the Donatists and Augustine’s treatment of them are not
primarily doctrinal; they are actually a study in Christian discipline and practice,
particularly Christian love.
10. Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) was an English Puritan whose understanding of God is
considered by earlier scholars to be too abstract and rationalistic. However, a review of
Charnock’s Christology, epistemology, and theology in A Discourse of the Knowledge of
God in Christ shows that such criticism is unjustified.
11. Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) affirms the objective aspect of atonement in his concept
of “satisfaction and penal substitution” and the subjective aspect of atonement in his
concept of unio cum Christo, thus maintaining a proper balance in his theology between
objective and subjective atonement.
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12. J. Denny Weaver’s criticism of satisfaction atonement and Joanne Carlson Brown’s
“Divine Child Abuse” perspective on atonement are both unsound interpretations.
13. Schleiermacher’s soteriology is based on two philosophical strands, i.e., dialectic
Neoplatonism and Romanticism. Here Christ’s redemption is seen not just as His act of
liberation from sin, but also as the fulfillment of the coincidentia oppositorum (the
coincidence of opposites) between the finite (individual) and the Infinite (whole) in the
dynamic dialectical interrelationship between them.
14. Schleiermacher and Barth’s differences are best understood in the context of a
philosophical vs. unphilosophical soteriology.
15. Theophilus Gale’s (1628-1678) proposal regarding “creation” and “providence” holds
theology and biblical truth above Platonic philosophy while still attempting to harmonize
Calvinism with Platonism, thus reflecting a philosophy of Reformed and Calvinistic
Platonism.
16. Herman Bavinck’s (1854-1921) theme of “participation in creation” resurrects the
traditional perspective on war in a uniquely practical way so as to reconcile it with his
neo-Calvinistic background.
17. John Plaifere’s (d.1632) doctrine of predestination in Appello Evangelium (1651) is
actually a type of conditional predestination since it fully embraces two important
Arminian principles: scientia media and resistible grace.

Miscellaneous Theses
18. Producing this dissertation has required painstaking effort (with emphasis on the “pain”),
but it is also the most rewarding and blessed work the author has ever done.
19. A mother’s prayer is spiritual joy, a wife’s perseverance is palpable joy, and a daughter’s
presence is emotional joy. They are all gifts from God.
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